Florida Appellate Court Questions Hierarchical Deference Approach to Church Property Disputes

 In First United Methodist Church of Hobe Sound, Florida v. Board of Trustees of the Florida Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, Inc., (FL App., April 8, 2026), a group of Methodist churches which are seeking to disaffiliate from their parent body sue seeking to invalidate a portion of the United Methodist Church's Book of Discipline. Under Church rules, property of local congregations is held in trust for the entire denomination. The Church's highest ecclesiastical court held that under a provision in the Book of Discipline, the parent body requires large payments in order for these plaintiff congregations to disaffiliate and keep their real property. Florida courts have traditionally required civil courts to defer to decisions of a denomination's highest ecclesiastical tribunal in the case of hierarchical churches. The court said in part:

Appellants contend that their case is not precluded by the hierarchical deference doctrine. Because they raise state-law claims against the Discipline’s Trust Clause, in Appellants’ view, it is appropriate for a state court to wade into the dispute and resolve the matter on neutral state-law principles. But that view ignores the backdrop of the hotly contested internal church dispute that led to the filing of the complaint. It also disregards the significant implications of a state court considering claims that seek to undo the internal adjudication of the property dispute by the church’s highest judicial council. ...

... We acknowledge that Appellants are dissatisfied that UMC chose one paragraph in the Discipline to resolve their internal dispute, rather than another. But this Court is jurisdictionally incapable of forcing UMC to apply one provision of its governing document over another..... As a way around that conclusion, though, Appellants make the following two arguments. 

First, Appellants argue that whether the Trust Clause in the Discipline creates a valid trust is a legal question that can be resolved via the application of neutral principles of law....

In the alternative, Appellants allege that the doctrine violates the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause because it favors hierarchically structured churches over congregational denominations....

Because the hierarchical deference approach remains the applicable standard governing Florida courts’ consideration of property disputes arising from within hierarchical churches, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Appellants’ claims.... 

That said, given the significance of the First Amendment questions presented here, we certify the following question of great public importance to the Florida Supreme Court:

1) When asked to adjudicate state-law claims to resolve intra-church property disputes involving hierarchical churches, are Florida courts still governed by the hierarchical deference approach or may such disputes be resolved under the neutral principles of law approach?

Ministerial Exception May Not Apply to Non-Catholic 1st Grade Teacher in Catholic School

In Coates v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Savannah, (MD GA, April 6, 2026), a Georgia federal district court refused at this point in the litigation to dismiss on ministerial exception grounds claims of racial discrimination in employment brought against a Catholic school by an African American 1st grade teacher. The court said in part:

... [T]he amended complaint plausibly alleges Coates did not serve a ministerial function at SPCCS [St. Peter Clavar Catholic School].  Coates alleges that before her employment with SPCCS even began, Coates told Hillig [the school's principal] she was not Catholic and would not accept employment if it would require her to “participate in Catholic doctrine or worship services.”... Hillig responded by assuring Coates that religious instruction would not be her responsibility and that she would only need to escort the students to Mass on Wednesdays and monitor behavior.... During Coates’ employment, Coates did not teach religion or lead students in worship or prayer.... Nor did she participate in “Catholic worship or practices.” ... Yet, Coates received positive performance reviews....

To be sure, the complaint also alleges facts suggesting Coates may have served a ministerial role at SPCCS. Coates signed an employment contract designating her role as “ministerial” and requiring her to model the Catholic faith regardless of religion..... Still, on a motion to dismiss, Coates’ need only plausibly allege she served a non-ministerial function.... Coates has alleged facts suggesting that, despite SPCCS’ formal designation of Coates’ position as ministerial, SPCCS did not actually expect Coates to perform ministerial functions at the school, and ...accepted Coates until she participated in a police investigation against another teacher. Perhaps, as discovery develops, the undisputed facts will show that SPCCS, like most religious schools, has a sincere mission to promote religious education, and that Coates, even as a non-Catholic, served a vital role in that mission. But because the amended complaint plausibly alleg[es] that Coates’ position was non-ministerial, Defendants’ motion to dismiss her employment claims on the basis of the ministerial exception is DENIED...

The court dismissed plaintiff's Title VII religious discrimination claims on the basis of the religious institution exclusion in Title VII.

Nevada Supreme Court Interprets Scope of Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine

In Singh v. Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, (NV Sup. Ct., April 2, 2026), a 3-judge panel of the Nevada Supreme Court held that the neutral principles exception to the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine applies beyond disputes over ownership of church property. At issue was whether the Management Committee of the Northern Nevada Sikh Society, without approval of the general membership, had authority form a subcommittee to transfer the Sikh Temple building into a trust. The court said in part:

[A]bsent [U.S.] Supreme Court authority holding otherwise, we now clarify that the neutral-principles exception to the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine may apply beyond real property disputes among church members. Rather, the relevant inquiry for courts to resolve is whether the court is able to apply neutral principles of law to resolve the issues at hand without consideration of ecclesiastical or doctrinal matters.... In other words, when neutral principles of law can resolve the underlying dispute, then the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine does not apply....

... [T]he issues raised in the complaint do not require the district court to resolve ecclesiastical questions or consider Sikh doctrine, practice or texts.... [T]hese claims ...arise from NNSS's Management's purported failure to follow NNSS's bylaws in forming two committees, attempting to place the Temple in trust, in not maintaining adequate membership records, and in restricting members from inspecting NNSS's books and records.

Church Challenges Injunction Barring Use of Its Property for Worship Services

Suit was filed last week in a Florida federal district court by members and elders of the Coastal Family Church challenging a temporary injunction that was issued in January barring the Church from using large space it purchased in a shopping center under a condominium agreement. The owner of the remaining units in the shopping center brought suit citing the provision in the condominium agreement that prohibits use of units as "a place of public assembly." Plaintiff alleged that this includes use for church services. The trial court issued a temporary injunction barring use of the Church's unit for any public assembly while the case is being litigated. (Background.) Now, in Tilton v. Upchurch, (MD FL, filed 4/2/2026) (full text of complaint), the Church sues the judge who issued the temporary injunction, alleging that the injunction violates plaintiffs' 1st and 14th Amendment rights. The complaint alleges in part:

40. The state-court injunction, temporarily enjoining the state-court defendant from utilizing the building in Flagler-Square for religious worship services and other activities protected by the First Amendment, has “effectively barr[ed]” unnamed parties in the state-court proceeding, and Plaintiffs here, “from attending religious services, [and] strike[s] at the very heart of the First Amendment’s guarantee of religious liberty.”...

64. As a result of the state-court injunction, Plaintiffs’ pastor faces the crippling punishment of contempt and sanction for merely attempting to exercise constitutionally protected First Amendment rights and sincerely held religious beliefs....

201. The state-court injunction’s prohibition on religious services and religious gathering at Flagler Square violates the Establishment Clause because it demonstrates blatant hostility towards Christians and churches who must worship in person....

Liberty Counsel issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit. 

California's Marriage Laws Survive Unusual 1st Amendment Challenge

In Hunter v. State of California, (CD CA, March 31, 2026), a California federal district court accepted the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the United States Magistrate Judge in Hunter v. California, (CD CA, March 5, 2026). In the case, in an unusual challenge to the state's domestic relations law, Kathryn Rose Hunter sued challenging California's "authority to impose and maintain marital status" and "maintenance of marital records." She contended that this violates the 1st Amendment's Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. According to the federal Magistrate's opinion:

Plaintiff alleges that by "authorizing" her marriages and issuing certificate as proof of her married status, the State was "participating" in her marriages, which is "equivalent to polygamy."... This violates Plaintiff's right to freely exercise of her religious belief that a marriage should only involve "two persons and God."... She asserts a right to be free of any "State-imposed marital status," but she cannot obtain a divorce "without further State involvement." ... Plaintiff contends that by conditioning marital dissolution on "further State participation, the State creates an excessive entanglement between authority and religious doctrine," violating the Establishment Clause...

The Free Exercise Clause absolutely protects the right to believe in a religion; it does not absolutely protect all conduct associated with a religion....

California's statutes concerning civil marriage are neutral and of general applicability. They neither refer to religion nor aim to suppress religious beliefs. They do not restrict or condition civil marriage rights on affirming particular religious beliefs. They do not provide for individualized exemptions, and they operate independently of any religious ceremonies in which a couple getting married or divorced might choose to engage. Since the challenged statutes are neutral and generally applicable, rational basis review applies.... Protection of offspring, property interests, and the enforcement of marital responsibilities are but a few of commanding problems in the field of domestic relations with which the state must deal."... California's Family Code, which establishes a legal framework for recognizing the creation, existence, and dissolution of civil marriages, is rationally related to this legitimate government interest...

"[T]he Establishment Clause must be interpreted by reference to historical practices and understandings."... Courts must draw the line between what is permissible and impermissible in accordance with "the understanding of the Founding Fathers."...

State involvement in civil marriages by enacting laws that define how one becomes legally married or dissolves a legal marriage was permissible in the days of the Founding Fathers.... The California statutes at issue align with this historical tradition. They neither endorse nor coerce the practice of any particular religion....

Extra Airport Screening from Placement on Selectee List Does Not Violate Religious Freedom

In Maniar v. Noem, (D DC, April 1, 2026), a D.C. federal district court dismissed a suit brought by plaintiffs, husband and wife, who are U.S. citizens of Pakistani national origin, and are practicing Muslims. Plaintiffs were originally placed on the federal government's no-fly list. They were subsequently removed from it but remain in the Terrorist Screening Data Set and the Selectee List subset. They allege that the difficulties they have encountered in their air travel violate their due process and religious exercise rights. The court said in part:

... Ms. Shaikh has failed to allege any burden to her air travel beyond having to obtain her boarding pass from a ticketing agent and the boarding pass being designated for secondary screening.... Compared to delays faced by everyday air travelers, ... Ms. Shaikh’s allegations are mere inconveniences....

As to Mr. Maniar’s travel experience, Defendants argue that the bulk of his allegations stem from actions of foreign agents, and “the actions taken by [other countries] are not redressable by this Court.”...

Moreover, Plaintiffs alleged status on the Selectee List does not affect their ability to travel within the United States by any other mode of transportation....

Plaintiffs allege that because of the treatment that Mr. Maniar was subject to in Pakistan, he and his wife are concerned that they will be subject to similar treatment if they were to attempt to travel internationally to fulfill their religious obligations.... 

... Plaintiffs cite no authority to support their argument that a fear of traveling violates their right to religious expression. Thus, for the same reasons that Plaintiffs failed to allege a deprivation of their right to travel, they have failed to allege any deprivation of their right to practice their religion freely....

Here, Plaintiffs’ claim is premised on the assertion that they will be unable to travel to complete Hajj. However, ... Plaintiffs have failed to allege that their status on the Selectee List has resulted in significant, frequent travel delays, let alone an inability to travel at all....

... Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts supporting the claim that their freedom of movement is burdened, much less substantially burdened.... Since they have failed to do so, they have failed to plausibly allege a violation of the RFRA....

Exclusion of Religious Training from College Grant Program Is Upheld

In Johnson v. Fleming, (ED VA, March 31, 2026), a Virginia federal district court dismissed Free Exercise Clause, Establishment Clause, and Equal Protection Clause claims challenging religious exclusions from the Virginia Tuition Assistance Grant Program. The VTAG program provides grants to Virginia residents who attend private non-profit colleges, except for religious training or theological education. The court said so long as the Supreme Court's decision in Locke v. Davey remains good law, the claims against VTAG must fail.

The case also challenged a program that offers college grants, with similar exclusions, to Virginia National Guard members. The court did not dismiss the challenges to that program because the court had only a limited factual record about the procedures utilized to administer the program. However, the court refused to issue a preliminary injunction because it is unlikely that plaintiffs challenging the program will succeed on the merits.

Military Rule Barring Political Speech While in Uniform Did Not Violate Reservists Free Exercise Rights Under RFRA

In Yarbrough v. Saltzman, (D DC, April 3, 2026), a D.C. federal district court dismissed a claim by a major in the Air Force Reserve that his religious freedom rights under RFRA were violated when he was issued a letter of admonishment for statements he made while speaking at a celebration for a friend's retirement from the military. The court said in part:

At the event, held aboard the Battleship Missouri Memorial, Yarbrough delivered a speech while in his Air Force uniform that called on the audience to resist a “radical political faction” within the military who were fostering a culture of “incompetence and cowardice” among the ranks by requiring that service members undergo mandatory anti-extremism training....

Yarbrough argues that Saltzman substantially burdened his religious exercise by preventing him from carrying out his religious duty to “speak truth.” ... This Court disagrees....

The appropriate inquiry must be trained on the “nexus between religious practice and religious tenet”: whether the regulation meaningfully forecloses individuals’ opportunities to vindicate their religious conviction....  Thus, the question in this case is whether the letter of admonishment placed Yarbrough in such a position.   It did not.  A government action does not substantially burden religious beliefs when it merely forecloses one of a “multitude of means” at the plaintiff’s disposal to satisfy that obligation....

[Thanks to Eugene Volokh via Religionlaw for the lead.]

Recent Articles of Interest

From SSRN:

• Carl H. Esbeck, Church Autonomy and the Co-Religionist Hiring Practice at Issue in Union Gospel Mission of Yakima v. Brown, 162 F. 4th 1190 (9th Cir. 2026), (Notre Dame Law Review Reflections __ (forthcoming 2026)).
• Deborah Cantrell, Assessing the Law and Mindfulness Movement, (U of Colorado Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 26-14 (2026)).
• Abubakar Yusuf Mamud, From Securitization to Open War: Media Framing, Alliance Politics, and the Collapse of Coercive Diplomacy in the United States (US)-Israeli Bombing of Iran, (March 13, 2026).
• Jeremy Ross, The End of Peremptory Strikes?: Free Exercise and Religion-Based Batson Challenges, (87 Mont. L. Rev. 11 (2026)).
• Marie-Amelie George, Protecting Trans Rights, (January 01, 2026).
• Cyra Akila Choudhury, Reproductive Crimes, Digital Evidence, And The Limits Of Privacy Law (March 22, 2026).
• Charlotte LeBarron, Abortion Surveillance and the Data Broker Loophole, (N.Y.U. Journal of Legislation and Public Policy, Volume 28, No. 1, pp. 245-289 (2025)).
• Hershey H. Friedman, Inside the Biblical Mind: Chizkuni's Psychological Genius and the Art of Medieval Commentary, (March 15, 2026).

From SSRN (Non-U.S. Law):

• Yeshwant Naik, Human Rights Violations Against the LGBTQ+ Community in Iran, (March 14, 2026).
• Firas Sallam, The Separation of Legitimacies: Rethinking Shūrā in Islamic Constitutional Architecture, (March 11, 2026).
• Adekunle Saheed Akinola, Judicial Restraint and the Politics of Dignity: Rethinking Constitutional Silence in Nigeria's Same-Sex Marriage Law, (November 12, 2025).
• Zubair Abbasi, Book Review: Siddiqui, Sohaira Z. M. Islamic Law on Trial: Contesting Colonial Power in British India. Oakland: University of California Press, 2025, (February 01, 2026).
• Zubair Abbasi, Reconstruction of Sharīʿa through Judicial Ijtihād Inheritance Rights of Childless Widows under the Ithnā ʿAshariyya School in Pakistan, (March 14, 2026).
• Jacqueline Anthonysamy & Marlina Jamal, (De)Legitimation of Restrictive Abortion in Selected Malaysian Mainstream and Independent Newspapers: A Comparative Critical Discourse Analysis, (Social Science and Humanities Open (2026)).

From SmartCILP:

• Charles J. Russo, Controversies over the Free Speech Rights of Educators to Avoid Using Pronouns Inconsistent with Their Religious Beliefs: "The Beginning of the End" or "the End of the Beginning?", 23 Ave Maria Law Review 145-164 (2025).
• Jordana R. Goodman, Patently Inequitable, 105 Boston University Law Review 987-1048 (2025).
• Neal C. Ternes & Joseph Sabin, Them's Fighting Prayers, 49 Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 43-70 (2025).

Jehovah's Witnesses Tax Dispute Dismissed Under Tax Injunction Act and Comity Principles

In Christian Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. Township of Gloucester, (D NJ, April 1, 2026), a New Jersey federal district court, invoking the federal Tax Injunction Act as well as principles of comity, dismissed a suit by a Jehovah's Witnesses organization ("CCJW") challenging a Payment in Lieu of Taxes Agreement ("PILOT") that its predecessor made with the Township. The Agreement provides that the religious organization will make these payments so long as its Assembly Hall remains exempt from property taxes. Since 1993, CCJW and its predecessor have paid over $1.3 million. Annual payments have been raised over the years, and CCJW has stopped making payments under it after the Township refused to modify the agreement. The court said in part:

CCJW asks the Court to declare that the Township’s enforcement of the PILOT Agreement violates its state and federal constitutional rights and that the Agreement is void.... On its state law contract claims, it seeks an order voiding the Agreement and terminating its obligation to continue making payments under the Agreement...... In the alternative, it seeks reformation of the Agreement to conform to the parties’ expectations. .... CCJW also seeks restitution of amounts previously paid under the Agreement....

Nomenclature aside, CCJW is plainly seeking declaratory relief to determine its alleged tax-exempt status under state law and prevent the Township from potentially taking action to challenge that status and assess, levy, or collect property taxes. That is precisely the type of relief the TIA precludes....

Finally, to the extent CCJW seeks only to “void” the PILOT Agreement and does not seek declaratory relief regarding the Township’s future tax collection efforts, the comity doctrine would still counsel against exercising jurisdiction....

In sum, where, as here, resolving Plaintiff’s claims would require the Court to address issues so closely tied to the administration of state tax law, the comity doctrine counsels restraint when the courts of New Jersey are fully capable of adjudicating these state-law issues alongside Plaintiff’s federal constitutional claims.

Churches Fail to Obtain Injunction Against Enforcement of Human Smuggling Law

In Southeastern Synod of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America v. Finney, (MD TN March 31, 2026), a Tennessee federal district court refused to issue a preliminary injunction against prosecution under Tennessee's law against "human smuggling."  The law prohibits transporting with intent to conceal, harboring, concealing or shielding from detection a person illegally in the United States if done for commercial advantage or private financial gain.

Plaintiffs are churches that provide housing and various services to undocumented immigrants and receive donations to support these activities. Other plaintiffs are individuals who rent housing to undocumented immigrants. The state contended that the Tennessee statute does not apply to the activities of these plaintiffs. While the court expressed doubt over that interpretation of the statute, it nevertheless refused to issue an injunction, saying in part:

Defendants argue Plaintiffs have not shown a likelihood of irreparable harm because there is no evidence that any Tennessee official agrees with Plaintiffs’ interpretation of the law and plans to use it against them. Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ fear that they might be prosecuted under the law is insufficient to show an immediate threat of irreparable harm that warrants a preliminary injunction....

Notwithstanding the challenges in discerning the specific conduct proscribed by the statute, given Defendants’ insistence that Plaintiffs’ conduct is not unlawful and does not subject them to risk of prosecution, Plaintiffs have not shown an immediate non-speculative, non-theoretical threat of prosecution.... 

President Issues Easter Message

On Friday, the White House posted a Presidential Message on Easter (full text). The Message reads in part:

This Easter Sunday, the First Lady and I join with Christians all across our Nation and around the world in rejoicing in the Resurrection of Jesus Christ, whose triumph over sin and victory over death secured the promise of redemption and the hope of eternal life for all who believe in Him as Lord and Savior.

Sunday, we proclaim with joy that Christ has risen, a new creation has been ushered in, and evil and death have been conquered forever through the unmatched power of God’s sacrificial love....

As we rejoice in this Easter season, we are reminded that the life of Jesus Christ and the truths of the Gospel have inspired our way of life and our national identity for 250 years.  From the Christian patriots who won and secured our liberty on the battlefield and every generation since, the love of Christ has unfailingly guided our Nation through calm waters and dark storms....

Noise Ordinance Is Constitutional as Applied to Anti-Abortion Sidewalk Advocacy

In Knotts v. City of Cuyahoga Falls. (ND OH, March 31, 2026), an Ohio federal district court upheld the application of a noise ordinance to anti-abortion sidewalk counselors who engage in sidewalk advocacy based on their religious beliefs. The court rejected plaintiffs' free speech, free exercise, and vagueness challenges to the ordinance, saying in part:

The Court notes that on its face 1) the Ordinance does not regulate speaker identity, but rather the amplification of the speaker, 2) it does not regulate the content of speech, but rather the amplification of said speech, and 3) the Ordinance exempts certain locations holding specific events (concerts, live outdoor musical or theatrical performances) from amplification restrictions, not content.  For example, under this Ordinance, a religious organization hosting a theatrical performance on its property is exempt from the amplification restrictions whether that performance is pro-life or pro-choice.  The Ordinance is content neutral. ...

The Ordinance applies to everyone, and does not regulate nor mention any religious activity, creed or affiliation.....  It does not distinguish among religions or between religion and non-religion.  Accordingly, it is neutral and generally applicable.  

Plaintiffs summarily assert that the Ordinance violates their first Amendment right to free exercise as it applies to them.... Plaintiffs explain that they “hold sincere religious convictions that compel them to engage in sidewalk advocacy to save the lives of the unborn, which they express through amplified speech.”... However, “‘a generally applicable law that incidentally burdens religious practices usually will be upheld.’” 

... [T]he burden does not infringe “free exercise unless it places a substantial burden on a central religious belief or practice[.]”   There is no such burden here.  Plaintiffs were not denied the right to speak on their religious views or otherwise express their views, they merely were not permitted to engage in amplified speech over the complaint of neighbors....

Church Wins Its Fight Over Fire Code Requirements

Last November, an Ohio state appellate court remanded to the trial court a church's appeal of an injunction that had been issued against it enforcing Ohio's fire code requirements for residential buildings. (See prior posting.) At issue was whether the church's "overnight ministry" triggered fire code requirements for residential use. The appellate court remanded the case because the trial court had not applied strict scrutiny as required by the Conscience Clause of the Ohio Constitution. Now in Pool v. Dad's Place, (OH Com. Pl., April 1, 2026), the Ohio trial court on remand held in favor of the Church and dismissed the fire department's request for injunctive relief. The court said in part:

Having applied strict scrutiny as set forth in the Sixth District's instructions, the Court concedes that the Fire Chief's enforcement of the fire code fails because it lacks a compelling interest and isn't the least restrictive means of enforcing fire safety. The City has given waivers to other businesses like hotels, but has refused to give the church a similar accommodation. this is fatal under strict scrutiny. Therefore, a judgment in favor of Dad's Place must be entered.

First Liberty Institute issued a press release announcing the decision. 

Court Orders Removal of Arkansas 10 Commandments Monument from State Capitol Grounds

In Cave v. Jester, (ED AR, March 31, 2026), an Arkansas federal district court ordered the Arkansas Secretary of State to remove a Ten Commandments monument from the Arkansas State Capitol grounds. The monument was identical to the one approved by the Supreme Court in the Van Orden case. In ordering removal of the Arkansas monument, the court, in a 148-page opinion, said in part:

This case is factually distinguishable from both Van Orden and [the 8th Circuit's]  Plattsmouth [decision].  Perhaps most notably here, the Ten Commandments Monument is new, and the Orsi, Cave, and Intervenor plaintiffs did not wait many years before challenging the monument. ...

Additionally, unlike in Van Orden and Plattsmouth where the Ten Commandments monuments were funded by the Fraternal Order of the Eagles, a civic organization with the secular purpose to reduce juvenile delinquency, here the Ten Commandments Monument was funded by a GoFundMe account set up by Senator Rapert through the Foundation with major funding from Agape Church in Little Rock and PureFlix Entertainment, whose stated purpose as a “Christian Movie Studio” is “to influence the global culture for Christ through media” and whose mission is to “to strive to make a difference for His name.”...  

Also, the context of the passage of the Display Act giving rise to the Ten Commandments Monument is different from the context of the monuments in Van Orden and Plattsmouth.  The passage of the Display Act itself indicates that the Display Act favors religion in violation of the Establishment Clause.....     

Further, the Arkansas General Assembly’s stated purpose for passing the Display Act was not to commemorate the State’s religious heritage or the development of the law or any other secular idea.  Instead, the Arkansas General Assembly’s stated purpose in passing legislation to mandate the placement of a new, stand-alone monument on State Capitol grounds was “commemorating the Ten Commandments.”  Ark. Code Ann. § 22-3-221(b)(1)....

Axios reports on the decision.

Pastors' Defamation Suit Barred by Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine

In Nieto v. Great Bridge Presbyterian Church, Inc., (VA App., March 31, 2026), a Virginia state appellate court held that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine required dismissal of a defamation suit brought by two pastors against the church that they formerly led. The complaint also alleged tortious interference with plaintiffs' pastoral relationship with the congregation. The claims grew out of a letter that was emailed to 750 persons after plaintiffs were dismissed from their pastoral relationship with their congregation.

The court said in part:

Here, the appellants base their defamation claims on a list of statements that can be categorized as either 1) purported mismanagement of funds or 2) the intimidation and shunning of “dissenters” or other members of the congregation.  All statements in each category are barred from civil-court review because of the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine....

Each of these statements would require us to evaluate and determine the appropriate financial management standard for pastors serving as leaders in the Presbyterian denomination and whether and to what extent the appellants may have breached that standard as determined by the denomination.... Great Bridge is a religious institution established as a local church by the Presbyterian denomination and therefore is subject to the religious denomination’s doctrinal and organizational documents, including certain policies and beliefs that pertain to proper church order, practices, governance, and leadership. ...

Without first determining the proper method that a pastor serving a Presbyterian church should responsibly exercise when administering the finances of a Presbyterian church, we cannot determine whether the statements regarding how the appellants allegedly misused that authority are actionable.  And a secular judicial body determining the fitness and qualifications of the office of a pastor who governs a church would violate that church’s “autonomy with respect to internal management decisions that are essential to the institution’s central mission.”...

Similarly, we cannot use neutral principles of law to discern whether the statements about the intimidation and shunning of “dissenters” or other members of the congregation are actionable....

Court Enforces EEOC Subpoena for Information on Jewish Employees at Penn

In U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania, (ED PA, March 31, 2026), a Pennsylvania federal district court enforced the EEOC's subpoena for information about Jewish employees of the University of Pennsylvania. The EEOC is investigating a charge that Penn engaged in harassment of Jewish employees in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The court said in part:

... [U]unlike investigations into ... sexual harassment or racial discrimination, the subpoena sought information pertaining to people’s faith, making its requests more intrusive and calling for greater sensitivity, something the EEOC now acknowledges. 

One of those requests in particular sought ... lists of school groups and organizations “related to the Jewish religion,” including personal contact information for Penn employees in those groups.  Though ineptly worded, the request had an understandable purpose—to obtain in a narrowly tailored way ... information on individuals in Penn’s Jewish community who could have experienced or witnessed antisemitism in the workplace....

Penn and other groups and associations the Court permitted to intervene significantly raised the dispute’s temperature by impliedly and even expressly comparing the EEOC’s efforts to protect Jewish employees from antisemitism to the Holocaust and the Nazis’ compilation of “lists of Jews.”  Such allegations are unfortunate and inappropriate.  They also obfuscate the Court’s limited role and the discrete legal issues before it.  And the EEOC no longer seeks any employee’s specific affiliation with a particular Jewish-related organization on campus.... 

Politico reports on the decision.

Court Refuses to Issue Consent Decree Exempting Church Sermons from Johnson Amendment

 As previously reported, in a suit brought against the Internal Revenue Service by two churches and two other non-profit religious groups challenging the Johnson Amendment, the IRS joined plaintiffs in filing a proposed Consent Judgment. The Consent Judgment proposed that the court issue an order enjoining the IRS from enforcing the Johnson Amendment against the churches. It enunciated a new IRS policy of permitting houses of worship to engage in speech concerning electoral politics viewed through the lens of religious faith made to their congregations in connection with religious services through their customary channels of communication on matters of faith. This would permit clergy to endorse political candidates from the pulpit. However, now the Texas federal district court in which the suit is pending has refused, on jurisdictional grounds, to adopt the proposed consent decree. In National Religious Broadcasters v. Bessent, (ED TX, March 31, 2026), the court held that the Tax Anti-Injunction Act and the related tax-suit bar in the Declaratory Judgment Act deprive it of jurisdiction to enter the proposed injunction. The court said in part:

The government cites no authority for its position that its own consent to an injunction regarding a condition for tax benefits creates jurisdiction that the AIA or DJA otherwise denies....

Other fora, however, may be available. A refund suit could be brought if a tax were ultimately collected....  And an exception in 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) now allows a ... declaratory suit—available in one of three courts headquartered in the District of Columbia— if the IRS were to make any determination with respect to an organization’s § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status. A dispute in that posture would also have the benefit of a specific set of facts upon which the IRS made a determination.

Americans United for Separation of Church and State which had sought to intervene in the case to oppose treating houses of worship differently than secular nonprofits issued a press release reacting to the decision.  Texas Tribune reports on the decision.