Religious Discrimination Claims Against Child Protective Services Meet Procedural Hurdles

In Gautreaux v. Masters, (WD TX, Aug. 29, 2022), a Texas federal magistrate judge recommended that the court dismiss some or all of the free exercise and due process claims brought by foster parents who were accused by the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) of child abuse. The opinion describes plaintiffs' allegations:

[DFPS] asked the couple to identify their religion during the application process, and they identified themselves as practicing members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saints.... Gautreaux alleges that DFPS demonstrated "hostility toward the Gautreauxes' religion" at their initial interview, while their follow-up interview "exclusively concerned the Gautreauxes' religious practices and beliefs."...

... DFPS informed Gautreaux that the department had found there was "reason to believe" she had committed the alleged abuse, resulting in Gautreaux being placed on the DFPS central registry "as a child abuser." ... Gautreaux alleges that DFPS's decision was motivated by religious "animus" and that there was no evidence of abuse to support the finding....

Gautreaux alleges that she is unable to practice her religion as a result of her placement on the DFPS central registry. Specifically, Gautreaux alleges that she cannot participate in her "calling" - an assignment made by Church leaders - which is to "teach singing to children in her local church."

In a lengthy opinion, the Magistrate Judge recommended either that all the claims be dismissed under the Younger abstention doctrine, or alternatively that most of plaintiffs' free exercise claims be dismissed because of 11th Amendment sovereign immunity. Under the alternative recommendation, the court could move ahead on  claims challenging DFPS's policies of considering religious beliefs and practices as a concern in abuse investigations and its disregarding of inconsistent court rulings.

Christian Healthcare Organization Sues Over Michigan Non-Discrimination Law

Suit was filed yesterday in a Michigan federal district court by a faith-based healthcare organization contending that Michigan's employment discrimination law violates its free exercise, free speech and due process rights. The 73-page complaint (full text) in Christian Healthcare Centers, Inc. v. Nessel, (WD MI, filed 8/29/2022), contends in part:

Under the guise of stopping discrimination, the law discriminates against religious organizations, requiring them to forfeit their religious character and hire people who do not share their faith. That same law also forces Christian Healthcare to prescribe cross-sex hormones and refer to patients in communications and medical records according to their stated gender identity, rather than their biological sex. All of this violates Christian Healthcare’s religious convictions. In effect, the law requires Christian Healthcare to check its religious faith at the clinic door—the very faith that motivates the clinic to open its doors to help those in need....

290. Michigan’s laws do not contain a religious exemption for religious entities like Christian Healthcare.

291. Michigan’s Employment Clause allows employers to apply to the Commission for an exemption on the basis that religion is a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the business or enterprise. MCL 37.2208; MDCR Rule 37.25(1)....

297. Because Christian Healthcare requires all employees to affirm and live in accordance with its Religious Statements, which prohibit same-sex relationships and expressing a transgender identity, it would need a BFOQ exemption from discrimination on the basis sexual orientation, gender identity, and religion for every one of its employees.

ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Iowa Supreme Court Overrules 2018 Decision That State Constitution Strongly Protects Abortion Rights

In a complicated set of opinions that span 182 pages, the Iowa Supreme Court overruled their own 2018 decision (referred to in the opinion as "PPH II") and held by a vote of 5-2 that neither the due process nor the equal protection clause of Iowa's constitution grants a fundamental right to an abortion. It thus rejected subjecting abortion regulation-- here a new 24-hour waiting period-- to strict scrutiny under the state Constitution. However the court did not decide what level of scrutiny should apply.  This left the standard to be the undue burden test imposed by federal law. In Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc. v. Reynolds, (IA Sup. Ct., June 17, 2022), Justice Mansfield's majority opinion said in part:

[Law] professors [in an amicus brief] urge that adhering to a precedent when the membership of a court changes “refutes the cynical view that a supreme court is a political institution guided by the justices’ personal values, rather than the law.” But we know that the professors do not share that cynical view, so why do they ask us to act in fear of it? Shouldn’t we instead follow our solemn oaths to uphold the Iowa laws and constitution? In the end, court decisions should be—and we believe are—judged by the strength of their reasoning, not by the identity of the persons who wrote or joined them....

Constitutions—and courts—should not be picking sides in divisive social and political debates unless some universal principle of justice stands on only one side of that debate. Abortion isn’t one of those issues....

In summary, PPH II lacks textual and historical support. It is doctrinally inconsistent with prior Iowa jurisprudence concerning family rights that followed a balancing approach. Its rhetoric is one-sided. Its constitutional footing is unsound. While it is true that some other states have provided heightened protection for abortion rights, they have done so by invoking more relevant substantive constitutional guarantees—such as the right of privacy—not a procedural clause like due process.....

While 5 Justices concurred in that conclusion, 2 of those Justices in an opinion by Justice McDermott disagreed with the instructions on remand given in Justice Mansfield's opinion, saying in part:

I join almost all parts of the court’s opinion, including...  its overruling of ... PPH II.... But I dissent from my colleagues’ remand directing the district court to apply an “undue burden” standard, subject (apparently) to the standard being “litigated further” by the parties. In my view, we should emphatically reject—not recycle—Casey’s moribund undue burden test and instead direct the district court to apply the rational basis test to the plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge.

Chief Justice Christensen filed an opinion dissenting in part, saying: 

Out of respect for stare decisis, I cannot join the majority’s decision to overrule ... PPH II ... because I do not believe any special justification “over and above the [majority’s] belief ‘that the precedent was wrongly decided’ ” warrants such a swift departure from the court’s 2018 decision....

Since 2018, the makeup of our court has significantly changed with the appointment of four new justices to replace outgoing justices. Coincidentally, all four outgoing justices were part of the 5–2 majority that recognized a fundamental right to decide whether to continue or terminate a pregnancy in the 2018 case.

Justice Appel, who is the only Justice on the court who was part of the majority in 2018, filed an 88-page dissent, concluding in part:

The majority has chosen to simply rule that strict scrutiny is not the applicable test of a statute regulating abortion ... and has remanded the case to the district court for further consideration of other issues. The problem with this approach is twofold. First, the majority opinion grossly understates the importance of this life-changing abortion decision on women. Second, the majority opinion eliminates a strong, workable, and widely accepted barrier to governmental intrusion into the reproductive choices of a woman and invites us to stare into the standard-less abyss....

I have some thoughts to seek to salvage what can be salvaged from the decision. First, the district court must recognize the rights primacy of the Iowa Constitution and reject summarily a rational basis test, which is too often no test at all. Second, if a version of the undue burden test is to be adopted, it must be with teeth.

Des Moines Register reports on the decision. [Thanks to Scott Mange for the lead.]

11th Circuit: Jail's Procedure For Passover Participation Is Upheld

In Dorman v. Chaplain's Office BSO, (11th Cir., June 10, 2022), the U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the procedures used by the Broward County, Florida jail that required inmates to register 45 days in advance in order to participate in Passover services and meals.  The court said in part:

First, the 45-day registration requirement did not constitute a substantial burden on Mr. Dorman’s exercise of his Jewish faith under the RLUIPA, and therefore it also did not violate the First Amendment’s more lenient reasonableness standard. Second, the electronic posting of the 45-day registration requirement on the Jail’s computer kiosk, which he and other inmates used to communicate with Jail staff, provided adequate notice of the registration requirement to satisfy due process.