In Polk v. Montgomery County Public Schools, (4th Cir., Jan. 28, 2026), the U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 decision, affirmed a Maryland federal district court's denial of a preliminary injunction sought by a substitute teacher who objected on free speech and free exercise grounds to the school district's Guidelines for Student Gender Identity. The court rejected plaintiff's free exercise claim, concluding that the Guidelines are neutral and generally applicable and that they satisfy the rational basis standard. The majority said in part:
... Polk believes that gender is rigid, based on her understanding of Christianity. And referring to her students by a gender that is not consistent with the student’s gender assigned at birth places a requirement on Polk, that she says is at odds with her faith....
Distilled to its core, the thrust of Polk’s appellate position is that, because persons who hold religious views are those most impacted by the Guidelines, they cannot be deemed “neutral.” But that logic turns the well-established neutrality analysis on its head. As the court explained, the Complaint “alleges no facts from which the Court could infer religious animus.” ... That a certain religious practice is incidentally burdened by the Guidelines is not sufficient. Rather, the Guidelines must be motivated by religious hostility....
The majority also rejected plaintiff's free speech claim, saying in part:
... [W]e agree with the district court that the Guidelines’s mandate does not concern the speech of a private citizen, but establishes the official duties of a public-school teacher. More pointedly, how a teacher addresses a particular student in a particular classroom — and whether a teacher communicates with a student’s parent — is merely a part of that teacher’s job description....
... And “[w]hen an employee engages in speech that is part of the employee’s job duties, the employee’s words are really the words of the employer. The employee is effectively the employer’s spokesperson.” ...
Judge Wilkinson dissented, contending that the Guidelines violated plaintiff's free speech rights. He said in part:
In holding instead that the Free Speech Clause does not provide even qualified protection to Ms. Polk’s speech, the majority leaves teachers completely vulnerable to becoming the unwilling mouthpieces of government messaging. Although transgender rights advocates may now cheer the majority opinion, they will find today’s cure in truth a poison when states enact legally indistinguishable policies preventing teachers from using preferred pronouns in schools. And because nothing prevents school systems from pushing this newfound control much further than mere pronoun usage, I respectfully dissent....
This case is, without question, about compelled speech—a detail to which the majority gives short shrift....
... My qualm with the majority is simply that we cannot categorically write all in-class speech out of the First Amendment. Garcetti has its place, but chiefly with regard to core curricular functions. Speech at the noncurricular margins of a teacher’s job should remain subject to the same standards that we have always applied. This is no jurisprudential revolution....
Ms. Polk’s case is one of many plaguing our nation’s educational system. Across all levels of education—elementary to college—LGBT rights, DEI, antisemitism, systemic racism, and innumerable other issues have made our schools hotbeds of vehement sociopolitical debate. Silencing voices and compelling affirmations to government preferred messaging do nothing to temper the vitriol; on the contrary, such actions foster further hostility....
