Court Limits Discussion of Religion in Trial for Blocking Abortion Clinic Entrance

In United States v. Gallagher, (MD TN, Jan. 5, 2024), a Tennessee federal district court ruled on the extent to which defendants can refer to their religious activities or beliefs and to the First Amendment in their upcoming criminal trial for violation of the Free Access to Clinic Entrances Act. Defendants are charged criminally with barricading the entrance to a Mt. Juliet, Tennessee abortion clinic in a so-called "rescue" operation. The court said in part:

It does not appear to be disputed that these defendants’ actions were motivated, at least in part, by their religious objections to the intentional termination of pregnancies. The Government argues, however, that evidence of those motivations would be “totally extraneous” to the “nature of the” charged offenses and should, therefore, be excluded.... The Government’s argument, however, is in significant tension with the FACE Act itself, which affirmatively places the defendants’ states of mind at issue by criminalizing only “intentional” acts taken “because [the victim] is or has been, or in order to intimidate such person or any other person or any class of persons from, obtaining or providing reproductive health services.” 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1). The defendants’ subjective motivations are, therefore, an unavoidable aspect of this case, and it is not clear to the court that those motivations can be accurately represented without at least some incidental reference to the details of their beliefs—which happen, in this instance, to be based in religion....

The court has already ruled that, as a matter of well-settled law, religious motivations are not a defense to a violation of either the FACE Act or the conspiracy statute.... The court, however, will not go so far as to wholly forbid the discussion of the defendants’ religious beliefs for the limited purpose of establishing or refuting intent or purpose.... 

... The defendants cannot turn an ounce of relevance into a gallon of irrelevant political messaging. The court, however, will not bar discussion of the defendants’ views altogether.

... When the defendants prayed or discussed their religious views, those specific actions were protected by the First Amendment. But if, in the next breath, they turned to discussing a plan to unlawfully obstruct the entrance of a clinic, then that conspiracy was just as illegal as it would have been if it had been the sole topic of conversation. Similarly, if they engaged in activities that would, in isolation, be protected by the First Amendment, but they did so while also violating the FACE Act through physical obstruction or intimidation, then the non-criminal components of their actions are no shield against prosecution for the criminal ones. Any argument to the contrary would be improper and will be barred.

The court also ruled that defendants may not present evidence or arguments at trial on various other matters including jury nullification, selective prosecution, potential sentences and good character. (See prior related posting.)

Crisis Pregnancy Center Sues Protesters Under FACE Act

 A civil suit under the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances (FACE) Act was filed last week in a New York federal district court by CompassCare which operates an anti-abortion crisis pregnancy center in a Buffalo, NY suburb.  The complaint (full text) in Crisis Pregnancy Services, Inc. v. Kamke, (WD NY, filed 10/5/2023), alleges that defendant organized a counter-protest to CompassCare's Walk for Life at which protesters blocked a highway and assaulted walkers and police.  It alleges that subsequently, one of the defendants wrote graffiti on the organization's driveway, intending to deter staff, volunteers and patients from entering, and on another occasion stole a no-trespassing sign. Another defendant allegedly spray painted the word Liars over the center's entrance sign.  Finally it alleges that Jane Doe defendants were involved with a firebombing and graffiti. LifeNews reports on the lawsuit.

Court Says Dobbs Decision Does Not Undercut Freedom of Access To Clinic Entrances Act

In United States v. Gallagher, (MD TN, July 3, 2023), a Tennessee federal district court became the first court to rule on whether the Supreme Court's Dobbs decision affects the constitutionality of the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances ("FACE") Act.  In the case, eleven co-defendants sought dismissal of their indictments for violating FACE. They first argued that since Dobbs held abortion is not entitled to heightened protection under the 14th Amendment, Congress' reliance in enacting the law on its 14th Amendment Section 5 enforcement powers is undercut. The court responded in part:

While the question of how section 5 applies to the FACE Act may be of some abstract or academic interest, however, it is of limited practical importance, given that section 5 is only one of two powers on which Congress relied in enacting the FACE Act, the other of which—the power to regulate interstate commerce—was not at issue in Dobbs.

Later in its opinion, the court rejected defendants' argument that Dobbs effectively created a carveout of abortion services from commerce clause coverage. It also rejected defendants' argument that they could not be prosecuted under 18 USC §241 for conspiring to prevent the exercise of a federal right. The court said "§ 241 does not require that the right in question be constitutional, only that it be federal. FACE is, of course, a federal statute...."

The court also rejected defendants' argument that the government is engaged in impermissible selective enforcement because it has not brought enough prosecutions under the FACE Act against individuals who have interfered in the operation of anti-abortion “crisis pregnancy centers.”

It went on to reject defendants' free speech arguments, saying in part:

Nor is the FACE Act being applied in an unconstitutional manner to these particular defendants based on their viewpoints or participation in First Amendment-protected activities, as would be required for a so-called “vindictive prosecution” defense. “...

Because there is no actual evidence of any such improper motive, the defendants engage in a sleight of hand, whereby they have treated any statement by the Department of Justice indicating a desire to safeguard access to abortion as evidence of a desire to punish these defendants for Dobbs. The defendants, though, are not the center of the moral or political universe. A desire to safeguard access to abortion is a desire to safeguard access to abortion—not an affront directed at them. More importantly, safeguarding access to abortion is, particularly under Dobbs, an entirely appropriate thing for legislatures and executives to do, if that is the course they choose. Indeed, it is harder to imagine a more fulsome endorsement of the elected branches’ power to set abortion policy than Dobbs...

Moving to defendants' Free Exercise/ RFRA claims, the court said in part:

The boundaries of the Free Exercise Clause are a topic of much disagreement.... The defendants’ argument, however, goes to something much more fundamental. Although the defendants go to great lengths to make this issue more complicated than it is, they ultimately ask a straightforward question: Does the Free Exercise Clause grant individuals who are acting out of religious motivations freedom to commit actions that otherwise would be crimes against the person or property of others through physical invasion, intimidation, or threat? The answer is similarly straightforward: No, it does not....

The defendants argued that RFRA requires that the state have a compelling interest to substantially burden religious exercise, and that after Dobbs there cannot be a compelling interest in protecting access to abortion. The court responded in part:

... [T]he Supreme Court has never held that a “compelling interest” depends upon something being considered a fundamental right. They are different constitutional concepts, performing different jurisprudential functions.

Militant Pro-Abortion Group Sued Under Access to Clinic Act

Suit was filed this week in a Florida federal district court against a militant abortion rights group by a pro-life pregnancy counseling and medical clinic that was vandalized and whose fundraising gala was disrupted by the group.  The complaint (full text) in Heartbeat of Miami, Inc. v. Jane's Revenge, (MD FL, filed 3/29/2023), charges violations of the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, trespass, civil conspiracy and violation of the Florida RICO statute.

At the same time, Florida's attorney-general filed suit in the same court against two members of the organization who allegedly participated attacks against three abortion counseling centers in Florida. The complaint (full text) in Moody v. Freestone, (MD FL, filed 3/29/2023), seeks an injunction and civil penalties, invoking the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act.

Daily Signal and Fox News report on the lawsuits.

Certiorari Filed On Whether Falun Gong Tables Are Protected Under FACEA

A petition for certiorari (full text) was filed yesterday in Zhang Jingrong v. Chinese Anti-Cult World Alliance, Inc., (Docket No. 21-1429, filed 5/10/2022). In the case, the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals held that five tables on the sidewalk in Flushing, Queens, New York where Falun Gong adherents passed out flyers and displayed posters were not a "place of religious worship" under the Freedom of Access To Clinics Entrances Act that prohibits intentionally injuring, intimidating, or interfering with anyone who is exercising 1st Amendment religious freedom rights “at a place of religious worship.” (See prior posting.) [Thanks to James A. Sonne for the lead.]

2nd Circuit: Protesters' Sidewalk Tables Were Not A "Place of Worship" Under FACEA

A provision (18 USC §248) in the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994 (“FACEA”) prohibits intentionally injuring, intimidating, or interfering with anyone who is exercising 1st Amendment religious freedom rights “at a place of religious worship.”  In Zhang Jingrong v. Chinese Anti-Cult World Alliance, Inc., (2nd Cir., Oct. 14, 2021), the U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that "a place of religious worship" in the statute is limited to "a place recognized or dedicated as one primarily used for religious worship", and not merely any place where religion is practiced.  Applying this definition, the court concluded that five tables on the sidewalk in Flushing, Queens, New York where Falun Gong adherents passed out flyers and displayed posters were not a "place of religious worship." The court said in part:

Plaintiffs and their fellow practitioners treated the tables primarily as a base for protesting and raising public awareness about the Chinese Communist Party’s alleged abuses against Falun Gong, rather than for religious worship. Nor was there evidence that the Falun Gong religious leadership had designated the tables as a place primarily to gather for or hold religious worship activities.

Judge Walker filed a concurring opinion arguing that 18 USC §248 exceeds Congress Commerce Clause power, saying in part:

In prohibiting violence against worshippers at places of religious worship, FACEA regulates local, non-economic conduct that has at best a tenuous connection to interstate commerce.

Courthouse News Service reports on the decision.