6th Circuit: Temporary Shortening of Prison Worship Time Upheld

In Dykes-Bey v. Schroeder, (6th Cir., Dec. 27, 2022), the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought under the 1st Amendment and RLUIPA by a Michigan inmate, concluding that the Michigan prison system had not imposed a "substantial burden" on the inmate's free exercise of religion. According to the court:

[D]efendants reduced the worship time for all religious groups from one hour to 30 minutes. As a result of this reduction in worship time, Dykes-Bey, a Moorish American Moslem, was unable to read the proclamation or conduct the closing prayer at four weekly meetings of the Moorish Science Temple of America....

Finding no 1st Amendment violation, the court said in part: 

Dykes-Bey sufficiently alleged a sincerely held religious belief or practice—reading the proclamation and conducting the closing prayer at meetings of the Moorish Science Temple of America. But the defendants' conduct did not rise to the level of a substantial burden on his religious exercise....

Focusing on plaintiff's RLUIPA claim, the court said in part:

Dykes-Bey sought only monetary relief from the defendants, which is not authorized by RLUIPA.

No State Action Involved In Barring Of Plaintiff From Moorish Science Temple

In Bey v. Sirius-El, (ED NY, Aug. 19, 2022), a New York federal district court dismissed a suit seeking damages, injunctive relief and criminal prosecution of defendants for barring plaintiff from attending the Brooklyn Moorish Science Temple in person. Plaintiff was barred because of the potential for a conflict between her and a "competing love interest" who has also been attending services. Plaintiff's free exercise claims were dismissed because she did no allege that any state action was involved.

Ohio Probate Court Lacks Jurisdiction To Change Nationality of Moorish Science Adherent

In In re Easterling, (OH App., April 24, 2019), an Ohio state appeals court affirmed a probate court's decision in a case brought by a member of the Moorish Science Temple of America. The probate court granted Douglas Easterling's request to change his name to Raphael Kulika Bey. However it denied his request to change his race from "Black/African American" to "Moor/Aboriginal American national." The appeals court held that Ohio probate courts lack jurisdiction to change a person's race or nationality. While the probate court has jurisdiction to correct a birth record, here petitioner's birth certificate did not list his race or nationality, so there was nothing to correct.

7th Circuit Remands Prisoner's Attempt To Join Moorish Science Worship

In Neely-Bey v. Conley, (7th Cir., Jan. 2, 2019), the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals, in a 38-page opinion, remanded to an Indiana federal district court a suit by an inmate who claimed that his free exercise rights were infringed when prison authorities at Correctional Industrial Facility did not permit him to participate fully in worship services of the Moorish Science Temple of America. The court said in part:

Mr. Neely-Bey ... does not ask the CIF to accommodate a personal belief not required of MSTA adherents. Rather, he asks that the CIF require the MSTA to accept him as a full member even though his belief system as a declared sovereign citizen differs substantially from that of the MSTA and MSTA liturgical practices require that its adherents share their religious beliefs in the course of their worship services. The MSTA consequently believes that admitting Mr. Neely-Bey as a member would challenge its teachings and, possibly, jeopardize its status....

We therefore have no doubt that the prison officials are on solid ground in maintaining that they have a right, and indeed an obligation, to protect the right of other prisoners who adhere to the MSTA faith to worship in a congregational manner to the extent that such a practice is consistent with other penal objectives.

Of course, in asserting such an objective and in choosing a means to achieve such an objective, Turner v. Safley ...teaches that prison officials cannot rely on the mere incantation of a penal interest but must come forward with record evidence that substantiates that the interest is truly at risk and that prison officials have chosen an appropriate manner to assert that interest. Before us, the defendants justify their actions only in terms of the MSTA’s rights without any reference to the possible impact on the security, operations, or finances of the CIF. Under such circumstances, we cannot conclude that the defendants have articulated a legitimate “penological” reason for denying Mr. Neely-Bey full participation in MSTA’s Friday services.

The merits of Mr. Neely-Bey’s claim for injunctive relief therefore remain an open question. In considering this question, the district court should not only determine the propriety of injunctive relief under the Free Exercise Clause, but possible relief under RLUIPA.

Indiana Lawyer reports on the decision.

No Religious Exemption To Immunization Requirements For Merely Moral Objections

In Watkins-El v. Department of Education, (ED NY, Oct. 6, 2016), a New York federal district court refused to grant a preliminary injunction, upholding a New York school's denial of a religious exemption from immunization requirements for plaintiff's children. An exemption is available only for "genuine and sincere religious beliefs...." The court said in part:

Although plaintiff asserts that his religion is "Islamism" and that he is a Moor, he does not claim that the tenets of Islamism or Moorish culture prohibit vaccinations.... Instead, Plaintiff bases his opposition on the assertion that these vaccines contain "monkey cells, pork derivatives, and aborted human fetuses," which Plaintiff's religion dictates he cannot consume.... Plaintiff's opposition to these substances may be genuine and sincere, but he has not demonstrated that it stems from a religious, rather than simply moral, belief.... Furthermore, Plaintiff presents no evidence that these vaccines in fact contain the substances to which he objects.

Moorish-American Religious Defense To False Identity Charge Fails

Thomas v. Commonwealth, (VA App., Aug. 16, 2016), involved an appeal by defendant of his conviction for providing a law enforcement officer a false identity with intent to deceive.  Defendant, who was driving with a suspended license, told police during a traffic stop that his name was "Barry Thomas-El." Police were unable to locate information on anyone with that name from the Department of Motor Vehicles, and only later identified him as "Barry Nelson Thomas, Jr."  At the trial court level, defendant attempted to raise a religious free exercise defense, arguing that use of the suffix "El" was an exercise of his religious beliefs as a Moorish-American national. The trial court excluded evidence relating to this defense.  The Virginia Court of Appeals affirmed, largely on procedural grounds, saying in part:

At the motion in limine hearing, appellant’s counsel argued that adding the suffix “El” to appellant’s name was an act of free exercise noting his “rebirth” within the Moorish American community.... However, appellant’s counsel failed to properly proffer what appellant’s testimony would have been at trial.

The court also upheld the trial court's exclusion of several documents relating to defendant's claim of Moorish-American citizenship, saying:

As the documents are political, rather than religious, in nature, they lack any tendency to make the existence of a religious imperative more or less probable. As such, they are irrelevant and thus not admissible.

Refusal To Enter Requested Surname on Birth Certificate Did Not Violate Free Exercise Rights

In Nix El v. Williams, (D DC, March 30, 2016), the D.C. federal district court rejected a claim by the father of a newborn daughter that his religious rights were infringed when D.C. Department of Health officials refused to list his daughter's surname on her birth certificate as "Nix El" rather than as "Nix", the parents' surname. D.C. statutes require the surname to match that of a family member. Plaintiff, who is a member of the Moorish Science Temple, contended that he wished to add "El" to his daughter's name because it is a title of nobility. In the suit, plaintiff had asked for declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory damages of $136 million plus punitive damages of $1 million per day for each day his daughter did not have a birth certificate.

Court Again Dismisses Moorish American's Claim of Immunity

In Bey v. City of Tampa, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148847 (MD FL, Nov. 2, 2015), a Florida federal district court dismissed with prejudice an amended complaint by a defendant claiming that her free exercise, speech and assembly rights were infringed when the city would not allow her to display her "Moorish Religious, Heritage, and History sign of the Morocco Treaty of Peace and Friendship" without a permit. Instead of curing pleading problems that led to her original complaint being dismissed (see prior related posting), plaintiff again argued that her status as "Moorish American national" exempts her from the Tampa's permit requirements.

11th Circuit: Moorish Property Owner May Replead Constitutional Claims

In Bey v. City of Tampa Code Enforcement, (11th Cir., April 8, 2015), the U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed, with leave to amend, a complaint alleging free exercise, RLUIPA and due process violations against a Tampa Code enforcement officer who cited Nura Washington Bey for displaying unpermitted signs, building without a permit, and failing to obtain a special use permit to operate a private recreational facility.  At issue was property Bey owned, known as Al Moroc Humanity Park, which was used each Sunday by Bey and her "fellow Moorish nationals" to practice their Islamic faith.  The court held that while Bey might be able to allege facts to support her First Amendment and RLUIPA claims, she had alleged little in her complaint. Instead she relied primarily on her claim that as a Moorish national she is outside the jurisdiction of the magistrate who presided at the Code enforcement hearing, and that she is entirely exempt from local land use regulations by reason of the First Amendment.