City-Sponsored Prayer Vigil Violated Establishment Clause

In Rojas v. City of Ocala, (MD FL, June 26, 2024), a Florida federal district court held that a prayer vigil in the town square organized by the police department violated the Establishment Clause. The 2014 vigil was planned in order to encourage witnesses to a shooting spree to come forward. The court in a previous decision found that the vigil violated the Establishment Clause, but the 9th Circuit remanded the case after the U.S. Supreme Court in 2022 repudiated the Lemon test and adopted a new test for determining when there has been an Establishment Clause violation. (See prior posting.) Reflecting on the time that had passed since the vigil, the court said:

In the meantime, the Chief of Police, Greg Graham, passed away; the Mayor of Ocala at the time left office; and the Prayer Vigil (which occurred in 2014) has not been repeated. Thus, the Court inquired whether it would make sense to call it a day on this timeworn litigation. But the parties, both represented by lawyers who specialize in First Amendment religion cases, insist on going forward. And, as the Court previously awarded nominal damages, the case is not moot....  So on we go.

Reaching the conclusion that under the Supreme Court's new Establishment Clause test set out in Kennedy v. Bremerton School District there was still an Establishment Clause violation, the court said in part:

Based on the undisputed facts, the City’s involvement in conceiving, organizing, and implementing the Prayer Vigil is government sponsorship of a religious event...

... [T]he City’s support of the Prayer Vigil favored a religious viewpoint. While the Prayer Vigil was geared towards Christianity, there is some evidence that it was not limited to any one faith.... But that thin layer of neutrality is not enough to avoid an Establishment Clause violation....

Similarly, Chief Graham’s offer to connect an objector, Paul Tjaden, with organizers... is not comparable to neutrality....  Trying to achieve neutrality towards religion by inviting an atheist to speak at an event whose only purpose is prayer fails to treat the secular viewpoint with the same level of respect being provided to religious prayer.

As Kennedy commands, the Court bases its decision on a “historically sensitive understanding of the Establishment Clause”....

Oklahoma Supreme Court Says Creation of Religious Charter School Is Unconstitutional

In Drummond v. Oklahoma Statewide Virtual Charter School Board, (OK Sup, Ct., June 25, 2024), the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the state Charter School Board's authorization of a Catholic sponsored publicly-funded charter school violates Oklahoma statutes, the Oklahoma Constitution and the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. The court said in part:

Although a public charter school, St. Isidore is an instrument of the Catholic church, operated by the Catholic church, and will further the evangelizing mission of the Catholic church in its educational programs. The expenditure of state funds for St. Isidore's operations constitutes the use of state funds for the benefit and support of the Catholic church. It also constitutes the use of state funds for "the use, benefit, or support of . . . a sectarian institution." The St. Isidore Contract violates the plain terms of Article 2, Section 5 of the Oklahoma Constitution....

Because it is a governmental entity and a state actor, St. Isidore cannot ignore the mandates of the Establishment Clause, yet a central component of St. Isidore's educational philosophy is to establish and operate the school as a Catholic school. St. Isidore will fully incorporate Catholic teachings into every aspect of the school, including its curriculum and co-curricular activities. It will require students to spend time in religious instruction and activities, as well as permit state spending in direct support of the religious curriculum and activities within St. Isidore--all in violation of the Establishment Clause....

... [W]hat St. Isidore requests from this Court is beyond the fair treatment of a private religious institution in receiving a generally available benefit, implicating the Free Exercise Clause. It is about the State's creation and funding of a new religious institution violating the Establishment Clause.12 Even if St. Isidore could assert free exercise rights, those rights would not override the legal prohibition under the Establishment Clause. Compliance with the Establishment Clause in this case is a compelling governmental interest that satisfies strict scrutiny under other provisions of the First Amendment.

Vice Chief Justice Rowe concurred in part and dissented in part, saying that he concurred only in the conclusion "that Article 1, Section 5 of the Oklahoma Constitution mandates that public charter schools are nonsectarian."

Justice Kuehn dissented, saying in part:

St. Isidore would not become a "state actor" merely by contracting with the State to provide a choice in educational opportunities. By allowing St. Isidore to operate a virtual charter school, the State would not be establishing, aiding, or favoring any particular religious organization. To the contrary: Excluding private entities from contracting for functions, based solely on religious affiliation, would violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.

AP reports on the decision.

Suit Challenges Louisiana's Law Requiring Posting of 10 Commandments in Public Schools

Suit was filed yesterday in a Louisiana federal district court by a group of parents (some of whom are clergy) on behalf of their minor children challenging Louisiana's recently enacted statute that requires the posting of the Ten Commandments in every public-school classroom. Contending that the law violates the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, the complaint (full text) in Roake v. Brumley, (MD LA, filed 6/24/2024) alleges in part:

Permanently posting the Ten Commandments in every Louisiana public-school classroom—rendering them unavoidable—unconstitutionally pressures students into religious observance, veneration, and adoption of the state’s favored religious scripture. It also sends the harmful and religiously divisive message that students who do not subscribe to the Ten Commandments—or, more precisely, to the specific version of the Ten Commandments that H.B. 71 requires schools to display—do not belong in their own school community and should refrain from expressing any faith practices or beliefs that are not aligned with the state’s religious preferences. And it substantially interferes with and burdens the right of parents to direct their children’s religious education and upbringing.  

...The state’s main interest in passing H.B. 71 was to impose religious beliefs on public-school children, regardless of the harm to students and families. The law’s primary sponsor and author, Representative Dodie Horton, proclaimed during debate over the bill that it “seeks to have a display of God’s law in the classroom for children to see what He says is right and what He says is wrong.”

The advocacy groups bringing the suit (ACLU, Americans United, FFRF) issued a press release announcing the filing of the suit.

Missouri Abortion Bans Do Not Violate State Constitution's Establishment Clauses

In Blackmon v. State of Missouri, (MO Cir. Ct., June 1, 2024), a Missouri trial court held that Missouri's various statutory provisions banning abortion do not violate the Establishment Clauses of the Missouri Constitution. Plaintiffs focused particularly on the mention of God in one of the statutory provisions and the legislative determination that life begins at conception in other provisions. The court concluded that the language mentioning God was similar to that in the Preamble to the Missouri Constitution, and that finding that language problematic would call into question whether the state Constitution's Preamble itself violates the Constitution.  In rejecting plaintiffs' other challenges, the court said in part:

Large portions of the parties' arguments centered around comments made by legislators concerning their religious motivations for supporting the Challenged Provisions. However, the court finds that individual comments by legislators should be given little to no consideration when determining the constitutionality of the Challenged Provisions....

The court does not accept Petitioners' argument that the determination that life begins at conception is strictly a religious one. The plain language of the Challenged Provisions stating that life begins at conception do not do so in religious terms.... While the determination that life begins at conception may run counter to some religious beliefs, it is not itself necessarily a religious belief. As such, it does not prevent all men and women form worshiping Almighty God or not worshipping according to the dictates of their own consciences....

Americans United issued a press release responding to the decision.

Church Sues Town Over Zoning Objections to Temporary Shelter Ministry

Suit was filed last week in a Colorado federal district court by a non-denominational Christian church challenging a town's claim that the church's Temporary Shelter Ministry violates the town's zoning ordinance. The complaint (full text) in Church of the Rock, Inc. v. Town of Castle Rock, Colorado, (D CO, filed 5/13/2024) alleges that the church's rights under the First Amendment as well as the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act are violated by the town's objections to the church's use of an RV and a trailer in the church's parking lot as temporary or emergency shelter for homeless families. The church also claimed unlawful retaliation by the town. Plaintiff additionally filed a Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Preliminary Injunction (full text). First Liberty issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

10th Circuit: Vaccine Exemption for Only Some Religions Violates 1st Amendment

In Jane Does 1-11 v. Board of Regents of the University of Colorado, (10th Cir., May 7, 2024), the U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals held that the policies for granting or denying a religious exemption from the Covid vaccine mandate on one of the campuses of the University of Colorado violated the 1st Amendment's Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. As explained by the court:

The September 1 Policy declared that “[a] religious exemption may be submitted based on a person’s religious belief whose teachings are opposed to all immunizations.” ...  The Administration made clear that it would “only accept requests for religious exemption that cite to the official doctrine of an organized religion . . . as announced by the leaders of that religion.”  ....

...  Therefore, as the Administration explained to Anschutz students and employees, Christian Scientists and Jehovah’s Witnesses would qualify for an exemption under the Administration’s criteria.  However, the Administration would reject an application for an exemption if it deemed the applicant’s beliefs “personal,” not “religious,” or “not part of a comprehensive system of beliefs.”...  For example, the Administration decided that “it is ‘morally acceptable’ for Roman Catholics to take vaccines against COVID-19,” and that any Roman Catholic objections to the COVID-19 vaccine are “personal beliefs,” not “religious beliefs.” ... For similar reasons, the Administration refused to approve exemptions for Buddhist applicants.  Nor would the Administration approve exemptions for applicants who were members of the Eastern Orthodox Church.  The Administration also rejected exemption applications from Evangelical Christians, non-denominational Protestants, and applicants who did not specify whether they were affiliated with a particular religious organization....

The University adopted a modified policy on September 24 in the face of litigation, but, according to the majority, it was a mere pretext to continue its September 1 policy. The majority found that both policies were unconstitutional, summarizing its holding in part as follows:

We hold that a government policy may not grant exemptions for some religions, but not others, because of differences in their religious doctrines, which the Administration’s first policy did.  We further hold that the government may not use its views about the legitimacy of a religious belief as a proxy for whether such belief is sincerely-held, which the Administration did in implementing the first policy.  Nor may the government grant secular exemptions on more favorable terms than religious exemptions, which the Administration’s second policy does.  Finally, we hold that the policies at issue in this appeal were motivated by religious animus, and are therefore subject to strict scrutiny—which neither policy survives.  The district court concluded otherwise and, in so doing, abused its discretion.....

Judge Ebel filed a partial dissent, saying in part:

I agree the September 1 mandate should be enjoined preliminarily, although for reasons different from those relied upon by the majority.  However, I would not enjoin the September 24 mandate....  

... I see no evidence indicating that the University adopted either mandate out of an animus—that is, a hostility—toward religion generally or toward some religions in particular.  Second, Plaintiffs have not shown that the two inquiries the University posed to those applying for a religious exemption under the September 1 mandate infringed any First Amendment protection.  The University was entitled to ask applicants why they opposed being vaccinated in order to determine whether that opposition was based on religious beliefs and, if so, whether those religious beliefs were sincerely held and, if so, how those beliefs could be accommodated.

Thomas More Society issued a press release announcing the decision. 

5th Circuit Remands Muslim Inmate's RLUIPA and Establishment Clause Claims

 In Lozano v. Collier, (5th Cir., April 11, 2024), the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a portion of the district court's decision and vacated another portion of it in a challenge by a Muslim inmate to practices that allegedly burdened plaintiff's ability to exercise his religion. The court said in part:

In his first RLUIPA claim, Lozano alleges that the [Texas Department of Criminal Justice] Defendants burdened his religious exercise by denying him the opportunity to shower privately with other Muslim inmates for Jumah.  He alleges that the shower conditions—which include inmates who are “naked, cussing, speaking idol talk” and inmates who are “homosexuals and predators”—make it impossible for him to meet his “holy obligation for cleanliness in prayer for Jumah”...   

Lozano’s second RLUIPA claim, alleges that the TDCJ defendants burdened his religious liberty by denying him a private cell to pray..... Lozano alleges... that other inmates in his cell intruded into his prayer space and tried to provoke him to fight them during his attempts to pray....

Lozano’s third RLUIPA claim involves an alleged lack of access to religious programming and instruction, namely, Taleem and Quranic studies. ...

In his § 1983 claim, Lozano contends that the existence of Jewish- and Native-American-designated units, and the absence of a Muslim-designated unit, constitutes a neutrality problem and violates the Establishment Clause.  

Lozano also alleges that the TDCJ’s faith-based dormitories have a curriculum that requires inmates to attend Christian-based classes, despite the faith-based dorms being nominally open to inmates of all religions. ...

... [W]e reverse the district court’s order granting summary judgment on Lozano’s RLUIPA claims... and vacate and remand for further consideration....

The district court held that Lozano failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact on whether the absence of a Muslim-designated unit or dorm violates the Establishment Clause.... We vacate and remand this claim to the district court to reconsider, in a manner consistent with applicable precedent and this opinion....

Satanic Temple Can Move Ahead with Establishment Clause Challenge to Its Treatment by City Council

In The Satanic Temple v. The City of Chicago, (ND IL, March 31, 2024), an Illinois federal district court held that The Satanic Temple ("TST") had alleged enough to move ahead on its claim that the city had violated the Establishment Clause by constantly delaying for over three years a request by a TST clergyman to deliver an invocation at a Chicago City Council meeting.  The court said in part:

The Establishment Clause requires that the City treat Vavrick the same as it would any other clergy member from any other religion. Assuming, therefore, that the City has not scheduled Vavrick to give an invocation because of his religious beliefs, such practice violates the Establishment Clause.

The court however dismissed plaintiffs' free speech claim finding that plaintiffs had not plausibly alleged that City Council invocations are anything other than government speech. It also refused to grant a preliminary injunction.

First Amendment Precludes Court from Enforcing Mahr in Divorce Action

 In Omid v. Ahmadi, (CT Super., March 18, 2024), a Connecticut state trial court in a action for dissolution of a marriage refused to enforce a mahr (dowry) agreement because interpreting it would require the court to interpret religious principles.  The mahr was entered by the parties in connection with their marriage in Afghanistan. The husband who had apparently been a translator for the U.S. military during the Afghan war received a visa to the United States and then returned to Afghanistan for one month to enter an arranged marriage. Three years later he arranged for his wife to obtain a U.S. visa. One year after she came to the U.S., the parties separated. In denying the wife's request in the dissolution case for an order enforcing the mahr, the court said in part:

The parties disagree as to when the 100,000 Afghanis must be paid, and whether, as the defendant argues, the terms "prompt" and "deferred" as used in the agreement describe a general duty to pay at any time, or a specific duty to pay one amount before marriage and one amount upon divorce or death of the husband. The term "prompt" in the parties' agreement is ambiguous and would require the court to look outside the four corners of the contract....

On the basis of the foregoing, to the extent that construction of the contract language would require this court to reference Islamic religious principles to determine the meaning of the terms employed, such action would likely violate the religion clauses of the first amendment of the United States constitution. The present agreement is sparse, and its terms are ill-defined without extratextual evidence. Because this extratextual evidence involves considerations of what the terms mean under Islamic law, the agreement is unenforceable because it is likely impossible for the court to disentangle secular from religious considerations.

Wisconsin Supreme Court Says Catholic Charities Not Exempt from Unemployment Comp Law

 In Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. v. State of Wisconsin Labor and Industry Review Commission, (WI Sup. Ct., March 14, 2024), the Wisconsin Supreme Court by a vote of 4-3 held that Catholic Charities Bureau and four of its sub-entities are not entitled to an exemption from the state's unemployment compensation law.  The statute exempts nonprofit organizations "operated primarily for religious purposes and operated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a church or convention or association of churches." The court concluded that under the statute, what is important is the purpose of the nonprofit organization, not the purpose of the church which controls it. The court said in part:

... [I]n determining whether an organization is "operated primarily for religious purposes" within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2., we must examine both the motivations and the activities of the organization....

CCB and the sub-entities profess to have a religious motivation.... However, accepting an organization's motivations does not end the inquiry as we must also examine its activities....

 Here, such criteria weigh in favor of a determination that CCB's and the sub-entities' activities are not "primarily" religious in nature.  The record demonstrates that CCB and the sub-entities, which are organized as separate corporations apart from the church itself, neither attempt to imbue program participants with the Catholic faith nor supply any religious materials to program participants or employees.  Although not required, these would be strong indications that the activities are primarily religious in nature....

CCB's and the sub-entities' activities are primarily charitable and secular.  The sub-entities provide services to individuals with developmental and mental health disabilities.  These activities include job training, placement, and coaching, as well as services related to activities of daily living.  CCB provides background support and management services for these activities——a wholly secular endeavor....  

Such services can be provided by organizations of either religious or secular motivations, and the services provided would not differ in any sense....

The court also concluded that neither this inquiry nor the required payment of unemployment tax violates the Free Exercise or Establishment Clauses.

Justice Bradley, joined in part by Chief Justice Ziegler, filed a lengthy dissenting opinion, saying in part:

 Impermissibly entangling the government in church doctrine, the majority astonishingly declares Catholic Charities are not "operated primarily for religious purposes" because their activities are not "religious in nature."... The statute, however, requires only that a nonprofit be operated primarily for a religious reason.

Justice Hagedorn also filed a brief dissenting opinion.

AP reports on the decision, as does Courthouse News Service,

Ban on Caste Discrimination Is Constitutional

In Bagal v. Sawant, (WD WA, March 8, 2024), a Washington federal district court rejected First and 14th Amendment challenges to the City of Seattle's adding of "caste" as a protected class under its anti-discrimination Ordinance. The court said in part:

First, Plaintiff argues that incorporating “caste” into existing anti-discrimination laws ipso facto creates a stigma, levelled towards a specific and insular minority group, namely members of the Hindu religion....

Plaintiff simply does not allege they are burdened, in any manner, from practicing their faith.... [H]aving failed to allege a cognizable injury, Plaintiff de facto lacks standing to assert a Free Exercise challenge to the Ordinance. Plaintiff’s Establishment Clause claim is similarly unavailing.... Fundamentally, Plaintiff’s reasoning is that the City of Seattle’s involvement on an issue of equal importance to practitioners of a certain religion becomes, as a consequence, activity in favor or opposition to that religion. And that, because the City of Seattle opted to disfavor caste-based forms of discrimination, a fortiori it condemned all notions of caste as it was understood by any religion. But that logic proves too much. And even assuming, arguendo, that the Ordinance does condemn notions of caste as is believed by a certain religion, that does not constitute activity in support or disparagement of that religion. For instance, birth control is a topic that involves both religious beliefs and general welfare concerns. And yet, no court has ever held that government approval of birth control violates the Establishment Clause....

It is not enough, in other words, that the anti-caste legislation strikes members of a religion as reflecting poorly on their religious beliefs.... In this case, the Ordinance’s principal effect is not to endorse a religion, but simply to bolster local anti-discrimination laws.  Any coincidental reference to a shared phenomenon (such as caste) is secondary, if not wholly, immaterial....

Second, Plaintiff contends that the Ordinance violates the Equal Protection Clause....

Nowhere does the text of the Ordinance make use of prohibited classifications.  Rather, the Ordinance is facially neutral and of general applicability.  Moreover, wholly absent from Plaintiff’s complaint are any facts suggesting that the legislative drafters were actually motivated by racial or ethnic animus.... Further to the point, Plaintiff’s complaint does not plausibly allege that the City of Seattle has applied the Ordinance in a discriminatory manner.

9th Circuit: On Supervised Release, Must Have Secular Alternative To 12-Step Program Requirement

 In United States v. Rourke, (9th Cir., Feb. 15, 2024), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals held that it was "plain error" for a district court to impose as a condition of supervised release, without a non-religious alternative, that defendant live at and participate in a 12-step based halfway house if his probation officer requires it. The court said in part:

A twelve-step program is “a distinctive approach to overcoming addictive, compulsive, or behavioral problems,” which “asks each member to ... recognize a supreme spiritual power, which can give the member strength.” .... We have previously held that compelling a parolee to participate in an “Alcoholics Anonymous 12 step program” violated the Establishment Clause....

... [R]emand to the district court to modify the condition is required. So long as the revised condition explicitly notes Rourke’s right to object to the imposition of religious-based treatment and to be offered a secular alternative, no Establishment Clause violation will result.

Good News Clubs Sue for Access to Hawaii Schools

Suit was filed two weeks ago in a Hawaii federal district court against the Hawaii Department of Education and four school districts in which schools have denied permission for Good News Clubs to use various school facilities for after-school programs. The complaint (full text) in Child Evangelism Fellowship of Hawaii, Inc. v. Hawaii State Department of Education, (D HI, filed 1/23/2024), alleges that the denials violate plaintiff's free speech, free exercise, Establishment Clause and equal protection rights. Plaintiff has also filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction accompanied by a Memorandum of Law supporting the Motion (full text). Liberty Counsel issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Questions of Fact Remain in Challenge to Application Process for Prison Chaplaincy Supervisor

 In Bridges v. Prince Georges County, Maryland, (D MD, Feb. 1, 2024), a Maryland federal district court refused to grant summary judgment for either plaintiff or the defendants in a suit by a Muslim chaplain alleging that his 1st Amendment rights were violated by the application process for a paid supervisory position at the county detention center.  At issue was a "Statement of Applicant's Christian Faith" that was part of the application form created by Prison Ministry of America (PMA) which, under contract with the county, was to provide a non-denominational chaplain supervisor for the jail.  After finding that plaintiff had standing and that PMA was a state actor during the hiring process, the court said in part:

Because a reasonable jury could find the Statement of Christian Faith to be “a religious test” ..., summary judgment cannot be granted in favor of Defendants on this count.  However, Defendants’ assertion that the Statement was optional creates a sufficient dispute of material fact as to render summary judgment inappropriate in Plaintiff’s favor, as well....

Regardless of whether the Statement of Christian Faith was mandatory or not, the inclusion of such a statement, especially given that it appeared on its face to be required, clearly employed a non-neutral policy as it specifically allowed for participation by Christians and no others.  This non-neutral practice, then, could be viewed by a reasonable jury as placing a burden on Plaintiff’s religious expression by denying him the ability to apply for a job that he otherwise would have been able to seek, due to his religion....  As such, a reasonable jury could find that this burdened Plaintiff’s freedom of expression and that the policy was not narrowly tailored to meet a compelling government interest, and thus summary judgment cannot be granted in favor of Defendants.  However, the question of whether the inclusion of the Statement of Christian Faith in the application burdened Plaintiff’s religious exercise, given Defendants’ assertion that the Statement of Christian Faith was not actually required, creates a genuine dispute of material fact, and, therefore, summary judgment cannot be granted in favor of Plaintiff, either.

Court Supervision of Church Election Invalidated by Mississippi Supreme Court

In Melton v. Union Hill Missionary Baptist Church, (MS Sup. Ct., Jan. 11, 2024), the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and vacated a decision of a state Chancery Court in a dispute over whether a church had dismissed its pastor.  After an initial vote to oust the pastor, the pastor continued to preach at the church.  The church filed suit and the chancellor ordered the congregation to hold a second vote at a church meeting at which the chancellor would preside. That meeting voted to retain the pastor. Invalidating the chancellor's order to hold a new meeting, the Supreme Court said in part:

The chancellor’s self appointment to oversee a congregational election outside the courthouse and inside a house of worship is far removed from the judicial function and treads heavily upon Mississippi’s Constitution and the Establishment Clause. Thus, the chancellor’s actions, though undoubtedly well intended, amounted to a constitutional violation, resulting in a blending of church and state. This unusual arrangement was the antithesis of the constitutional doctrine that historically has demanded separation of church and state....

Because the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine applies, this Court reverses and vacates the orders of the Madison County Chancery Court.

State Regulation of Catholic Childcare Program Upheld

In South Hills Catholic Academy v. Department of Human Services, (PA Commonwealth Ct., Jan. 11, 2024), a Pennsylvania appellate court rejected a Catholic school's challenges to regulatory requirements imposed on it.  The state asserted that the school's program allowing parents to drop students off 45 minutes early and pick them up 90 minutes late constitutes an uncertified child care center. The school contended that the Department's regulations violate the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the 1st Amendment and the freedom of conscience and religious practices clause of the Pennsylvania constitution. The court said in part:

Private School believes the Department’s regulations impermissibly infringe upon a religious school’s ability to hire staff “based upon their religious beliefs and their ability to transmit those beliefs to the individuals they instruct.”...

The Department’s regulations continue to require only “compliance” with existing civil rights statutes and regulation, from which religious schools are exempt. Therefore, we reject Private School’s contention that reference in the regulations to various civil rights laws infringes upon a religious school’s employment decisions.

With regard to Private School’s other asserted concerns, ..., Private School “has not explained how the regulations at issue interfere with the facility’s ability to communicate Church teachings,” and has “failed to identify any actual or imminent infringement upon [its] right.”... Accordingly, Private School’s “constitutional claims necessarily fail.”

Constitutional Challenge to RLUIPA Dismissed on Sovereign Immunity Grounds

In Coritsidis v. Khal Bnei Torah of Mount Ivy, (SD NY, Jan. 3, 2024), a New York federal district court dismissed the portion of the lawsuit naming the United States as defendant. Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act discriminates in favor of religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. The court did not get to the merits of the constitutional argument, saying in part:

Because Plaintiffs fail to meet their burden to establish an applicable waiver or exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the Court dismisses all claims against the United States without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1).

The court went on to refuse to exert supplemental jurisdiction over state law nuisance claims against defendant synagogue. Rcbizjournal reports on the decision.

School Board Not Liable for Teacher's Proselytization of Muslim Student

In Chaudhry v. Community Unit School District 300 Board of Education, (ND IL, Dec. 29, 2023), an Illinois federal district court dismissed Establishment Clause, Due Process and Equal Protection claims by Muslim parents against an Illinois school board that employed teacher Pierre Thorsen who convinced their daughter to convert to Christianity.  The court said in part:

[T]he complaint continues to state an implausible theory of Monell liability because it does not plead enough factual matter to raise the inference that any assertedly unconstitutional practice had become so widespread that the Board was bound to have noticed it. It likewise continues to fail to plausibly allege that anyone other than Thorsen was the moving force behind any of the Parents’ asserted injuries.... At best, the Parents have alleged facts consistent only with the “isolated wrongdoing of one . . . rogue employee[].”... Because Monell does not allow for respondeat superior liability, these claims are not plausibly pleaded, and they therefore fail.

Negligence Claims Against Religious Boarding School Barred by Establishment Clause

In Drew v. Householder, (WD MO, Dec. 19, 2023), plaintiff sued Circle of Hope Boarding School, a fundamentalist Baptist school for girls, and its schoolmasters alleging that during the five years she was there she was subjected to sexual, physical and emotional abuse, and received inadequate and unaccredited formal instruction. She also alleged that the schoolmasters took $25,000 plus social security money from her. While allowing plaintiff to move ahead with several claims, the court dismissed, among others, her negligence claims, saying in part:

The Missouri Supreme Court has considered the extent to which judicial decision making may involve analysis of ecclesiastical matters without running afoul of the First Amendment’s establishment and free exercise clauses....

[A]llegations based in Missouri common law of negligence against religious institutions run afoul of the First Amendment, except in limited instances where the negligence allegation does not require interpretation of religious doctrine, policy, or interpretation.... It is plain neither of Plaintiff’s remaining negligence claims—Count Seven’s general negligence and Count Eight’s negligent supervision of students—falls into this narrow exception.... [N]egligent supervision claims against a religious institution violate the First Amendment because they require a court to evaluate “what the church ‘should know.’”... Likewise, general negligence claims against religious institutions violate the First Amendment, as it forces the court to consider how a reasonably prudent religious institution would act, thereby “excessively entangle[ing] itself in religious doctrine, policy, and administration.”...

... [T]his Court likewise finds that dismissal of Plaintiff’s negligence claims in Counts Six, Seven, Eight, and Eleven is appropriate also under the provisions of the Missouri Constitution declaring separation of church and state....

2nd Circuit: NY Ban on Firearms in Places of Worship Violates Free Exercise Rights

 Antonyuk v. Chiumento, (2d Cir., Dec. 8, 2023), is a 261-page opinion upholding in part and rejecting in many other respects constitutional challenges to New York's Concealed Carry Improvement Act.  One of the constitutional challenges which the court upheld was a claim by a pastor and his church that applying a firearms ban to non-security personnel in places of worship violates the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses.  In the case, the pastor alleged that the New York restrictions interfere with his religious duty to protect his congregation by being armed in church and by inviting other congregants with concealed carry licenses to bring their firearms. In accepting that argument, the court said in part:

[T]he CCIA is not neutral because it allows the owners of many forms of private property, including many types of retail businesses open to the public, to decide for themselves whether to allow firearms on the premises while denying the same autonomy to places of worship. By adopting a law that applies differently as to places of worship (alongside the other enumerated sensitive places) than to most other privately owned businesses and properties, the CCIA is, on its face, neither neutral nor generally applicable....

The State provides no explanation for why leaders of religious groups in general, and the Plaintiffs specifically, are less able to “eject persons carrying firearms” than any other property owner who is permitted to make a free choice whether to allow firearms on their premises.... A place of worship that prohibits guns will be equally reliant on the police and the criminal law to eject a person carrying a firearm, whether it does so pursuant to a sensitive place designation or a church policy. Either way, someone will have to call the cops. And if the State has determined that places of worship must be designated as sensitive places because criminal trespass law is not enough to keep out guns, then the decision to regulate places of worship more assiduously than other locations amounts to an unequal pursuit of the interest in preventing gun violence. Such an approach is understandable, but unconstitutional....

Reuters reports on the decision.