In United States v. Skrmetti,(Sup.Ct., June 18, 2025), the U.S. Supreme Court today by a vote of 6-3 upheld Tennessee's law that bars both hormonal and surgical gender transition procedures for minors. The case generated 5 separate opinions spanning 118 pages. Chief Justice Roberts' majority opinion held that the Tennessee law does not trigger heightened scrutiny. He said in part:
This Court has not previously held that transgender individuals are a suspect or quasi-suspect class. And this case, in any event, does not raise that question because SB1 does not classify on the basis of transgender status. As we have explained, SB1 includes only two classifications: healthcare providers may not administer puberty blockers or hormones to minors (a classification based on age) to treat gender dysphoria, gender identity disorder, or gender incongruence (a classification based on medical use). The plaintiffs do not argue that the first classification turns on transgender status, and our case law forecloses any such argument as to the second....
... [T]here is a rational basis for SB1’s classifications. Tennessee concluded that there is an ongoing debate among medical experts regarding the risks and benefits associated with administering puberty blockers and hormones to treat gender dysphoria, gender identity disorder, and gender incongruence. SB1’s ban on such treatments responds directly to that uncertainty....
Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:
This case carries a simple lesson: In politically contentious debates over matters shrouded in scientific uncertainty, courts should not assume that self-described experts are correct.
Deference to legislatures, not experts, is particularly critical here. Many prominent medical professionals have declared a consensus around the efficacy of treating children’s gender dysphoria with puberty blockers, cross-sex hormones, and surgical interventions, despite mounting evidence to the contrary. They have dismissed grave problems undercutting the assumption that young children can consent to irreversible treatments that may deprive them of their ability to eventually produce children of their own. They have built their medical determinations on concededly weak evidence. And, they have surreptitiously compromised their medical recommendations to achieve political ends.
Justice Barrett, joined by Justice Thomas, filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:
Because the Court concludes that Tennessee’s Senate Bill 1 does not classify on the basis of transgender status, it does not resolve whether transgender status constitutes a suspect class.... I write separately to explain why, in myview, it does not....
Beyond the treatment of gender dysphoria, transgender status implicates several other areas of legitimate regulatory policy—ranging from access to restrooms to eligibility for boys’ and girls’ sports teams. If laws that classify based on transgender status necessarily trigger heightened scrutiny, then the courts will inevitably be in the business of “closely scrutiniz[ing] legislative choices” in all these domains....
Justice Alito filed an opi nion concurring in part, saying in part:
I do notjoin Part II–A–2 of the opinion of the Court, which concludes that SB1 does not classify on the basis of “transgender status.” There is a strong argument that SB1does classify on that ground, but I find it unnecessary to decide that question. I would assume for the sake of argument that the law classifies based on transgender status, but I would nevertheless sustain the law because such a classification does not warrant heightened scrutiny. I also do not join Part II–A–3 of the Court’s opinion because I do not believe that the reasoning employed in Bostock v. Clayton County ... is applicable when determining whether a law classifies based on sex for Equal Protection Clause purposes.
Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Jackson and joined in part by Justice Kagan, saying in part:
Tennessee’s law expressly classifies on the basis of sex and transgender status, so the Constitution and settled precedent require the Court to subject it to intermediate scrutiny. The majority contorts logic and precedent to say otherwise, inexplicably declaring it must uphold Tennessee’s categorical ban on lifesaving medical treatment so long as “‘any reasonably conceivable state of facts’” might justify it... Thus, the majority subjects a law that plainly discriminates on the basis of sex to mere rational-basis review. By retreating from meaningful judicial review exactly where it matters most, the Court abandons transgender children and their families to political whims....
Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:
I take no view on how SB1 would fare under heightened scrutiny.... So I would both start and stop at the question of what test SB1 must satisfy. As JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR shows, it is heightened scrutiny...
SCOTUSblog reports on the decision.