Catholic School's Firing of Guidance Counselor Over Same-Sex Marriage Remains In Litigation

In Drumgoogle v. Paramus Catholic High School, (NJ Super., Aug. 22, 2016), a New Jersey state trial court refused to grant summary judgment to a Catholic high school in a suit by its former dean of guidance who was fired after she entered a same-sex marriage.  The school terminated her under a provision of its collective bargaining contract that allows for-cause termination of a tenured teacher for "violating accepted standards of Catholic morality as to cause public scandal." Plaintiff claims that the school's policy on harassment bars discrimination against her on the basis of marital status and claims her firing violates the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination.  The court concluded that further discovery is required in order to determine whether plaintiff's status requires application of the "ministerial exception" to anti-discrimination laws and whether the dispute is secular or ecclesiastical. The Bergen County Record reports on the decision.

Ministerial Exception Doctrine Bars ADA Claim By Adventist Music Teacher

In Curl v. Beltsville Adventist School, (D MD, Aug. 15, 2016), a Maryland federal district court held that the ministerial exception doctrine applies to prevent a music teacher at a Seventh Day Adventist school from pursuing federal claims under the Americans With Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the Family and Medical Leave Act.  The teacher sued when her contract was terminated because she was unable to return fully to work a number of months after being seriously injured in a fall at work. In finding that plaintiff 's position was ministerial in nature, the court said in part:

Although a portion of Plaintiff's responsibilities were secular in nature, Plaintiff acknowledges that she is personally a Seventh-day Adventist whose role at the School included teaching religious music and leading prayer services.... [S]he agreed to abide by the Education Code, which "requires that schools employ only those who live in complete harmony with the beliefs and practices of the Church" and therefore required that all School teachers be "baptized Adventists committed to the Church's program of ministry."... [A] portion of her salary was paid by tithe funds, which are intended to be used for ministry.... Moreover, Plaintiffs performance was evaluated in part based on her spiritual leadership.

Ministerial Exception Claim Requires Case-Specific Factual Analysis

In Collette v. Archdiocese of Chicago, (ND IL, July 29, 2016), an Illinois federal district court refused to dismiss an employment discrimination suit brought by plaintiff who for 17 years was employed as the Director of Worship and Director of Music at Holy Family Parish in Inverness, Illinois.  He was dismissed when it was learned he was planning to marry his same-sex partner.  When he sued claiming violations of federal, state and local law, defendants moved to dismiss on the basis of the ministerial exception doctrine.  They argued that he should be seen as a "ministerial" employee based solely on his titles. The court refused to dismiss solely on the pleadings, holding that whether plaintiff is a "ministerial" employee requires a fact-specific analysis.

Minister Can Sue His Church For Disability Benefits

In Bigelow v. Sassafras Grove Baptist Church, (NC App., May 10, 2016), the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that neither the ministerial exception doctrine nor the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine bars a minister from suing his church for contractually promised disability compensation and benefits.  The court said in part:

because plaintiff’s complaint does not challenge the Church’s decision to terminate his employment, but instead seeks to enforce a contractual obligation regarding his compensation and benefits, we hold that the ministerial exception does not apply and is not a basis for dismissal of plaintiff’s claims....

because a court can decide plaintiff’s contract-based claims applying “neutral principles of law,” without entangling the Court in an ecclesiastical dispute or interpretation, we hold that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine does not require dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint.

[Thanks to Will Esser via Religionlaw for the lead.] 

Catholic School Principal's Title VII Suit Dismissed Under "Ministerial Exception"

In Fratello v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New York, (SD NY, March 29, 2016), a New York federal district court held that the "ministerial exception" to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act precludes the former lay principal of a Catholic elementary school from suing for employment discrimination.  Plaintiff alleged that her employment was terminated as a result of gender discrimination and retaliation. In relying on the ministerial exception doctrine as set out in the U.S. Supreme Court's 2012 Hosanna-Tabor decision, the district court said in part:

There is no dispute that Plaintiff is not a member of the clergy and that she would not be considered a minister for purposes of Church governance. But the issue here is one of U.S., not canon, law, and “minister” for purposes of the ministerial exception has a far broader meaning than it does for internal Church purposes. 

Title VII Suit Dismissed Under Ministerial Exception

In Moreno v. Episcopal Diocese of Long Island, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16543 (ED NY, Jan. 20, 2016), a New York federal magistrate judge recommended dismissing a Title VII action brought by an African-American Episcopal pastor who claimed that his dismissal from his position was the result of racial discrimination.  The court held that the ministerial exception doctrine applied, saying:

The Supreme Court clarified that the purpose of this exception is "not to safeguard a church's decision to fire a minister only when it is made for a religious reason. The exception instead ensures that the authority to select and control who will minister to the faithful — a matter 'strictly ecclesiastical,'—is the church's alone."

Ministerial Exception Applies To Hospital Chaplain's Discrimination Lawsuit

In Penn v. New York Methodist Hospital, (SD NY, Jan. 20, 2016), a New York federal district court invoked the ministerial exception doctrine to dismiss a discrimination suit brought by an African-American Methodist pastor employed as a part-time chaplain by a Methodist hospital.  Plaintiff claimed that he was not promoted to a vacant full-time position because of his race and religion. The court held that the hospital is a "religious institution" for purposes of the ministerial exception doctrine even though it had severed its formal ties with the United Methodist Church:

Severing a formal affiliation with the Church does not necessarily imply that the Hospital does not maintain any church-based relationship or have any religious characteristics.

It went on to find:

insofar as Plaintiff is a Methodist and was responsible—at least in part—for preaching the Christian faith, the relationship between Plaintiff and NYMH (specifically, the pastoral care department) was that of a religious employee and a religious institution. This case does not present the Court, nor will the Court venture out to decide, whether this holding would apply to a religious institution’s employment of a minister, pastor, or chaplain of a different faith.

Catholic School Violates Mass. Law By Refusing To Hire Applicant Who Is In A Same-Sex Marriage

In Barrett v. Fontbonne Academy, (MA Super. Ct., Dec. 16, 2015), a Massachusetts state trial court held that a Catholic women's preparatory school unlawfully discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation and gender in violation of 21 MGL Chap. 151B when it withdrew an offer of employment as Food Services Director to Matthew Barrett after it discovered he was a spouse in a same-sex marriage.  The school said that same-sex marriage is inconsistent with the teachings of the Catholic Church.  In finding a statutory violation, the court rejected the school's argument that it came within the statutory exemption for religious organizations in Sec. 1(5) of the statute, because that exemption is limited to organizations that limit membership, enrollment, admission, or participation to members of the same religion. The court held that this limitation takes precedence over seemingly broader exemptive language for religious organizations in Sec. 4(18).  It also held that imposing these anti-discrimination provisions on the school did not violate the school's right of expressive association.  Finally the court rejected the school's reliance on the "ministerial exception" doctrine, concluding that Barrett would not be considered a minister "under any version of this doctrine." The Advocate reports on the decision.

Archdiocese Must Go To Trial On Teacher's Hostile Work Environment Claims

In Bohnert v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of San Francisco, (ND CA, Sept. 25, 2015), a California federal district court refused to dismiss a hostile work environment and emotional distress suit by by a former biology teacher in a boys' Catholic high school.  As described by the court, male students at the school sexually harassed the teacher, including disseminating several "upskirt" photos and videos of her.  In a 38-page opinion, the court rejected the Archdiocese's  motion for summary judgment on its "ministerial exception" and "church autonomy" defenses, finding that numerous factual issues remain.

Ministerial Exception Bars Discrimination Claims Against Salvation Army

In Rogers v. Salvation Army, (ED MI, May 11, 2015), a Michigan federal district court held that the ministerial exception doctrine bars race and age discrimination claims against The Salvation Army ("TSA") by plaintiff who, when terminated, was employed as a Spiritual Counselor by TSA. The court also rejected plaintiff's discrimination and harassment claims on the merits.

Employment Discrimination Suit Dismissed On Ministerial Exception Grounds

In Preece v. The Covenant Presbyterian Church, (D NE, April 22, 2015), a Nebraska federal district court held that the ministerial exception doctrine requires dismissal of employment discrimination claims by a church's former Director of Youth Ministry.  Richard Preece claimed that his employment was terminated in violation of Title VII and the Nebraska Fair Employment Practices Act because he obtained a divorce and in retaliation for complaining about sexual harassment by a pastor who was his direct supervisor.  The court held:

The plaintiff’s job duties reflected a role in him conveying the defendant’s message and carrying out its mission..... In this case, the defendant’s treatment of the plaintiff in relation to his sexual harassment allegation clearly implicates an internal church decision and management, rather than the outward physical acts of one pastor. Accordingly... this court finds the plaintiff’s sexual harassment claim is factually entwined and related to the plaintiff’s other claims, which the court may not review without excessive government entanglement with religion in violation of the First Amendment.

Ministerial Exception Prevents Court From Deciding Complaint Over Pastoral Letter Requirement

On Monday, the Ventura County California Superior Court dismissed the complaint in Serrano v. Family Life Faith, a lawsuit by two teachers who were fired for failing to provide a letter from a pastor confirming their membership in a church.  Little Oaks, a for-profit private Christian school which imposed the requirement, is affiliated with the non-profit Calvary Chapel. (See prior posting.)  The court held that the "ministerial exception" doctrine precludes it from adjudicating issues regarding the hiring or firing of ministerial type employees of religious schools, such as these teachers who were introducing students to Christianity. Christian Post reports on the decision.

6th Circuit: Ministerial Exception Is Non-Waivable

In Conlon v. InterVarsity Christian Fellowship/ USA, (6th Cir., Feb. 5, 2015), the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals faced its first "ministerial exception" case since the Supreme Court's 2012 Hosanna-Tabor decision.  In the case, InterVarsity Christian Fellowship, a Christian campus organization, asserted a "ministerial exception" defense in a sex discrimination suit against it by its former spiritual director who claimed that her firing because her marriage was heading toward divorce violated Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Michigan's Elliot-Larsen Act.  The 3-judge panel's majority opinion held first that IVCF, while not a church, is still a religious organization that can claim the ministerial exception for a ministerial employee such as plaintiff.

Conlon claimed that IVCF had waived the ministerial exception, but the majority held:

The ministerial exception is a structural limitation imposed on the government by the Religion Clauses, a limitation that can never be waived....

Finally the majority held that the First Amendment's ministerial exception can be asserted as a defense against state law claims, and can be raised by individuals when they are personally sued for discrimination as the agents of a religious employer.

Judge Rogers concurred in the result, but contended that the majority went further than necessary in reaching its conclusion.  He said:

Our decision today does not require us to decide whether a religious employer could enter into a judicially-enforceable employment contract with a ministerial employee not to fire that employee on certain grounds (such as pregnancy). Judicial enforcement of such a contract might unduly interfere with the independence of religious institutions, but barring religious institutions from offering such a legally binding guarantee might make it harder for some religious institutions to hire the people they want. Conlon in this case now disavows any contractual argument. Thus, to the extent that any analysis in the majority opinion might be read to govern non-Title VII employer obligations, such analysis is not necessary to our judgment. 

Acton Institute Power Blog reports on the decision. [Thanks to Paul deMello Jr. for the lead.] 

Puerto Rico Appeals Court Applies Ministerial Exception Doctrine

In Vega v. Barbara Ann Roessler Church, Inc., 2014 PR App LEXIS 1954 (PR Ct. App., May 30, 2014), the Puerto Rico Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision applied the "ministerial exception" doctrine to dismiss a claim by a minister that he was unfairly dismissed as pastor of his church. The opinion is in Spanish.

Court Dismisses Episcopal Priest's Suit Against Bishop Who Fired Him

In Warnick v. All Saints Episcopal Church, (PA Com. Pl., April 15, 2014), a Pennsylvania trial court dismissed a suit brought by Episcopal priest Jeremy Warnick against All Saints Episcopal Church (his former parish), the Episcopal Bishop of Pennsylvania and three All Saints congregants.  The suit, alleging contract and defamation claims, challenges Bishop Charles Bennison's revocation of Warnick's license to minister in Pennsylvania, the Bishop's letter to the congregation explaining the decision and statements made by three congregants at a church meeting. The controversy revolved around Warnick's proposal for a radical restructuring of the parish.  It also involved complaints that Warnick was living on week ends with a woman (who he then married in a Methodist ceremony) before his divorce from his wife was finalized, and Warnick had posted answers to a "sexual position quiz" on Facebook.

After Warnick unsuccessfully pursued a canonical complaint against Bennison, he filed this civil lawsuit. The court held that both the First Amendment requirement of deference to ecclesiastical courts and the ministerial exception doctrine require dismissal of the complaint. The court added that even if all the claims were not barred by the First Amendment, "Father Warnick’s claims fail as a matter
of law because the undisputed evidence shows that necessary elements have
not been shown for defamation, contract and civil conspiracy claims."

Kentucky Supreme Court Fleshes Out The Ministerial Exception Doctrine

In two cases decided earlier this week, the Kentucky Supreme Court clarified the ministerial exception doctrine.  In Kirby v. Lexington Theological Seminary, (KY Sup. Ct., April 17, 2014), Jimmy Kirby, a tenured professor teaching Christian social ethics at Lexington Theological Seminary had his employment terminated as part of the seminary's response to a financial crisis it was facing. Kirby sued claiming race discrimination and breach of contract. The court held that the race discrimination claim was barred by the ministerial exception doctrine, saying:

we explicitly adopt the ministerial exception as applicable to employment claims—especially discrimination claims—asserted against a religious institutional employer by an employee who is directly involved in promulgating and espousing the tenets of the employer's faith.....

From a broad perspective, the ministerial exception does not strip a court of its jurisdiction but, instead, simply disallows the forward progress of the particular suit. The ministerial exception's very name inherently suggests it does not operate as a jurisdictional bar. It is an exception, not an exemption.  Most likely, a great deal of the current disagreement over the ministerial exception's proper operation stems from the conflation of the ministerial exception with the broader principle of ecclesiastical abstention. Secular courts do not have jurisdiction to hear disputes over church doctrine. But courts do have jurisdiction to hear and resolve employment disputes, contract claims, tort claims, or similar. And that authority is not lost as a result of the ministerial exception.

However the court permitted Kirby to proceed with his claim that his dismissal violated his contractual rights as a tenured professor:

Although state contract law does involve the governmental enforcement of restrictions on a religious institution's right or ability to select its ministers, those restrictions are not governmental restrictions. Simply put, the restrictions do not arise out of government involvement but, rather, from the parties to the contract, namely, the religious institution and its employee. 

Contractual transactions, and the resulting obligations, are assumed voluntarily. Underneath everything, churches are organizations. And, like any other organization, a "church is always free to burden its activities voluntarily through contracts, and such contracts are fully enforceable in civil court."  Surely, a "church can contract with its own pastors just as it can with outside parties."  "Enforcement of a promise, willingly made and supported by consideration, in no way constitutes a state-imposed limit upon a church's free exercise rights."

In a companion case, Kant v. Lexington Theological Seminary, (KY Sup. Ct., April 17, 2014),  Laurence Kant, another tenured professor who was terminated at the same time, also sued for breach of contract.  The Court held that Kant, a Professor of History of Religion who was Jewish, was not a "minister" for purposes of the ministerial exception doctrine:

we find it important to emphasize the connection between the religious institution's employee and the doctrine or tenets of the religious institution. A minister, in the commonly understood sense, has a very close relationship with doctrine of the religious institution the minister represents. The members of the congregation or faith community view a minister as one who is, among other things, the face of the religious institution, permitted to speak for the religious institution, the embodiment of the religious institution's tenets, and leader of the religious institution's ritual.  Kant did none of these things....

[T]he simple fact that an employee professes a different religious belief system than his religious institutional employer does not eliminate the employee as a ministerial employee under the law. The primary focus under the law is on the nature of the particular employee's work for the religious institution. Here, Kant's work was chiefly secular.

Discriminatory Firing Claim Dismissed Under Ministerial Exception Doctrine

In Conlon v. Intervarsity Christian Fellowship/ USA, (WD MI, April 3, 2014), a Michigan federal district court applied the ministerial exception doctrine to dismiss a discrimination suit brought by a former spiritual director to Intervarsity Christian Fellowship staff members. Plaintiff Alyce Conlon, who was considering divorcing her husband, was placed on leave and ultimately fired under IVCF’s Separating and Divorcing Staff Policy. She claims that she was treated differently than male staff members who divorced their spouses. The court said in part:

Plaintiff’s suggestion that the ministerial exception applies only to those cases in which a court would be required to evaluate religious doctrine “misses the point of the ministerial exception,” which is not to “safeguard a church’s decision to fire a minister only when it is made for a religious reason.” Hosana-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 709. Rather, the exception “ensures that the authority to select and control who will minister to the faithful—a matter strictly ecclesiastical—is the church’s alone.” Id. Thus, the ministerial exception prevents a court from evaluating the employment decisions of a religious organization regardless of whether the court would be required to delve into religious doctrine.

Court Dismisses Pastor's Contract Claim On 1st Amendment Grounds

In Reese v. General Assembly of Faith Cumberland Presbyterian Church in America, (TX App., March 14, 2014), a Texas appellate court dismissed on 1st Amendment grounds a lawsuit brought by a pastor who was fired less than two years into his 5-year employment contract with a Presbyterian congregation.  Pastor Charles Reese sued the church for damages alleging breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court said in part:

To determine the efficacy of his claims, the courts would have to decide whether the termination of his employment was wrongful or premature. The free exercise clause of the Constitution prohibits the courts from reviewing employment decisions regarding ministers....

Here, if the Court were to second guess the Church’s decision to terminate Reese it would deprive the Church of its right “to shape its own faith and mission” by “imposing an unwanted minister.” Further, Reese is seeking damages nearly identical to those sought by the respondent in Hosanna-Tabor. As such, any monetary award by the Court would “operate as a penalty on the Church for terminating an unwanted minister.” Clearly, failure to extend the crux of Hosanna-Tabor to the instant case would result in the untenable consequence of the Court establishing religion and preventing the free exercise thereof in violation of the First Amendment.

Ministerial Exception and Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrines Require Dismissal of Suit By Former Catholic Cemetery Employee

In Fisher v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, (OH App., March 14, 2014), an Ohio state appellate court dismissed a suit by Vickie Fisher, the former co-director of a Catholic cemetery, whose job was eliminated by a new cemetery executive director. In her suit, Fisher alleged age discrimination, promissory estoppel, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.  The court held that the ministerial exception doctrine applies to require dismissal:

Fisher was responsible for coordinating services in the chapel, working with grieving families, coordinating services with various parishes, and attending grave-site services. She interacted with clergy on a daily basis, and employed her status as a person “of the faith” to console grieving families. Fisher conducted these duties in a liturgical setting replete with religious statuary, photographs of the Pope and Archbishop, and a dispensary for Rosaries. 

Fisher also underwent multi-year, doctrine-specific training at a Jesuit Catholic University to better perform her job. She was involved in the preparation and performance of religious rituals. As codirector of the cemetery, she served in an indisputable leadership position, acting as the face of the Catholic Church to thousands of grieving families. And like the plaintiff in Hosanna-Tabor, she saw herself as part of a larger ministry.

To the extent that the ministerial exception doctrine does not apply to Fisher's common law claims, the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine does: "Fisher’s claims would invariably interject this court into the Archdiocese’s internal affairs."

Judge DeWine concurred separately to urge that the court need not go beyond the ministerial exception doctrine to dismiss the lawsuit.

Affidavit Does Not Establish Applicability of Ministerial Exception Doctrine

Hough v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Erie, (WD PA, March 4, 2014), is an Age Discrimination In Employment suit brought by three former Catholic parochial school teachers who were not hired into a consolidated Catholic school system created when their school closed. The Diocese moved for summary judgment claiming that the "ministerial exception" doctrine precludes plaintiffs' lawsuit.  The only evidence that plaintiffs qualify as "ministers" for purposes of the exception were affidavits from the diocese's Vicar for Education stating that all parochial school teachers are considered to be ministers of the faith-- instruction in religious truth and values is infused in all parts of the curriculum. The Pennsylvania federal district court denied defendants' the motion for summary judgment, saying in part:

Although the Supreme Court refused to provide a bright line test for a determination of when someone is accorded ministerial status, Defendants’ argument – that all teachers are considered to be ministers by Defendants – was not enough, in and of itself, for the high court in Hosanna-Tabor.