In Palmer v. Liberty University, Inc., (4th Cir., June 30, 2023), the three judges on the panel of the U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed on whether they should consider the ministerial exception doctrine in deciding an age discrimination case brought by a Liberty University art professor. In 2018, the University notified plaintiff who was then 79 years old that her teaching contract would not be renewed for the following year. Judge King's majority opinion held that the professor had not produced evidence of age discrimination. Instead, the university dismissed her because she was not meeting its expectations regarding digital art skills.
Despite that favorable ruling, the University, in a cross-appeal, asked the court to also rule that the ministerial exception doctrine applied. Judge King held that the court need not reach that issue.
Judge Richarson filed a concurring opinion contending that dismissal of the professor's claim should be based on the ministerial exception doctrine, saying in part:
Though Palmer did not perform formal religious instruction, her job description required her to integrate a “Biblical worldview” into her teaching. And Palmer admits to regularly praying with students, indeed starting her classes with a psalm or a prayer. Accordingly, Liberty viewed her as an official “messenger” of its faith...
If a court imposes a minister on a congregation that doesn’t want her—even if the court does so based on employment-law principles—it nonetheless impinges on the church’s religious interest in choosing who speaks for it....
Skirting the ministerial exception by dismissing an employment-discrimination claim on its merits forces us to inquire into the church’s motives for firing its minister. But, as discussed already, the church’s decision is intrinsically bound up in religious doctrine. To subject such a decision to the scrutiny of temporal courts threatens the church’s “power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of . . . faith.”...
Because Palmer—like every professor at Liberty—served as the school’s religious “messenger” to its students, she was its “minister” for First Amendment purposes. The ministerial exception thus bars her employment-discrimination claim.
Judge Motz filed a concurring opinion responding to Judge Richardson's opinion. Judge Motz said in part:
Make no mistake: the conception of the ministerial exception advanced by my concurring colleague is no mere application of existing precedent. It is a dramatic broadening of the ministerial exception that would swallow the rule....
The ministerial exception effectively “gives an employer free rein to discriminate because of race, sex, pregnancy, age, disability, or other traits protected by law when selecting or firing their ‘ministers,’ even when the discrimination is wholly unrelated to the employer’s religious beliefs or practices.”... It is no exaggeration to say that the ministerial exception “condones animus.”... Thus, the necessary implication of greatly expanding the ministerial exception is that far fewer employees would be protected from employment discrimination.
When it comes to key religious figures, this is a necessary tradeoff....
But Palmer was not a key religious figure or a minister. She was an art professor. Indeed, if basic acts like praying with one’s students and referencing God in the classroom are enough to transform an art professor into the type of key faith messenger who qualifies for the ministerial exception, one can only speculate as to who else might qualify for the exception...
An employee does not shed her right to be free from workplace discrimination simply because she believes in God, prays at work, and is employed by a religious entity.