Here, plaintiff fails to allege facts plausibly supporting a minimal inference of discriminatory motivation. Although plaintiff contends that she was treated differently than other Lucille Roberts members on the basis of her religion, the factual allegations only suggest that she was treated differently because she insisted on wearing an article of clothing that, according to defendant, was inappropriate gym attire.... Nowhere does the complaint allege that defendant selectively enforced its dress code against Jewish women.... There is no indication ... that claims grounded solely in disparate impact—and lacking any allegation of discriminatory intent—are cognizable under Title II.Consumerist reports on the decision.
Meanwhile, JTA reported yesterday on a religious discrimination in employment lawsuit filed in New York state court. Plaintiff Hadas Goldfarb, an Orthodox Jewish woman who was hired by New York Presbyterian Hospital as a paramedic, was dismissed when when she insisted on wearing a skirt instead of pants as required by the hospital's dress code. Unlike the public accommodation section of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the employment discrimination provisions (Title VII) require employers to reasonably accommodate an employee's religious exercise. [Thanks to Steven H. Sholk for the lead.]
