Arizona Supreme Court Interprets Clergy Exemption from Mandatory Reporting of Child Abuse

 In Jane Doe I v. Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day-Saints, (AZ Sup. Ct., July 29, 2026), the Arizona Supreme Court settled important interpretive questions regarding Arizona's requirement to report child abuse to authorities and the ability of a court to inquire into a clergy member's failure to do so. At issue was the scope of the clergy exemption from Arizona's reporting law when a congregation member admits the abuse to the clergy member. The issue arose in a suit by abuse victims against the Church and clergy members. The Court summarized its holding:

We must decide if a factfinder—a court or jury—may inquire into whether a clergy member violated religious doctrine by failing to report abuse of a minor.  Subsection (A) of A.R.S. § 13-3620 (the “Reporting Statute”) requires “[a]ny person who reasonably believes that a minor” is the victim of abuse to “immediately report or cause reports to be made.”  The Reporting Statute, however, allows a clergy member who receives “a confession or confidential communication” to refrain from reporting the “confession” or “confidential communication” if the clergy member “determines that it is reasonable and necessary within the concepts” of the clergy member’s religion....  We hold that the First Amendment generally prohibits factfinders from inquiring into a clergy member’s application of his particular religious doctrine—absent fraud or collusion for secular purposes—in determining whether reporting should be withheld if “reasonable and necessary.” 

We next determine the meaning of the terms “confession” and “confidential communication” in the Reporting Statute.  We hold that “confession” means “a confidential acknowledgment or admission of a crime, sin, or fault to a member of the clergy, priest, or Christian Science practitioner for the purpose of absolution.”  A “confidential communication” refers to “speech or correspondence that is treated as private or made in confidence, generally under circumstances that indicate the communication is intended only for the person or persons addressed.”  The First Amendment, however, requires courts to exercise substantial deference to a religious institution’s own doctrinal conception of “confession” or “confidential communication.” 

Finally, we resolve whether a factfinder may determine who qualifies as a “member of the clergy.”  We hold that the First Amendment protects the right of a religious institution to define who is a “member of the clergy” and, absent fraud or collusion for secular purposes, prohibits factfinders from inquiring into the religious institution’s designation of clergy.

12 News reports on the decision.

3rd Circuit: RLUIPA's Institutionalized Persons Precedent Can Inform RLUIPA Land Use Cases as Well

 In Anash, Inc. v. Borough of Kingston, (3rd Cir., July 30, 2026), the U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision ordered a Pennsylvania federal district court to issue a preliminary injunction allowing a rabbi and his congregation access to two buildings that allegedly violated zoning provisions once building code violations were cured.  Rabbi Shimon Hellinger had acquired two properties, one used for office space and a yeshiva, and the other used for group living for ten Orthodox Jewish students who were members of the rabbi's congregation. The rabbi did not respond to notices of violations issued by zoning and code enforcement officials. On the day before Rosh Hashanah, enforcement officials obtained administrative search warrants and condemned the properties through no-occupancy orders. The rabbi and his yeshiva filed suit alleging that the official actions violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. The district court refused to grant a preliminary injunction. The 3rd Circuit affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction against building code enforcement because building codes are not land use regulations covered by RLUIPA. However, the court reversed the denial of a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the zoning regulations, saying in part:

... [I]t is likely that the implementation of the 2023 Zoning Ordinance substantially burdens Rabbi Hellinger and his congregation’s religious exercise. ...

... [I]n Holt v. Hobbs, ... the Supreme Court adjudicated a RLUIPA substantial-burden claim by an institutionalized person.  It held that a prison policy that required an inmate to “engage in conduct that seriously violates [his] religious beliefs” was a substantial burden....  

... [A]lthough they are not identical, RLUIPA’s institutionalized persons provisions and its land-use provisions both use a substantial-burden standard subject to strict scrutiny....  The structural similarity allows the situations ... under which RLUIPA protects religious beliefs of institutionalized persons to be translated into the land-use context... Doing so yields two substantial-burden scenarios – both related to the protection of religious belief.  The first occurs when a person is forced to choose between following the precepts of his religion and avoiding the effect of a land use regulation.... The second occurs when a land use regulation places substantial pressure on a person to substantially modify his behavior in violation of his beliefs....

... [A] land use regulation imposes a substantial burden on religious exercise if it restricts access to real property that is otherwise available for the proposed exercise of religion. Second, a land use regulation – even one of general applicability – imposes a substantial burden if it limits the use of real property that is otherwise available for the proposed exercise of religion so as to prevent the proposed exercise of religion on the property.  Third, even when the imposition or implementation of a land use regulation does not directly impede religious exercise, the land use regulation may still impose a substantial burden if it has a significant adverse effect on real property that is used or otherwise available for the proposed exercise of religion....

... [I]t is unlikely that the Kingston Defendants will be able to demonstrate a compelling governmental interest in perpetuating the condemnation orders after the Building Code violations have been remediated....

Judge Restrepo dissented, saying in part:

The majority’s opinion contravenes a cohesive body of law among our sister circuits interpreting the substantial burden provision of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”).... Commentators have described the courts as “coalesce[ing] around a totality-of-the-circumstances test, examining whether the government’s actions substantially inhibit religious exercise, rather than merely inconveniencing it.”... But the majority does not engage with this caselaw and merely offers in a footnote the vague statement that “[o]ur sister circuits have taken a variety of approaches” followed by a string cite..... 

Instead, the majority relies on RLUIPA’s separate provisions governing prison inmates despite recognizing that the substantial burden analysis in the prison context is “not applicable” to RLUIPA land use cases.... RLUIPA land use decisions uniformly caution against relying on principles from prison cases because “land-use regulations do not typically compel plaintiffs to ‘violate their beliefs’ in the way that, for example, prison rules might require an inmate to engage in conduct that goes against his or her religious tenets....

Unlike the majority, I would follow the approach and guidance of our sister circuits. The circuits consider two factors that are particularly apposite here: (1) whether the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of religious land use or whether the plaintiff’s burden was self-imposed; and (2) whether the plaintiff had ready alternatives....

Separate from the merits, this appeal fails on justiciability grounds....

Fire At Iowa Meat Packing Plant May Reduce Supply of Kosher Meat Nationally

According to KCRG News, a fire that broke out on Tuesday has destroyed 75% of the AgriStar Meat and Poultry processing plant in Postville, Iowa. The fire has been ruled as accidental. According to Brownfield Ag News, the plant is one of the largest kosher meat processing plants in the United States. It processes more than 50 million pounds of cattle products and 50 million pounds of poultry products every year. In a Statement (full text), Rabbi Moshe Elefant, CEO of OU Kosher, a major kosher certification agency that certifies Agri Star's products, said in part:

As we monitor the situation in Postville, the safety of the employees and fire fighters is our first concern. 

The damaged facility means a significant portion of kosher beef and chicken slaughtered and sold in the US will not enter the kosher supply chain.  Kosher consumers will feel the impact of the tightening supply with reduction of availability. 

We are working closely with AgriStar and all other suppliers to find solutions for ramping up production at other plants. We are also letting kosher consumers know about the importance of validating the kosher symbol and package integrity on products they purchase.... Unfortunately, when supply is limited, it creates opportunity for unscrupulous individuals who seek to make money by preying on the well-meaning Kosher observant public.

Trump Honors Memory of First U.S.-Born Martyr Beatified by the Catholic Church

Yesterday, the White House posted a Presidential Message on the 45th Anniversary of the Martyrdom of Father Stanley Rother (full text). It reads in part:

Today, Melania and I join with American Catholics and people of faith all across the world in honoring the towering legacy of Father Stanley Rother—an Oklahoma farm boy, the first American-born martyr beatified by the Catholic Church, and a champion of human dignity who heroically laid down his life to bring the light of Jesus Christ to a people plagued by horrific darkness....

In 1968, just years after his ordination, Father Rother answered God’s call to missionary life, departing the United States for the war-torn highlands of Guatemala, then ravaged by conflict.  Though thousands of Catholics were forcibly disappeared and viciously murdered during the Guatemalan Civil War, Father Rother nonetheless spent 13 years bringing the Gospel to those devastated by poverty and violence—translating sacred Scripture and helping to build a school, a hospital, and the region’s first Catholic radio station—fearlessly embodying Christ’s commission to “make disciples of all nations.”...

Today, we are reminded that Father Rother’s life and martyrdom are the fruits of America’s rich tradition of religious liberty.  In his honor, we recommit to remaining vigilant so that our birthright of freedom endures in the face of every trial.  We acknowledge with deep pride that America’s missionary zeal and generous spirit were, are, and will continue to be among the greatest forces of peace, justice, and flourishing in human history....

Challenge To Makeup of Religious Liberty Commission Is Dismissed

 In The Interfaith Alliance v. Trump, (SD NY, July 27, 2026), a New York federal district court dismissed a suit brought by several religious organizations challenging the composition of President Trump's Religious Liberty Commission. Plaintiffs contended that the makeup of the Commission violates the Federal Advisory Committee Act which, among other things, requires membership on federal advisory committees to be “fairly balanced” in light of the functions the committee performs. Plaintiffs (which include organizations representing the Muslim, Hindu and Sikh communities) contended that the Commission contains no members who represent non-Judeo-Christian religious traditions and that the Commission is unbalanced in its representation of views on separation of church and state. The court said in part:

FACA requires that a “[c]ommittee’s members represent a fair balance of viewpoints given the functions to be performed,” but it does not define what constitutes a “fair balance.” ...  As such, the statute leaves unanswered three sets of questions regarding whether a committee is appropriately balanced.  First, “even before the points of view on an advisory committee can be balanced at all,” one must ask: “which points of view should be balanced[?]”...  The next question is: “what constitutes an appropriate or ‘fair’ balance of those views[?]”... Is a single member representing each view enough, or does a committee need more?  And finally, “which kind of organization or individual legitimately represents” a viewpoint by being a member of a committee?... For example, what kind of individual would hypothetically speak for an “interfaith perspective”? 

Lacking clear answers to these questions, courts have been “highly deferential” in reviewing a committee’s composition....

FACA is properly read as requiring such strong deference for two reasons.  First, determining whether a committee is fairly balanced is largely “a political task not properly undertaken by life-tenured, unelected federal judges,”...

Second, it is notable that “as part of [a] compromise [in FACA’s enactment], Congress deleted from the Act any specific standards” governing committee membership....

Under this deferential standard, the RLC’s membership is fairly balanced.  Its members include workers in the public, private, and nonprofit sectors, have widely varying life experiences—from a former host of a popular television show to a State Lieutenant Governor, are religious leaders as well as rank-and-file congregants, and—to the extent that it matters—encompass adherents of at least five different religions....

It was certainly within President Trump’s discretion to decide that it was comparatively more important to prioritize balancing whether the RLC’s members were “representatives of various sectors of society, including the private sector, employers, educational institutions, religious communities, and States.”...

The Court also rejects the premise that there is a single “Judeo-Christian” viewpoint....

AP reports on the decision.

Suit Challenges Town's Refusal to Permit Nativity Display on Town Square

Suit was filed last week in a New York federal district court challenging an upstate New York town's refusal to permit placing of a privately-sponsored nativity display in the town square during the Christmas season. The complaint (full text) in Polverino v. Town of Brighton, New York, (WD NY, filed 7/21/2026), alleges that the town every year permits a Menorah display sponsored by Chabad Lubavitch, while Brighton town officials have ignored, evaded and effectively denied plaintiff's Nativity display requests for more than two years. Plaintiff alleges that this violates his free speech and free exercise rights, as well as the 1st Amendment's Establishment Clause and the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection clause. ACLJ issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Maryland Supreme Court: Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine Does Not Apply to Eviction of Defrocked Bishop From Parsonage

In Eritrean Orthodox Tweahdo Diocese of USA and Canada v. Sinoda, (MD Sup. Ct., July 23, 2026), the Maryland Supreme Court held that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine does not apply to a wrongful detainer action by a church seeking to evict a defrocked bishop from a church parsonage. The court said in part:

Respondent contends that the removal of Patriarch Antonios by the Eritrean government was invalid. As a result, Respondent argues, the existing “government-controlled” Synod was organized in violation of the Bylaws. Due to its illegitimacy, Respondent claims, the Synod lacked proper authority to defrock him as Bishop. Consequently, he was not properly removed from the Board, and the Board’s subsequent decision to remove him from the Property – made without him present – was illegitimate. According to Respondent, he remains the true Bishop in control of the Corporation, with a possessory right to occupy the Property that serves as a parsonage for the current bishop. Respondent contends that, in order to decide whether or not he has a right to possess the Property, a Maryland court would need to decide a question of religious doctrine....

To resolve this case, it is not necessary to decide whether the Synod is legitimate or whether the decisions to defrock Respondent and to remove him from the Corporation’s Board are doctrinally proper. The crux of Respondent’s argument for his possessory interest in the Property is his position as Bishop....  

However, the record lacks any evidence that there is any legal right for the Bishop of the United States and Canada to possess the Property. The Church’s Bylaws are silent concerning the provision of a parsonage to any bishop. The deed to the Property mentions nothing about who will occupy the premises. It is undisputed that no lease provides for Respondent to occupy the Property for as long as he serves as Bishop (or for any other period of time). There is no evidence of any other contract – such as an employment agreement – under which the Church or the Corporation agrees to provide the Property for use as a parsonage to the Bishop of the United States and Canada. Lastly, the Maryland Religious Corporation Law is silent on any such property right conditioned on the employment of a clergyperson....

The lower courts erred in invoking the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. That doctrine has no application to this case because Respondent’s right to possess the Property does not turn on whether he is the Church’s rightful Bishop of the United States and Canada. Applying neutral principles of Maryland property law to the undisputed facts of this case, we conclude that Respondent was a licensee with respect to the Property and that the Corporation has revoked Respondent’s license to reside at the Property....

9th Circuit: Employee Adequately Alleged Religious Objections to Covid Vaccine

In Weiss v. The Permanente Group, (9th Cir., July 24, 2026), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded a California federal district court's dismissal of Title VII and California state law claims alleging that plaintiff's employer failed to accommodate plaintiff's religious objections to the Covid vaccine mandate after initially approving her request. The court said in part:

... TPMG notified Weiss that, due to its findings and concerns about a pattern of insincere religious exemption requests among its employees, it would be conducting additional review of all previously approved exemptions...

Weiss plausibly alleged that she provided notice of her religious conflict with the Mandate in her initial request for a religious exemption. She identified herself to TPMG management as “a Christian Jew” and described specific religious doctrines that she asserted prohibited her from receiving the COVID-19 vaccine. These doctrines included the Torah’s prohibition against “accepting foreign material into our bodies,” Deuteronomy’s counsel against “needle wounds except for direct curative benefit,” and the professed requirement under Jewish law to “maintain [one’s] body and blood uncontaminated.” She also stated that receiving a COVID=19 vaccine would be contrary to her belief that she should not “introduce foreign substances into [her] body temple that change how [her] Creator designed it.”...   

Weiss acknowledged that she had previously received vaccinations, and she explained that her present concern arose not because the COVID-19 vaccine was different, but because her religious commitment had changed....

Judge Paez filed two unpublished partial dissenting opinions, one concluding that the district court should not have dismissed plaintiff's claim that TPMG's vaccination requirement and its intrusive questions about her religious and medical history constituted an invasion of privacy under the California Constitution. Plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to state a prima facie claim for invasion of privacy. The second unpublished dissent contended that the court should certify to the California Supreme Court the question of whether a health care provider’s requirement that employees obtain either a COVID-19 vaccination or an exemption constitutes a serious invasion of privacy under the California Constitution.

Becket issued a press release announcing the decision.

Recent Articles of Interest

From SSRN:

• Sarah Barringer Gordon, The Holy Cause: Church and State in Revolutionary and Early National New York, (December 20, 2025).
• Dennis Wieboldt, The Study of Jesuit, Catholic Legal Education: An Idea and a Program, (2 Jesuit Ed. Q. 155 (2026)).
• Isaac Barnes May, AI Companies as Conscientious Objectors: RFRA and the Refusal to Design Autonomous Weapons, (June 30, 2026).
• Dennis Wieboldt, William Bentley Ball and the "Century of Struggle" for School Choice, (51 J. Sup. Ct. Hist. __ (2026)).
• Travis Gilly, The Exemption They Cannot Reach: Mandated Scripture, Mahmoud v. Taylor, and the Self-Defeating Logic of the Academic Defense, (June 28, 2026).
• Almaz Assan, The Matrix Model of Layered Subjectivity: Deconstructing Radical Political Theology in a Post-secular World, (June 15, 2026).
• Deborah Machalow, Miscarriage of Democracy: What Happened in Arkansas, Florida, Nebraska, and South Dakota to Defeat Abortion-Related Ballot Measures in 2024, (April 11, 2025).
• Jeremy Christiansen, Natural Law, Unjust Laws, and Judicial Recusal: A Response to the "Natural Law" Originalists, (Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy, Volume 41 (2026).
• Melissa Murray & Katherine Shaw, The Promise and Peril of Direct Democracy After Dobbs, (Virginia Law Review, Vol. 112, p. 1, 2026).
• Trevor Reynolds, I Am a Person Too: The State's Failure to Secure Transgender Rights and Personhood, (Richmond Public Interest Law Review, Volume 28, No. 3. Pp. 331–352 (2025).

From SSRN (Issues in Middle Eastern Nations):

• Michal Saliternik, Yoav Sapir, Jonathan Yovel, Ori Aronson & Yair Lorberbaum, The Reintroduction of the Death Penalty in Israel: A Critical Assessment, (Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft, volume 138, issue 2, 2026).
• Ingrid Dingelstad-Frankova, The Institutionalisation and Investigation of Zakat as a Revenue Instrument: The Islamic State, 2014-2017, (July 23, 2026). 

From SSRN (Issues in South Asian Nations):

• Mohammed Afeef Saadulla, Ethnicizing Law: The Hindu Majoritarian Project to Convert Muslim Places of Worship in India, (November 30, 2025).
• Arafat Rahman Akram, Legal Issues Affecting Consent to Marry: A Comparative Study of Bangladesh, Malaysia and the United Kingdom, (June 20, 2026).
• Sharat Fatema Angelic, Legal Issues Affecting the Non-registration of Marriage: A Comparative Study of Bangladesh, Malaysia and the United Kingdom, (June 10, 2026).
• Liaqat Ali Khoso, Sacred Spaces, Shattered Lives: Institutional Child Sexual Abuse in Pakistan’s Religious Seminaries and the Imperative for Systemic Reform, (July 18, 2026).

From SSRN (Islamic Law):

• Muhammad Irfan Haroon, Khulʿ in Pakistan: Between Sharīʿah Principle and Judicial Practice: A Practitioner's Critical Analysis, (July 01, 2026).
• Arafat Rahman Akram & Sharat Fatema Angelic, The Concept of Shūrā and its Contemporary Application in Governance and Law: An Islamic Perspective, (June 29, 2026).
• Michael J. T., McMillen, Islamic Finance in North America: A Highly Abbreviated, Ruthlessly Selective, and Overtly Personal History, (June 16, 2026).
• Muhammad Irfan Haroon, The Place and Respect of Women in Islam (May 27, 2026).
• Muhammad Irfan Haroon, A Wife's Unconditional Right to Maintenance: Analysing the Supreme Court of Pakistan's Jurisprudence in Ambreen Akram v. Asad Ullah, (July 06, 2026).
• Sharat Fatema Angelic, Talaq Tafwid and Khulu' Divorce: A Comparative Legal Analysis of Women's Right to Divorce in Bangladesh and Pakistan, (June 10, 2026).
• Arafat Rahman Akram, Criminalizing Triple Talaq: A Comparative Study of India, Bangladesh and Malaysia, (June 23, 2026).

Canada Reports That Religion-Motivated Hate Crimes Decreased 18% In 2025

 Last week, the Canadian government released data on Police Reported Crime Statistics in Canada for 2025, including data on hate crimes. The report says in part:

The number of police-reported hate crimes decreased 3%, from 4,841 incidents in 2024 to 4,708 incidents in 2025. Prior to 2025, the number of hate crimes had more than doubled (+166%) from 2018 to 2024. Expressed as a rate, police-reported hate crimes declined 4% in 2025 to 11 incidents per 100,000 yet were more than twice as high as in 2018 (5 incidents).

The decline in the number of incidents in 2025 was in large part the result of fewer hate crimes targeting religion (-18% to 1,115 incidents) and those targeting sexual orientation (-19% to 534 incidents)....

More detailed data on  religion-motivate hate crimes shows that anti-Jewish hate crimes decreased 16% from 2025; anti-Muslim hate crimes decreased 11%; and anti-Catholic hate crimes decreased 39% from the prior year.

A report by JNS analyzes the Canadian data with a focus on anti-Jewish hate crimes. It points out that 70.7% of the 2025 hate crimes targeting a religious group and 16.7% of all 2025 hate crimes were aimed at Jews who constitute 1% of Canada's total population.

Justice Department Updates Guidance to Federal Agencies on Protecting Religious Liberty

Yesterday, the Attorney General issued a 26-page Memorandum to Executive Departments and Agencies (full text) on Federal Law Protections for Religious Liberty. The Memorandum updates and expands one issued in 2017 (see prior posting). According to a Justice Department press release:

Key updates in the guidance include:

Integration of recent Supreme Court precedent. The memo reflects recent judicial decisions clarifying the scope of the First Amendment, RFRA’s broad protection of religious liberty, and the requirement of equal treatment toward religious organizations in government programs. 

Protection of parental rights. The updated guidance emphasizes the Supreme Court’s recent precedents confirming that the Constitution protects parents’ ability to direct the religious upbringing of their children. 

Reaffirmation of church autonomy.  The guidance highlights constitutional protections that bar government interference in internal religious governance, including employment. 

Expanded direction for federal agencies. Agencies are instructed to proactively consider religious‑liberty impacts when developing rules and policies, designate officers to review regulatory proposals for compliance, and ensure enforcement actions respect RFRA and other protections.  Agencies must also consider religious‑liberty concerns raised by the public during notice‑and‑comment periods. 

Clarified protections in federal employment. The guidance reaffirms that agencies must follow recent Office of Legal Counsel opinions when accommodating religious expression and practice in the workplace, including scheduling accommodations and workplace religious expression. 

Safeguards for religious organizations in federal contracting and grant programs. Agencies may not condition an individual’s participation in federal programs on relinquishing their religious character or hiring rights.  Religious organizations must be permitted to compete on equal footing with secular organizations....

9th Circuit: School Social Worker's Office Display Was Government Speech Subject to School Regulation

In Theis v. Intermountain Education Service District Board of Directors, (9th Cir., July 21, 2026), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision upheld an Oregon federal district court's determination that a school district could bar a school social worker from displaying, when students are in his office, books that the school found to be hostile toward transgender individuals. The majority held that plaintiff's display was not protected by the First Amendment because it is government speech. The court said in part:

First, Theis’s speech occurred within the scope of his professional role.  It was confined to the environments—his offices—in which he was assigned to perform his duties and to times when he was with students.  And Theis does not dispute that his speech was aimed at students.  This case is therefore distinguishable from those in which a school employee engages in the challenged speech off school grounds or while performing tasks unrelated to the school’s ordinary operations, and from cases in which the employee does not direct his speech to students.... 

Second, and most importantly, Theis’s speech “owes its existence to his position” in the IMESD schools.... Theis displayed the books in his offices where he interacted with students as part of his assigned duties, and the displays were visible to those students during evaluations and meetings... 

This case is different [from the Supreme Court case of Kennedy v. Bremerton].  Theis’s display of books occurred in the course of performing his assigned duties and in a setting where he was responsible for interacting directly with his students.  Unlike Coach Kennedy, who was off the clock, Theis was not engaged in a moment of private expression detached from his role.  To the contrary, he was engaged in his core professional responsibilities.... 

Judge VanDyke filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

... [E]exactly no one believes the majority’s legal fiction—that anything seen by students on school grounds is necessarily government speech or perceived as such.  When a student sees personal materials hanging in a teacher’s office, they naturally identify that ornamentation as reflecting the teacher’s own personal views....  A free and open American society appropriately recoils at the prospect of public-school teachers becoming involuntarily conscripted apparatchiks of any administration’s particular orthodoxy....

The fact that Theis’s speech was private expression does not render it immune from government regulation.  When a government employee speaks in his personal capacity, he can only invoke the protections of the First Amendment if he can show that he spoke “on a matter of public concern.”...  If this burden is met, courts engage in “a delicate balancing of the competing interests ... [to determine] whether an employee’s speech interests are outweighed by “the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.” 

 ... [I]n this case, nothing could support the conclusion that the government’s interest in efficiently operating its public schools outweighed Theis’s speech interest.... [A]fter three years of Theis’s use of the books in decorating his office, the record contains no evidence whatsoever of “actual, material, and substantial disruption” in the school.... The only negative reaction to the books... all originated from a single, adult teacher who saw “the books in [Theis’s] office, researched them online, and then determined they were offensive.”...

[Thanks to Thomas Rutledge for the lead.]

9th Circuit: Trial Court Must Evaluate Penological Interest In Refusing to Replace Inmate's Arabic-Language Quran

In Kane v. Haynes, (9th Cir., July 23, 2026), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded a district court's dismissal of a free exercise claim brought by a Muslim inmate against prison officials. The court said in part:

While transferring then-inmate Ali Kane between units at the Airway Heights Correctional Center, Department of Corrections (DOC) officers disposed of an unmarked Arabic-language copy of the Quran.  After Kane initiated DOC’s grievance process, DOC offered Kane a replacement copy in English. Kane refused, stating that his religious practice requires him to memorize and utter his prayers in Arabic. 

Kane sued the correctional officers in their official capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming the officers’ destruction of Kane’s copy of the Quran and refusal to provide a substitute Arabic-language copy violated his First Amendment right to free exercise....

... Kane ... offered that his inability to memorize the Arabic passages has severe religious consequences (e.g., sin cannot be forgiven as required by Islam), and Kane, having since forgotten the verses, cannot meet his daily religious obligations.   

The district court, however, did not ... evaluate whether the government has shown a legitimate penological interest justifying its actions under [Turner v. Safley]...  We thus remand so that the district court may consider the Turner factors....