Kapparot Protesters Lose Suit Against City

In Karlan v. City of Los Angeles, (CA App., Nov. 27, 2023), a California state appellate court affirmed the dismissal of a lawsuit brought by protesters who objected to an Orthodox synagogue's pre-Yom Kippur kapparot ritual in which chickens are killed and their carcasses are discarded.  According to the court:

The complaint alleged the City abused its discretion and endorsed the exercise of religion by refusing to enforce Penal Code section 597, which prohibits the intentional and malicious killing of animals, against Kapparot practitioners. The complaint also alleged violations of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Acts ... and the Ralph Civil Rights Act of 1976... against Captain Vernon for his threats to arrest appellants if they used a projector or amplified sound during their protest....

The order appellants seek in this case—“to compel [the City] ‘to make enforcement decisions without regard to religion’”—would control the manner in which the City exercises its discretion to enforce criminal laws. This type of order is barred under the rule codified in Civil Code section 3369....

Appellants here fail to demonstrate how the City acted unreasonably and arbitrarily. Appellants admit their purpose in filing this action was to obtain a ruling as to whether “religious motivation [can lawfully] create[ ] an exemption from prosecution” under Penal Code section 597. Appellants’ pursuit of a definitive ruling means the issue remained unsettled at the time the City made its choice not to enforce the law....

... Appellants identify no allegation in which Captain Vernon threatened them with violence beyond his threats of arrest. Without more, appellants have failed to plead sufficient facts to establish violations under the Bane and Ralph Act....

Appellants finally contend ... violation of the Establishment Clause..... Raised for the first time on appeal, appellants contend they have taxpayer standing to assert this claim. Appellants’ failure to present this theory in the trial court and adequately brief the issue on appeal has forfeited the argument....

Inclusion of "Caste" In Antidiscrimination Policy Does Not Violate Establishment Clause

In Kumar v. Koester, (CD CA, Nov. 21, 2023, a California federal district court rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to the inclusion of "caste" in California State University's Discrimination, Harassment and Retaliation Policy. The Policy includes in its anti-discrimination ban a prohibition on discrimination based on "Race or Ethnicity (including color, caste, or ancestry)". Plaintiffs-- two Hindu professors-- contend that the Policy defines Hinduism as including a caste system and amounts to government disapproval of Hinduism.  In rejecting these contentions, the court said in part:

Plaintiffs argue that the CFA [California Faculty Association] and CSSA [California State Student Association] Resolutions demonstrate anti-Hindu sentiments. And because Defendant considered its stakeholders' input when amending the Policy, Defendant, in turn, expressed disapproval of Hinduism when it included the word "caste" in the Policy.

Plaintiffs' argument fails for two reasons. First, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that CFA or CSSA speak for Defendant.... Plaintiffs do not offer any evidence that the Workgroup inappropriately considered the two Resolutions amongst the large amount of feedback it received from a wide array of CSU stakeholders....

Second, Plaintiffs' argument fails because the resolutions do not express anti-Hindu sentiments. To be sine, the Resolutions clearly denounce caste discrimination that occurs in South Asian societies and CFA's resolution explicitly references the presence of caste discrimination in "the Hindu religion."... But CFA's resolution does not link caste discrimination to Hinduism exclusively.... [Its] description of "caste" recognizes caste discrimination as a social ill that permeates South Asian culture and society....

Just as Plaintiffs fail to show that the Policy disapproves of Hinduism, they also fail to demonstrate that the Policy defines Hindu doctrines.

The court also dismissed plaintiffs' due process challenges for lack of standing. 

West Virginia School Settles Suit Over Religious Activities

The Freedom From Religion Foundation announced yesterday the settlement of a suit against a West Virginia school, its principal and a substitute teacher for scheduling and hosting an evangelical Christian revival as an assembly in the school auditorium during homeroom period in violation of the Establishment Clause.  Yesterday the parties jointly dismissed Mays v. Cabell County Board of Education, (SD WV, dismissed 10/26/2023).. According to FFRF:

As part of a settlement, the board agreed to amend its policies relating to religion in schools. The board voted on Oct. 17 to adopt the policy revisions. Significantly, those changes require annual training of teachers about religion in school. School administrators also are tasked with greater monitoring of school events. Finally, the policy provides greater detail to ensure that employees do not initiate or lead students in religious activities. [Full text of amended policy.]

The settlement also includes nominal damages and attorneys' fees of $175,000 paid by the school board's insurers. (See prior related posting.)

Oklahoma AG Sues State's Charter School Board Over Its Approval of Religious Charter School

Last week Oklahoma's Attorney General filed suit against the Oklahoma Statewide Virtual Charter School Board challenging its approval of the Catholic Archdiocese's application for a state-funded online religious charter school. (See prior related posting.) The ACLU and Americans United had previously filed suit in a state trial court challenging the Board's action. The Attorney General's action was filed directly with the Oklahoma Supreme Court. As reported by PBS News, the AG's action came after 3 members of the Board signed a contract this week for the school. In Drummond v. Oklahoma Statewide Virtual Charter School Board, (OK Sup. Ct., filed 10/20/2023), the Attorney General filed an Application to Assume Original Jurisdiction and Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Declaratory Judgment, as well as a Brief in Support (full text) of its motions. The brief reads in part:

Make no mistake, if the Catholic Church were permitted to have a public virtual charter school, a reckoning will follow in which this State will be faced with the unprecedented quandary of processing requests to directly fund all petitioning sectarian groups....  For example, this reckoning will require the State to permit extreme sects of the Muslim faith to establish a taxpayer funded public charter school teaching Sharia Law. Consequently, absent the intervention of this Court, the Board members’ shortsighted votes in violation of their oath of office and the law will pave the way for a proliferation of the direct public funding of religious schools whose tenets are diametrically opposed by most Oklahomans.

As to the merits, this case is simple: Oklahoma’s Constitution disallows sectarian control of its public schools and the support of sectarian practices—indirect or otherwise....

The brief also asserted that the Board's action violates the 1st Amendment's Establishment Clause. The Oklahoma Attorney General issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

School Material on Islam Did Not Violate Current Establishment Clause Test

As previously reported, in November 2020 in Hilsenrath v. School District of the Chathams, a New Jersey federal district court held that the 7th grade World Cultures and Geography course presentation of material about Islam did not violate the Establishment Clause. Subsequently the U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals (2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 20588 (July 20, 2022)) remanded the case to the district court for further consideration in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Kennedy v. Bremerton School District. Now in Hilsenrath v. School District of the Chathams, (D NJ, Oct. 16, 2023), the district court reaffirmed its former conclusion, saying in part:

In sum, the curriculum and materials here were not coercive and do not otherwise bear or resemble the “hallmarks of religious establishments the framers sought to prohibit when they adopted the First Amendment.” Accordingly, the Board did not violate the Establishment Clause. I will enter summary judgment in the Board’s favor on Hilsenrath’s remaining nominal-damages claim.

Reservist Challenges Military's Admonition of Him for His Remarks at Retirement Ceremony

Suit was filed this week in a Texas federal district court by Jace Yarbrough, a Major in the Air Force Reserve, challenging a Letter of Admonition issued to him by the military for the content of remarks he made while speaking, in uniform, at a retirement ceremony for Senior Master Sergeant Duane Fish, an Air Force flight superintendent with whom he worked closely and with whom he shared religious beliefs and values.  The complaint (full text) in Yarbrough v. United States Space Force, (ED TX, filed 10/3/2023), asserts that Yarbrough's Christian faith is central to his worldview, conduct and speech. The complaint describes the remarks at issue as encouraging people to practice the courage and virtue exemplified by SMSgt Fist.  It goes on:

92. In keeping with that theme, [Yarbrough] expressed his personal concerns about the negative impact of politicization within the military.... He worried that “radical” factions in “our wider culture” have “brought the culture war inside the DoD,” and that politicization of the military would be “a death knell for courage and competence.” 

93. To support his views, he drew on the teachings and thought of Eastern Orthodox Christian and writer Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn ... regarding the corrosive cultural consequences of dishonesty and self-deception.... 

94. Mr. Yarbrough gave two examples of objective realities he believes are known intuitively to all persons as persons: 1) “men can’t birth babies” and 2) “boys should not be allowed in girls’ locker rooms.” 

95. He expressed his faith-based belief that forcing people to deny such self-evident beliefs “requires constant . . . self-deception,” which can “habituate [us] to dishonesty” and cause us to lose our “grip on objective reality,” making us “less capable and less effective in our world.... 

96. As part of his warning against politicization, he referenced “recent DoD-wide extremism training” that he had attended, in which he “was relieved to see that [his] teammates recognized that training for what it was, a thinly veiled flex of political power.”...

The suit alleges that the Letter of Admonition, among other things, violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, as well the Free Exercise, Free Speech and Establishment Clauses.

First Liberty Institute issued a press release, including a link to the full text of plaintiff's remarks at the retirement ceremony.

Faith-Based Foster Care Agency May Limit Clients to Those with Compatible Religious Beliefs

 In two decisions issued last week, a South Carolina federal district court rejected Establishment Clause challenges to waivers from federal anti-discrimination requirements granted faith-based child placement agencies.  In Rogers v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, (D SC, Sept. 29, 2023), plaintiff challenged an Executive Order issued by the governor of South Carolina allowing licensing of religious child placement agencies that worked only with clients who shared their religious beliefs. At issue in the case was the rejection by Miracle Hill Ministries of a foster-parent application submitted by a same-sex couple who belonged to the local Unitarian-Universalist Church. The court rejected plaintiffs' Equal Protection claim because plaintiffs had not identified any state action involved.  It rejected their Establishment Clause claim, saying in part:

Plaintiffs’ legal premise is based on the now abandoned framework of the “Lemon Test” by focusing their argument on the third factor in Lemon regarding an “excessive government entanglement with religion.” ... Instead, based on historical practices and understandings which Kennedy requires, Establishment Clause protections are more likely triggered “when the government use[s] the established church to carry out certain civil functions, often by giving ‘the established church a monopoly over a specific function.’” ...

Plaintiffs identify but misstate three “hallmarks” of “founding-era religious establishments” that “reflect[] ‘forms of coerc[ion]’ regarding ‘religion or its exercise.’”... Stated in full, they are: 1) “the government punished dissenting churches and individuals for their religious exercise,” 2) “the government provided financial support for the established church, often in a way that preferred the established denomination over other churches,” and 3) “the government used the established church to carry out certain civil functions, often by giving the established church a monopoly over a specific function[.]” ...

Plaintiffs fail to meet their burden to show that these “hallmarks” exist here...

In Madonna v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, (D SC, Sept. 29, 2023), plaintiff was rejected by Miracle Hill because she did not share its evangelical-Christian beliefs and could not affirm its statement of faith. Rejecting plaintiff's Establishment Clause claims, the court said in part:

Defendants did not compel Maddonna to sign Miracle Hill’s statement or leave her without an adequate alternative to signing it. To the contrary, Maddonna could foster the same children at any of twenty-six other private agencies in the State... or with the State itself....  Accordingly, Maddonna has not shown “a historically disfavored establishmentarian practice” based on a claim of “subtle and indirect pressure.”...

Maddonna’s attempt to implicate an impermissible religious accommodation is foreclosed by Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, an analogous case in which the Supreme Court found the denial of a similar religious accommodation for foster care agencies burdened the Free Exercise Clause.

Becket issued a press release announcing the decisions.

Expanded Protection of Utah Lands Did Not Violate Establishment Clause

In Huck v. United States, (D UT, Sept. 21, 2023), a Utah federal district court rejected Establishment Clause, equal protection, due process and other challenges to Congress' 2019 designation of certain public lands in Utah as wilderness areas. The designation resulted in the lands being subject to more stringent use restrictions, including a ban on motor vehicles. Plaintiffs alleged that the designation was done to support Earth-religions and their beliefs regarding the ‘sacredness’ of public lands, in violation of the Establishment Clause. The court said in part:

 Given the recency of the Kennedy v. Bremerton School District decision, there is limited case law interpreting and applying the Supreme Court’s new [Establishment Clause] standard....

Recognizing these are relatively unchartered waters, the court considers Plaintiffs’ challenge with an eye toward the historical practice and understanding of the Establishment Clause and federal public lands management. While the concept of designated wilderness areas and motor vehicles might have seemed outlandish to the Founding Fathers, there is substantial legal authority supporting the federal government’s historically broad authority to designate public lands and restrict the public’s access to them. These actions, without more, do not raise the specter of government coercion of religious practices or observances....

Similarly, Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged BLM’s motor vehicle restrictions violate “governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion.”

The court also rejected plaintiffs' equal protection claim, saying in part:

Though Plaintiffs speculate that “[t]he BLM (as well as other . . . agencies) [conspired] with Earth-religionists [to] . . . deprive the aged, disabled or handicapped . . . from being able to access and travel upon many of the public lands,” these conclusory allegations—or speculations—fall short of satisfying Plaintiffs’ burden of alleging that the challenged actions were driven by discriminatory intent. On the contrary, Plaintiffs stress that the Dingell Act and motor vehicle restrictions were the result of the Earth-religionists’ efforts to “preserve and protect ‘Gaia’ or ‘Mother Earth,’” rather than an attempt to hinder the elderly or disabled.

Suit Says High Schoolers Deceived Into Attending Christian Religious Event

Suit was filed this week in a Louisiana federal district court by two plaintiffs suing on behalf of themselves and their high-school age daughters alleging that the Baton Rouge school board and its superintendent, along with a Christian youth organization, in 2022 created a religious "Day of Hope" event that was falsely promoted to public school students and their parents as a college and career fair. The complaint (full text) in Roe v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, (MD LA, filed 9/19/2023), alleges in part:

When students, parents, and other volunteers arrived for the “Day of Hope” event ..., it very quickly became evident to them that the event was nothing like what had been advertised. The event immediately took the form of a Christian church service, with speakers and presenters praying and making repeated, overt appeals to Jesus and God.....

Later that morning, students were segregated by gender....  [P]resenters and facilitators of the event acted with hostility toward transgender and gender non-binary students, ... forcing them into either the male or female segregated gender group based on their outward appearance and without their consent....

While the boys competed in physical activity contests for prize money, girls were graphically lectured by pastors and other religious figures about virginity, rape, abuse, and suicide and were even told to “forgive” their rapists and abusers....

Intimidation and harassment of LGBTQ+ students at this church event were likewise rampant....

The suit alleges claims under the Establishment Clause as well as various civil rights and state law violations. BRProud reports on the lawsuit.

Plaintiffs Must Seek Narrower Relief Against Restrictions on LGBTQ Books in Children's Section of Library

In Virden v. Crawford County, Arkansas, (WD AR, Sept. 12, 2023), the court denied plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction because the proposed injunction was too broad, but left open the possibility of a narrower injunction later on.  The court described the dispute:

According to Plaintiffs’ amended complaint, in late 2022 or early 2023 the Crawford County Library System implemented a policy under which its library branches must remove from their children’s sections all books containing LGBTQ themes, affix a prominent color label to those books, and place them in a newly-created section called the “social section.” Plaintiffs allege this policy was imposed on the Library System by the Crawford County Quorum Court in response to political pressure from constituents who objected, at least partly on religious grounds, to the presence of these books in the children’s section.

Plaintiffs claimed that this policy violates the Establishment Clause as well as their 1st Amendment free speech right.  The court said in part:

First, with respect to the Establishment Clause claim, it must be noted that—as Defendants acknowledge—there is little useful precedent to guide this Court’s analysis. The United States Supreme Court’s most recent guidance on such claims amounts to little more than the extremely general and abstract direction that “the Establishment Clause must be interpreted by ‘reference to historical practices and understandings.’” Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist..... In the face of this instruction, the County resorts to arguing that book banning and censorship, for reasons both religious and otherwise, have a centuries-long history in America and the broader Western world....

Neither side’s argument regarding the Establishment Clause claim is satisfactory. Plaintiffs’ argument simply sidesteps the “historical practices and understandings” analysis altogether. But the County’s argument, which is essentially that the Establishment Clause does not prohibit state-sponsored religious viewpoint discrimination because state actors have been violating the Free Speech Clause for centuries, seems out of step with the Kennedy Court’s admonition that the First Amendment’s Establishment, Free-Exercise, and Free-Speech Clauses “have complementary purposes, not warring ones where one Clause is always sure to prevail over the others.”.... 

The court found that plaintiffs had alleged sufficient facts to avoid dismissal of their claim that their 1st Amendment right to receive information had been infringed. However, it refused to enter a preliminary injunction requiring the library to return to its prior procedures for classifying and processing books, saying in part:

... Plaintiffs’ proposals would essentially freeze in perpetuity the Library’s method for processing all types of books—not only children’s books relating to LGBTQ topics. The Court does not see any reason, on the record before it, why it should curtail the Library’s discretion in processing books on such disparate topics as caring for houseplants, playing chess, or mystery novels. Furthermore, the requested injunctions are so vague and general that they could potentially prevent the Library from altering these processes even for reasons that could be perfectly benign, prudent, and constitutionally inoffensive. 

CT Supreme Court Upholds Refusal to Enforce Ketubah in Divorce Action

In Tilsen v. Benson, (CT Sup. Ct., Sept. 5, 2023), the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld a trial court's refusal to enforce the provisions of the parties' ketubah (Jewish marriage document) in setting alimony in a marital dissolution action. The husband, a rabbi, sought enforcement of the ketubah as a prenuptial agreement.  The ketubah provided that any divorce would be "according to Torah law."  Husband contended that meant a 50/50 division of property and no obligation to pay alimony, but conflicting interpretations of Jewish law were presented to the trial court.  The Supreme Court said in part:

... [W]e conclude that the plaintiff’s desired relief violates the establishment clause under the neutral principles of law doctrine. Most significant, the parties’ ketubah is facially silent as to each spouse’s support obligations in the event of dissolution of the marriage, thus leaving the court to determine those obligations from external sources as to Jewish law, namely, the parties’ expert witnesses, whose proffered opinions differed in this case, instantly alerting the court as to the establishment clause dilemma....

The court also rejected husband's argument that refusal to enforce the ketubah violated his free exercise rights by preventing him from divorcing according to Jewish law and denying him the generally available benefit of enforcing a prenuptial agreement only because of the agreement's religious nature.  The court said in part:

... [E]nforcement of this vaguely worded ketubah in the guise of protecting the plaintiff’s free exercise rights would have put the trial court on the horns of an establishment clause dilemma.

Second, the trial court did not deny the plaintiff access to the court or otherwise exact some kind of penalty in connection with his religious beliefs or practices; its decision simply meant that this dissolution action would be governed by generally applicable principles of Connecticut law as expressed in our alimony and equitable distribution statutes. Parties who desire specific tenets of their religious beliefs to govern the resolution of marital dissolution actions remain free to contract for that relief via a properly executed antenuptial, postnuptial, or separation agreement that is specifically worded to express those beliefs in a way that avoids establishment clause concerns under the neutral principles of law doctrine.

Enforcing Agreement To Cooperate With Jewish Religious Court Does Not Violate Establishment Clause

In Satz v. Satz, (NJ Super., Aug. 18, 2023), a New Jersey state appellate court upheld a trial court's order enforcing a marital settlement agreement (MSA) that the parties had entered in connection with their divorce proceedings. One provision in the agreement obligated the parties to comply with recommendations of a Jewish religious court (beis din) regarding the husband giving a get (Jewish bill of divorce) to the wife. According to the court:

On July 6, 2022, the beis din issued a fifteen-page ruling finding that defendant had not properly responded to summonses from rabbinical courts, that defendant is "obligated to divorce [plaintiff] forthright and immediately," and that his refusal to provide plaintiff a get "is a form of abuse." 

Affirming the trial court, the appellate court rejected the husband's Establishment Clause challenge, saying in part:

In this case ... the trial court was asked to enforce a civil contract, not a religious one. Nor did the trial court substantively review or affirm the beis din ruling. For purposes of this appeal, the beis din ruling is essentially a report confirming plaintiff's assertion that defendant failed to participate in the beis din proceeding in violation of his obligations under the MSA....

Defendant agreed in the MSA to abide by the beis din ruling, whatever that might be. In enforcing that agreement, the trial court in no way interpreted religious doctrine. The orders entered in this case scrupulously avoid entanglement with religion because the trial court applied well-established principles of civil contract law, not rabbinical law. The latter body of law remained solely within the province of the beis din and was not interpreted or applied by the Family Part judge, nor by us.

Denying Satanic Temple's Invocation Request Upheld

In The Satanic Temple, Inc. v. City of Boston, (D MA, July 31, 2023), a Massachusetts federal district court upheld Boston City Council's refusal to invite a representative of The Satanic Temple ("TST")  to deliver an invocation at a City Council meeting. The court said in part:

TST can prevail on its Establishment Clause claim if the evidence shows that the City's denial of TST's request to give the invocation was based on TST's religious beliefs. The City provides ample evidence that the refusal to invite TST to give an invocation was not because of TST's religious beliefs. All of the evidence submitted suggests that individual City Councilors invited speakers who served their constituents and were active in their communities, and TST did not qualify as such....

While TST provides some evidence that it had been involved in the greater Boston community, which is the primary factor City Councilors consider when selecting invocation speakers, through “Menstruatin’ with Satan,” “Warmer than Hell,” and Boston Pride tabling, there is no evidence that the City Councilors knew of those activities, nor that those activities took place within the Councilors’ districts. Indeed, the evidence clearly conflicts with that conclusion.....

The emails sent from the public to the City Councilors fall short of supporting TST's discrimination claim. Emails from the public expressing disagreement with TST's beliefs —particularly where, as here, there is no evidence that any City Councilor responded to those emails—do not support an inference that City Councilors did not invite TST to give an invocation because they shared the same opinion as the senders....

The City Council's process—or lack thereof—for selecting invocation speakers is the most troublesome to the Court of all factors to consider regarding legislative prayer practices. There is no dispute that the selection of the invocation speaker is left to each individual City Councilor's discretion, and there are no formal written policies governing this procedure. This leaves ample room for abuse, which concerns the Court. However, the lack of a formal, written policy does not by itself create a constitutional problem (though the existence of one could provide neutrality-enforcing guidelines that would help avoid constitutional issues in the future), nor does the fact that the selection of speakers is left to the discretion of the individual Councilors.

The court also rejected a free exercise claim. [Thanks to Greg Chaufen for the lead.]

Court Upholds Accreditation Requirement For Religious University

In Wisdom Ministries, Inc. v. Garrett,(ND OK, Aug. 1, 2023), an Oklahoma federal district court rejected a constitutional challenge to a cease and desist order issued by the Oklahoma State Regents.  The Regents insisted that Wisdom University, an Oklahoma-based online university operated by Wisdom Ministries, obtain proper accreditation before it issues degrees. The court held that the requirement does not violate the university's free expression, free exercise, Establishment Clause, freedom of association or equal protection rights, saying in part:

The issue raised by plaintiff has nothing to do with governmental restriction of content or subject matter being taught at Wisdom University but, instead, the state is applying a facially neutral regulation that ... falls with the power of the state to regulate business conduct....

Consumer protection is a legitimate state interest, and there is an equal need to protect students attending a secular or religious institution from paying for a degree program that does not meet certain minimal objective standards. The statute does not impose any higher burden on religious schools to obtain accreditation and such institutions are free to obtain accreditation from an agency specializing on accreditation for religious schools. Nothing about the accreditation requirement suggests that the state is favoring secular institutions or acting with hostility to religious institutions, and plaintiff has not shown that enforcement of the accreditation requirement of § 4103 violates the Free Exercise Clause as applied to religious colleges or universities....

Plaintiff’s allegations do not support a plausible claim that enforcement of the accreditation requirement of § 4103 will violate plaintiff’s rights under the Establishment Clause. Plaintiff makes a series of conclusory allegations that obtaining proper accreditation will involve the Regents in plaintiff’s religious affairs, but these allegations are speculative at best. Defendants have taken the position that Wisdom Ministries is free to operate a school or university without obtaining the accreditation required by § 4103, as long as Wisdom Ministries does not purport to offer a degree.

Hindu Profs May Move Ahead with Some Challenges To "Caste" In Anti-Discrimination Policy

In Kumar v. Koester, (CD CA, July 25, 2023), a California federal district court dismissed for lack of standing plaintiffs' free exercise and equal protection challenges to California State University's inclusion of the term "caste" in its Interim Non-discrimination Policy. However, the court concluded that plaintiffs-- South-Asian, Hindu CSU professors-- may move ahead with their Establishment Clause and vagueness claims. 

Plaintiffs object to the University's policy that treats "caste" as a social and religious hierarchy created by the Hindu religion. They contend that caste is no part of Hinduism and that its inclusion in the University policy promotes racial and religious stereotypes and subjects plaintiffs' Hindu religious beliefs to public ridicule. The court dismissed plaintiffs' equal protection challenges because "abstract stigmatic injuries" are not sufficient to create standing.  Insofar as plaintiffs argue that the Policy provides insufficient protection to non-Asian victims of caste discrimination, plaintiffs allege no injury to themselves. As to plaintiffs' free exercise challenges, the court said in part:

Plaintiffs emphatically denounce the caste system and reject the notion that it is part of their religion. Thus, the Policy does not threaten any of Plaintiffs' rights to practice their religion.

As to plaintiffs' Establishment Clause claims, the court said in part:

To evaluate the merits of an Establishment Clause claim, a court must reference historical practices and understandings.... A government practice that unevenly impacts religion may nevertheless be constitutional if it is supported by history and tradition.... Defendant contends that inclusion of the term "caste" is supported by a long history and tradition of disallowing racial discrimination in schools. While Defendant is correct that there is a long history of preventing racial discrimination in education, Defendant has not adequately demonstrated that there is a history or tradition of incorporating words with religious connotations to curb racial discrimination. Therefore, Defendant has failed to demonstrate that implicating Hinduism through the Policy's inclusion of the term "caste" is supported by history and tradition.

[Thanks to Glenn Katon for the lead.]

Guam Legislature Overrides Veto of Bill Authorizing Government-Funded Religious Charter Schools

On July 24, the Guam legislature by a vote of 13-0 overrode Governor Lourdes Leon Guerrero's July 12 veto of Bill No.62-37.  (Full text of veto message). The bill allows both private religious schools and private non-sectarian schools to petition to convert to government-funded Academy Charter Schools. The legislation authorizes up to 7 charter schools to operate at any one time. (Full text of bill and veto override vote). The legislature's introductory language in the bill reads in part:

I Liheslaturan Guåhan intends to remove any discrimination or distinction between private sectarian or non-sectarian applicants for converting existing schools or for new charter schools. I Liheslaturan Guåhan recognizes the enormous contribution and history of private sectarian education on Guam and intends for all applicants to be considered on their records and applications to convert to an Academy Charter School.

According to the Guam Daily Post:

Gov. Lou Leon Guerrero in a veto message this month said that Bill 62 violated the First Amendment and the doctrine of separation of church and state, as well as the Organic Act of Guam. She stated she couldn’t authorize the spending of taxpayer money on a religious school, which would then be regulated by the government.

But Attorney General Doug Moylan differed in a legal opinion issued to lawmakers. Several faith-based organizations receive money from the government of Guam already, he noted.

Court Rejects Muslim Americans' Challenge to Their Treatment at U.S. Borders

In Kariye v. Mayorkas, (CD CA, July 19, 2023), a California federal district court dismissed claims by three Muslim plaintiffs that their rights have been violated by ongoing religious questioning of Muslim Americans at ports of entry. The court rejected plaintiffs' Establishment Clause challenge, saying in part:

In light of the case law holding that the government has plenary authority at the border and that maintaining border security is a compelling government interest, the court finds that "reference to historical practices and understandings" weighs against finding an Establishment Clause violation based on religious questioning at the border.... Plaintiffs' allegations to the contrary—that American history and tradition protect religious belief—do not sufficiently address historical practices and understandings at the border.

Rejecting plaintiffs' Free Exercise claim, the court said in part:

[T]he ongoing harms alleged by Plaintiffs here—their modifications to religious practices during international travel— ... can ... be categorized as subjective chilling effects insufficient to constitute a substantial burden under the Free Exercise Clause....

... Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged they were deprived of a government benefit or coerced to act contrary to their religious beliefs...

... Plaintiffs' allegations support the conclusion that the questioning alleged in this case would be a narrowly tailored means of achieving the compelling government interest of maintaining border security.

The court also rejected plaintiffs' freedom of association, retaliation, equal protection and RFRA claims.

9th Circuit: Prison Official's Referencing Bible Verse Did Not Violate Establishment Clause

In Forter v. Young, (9th Cir., July 12, 2023), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals rejected former prisoner Jeffrey Forter's complaints about the procedure used to deny his religious meal accommodation request.  In seeking access to kosher meals, Forter cited a Bible verse. A response from a prison official disagreed with Forster's interpretation of the verse and cited an additional verse. Forster claimed that response violated the Establishment Clause.  The court disagreed, saying in part:

[T]he Establishment Clause does not prevent religious references by state actors... and the prison official’s actions do not constitute an unconstitutional “official policy that ‘establishes a religion or religious faith, or tends to do so,’”

Court Strongly Criticizes Performance of Counsel for The Satanic Temple

In March 2021, The Satanic Temple and one of its members filed suit in a Texas federal district court challenging Texas' requirement that a woman have a sonogram prior to an abortion. The complaint alleged that in light of the Satanic Temple's Satanic Abortion Ritual, the Texas requirement violated plaintiffs' free exercise, substantive due process and equal protection rights. (See prior posting.) After the U.S. Supreme Court's Dobbs decision, The Satanic Temple filed a Third Amended Complaint.  In The Satanic Temple, Inc. v. Young, (SD TX, July 3, 2023), the Texas district court then dismissed the suit for lack of standing and on sovereign immunity grounds.  The court added:

Without any supporting detail, Plaintiffs assert two causes of action under the First Amendment, one being a claim swirling together the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses, and the other pertaining to the Establishment Clause. Young argues that these claims are so inadequately pleaded as to deprive her of fair notice as to what exactly this suit is about in the wake of Dobbs....

The court also refused to grant plaintiffs leave to replead their claims.  In doing so, the court set out an unusually strong criticism of the performance of plaintiffs' counsel, saying in part:

Given the detail of the prior complaints and these substantial changes in the law, the deficiencies in the operative complaint are no doubt intentional. And indeed, the filing of a willfully deficient amended complaint is of a piece with the mulish litigation conduct by counsel for Plaintiffs, Attorney Matt Kezhaya, in this and other actions representing The Satanic Temple. Recently considered in this regard was whether to revoke his permission to proceed pro hac vice in light of sanctions entered against him in other federal courts after his appearance here. For example, [in one of those cases:]

He ... filed a second motion for TRO containing negligible legal analysis, with six pages of the main analysis dedicated to presentation of what’s purported to be a five-act play.....

Litigation of constitutional claims is a serious matter. Such issues deserve serious attention from counsel desiring to be taken seriously. As it turns out, Plaintiffs might have been better served by proceeding pro se, as applicable standards would dictate that their filings would be “liberally construed” and “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”...

And any repleading at this stage would manifest undue prejudice to a range of current and former Defendants who still have little clue as to the exact nature of the claims brought in this case. The Court is also of the firm belief that any further attempt at repleading would be futile, given that Attorney Kezhaya’s filings become more conclusory, reductive, and intemperate over time, in line with his performative and obstinate conduct to date.

Monell Claims Opposing Transcendental Meditation Program in Chicago Schools Move Ahead

In Hudgins v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, (ND IL, June 30, 2023), two former high school students and the mother of one of the students sued claiming that a Quiet Time transcendental meditation program in the Chicago public schools violated the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses as well as the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Plaintiffs claim that the program contained hidden Hindu religious elements. A number of plaintiffs' claims were dismissed, primarily on statute-of-limitations grounds. However, the court allowed plaintiffs to move ahead with their Section 1983 Monell claims for damages against the Chicago Board of Education and the David Lynch Foundation which operated the program under contract in the schools.