7th Circuit Keeps RLUIPA Suit Against Chicago Alive

In World Outreach Conference v. City of Chicago, (7th Cir., June 1, 2015), the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals breathed new life into a RLUIPA case that has been in litigation for 9 years. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the city of Chicago as to claims against the city for damages because of delays in granting licenses to World Outreach so it could operate a former YMCA building for its religious purposes. World Outreach argued it lost some $591,000 that it could have made by housing Hurricane Katrina evacuees in the building. The court's opinion by Judge Posner included comments about the power of aldermen in Chicago politics.  Judge Cudahy concurred with one of the shortest and most cryptic opinions ever:

Unfortunately; and I think the opinion must be stamped with a large “MAYBE.”

(See prior related posting.) RLUIPA Defense blog reports on the decision.

Church Sues Over Zoning Restrictions That Are Forcing It To Move

The San Diego Reader reports on a lawsuit filed May 28 by the San Diego Christian Worship Center against the city challenging zoning restrictions that will force the church to relocate in September.  The city granted the church a 5-year conditional use permit in 2010, and the church made $700,000 of improvements to its site. In 2014 the city changed the zoning in the area to "prime industrial," which does not allow churches, and the city says it will not renew the conditional use permit. The church lacks the resources to find a new building. Apparently the complaint contends that the new zoning designation, which excludes instructional studios and entertainment venues as well as churches, amounts to a prior restraint on First Amendment expression.  The church also claims-- presumably invoking RLUIPA-- that the cost of preparing an application every 5 years to renew its conditional use permit imposes a substantial burden on its exercise of religion.  It will cost $50,000 to $100,000 to prepare the application, which must include an environmental impact statement.

6th Circuit Hears Oral Arguments In RLUIPA Zoning Case

On Wednesday, the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral arguments (audio of full arguments) in Tree of Life Christian Schools v City of Upper Arlington, (Docket No. 14-3469, argued 4/29/2015). In the case, an Ohio federal district court dismissed a Christian school's RLUIPA and constitutional challenge to Upper Arlington's refusal to issue a conditional use permit or to rezone for use as a school an existing office building. (See prior posting.)  Upper Arlington News, reporting on the oral arguments, quoted the reaction to the arguments from Erik Stanley who argued the case for Tree of Life:

A few of the judges seemed to key in on the idea the city argued all along that the city needs this property for revenue, but the judges seemed alarmed that some of the uses the city has allowed in the ORD don’t generate a lot of revenue. The city cannot have this zoning district that claims only to allow revenue-generating uses when they’ve allowed uses that don’t generate revenue to the extent Tree of Life would, such as day care centers, charitable hospitals and nonprofit offices.

Small Church Brings RLUIPA Suit Against Kansas County

AP reports that the 15-member Liberty Baptist Church in Crawford County, Kansas on Monday filed a RLUIPA lawsuit against the county which has twice denied the church a conditional use permit that it sought in order to build on a 2.8 acre parcel of land it bought in 2013. The suit claims that County regulations prevent new churches from locating anywhere in the county without undergoing an extensive zoning process.

Supreme Court Denies Review In RLUIPA Land Use Case

The U.S. Supreme Court today denied review in Lichtfield Historic District Commission v. Chabad Lubavitch of Litchfield County, Inc., (Docket No. 14-1001, cert. denied 4/20/2015) .(Order List). In the case, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the district court had applied erroneous legal standards in deciding whether a refusal to allow a Jewish group to expand a building in Lichtfield's Historic District violates RLUIPA’s substantial burden and nondiscrimination provisions. (See prior posting.) AP reports on the Supreme Court's denial of review.

RLUIPA Lawsuit Settled By California City

The Long Beach Press Telegram reports that the Bellflower, California city council agreed last Monday to settle a RLUIPA lawsuit filed against it by Glory Tabernacle Christian Center, a church that welcomes members of the LGBT community.  The church claims discrimination. The city refused to issue it a use permit because of insufficient parking, even though a similar requirement was not imposed on a nearby mortuary and fire museum.  The city will grant the church a permit to hold Sunday services for up to 150 people and hold week day meetings for up to 50 people.  It will also pay the church $1.775 million in damages. If Council approves the use permit at its May meeting, the church will dismiss its suit 90 days later and notify the Justice Department of the settlement.

Ministry Can Proceed On RLUIPA Equal Terms Claim Over Transitional Housing

In Holy Ghost Revival Ministries v. City of Marysville, (WD WA, April 7, 2015), pastors who operate a group "Mack houses"-- low-cost transitional housing facilities for released convicts, many of whom are registered sex offenders-- brought suit in federal district court.  They claim that the city has a policy of discriminating against them because of their religion and that city officials promote citizen complaints about Mack houses.  The court concluded that there was not religious discrimination because the city's objections rest on the fact that the housing caters to registered sexual offenders.  However the court did permit plaintiffs to proceed on one of their RLUIPA claims:

Because the complaint alleges that the Mack Houses, which are religious institutions, were singled out by the City for enforcement of the zoning code, the court concludes that Plaintiffs have adequately alleged treatment on a less than equal basis with secular comparators, such as other group housing institutions.

11th Circuit: Moorish Property Owner May Replead Constitutional Claims

In Bey v. City of Tampa Code Enforcement, (11th Cir., April 8, 2015), the U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed, with leave to amend, a complaint alleging free exercise, RLUIPA and due process violations against a Tampa Code enforcement officer who cited Nura Washington Bey for displaying unpermitted signs, building without a permit, and failing to obtain a special use permit to operate a private recreational facility.  At issue was property Bey owned, known as Al Moroc Humanity Park, which was used each Sunday by Bey and her "fellow Moorish nationals" to practice their Islamic faith.  The court held that while Bey might be able to allege facts to support her First Amendment and RLUIPA claims, she had alleged little in her complaint. Instead she relied primarily on her claim that as a Moorish national she is outside the jurisdiction of the magistrate who presided at the Code enforcement hearing, and that she is entirely exempt from local land use regulations by reason of the First Amendment.

Muslim School's Zoning Challenge Dismissed Without Reaching Merits

In Muslim Community Association of Ann Arbor v. Pittsfield Charter Township, (ED MI, March 20, 2015), the Michigan Islamic Academy claimed that Pittsfield Township violated the substantial burden, anti-discrimination and equal terms provisions of RLUIPA, as well as the Establishment Clause and the Equal Protection Clause, in denying it zoning authorization so it could build a Muslim school. The court dismissed the RLUIPA claims on the basis that plaintiff had no legally cognizable interest in the property.  It merely had a promise from the owner to donate 5 acres for the school if zoning approval was obtained. The court went on to hold that plaintiff's RLUIPA and constitutional claims are not ripe because plaintiff never went beyond the Planning Commission and Township Board to the Zoning Administrator and Zoning Board of Appeals. The court held that plaintiff could continue or refile the suit if these defects are cured. (See prior related posting.).

Orthodox Jewish School Loses RLUIPA Zoning Challenge

In Joan Dachs Bais Yaakov Elementary School v. City of Evanston, (IL App., March 6, 2015), an Illinois appellate court rejected a RLUIPA challenge brought by an Orthodox Jewish elementary school after Evanston City Council refused zoning modifications that would allow the construction of a school on property in an industrial zone that plaintiff had purchased.  Rejecting the school's reliance on RLUIPA's equal terms provision, the court said:

Unlike its nonreligious comparators, the removal of the ... property from the property tax rolls would deprive Evanston of hundreds of thousands of dollars annually in property tax revenue at a time when approximately 40% of its land is already off the tax rolls. The generation of tax revenues is a legitimate concern of land-use regulation.... and, thus, renders JDBY, which is not subject to property taxes, dissimilar to its nonreligious comparators who are subject to such taxes.

The court also upheld a trial court finding that RLUIPA's nondiscrimination provisions had not been violated.  RLUIPA Defense blog has more on the decision.

Applying Holt v. Hobbs To A Complex Case-- The Demands of a Transgender Native American Inmate

A fascinating decision handed down by an Idaho federal district court last week shows the complexity faced by prisons in attempting to applying the U.S. Supreme Court's January RLUIPA decision in Holt v. Hobbs.  In Stover v. Corrections Corporation of America, (D ID, Feb. 27, 2015), the court was faced with demands by a Native American male-to-female transgender prisoner for use of the prison's sweat lodge for religious purposes.  According to the court:

Although Plaintiff receives female hormone therapy and has developed feminine characteristics such as breasts, she is incarcerated in a men’s prison because she remains anatomically male—she has not had sex reassignment surgery.

Defendants conceded that under RLUIPA barring plaintiff from engaging in a sweating ceremony is a substantial burden on the exercise of her Native American religious beliefs. According to the court:

Defendants offer two explanations for their decision to prohibit Plaintiff from using the sweat lodge to practice her religion. First, they argue that prohibiting Plaintiff from using the lodge is necessary to ensure her safety. The Court does not doubt that prohibiting Plaintiff from using the sweat lodge in the company of male inmates is justified by the compelling governmental interest of keeping Plaintiff safe from physical or sexual assault..... [I]nmates are generally not fully clothed in the sweat lodge, and prison staff cannot observe the inside of the lodge. Plaintiff has already been a victim of several sexual assaults in prison. As a transgender prisoner with feminine characteristics such as breasts, Plaintiff would be in serious and immediate danger if she were to sweat with the male inmates in the sweat lodge at the men’s prison in which she is confined. Ensuring a vulnerable prisoner’s safety is obviously a compelling governmental interest.

However the court was not convinced that prison authorities had satisfied the least-restictive-alternative test as interpreted by the Supreme Court. A volunteer chaplain had apparently offered to escort Plaintiff to the sweat lodge when it was not in use by others so she could carry out the ritual.  While that may well seem to be the kind of less restrictive alternative that the Supreme Court required in Holt, here there was another complexity:

[Defendants] argue that the religious beliefs of the other inmates, who use the only sweat lodge... would be violated by allowing Plaintiff to enter the sweat lodge at any time, even by herself.... "[S]ome Native American tribes believe that allowing a two-spirited person (an individual suffering from gender identify disorder or gender dysphoria) to enter a sweat lodge utilized by single-spirited individuals would desecrate the religious sanctity of the lodge." ... 

After careful consideration, the Court concludes that Defendants have not establish[ed] that burdening one individual’s religious practice in an attempt to avoid burdening another’s religious practice is a compelling governmental interest under RLUIPA. .... The Court is persuaded that government officials cannot avoid Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim merely by citing other inmates’ religious concerns, particularly where, as here, the asserted justification is based on mere speculation as to what some other inmates might find religiously objectionable. 

Cert Filed In RLUIPA Zoning Case

AP reported yesterday that a petition for certiorari has been filed with the U.S. Supreme Court in Chabad Lubavitch of Litchfield County, Inc. v. Litchfield Historic District Commission,  In the case, the U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the district court had applied erroneous legal standards in deciding whether a refusal to allow a Jewish group to expand a building in Litchfield's Historic District violates RLUIPA’s substantial burden and nondiscrimination provisions. (See prior posting).

House Holds Hearing On RFRA and RLUIPA

Yesterday the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice held a hearing titled Oversight of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the Religious Land Use and Instituionalized Persons Act.  The full text of the prepared statements of the four witnesses appearing at the hearing are available on the Committee's website.

Religious Freedom Laws Limit Reach of Homeowners Association Rules

A state court judge in Collin County, Texas yesterday ruled that the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the federal Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act trump Home Owners' Association rules. According to the Dallas Morning News, a neighbor, joined later by the property owners association, sued to enforce deed restrictions barring use of a north Dallas home by Congregation Toras Chaim, a group of 30 Orthodox Jewish families, for daily prayer services.  Plaintiffs argued unsuccessfully that the state and federal religious freedom statutes apply only to action by governmental entities. [Thanks to Steven H. Sholk for the lead.]

Some Thoughts On Today's Supreme Court Decision In Holt v. Hobbs

Today's Supreme Court decision in Holt v. Hobbs (see prior posting) is likely to lead to a dramatic increase in resources that federal district courts must devote to the dozens-- if not hundreds-- of prisoner RLUIPA cases that are filed each year.  Federal courts, under 28 USC Sec. 1915A, are required to conduct an early preliminary screening of prisoner lawsuits in order to dismiss those that have no chance of success.  It has been common for district courts to dismiss cases at this preliminary stage on the ground that the inmate has failed to show a "substantial burden" on his or her religious exercise.  Often courts have reached that conclusion on the basis that, while an inmate was denied the ability to carry out some particular religious ritual or requirement, the inmate had a number of other ways to practice his or her faith.  Today the Supreme Court rejected that approach, saying:

[T]he District Court erred by concluding that the grooming policy did not substantially burden petitioner’s religious exercise because “he had been provided a prayer rug and a list of distributors of Islamic material, he was allowed to correspond with a religious advisor, and was allowed to maintain the required diet and observe religious holidays.”... In taking this approach, the District Court improperly imported a strand of reasoning from cases involving prisoners’ First Amendment rights. See, e.g., O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U. S. 342, 351–352 (1987); see also Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78, 90 (1987). Under those cases, the availability of alternative means of practicing religion is a relevant consideration, but RLUIPA provides greater protection. RLUIPA’s “substantial burden” inquiry asks whether the government has substantially burdened religious exercise (here, the growing of a 1⁄2-inch beard), not whether the RLUIPA claimant is able to engage in other forms of religious exercise.

So courts will now need to concentrate on the "compelling interest" and "least restrictive means" prongs of RLUIPA in initial screening of complaints.  More cases are likely to survive initial screening when those elements are the focus.  In prison contexts, generally one of two sorts of compelling interests are asserted-- (1) prison security or (2) budgetary concerns in accommodating prisoner religious practices.  In Holt, security and safety were asserted, and the Court conceded that those are compelling interests. However it suggested that budgetary concerns (such as those asserted when inmates seek religious diets) pose a more difficult question, saying:

Congress stated that RLUIPA “may require a government to incur expenses in its own operations to avoid imposing a substantial burden on religious exercise.” §2000cc–3(c). See Hobby Lobby.... 

When it comes to evaluating whether the government has shown that its restriction on religious exercise is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest, the Court emphasized that the inquiry must be narrowly focused:

The Department argues that its grooming policy represents the least restrictive means of furthering a “‘broadly formulated interes[t],’” ... namely, the Department’s compelling interest in prison safety and security. But RLUIPA, like RFRA, contemplates a “‘more focused’” inquiry and “‘requires the Government to demonstrate that the compelling interest test is satisfied through application of the challenged law “to the person”––the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially burdened.’”... RLUIPA requires us to “‘scrutiniz[e] the asserted harm of granting specific exemptions to particular religious claimants’” and “to look to the marginal interest in enforcing” the challenged government action in that particular context....

How far must this individualization go?  Must authorities consider how likely it is that the particular claimant will create a security risk?  Should the evaluation of alternatives depend, for example, on whether the particular inmate seeking to grow a beard has a history of attempting to smuggle contraband? The more individualized the determination must be, the fewer cases that will be able to be disposed of at the preliminary screening stage.

Finally one additional portion of the Court's opinion adds complexity to the question of when a religious exemption from a prison rule must be granted. The Court said:

[T]he District Court went astray when it relied on petitioner’s testimony that not all Muslims believe that men must grow beards. Petitioner’s belief is by no means idiosyncratic....  But even if it were, the protection of RLUIPA, no less than the guarantee of the Free Exercise Clause, is “not limited to beliefs which are shared by all of the members of a religious sect.”

Those who follow Religion Clause's weekly summary of prisoner free exercise cases know that inmates professing a wide variety of religious beliefs seek religious accommodations relating to grooming, clothing, possession of religious items, worship space, congregate religious services, religious dietary restrictions, and more.  The Supreme Court has now reaffirmed the conclusion of most courts that an inmate may invoke RLUIPA to require accommodation of a totally idiosyncratic belief-- so long as it is sincerely held. Religious visions shared by no one else apparently still qualify.

Supreme Court Unanimously Upholds Muslim Inmate's Right To Grow Half-Inch Beard

Today in Holt v. Hobbs, (Sup. Ct., Jan 20, 2015), the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that the Arkansas Department of Corrections policy that prevents a Muslim inmate from growing a one-half inch beard for religious reasons violates the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act.  In an opinion by Justice Alito the court held that it is irrelevant for purposes of RLUIPA that an inmate has other means of practicing his religion. While cases invovling prisoners' First Amendment rights invoke that reasoning, RLUIPA provides greater protection.  The court went on to reject the state's contention that its no-beard policy is the least restictive means of furthering a compelling state interest. It found unpersuasive the state's arguments regarding contraband and identification of inmates. The Court added that prison officials still have ample ways to maintain security, saying that "in applying RLUIPA’s statutory standard, courts should not blind themselves to the fact that the analysis is conducted in the prison setting."

Justice Ginsburg filed a short concurring opinion, joined by Justice Sotomayor, emphasizing that here, unlike in the Hobby Lobby case, accommodating petitioner's religious beliefs would not detrimentally affect third parties who do not share his beliefs. Justice Sotomayor filed a separate concurring opinion saying: "I do not understand the Court’s opinion to preclude deferring to prison officials’ reasoning when that deference is due—that is, when prison officials offer a plausible explanation for their chosen policy that is supported by whatever evidence is reasonably available to them."

Hawaiian Temple Sues Over Zoning Denial

RLUIPA Defense blog reported this week on a suit filed last November in federal district court in Hawaii by Spirit of Aloha Temple which was denied zoning approval to expand the use of a botanical garden it owns.  The Temple sought to use existing structures on the property for its Integral Yoga observances, including religious services, weddings and educational activities. The complaint (full text) in Spirit of Aloha Temple v. County of Maui, D HI, filed 11/26/2014) contends that the denial of permission violates RLUIPA, the 1st and 14th Amendments and Hawaiian constitutional and statutory provisions.

Church Files RLUIPA and Constitutional Challenges To Zoning Delays

Earlier this month, a lawsuit was filed against the Town of Colonie, New York, its Planning Board and officials claiming that the town's refusal to give a church various zoning approvals for a new facility violated RLUIPA, the 1st and 14th Amendments and New York state constitutional provisions.  The complaint (full text) in Life Covenant Church, Inc. v. Town of Colonie, (ND NY, filed 12/17, 2014), alleges:

LifeChurch’s zoning requests have been lost in a bureaucratic maze as the Town and Town Officials have routinely made conflicting requests and continued to unnecessarily delay in requesting and reviewing materials prior to the Planning Board’s consideration of LifeChurch’s zoning requests.

RLUIPA Defense blog has additional details.

DOJ Announces Settlement of RLUIPA Zoning Suit On Behalf of Minnesota Mosque

The Minnesota United States Attorney's Office announced yesterday that a settlement agreement in principle has been reached in its RLUIPA lawsuit against the City of St. Anthony Village (MN).  The suit challenges the city's refusal to issue a conditional use permit to the Abu Huraira Islamic Center-- with its largely Somali Muslim membership-- that sought to purchase an existing business center in an area zoned "light industrial," use the basement for worship space and continue to rent the remainder of the building to existing business tenants. (See prior posting.)  The agreement, which must still be approved by the St. Anthony City Council, the Justice Department and the federal district court, calls for the city to create a Planned Use Development that will allow the Islamic Center to use the basement space for worship. The city will also undertake various other initiatives to prevent future religious discrimination.  The Minneapolis Star-Tribune reports in more detail on the settlement terms.

Mosque Proponents Sue Pennsylvania Township Over Zoning Variance Denial

CAIR-Philadephia announced yesterday that it has filed a federal lawsuit against Bensalem Township, Pennsylvania challenging its refusal to grant a zoning variance to a Muslim congregation, Bensalem Masjid, which seeks to build a mosque on property that it currently leases with an option to purchase. The complaint (full text) in The Bensalem Masjid Inc. v. Bensalem Township, (ED PA, filed 12/8/2014), contends that the Township's zoning ordinances allow houses of worship only in areas zoned Institutional (IN), and that there are no available properties zoned IN that could be used for a mosque. The complaint contends that the Township's zoning ordinances and regulations, and its action refusing a variance, violate RLUIPA, the 1st and 14th Amendments and the state's Religious Freedom Protection Act. Philadelphia Daily News reports on the lawsuit.