As things stand now, ... our understanding of Title VII leaves us with a somewhat odd body of case law that protects a lesbian who faces discrimination because she fails to meet some superficial gender norms—wearing pants instead of dresses, having short hair, not wearing make up— but not a lesbian who meets cosmetic gender norms, but violates the most essential of gender stereotypes by marrying another woman. We are left with a body of law that values the wearing of pants and earrings over marriage. It seems likely that neither the proponents nor the opponents of protecting employees from sexual orientation discrimination would be satisfied with a body of case law that protects “flamboyant” gay men and “butch” lesbians but not the lesbian or gay employee who act and appear straight....
In addition to the inconsistent application of Title VII to gender non‐conformity, these sexual orientation cases highlight another inconsistency in courts’ applications of Title VII to sex as opposed to race.... [C]ourts and the Commission have consistently concluded that the statute prohibits discrimination based on an employee’s association with a person of another race, such as an interracial marriage or friendship..... But ... Title VII ... has not protected women employees who are discriminated against because of their intimate associations with other women, and men with men....
Perhaps the writing is on the wall. It seems unlikely that our society can continue to condone a legal structure in which employees can be fired, harassed, demeaned, singled out for undesirable tasks, paid lower wages, demoted, passed over for promotions, and otherwise discriminated against solely based on who they date, love, or marry. The agency tasked with enforcing Title VII does not condone it, ...; many of the federal courts to consider the matter have stated that they do not condone it...; and this court undoubtedly does not condone it.... But writing on the wall is not enough. Until the writing comes in the form of a Supreme Court opinion or new legislation, we must adhere to the writing of our prior precedent....Judge Ripple concurred in the outcome, but did not join those part of the opinion expressing doubt about the continued viability of the past precedent. The decision came in the case of a part-time adjunct professor at a community college who claimed that she was denied a full-time position. Indy Star reports on the decision.