In
Neely-Bey v. Conley, (7th Cir., Jan. 2, 2019), the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals, in a 38-page opinion, remanded to an Indiana federal district court a suit by an inmate who claimed that his free exercise rights were infringed when prison authorities at Correctional Industrial Facility did not permit him to participate fully in worship services of the Moorish Science Temple of America. The court said in part:
Mr. Neely-Bey ... does not ask the CIF to accommodate a personal belief not required of MSTA adherents. Rather, he asks that the CIF require the MSTA to accept him as a full member even though his belief system as a declared sovereign citizen differs substantially from that of the MSTA and MSTA liturgical practices require that its adherents share their religious beliefs in the course of their worship services. The MSTA consequently believes that admitting Mr. Neely-Bey as a member would challenge its teachings and, possibly, jeopardize its status....
We therefore have no doubt that the prison officials are on solid ground in maintaining that they have a right, and indeed an obligation, to protect the right of other prisoners who adhere to the MSTA faith to worship in a congregational manner to the extent that such a practice is consistent with other penal objectives.
Of course, in asserting such an objective and in choosing a means to achieve such an objective, Turner v. Safley ...teaches that prison officials cannot rely on the mere incantation of a penal interest but must come forward with record evidence that substantiates that the interest is truly at risk and that prison officials have chosen an appropriate manner to assert that interest. Before us, the defendants justify their actions only in terms of the MSTA’s rights without any reference to the possible impact on the security, operations, or finances of the CIF. Under such circumstances, we cannot conclude that the defendants have articulated a legitimate “penological” reason for denying Mr. Neely-Bey full participation in MSTA’s Friday services.
The merits of Mr. Neely-Bey’s claim for injunctive relief therefore remain an open question. In considering this question, the district court should not only determine the propriety of injunctive relief under the Free Exercise Clause, but possible relief under RLUIPA.
Indiana Lawyer reports on the decision.