In Kluge v. Brownsburg Community School Corp., (7th Cir., April 7, 2023), the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision upheld a school's dismissal of a teacher who refused on religious grounds to comply with the school policy of calling transgender students by their names registered in the school's official database. In a 79-page majority opinion rejecting the teacher's Title VII claims, the court said in part:
After Brownsburg initially accommodated Kluge’s request to call all students by their last names only, the school withdrew the accommodation when it became apparent that the practice was harming students and negatively impacting the learning environment for transgender students, other students both in Kluge’s classes and in the school generally, as well as the faculty. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the school after concluding that the undisputed evidence showed that the school was unable to accommodate Kluge’s religious beliefs and practices without imposing an undue hardship on the school’s conduct of its business of educating all students that entered its doors. The district court also granted summary judgment in favor of Brownsburg on Kluge’s retaliation claim. We agree that the undisputed evidence demonstrates that Kluge’s accommodation harmed students and disrupted the learning environment. Because no reasonable jury could conclude that harm to students and disruption to the learning environment are de minimis harms to a school’s conduct of its business, we affirm.
Judge Brennan dissented as to the reasonable accommodation claim. In a 54-page dissent, he said in part:
Kluge’s religious accommodation claim comes down to a fact-intensive inquiry: Did the School District demonstrate that Kluge’s gender-neutral accommodation of calling all students by only their last names causes undue hardship—that is, more than a de minimis cost? The majority opinion says “yes,” but it sidesteps Kluge’s countervailing evidence, fails to construe the record in his favor, and overlooks credibility issues on both sides, which are reserved for resolution by the factfinder.
... [W]ithout supporting authority, my colleagues hold that the undue hardship inquiry looks only to evidence within the employer’s knowledge at the time of the adverse employment decision.... Considering the entire record, there is a genuine issue of material fact on undue hardship, which we should remand for trial.
Reuters reports on the decision.
