In Muhammad v. Paruk, (ED MI, May 12, 2008), the federal court relied primarily on language in the Declaratory Judgment Act giving it discretion on whether or not to issue a declaratory judgment. The court said:
[I]f Paruk has a valid, neutral and generally applicable policy of requiring witnesses to keep their faces visible while giving testimony, that policy would not violate Muhammad’s right to free exercise of her religion. Determining if Paruk has such a policy and, if he does, deciding whether it is valid, neutral and generally applicable would necessitate a detailed examination of how Paruk manages his court room as a state court judge. Conducting this type of review as a federal judge would undoubtably increase friction in the relationship between our state and federal courts.... [R]espect for the relationship between our state and federal courts weighs heavily against exercising jurisdiction over Muhammad’s declaratory judgment action for violation of her right to free exercise of her religion....The AP yesterday reported on the decision. [Thanks to How Appealing for posting the opinion.]
To establish a ... denial of access to the courts claim... could require me to determine whether Muhammad’s state court claim was "non-frivolous" ... and to review
whether Judge Paruk’s actions frustrated Muhammad’s litigation. This kind of review also threatens to increase the tension between our state and federal courts and weighs against exercising jurisdiction over Muhammad’s declaratory judgment action for denial of access to the courts.
