Wife's Religious Convictions Do Not Override Vermont Divorce Law

In Maghu v. Singh, (VT Sup. Ct., Jan. 12, 2018), the Vermont Supreme Court rejected a wife's attempt to obtain dismissal of a no-fault divorce petition filed by her husband.  The couple was married in India and, among other contentions, the wife argued that Vermont's courts should defer to Indian divorce law. In rejecting that contention, the court said in a footnote:

We reject wife’s argument that the court’s grant of a no-fault divorce contrary to India’s Hindu Marriage Act, and the religious requirements reflected therein, impinges on wife’s free exercise of religion in violation of Chapter I, Article 3 of the Vermont Constitution. Quite the opposite, it would be constitutionally problematic, to say the least, if we began to decline access to a divorce from an otherwise qualified domiciliary on the basis of the religious convictions of the other party. 

European Court: EU Regulation Does Not Apply to Religious Court Divorces

In Sahyouni v. Mamisch, (CJEU, Dec. 20, 2017), the Court of Justice of the European Union held that EU Council Regulation 1259/2010 implementing enhanced legal cooperation in matters of divorce and legal separation does not apply to a divorce granted by a Muslim religious court.  The European Court said in part:

it is clear from the objectives pursued by Regulation No 1259/2010 that the latter regulation covers solely divorces pronounced either by a national court or by, or under the supervision of, a public authority.

Law & Religion UK blog has more on the decision.

Ontario Court Holds Mahr Is Part of Family Property In Divorce

In Bakhshi v. Hosseinzadeh,(Ont. Ct. App., Nov. 2, 2017), the Ontario Court of appeal held that the Mahr in an Islamic marriage contract is to be counted as part of net family property.  The Family Law Act in the Canadian province of Ontario calls for equal division of family-owned property in a divorce.  Here the marriage contract called for the husband to pay the wife 230 gold coins (found by the court to be worth $79,580).  The Court of Appeals held that the wife is entitled to receive the Mahr payment from her husband, but that (absent a provision to the contrary in the marriage contract) this amount is then to be included as family-owned property in the equalization calculation. Law Times reports on the decision.

NY Appeals Court Rules On Custody After Divorce of Hasdic Jewish Couple

In Weisberger v. Weisberger, (NY App., Aug. 16, 2017), a New York appellate court modified a trial court's custody order in a divorce proceeding.  At issue was the party's original agreement regarding the Jewish religious upbringing of their children. That agreement provided that the mother would raise the children in the "Hasidic practices of ultra Orthodoxy." The parties had divorced after the mother revealed that she was attracted to women rather than men.  When the mother changed the family's religious practices (and also began living with a transgender man), the trial court awarded the father full custody of the children.  The appeals court modified that order, returning custody to the mother with increased visitation rights for the father, and provided the father would have custody of the children during Jewish holidays.  It also ruled:

While we respect the parties' right to agree to raise their children in a chosen religion ... the weight of the evidence does not support the conclusion that it is in the children's best interests to have their mother categorically conceal the true nature of her feelings and beliefs from them at all times and in all respects, or to otherwise force her to adhere to practices and beliefs that she no longer shares.... 

This is not to say that it would be in the children's best interests to become completely unmoored from the faith into which they were born and raised.... [I]t is in the children's best interests to continue to permit the father to exercise final decision-making authority over the children's education and to continue to permit him to require the children to practice full religious observance in accordance with the Hasidic practices of ultra Orthodoxy while they are in his custody, or in the custody of a school that requires adherence to such practices.... [W]e deem it appropriate to direct the mother to make all reasonable efforts to ensure that the children's appearance and conduct comply with the Hasidic religious requirements of the father and of the children's schools while the children are in the physical custody of their father or their respective schools. Further, in light of the mother's proposal ... to keep a kosher home and to provide the children exclusively with kosher food, we find that it would be in their best interests for her to do so.... Except for these specified matters, we otherwise modify the religious upbringing clause to allow each parent to exercise his or her discretion while the children are in his or her care or custody.

JTA reported on the decision in an article published this week. [Thanks to Rabbi Michael Simon for the lead.]

India's Supreme Court Invalidates Triple Talaq Divorces For Muslims

India's Supreme Court today, by a vote of 3-2, invalidated the Sunni Muslim practice of divorce by triple talaq.  In Bano v. Union of India, (India S.Ct., Aug. 22, 2017), in 3 opinions spanning 395 pages, three justices agreed (in 2 separate opinions) that triple talaq is invalid.  Two other justices concluded that the practice is not unconstitutional, but urged the government to legislate on the matter within 6 months and would have enjoined use of the divorce procedure during that period.

Justice Nariman's opinion, joined by Justice Lalit concluded:

it is clear that this form of Talaq is manifestly arbitrary in the sense that the marital tie can be broken capriciously and whimsically by a Muslim man without any attempt at reconciliation so as to save it. This form of Talaq must, therefore, be held to be violative of the fundamental right contained under Article 14 [Right to Equality] of the Constitution of India. In our opinion, therefore, the 1937 Act [Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act], insofar as it seeks to recognize and enforce Triple Talaq ... must be struck down as being void to the extent that it recognizes and enforces Triple Talaq.

Justice Joseph concluded that "triple talaq is against the basic tenets of the Holy Quran and consequently, it violates Shariat."  He continued:

The whole purpose of the 1937 Act was to declare Shariat as the rule of decision and to discontinue anti-Shariat practices with respect to subjects enumerated in Section 2 which include talaq. Therefore, in any case, after the introduction of the 1937 Act, no practice against the tenets of Quran is permissible.... What is held to be bad in the Holy Quran cannot be good in Shariat and, in that sense, what is bad in theology is bad in law as well.

Chief Justice Khehar, Joined by Justice Nazeer, concluded that triple talaq is protected by Article 25 of the Constitution that protects freedom of religion, saying in part:

It is not for a court to determine whether religious practices were prudent or progressive or regressive. Religion and ‘personal law’, must be perceived, as it is accepted, by the followers of the faith. And not, how another would like it to be (-including self-proclaimed rationalists, of the same faith). Article 25 obliges all Constitutional Courts to protect ‘personal laws’ and not to find fault therewith. Interference in matters of ‘personal law’ is clearly beyond judicial examination....

However, he qualified this by calling on the government to modify the situation by legislation, saying:

[we] are satisfied, that this is a case which presents a situation where this Court should exercise its discretion to issue appropriate directions under Article 142 of the Constitution. We therefore hereby direct, the Union of India to consider appropriate legislation, particularly with reference to ‘talaq-e-biddat’. We hope and expect, that the contemplated legislation will also take into consideration advances in Muslim ‘personal law’ – ‘Shariat’, as have been corrected by legislation the world over, even by theocratic Islamic States....

Till such time as legislation in the matter is considered, we are satisfied in injuncting Muslim husbands, from pronouncing ‘talaq-e-biddat' as a means for severing their matrimonial relationship. The instant injunction, shall in the first instance, be operative for a period of six months.

The Quint reports on the decision.

Appeals Court Refuses To Order Recusal of Fundamentalist Christian Judge

In Ex parte Tiara Brooke Lycans, (AL App., July 28, 2017), an Alabama appellate court refused to issue a writ of mandamus ordering a trial judge who also serves as a preacher of a fundamentalist Christian church to recuse himself in a divorce action in which the wife, a lesbian, feared bias in the judge's custody ruling.  The court said in part:

Judge Bell's expressed belief that homosexual relationships and marriage are contrary to God's law, ... that God's law takes precedence over man-made law, and his placing paramount importance on the moral environment in which a child will live ... would tend to indicate to a reasonable person that a reasonable basis for questioning Judge Bell's impartiality in the divorce action exists; however, the standard is not whether there are some facts that would tend to indicate ... a reasonable basis.... Rather, the issue is "whether a reasonable person knowing everything that [Judge Bell] knows would have a "reasonable basis for questioning [Judge Bell's] impartiality."...  Judge Bell, in his pendente lite custody order ... granted the mother and the father joint physical custody of the child, with custody alternating weekly, and ... [he] has granted two other lesbian mothers and the fathers of their children joint physical custody.... [A] reasonable person who knows everything that Judge Bell knows would not have a reasonable basis for questioning Judge Bell's impartiality....

Christian Post reports on the decision.

No Ramadan Divorces In Palestinian Territories

According to a report today from Al Jazeera, Mahmud Habash, the chief judge of Palestinian Islamic courts in the West Bank and Gaza, has ordered judges to grant no divorces during Ramadan.  Only religious courts have jurisdiction over divorces in the Palestinian Authority.  Habash said that based on experience from previous years, some litigants make "quick and ill-considered decisions" after they have not eaten or smoked.

India's Supreme Court To Hear Constitutional Challenge To Personal Status Laws

NewsClick yesterday carried a lengthy article surveying the background and importance of the Shayara Bano case which will be heard by a 5-judge panel of India's Supreme Court next month.  At issue is whether laws involving personal status which are governed in India by separate legal codes for different religious groups are subject to the fundamental rights protections of India's Constitution.  In this case, the issue is whether Muslim divorce through "Triple Talaq", a practice invoked pursuant to the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act (1937), violates women's rights to equality, life and dignity. The article summarizes in part:

In the triple talaq case the Supreme Court is confronted with this question yet again and it remains to be seen if they will decide the question or dodge it by saying that Islam itself does not recognize triple talaq and hence, there is no need to decide the larger issue of whether personal laws are amenable to constitutional checks and challenges. What is at stake is not just Muslim Personal Law but all laws governing marriage and divorce, including Hindu Law. Will the ruling party that is moving towards a Hindutva State, allow such a challenge is the question. For now the Union of India has committed itself to the challenge but may remain content with the striking down on the ground that it is un-Islamic as some groups have argued. There is a lot riding on this case, not just talaq. The issues are fundamental to constitutional gender justice for all women.

Appeals Court Upholds Ban On Father Discussing Religion During Child Visitation

In Koch v. Koch, (FL App., Sept. 28, 2016), a Florida state appellate court upheld a trial court's order in a parenting plan that was part of a divorce proceeding prohibiting the father from discussing any religious matters during his two hours per week visitation time with his 3 children.  The trial court had concluded that religiously-based admonishments, threats of damnation, and demonization of the children’s mother was abusive to the children, causing them anxiety and severe emotional distress.

Illinois Court Recognizes Muslim Divorce In India Through Khula

Times of India reported yesterday on a June 28 opinion handed down by a Cook County, Illinois circuit court judge recognizing that a Muslim woman's first marriage had been validly dissolved in India in 2007 through the little-known wife-initiated Sharia law procedure of khula.  The issue arose when the woman's second husband raised as a defense in a divorce proceeding the argument that their marriage was never valid because the wife was never divorced from her first husband.

No-Fault Divorce Does Not Violate Hindu Husband's Free Exercise Rights.

In Bhandaru v. Vukkum, (KY App., Aug. 19, 2016), a Kentucky appeals court rejected an argument that the state's no-fault divorce law violates the free exercise rights of a Hindu husband.  The husband argued that his Hindu religion only permits divorce if some grounds for divorce are stated. The court concluded however that the divorce law is a law of general applicability and the state has a rational basis for it.  It thus survives a 1st Amendment challenge and the free exercise provisions of the Kentucky constitution offer no greater protection than those in the 1st Amendment.  The court also rejected the argument that under notions of comity it should have applied the Indian Hindu Marriage Act.

Israel's Rabbinical Courts Grapple With Unrealistic Marriage Contract Terms

In Israel, an interesting contract question is being increasingly faced by state rabbinical courts that have jurisdiction over divorce actions. Traditional Jewish marriage ceremonies involve the husband signing a ketubah, or Jewish wedding contract.  The traditional form of the ketubah  includes the pledge of a sum of money which must be paid to the wife upon the husband's death or upon divorce. (Background.) Again traditionally the amount was set at "200 zuz" which has been seen as equating to around $750 (US).  However it has become a custom in Israel for grooms to demonstrate their love for their bride by inflating the amount in the ketubah by large multiples.  That is background to this report yesterday from JTA on a request from Jerusalem's regional rabbinical court to the Chief Rabbinate to limit the practice by capping the amount that can be set out in the ketubah to 1 million Israeli shekels ($264,000 US):

The unusual request earlier this month follows a divorce in which a man’s ex-wife demanded he pay her 555,555 shekels — approximately $145,000 — because that was the sum he pledged to pay on his ketubah.... Her ex-husband argued that he made the pledge as a testament of his love and appreciation for her, not thinking it would be legally binding.....  

Many grooms pledge sums they cannot afford, attaching many zeros to the number 18 – which is associated with life because of Jewish numerology – or the 555,555 figure, which is especially popular among Sephardic Jews who believe it is lucky. The custom of reading out the ketubah to the wedding guests adds incentive to name high figures, which the court defined as unrealistic.

The panel of three rabbinical judges ... reviewing the divorce case in question was divided, with one judge ruling in favor of the ex-wife’s demand. But his colleagues were of the opinion that the ex-husband should not be made to pay the full sum[, and] finally awarded the woman the equivalent of $31,600 from her ex-husband, or 120,000 shekels.

India's Supreme Court May Consider Constitutionality of Muslim Divorce Practices

India's Supreme Court today said it will examine whether it has jurisdiction to invalidate Muslim personal laws if they interfere with constitutional rights.  According to NDTV, the move comes in a suit challenging triple talaq, the practice that allows a Muslim husband to divorce his wife by pronouncing three times the phrase "I divorce you." (Background.) One of the cases raising the question was brought by a woman whose husband divorced her through triple talaq delivered by mail. The court will hear arguments on the issue on Sept. 6.

Appeal Planned In Pakistan Court's Expansion of Grounds For Christian Divorce

Christians in Pakistan  (May 26) reports that a Christian leader will appeal to Pakistan's Apex Court a ruling handed down on May 23 by the Lahore High Court that expanded the grounds for Christian divorce in the country.  The Pakistan's Christian Divorce Act of 1869 allowed Christians to divorce in accordance with the procedures of British law.  However in 1981 General Zia-ul-Haq annulled that provision and limited the grounds for Christian divorce to adultery.  Now a High Court judge has ruled that the 1981 change was unconstitutional, reviving the ability of Christian couples to divorce on additional grounds found in British law, including divorce if the marriage has become irreparable. As reported by Christian Daily (May 26), some Christians feel that the expanded grounds for divorce mar the sanctity of marriage.

Pope Francis Releases Historic Document on Family Life

As reported by Crux, the Vatican today released Pope Francis' much anticipated Apostolic Exhortation titled Amoris Laetitia (The Joy of Love). Here is the full text of 256-page document which grew out of meetings of Catholic bishops from around the world in 2014 and 2015 on issues of the family. The Vatican has also released a Summary of each of the document's nine chapters.  Of particular interest is Chapter 8 which deals with the Church's treatment of divorced Catholics. The Summary of that Chapter reads in part:

 As far as discernment with regard to “irregular” situations is concerned, the Pope states: “There is a need ‘to avoid judgements which do not take into account the complexity of various situations’ and ‘to be attentive, by necessity, to how people experience distress because of their condition’” (AL 296). And he continues: “It is a matter of reaching out to everyone, of needing to help each person find his or her proper way of participating in the ecclesial community, and thus to experience being touched by an ‘unmerited, unconditional and gratuitous’ mercy” (AL 297). And further: “The divorced who have entered a new union, for example, can find themselves in a variety of situations, which should not be pigeonholed or fit into overly rigid classifications leaving no room for a suitable personal and pastoral discernment” (AL 298).

... [T]he Pope states that “the baptized who are divorced and civilly remarried need to be more fully integrated into Christian communities in the variety of ways possible, while avoiding any occasion of scandal”. “Their participation can be expressed in different ecclesial services… Such persons need to feel not as excommunicated members of the Church, but instead as living members, able to live and grow in the Church… This integration is also needed in the care and Christian upbringing of their children” (AL 299).

In a more general vein, the Pope makes an extremely important statement ... :“If we consider the immense variety of concrete situations, … it is understandable that neither the Synod nor this Exhortation could be expected to provide a new set of general rules, canonical in nature and applicable to all cases. What is needed is simply a renewed encouragement to undertake a responsible personal and pastoral discernment of particular cases, one which would recognize that, since ‘the degree of responsibility is not equal in all cases’, the consequences or effects of a rule need not necessarily always be the same” (AL 300).... 

Crux has also posted an analysis of the document

Tennessee Judge Says Obergefell Ended State Jurisdiction Over Contested Divorces

A Tennessee Chancery Court Judge, in what can only be described as a fit of judicial pique, last week used a divorce case in which he had substantial doubt about the parties' credibility to launch a verbal attack on the U.S. Supreme Court's same-sex marriage decision and develop a rather far-fetched theory of the decision's impact.  In Bumgardner v. Bumgardner, (TN Chan., Aug. 31, 2015), the court said in part:

With the U.S. Supreme Court having defined what must be recognized as a marriage, it would appear that Tennessee' s judiciary must now await the decision of the U. S. Supreme Court as to what is not a marriage, or better stated, when a marriage is no longer a marriage. The majority' s opinion in Obergefell, regardless of its patronizing and condescending verbiage, is now the law of the land....

Thus, it appears there may now be, at minimum ... concurrent jurisdiction between the state and federal courts with regard to marriage/divorce litigation. Perhaps even more troubling, however, is that there may also now be a new or enhanced field of jurisprudence— federal preemption by " judicial fiat." ...

[R]egardless of the states' traditional regulation of the area of marriage and divorce..., what actually appears to be the intent and ( more importantly) the effect of the Supreme Court ruling is to preempt state courts from addressing marriage/ divorce litigation altogether. ...

The conclusion reached by this Court is that Tennesseans, corporately, have been deemed by the U.S. Supreme Court to be incompetent to define and address such keystone/ central institutions such as marriage and, thereby, at minimum, contested divorces. Consequently, since only our federal courts are wise enough to address the issues of marriage— and therefore contested divorces— it only follows that this Court' s jurisdiction has been preempted. ...

Although this Court has some vague familiarity with the governmental theories of democracy, republicanism, socialism, communism, fascism, theocracy, and even despotism, implementation of this apparently new "super -federal -judicial" form of benign and benevolent government, termed " krytocracy" by some and " judi-idiocracy" by others, with its iron fist and limp wrist, represents quite a challenge for a state level trial court. In any event, it should be noted that the victory of personal rights and liberty over the intrusion of state government provided by the majority opinion in Obergefell is held by this Court only to have divested subject matter jurisdiction from this Court when a divorce is contested.

Huffington Post reports on the decision.

Texas Supreme Court: State Lacks Standing To Appeal Trial Court's Grant of Same-Sex Divorce

In a 5-3 decision, the Texas Supreme Court yesterday in State of Texas v. Naylor  (TX Sup. Ct., June 19, 2015), held that the state lacks standing to appeal a divorce decree of sorts that had been granted by a trial court to a lesbian couple.  In the case, the couple had been legally married in Massachusetts, but were now Texas residents.  The trial court recognized the problem of issuing a decree since under Texas law the couple's marriage was not recognized.  Instead it issued an order-- pursuant to an agreement of the parties-- which was "intended to be a substitute for ... a valid and subsisting divorce... and is intended to dispose of all economic issues and liabilities as between the parties whether they [are] divorced or not."  After the order was entered, the state of Texas filed a motion to intervene to defend the Texas law that limits divorce actions to opposite-sex couples who are married to one another.

The Supreme Court's majority opinion by Justice Brown held that the state was too late in attempting to intervene as a party since it did not try to do so until after a decree was entered.  It also held that the state did not show grounds to maintain a third-party appeal of the trial court's decision. Justice Boyd filed a concurring opinion emphasizing that the state is in no way bound by the trial court's decree.

Justice Willett delivered a dissenting opinion (which was joined by Justices Guzman and Devine) concluding:

In my view, the attorney general—constitutionally bound to “represent the State in all suits” has an interest sufficient to intervene to defend Texas law against perceived constitutional attack. His arguments may not prevail, but he should be allowed to make them.

Justice Devine also filed a separate dissent reaching the merits and concluding that the Texas ban on same-sex marriages is constitutional.  Thus, since the parties were not married, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the divorce action. Dallas Morning News reports on the decision. [Thanks to How Appealing for the lead.]

Lack of Judges Creates Huge Backlog In Israel's Highest Religious Court

Haaretz reported last week on the paralysis in Israel's Rabbinical Court because of the partisan fighting that has prevented the appointment of new judges by the committee charged with doing so.  The High Rabbinical Court is the highest appellate court in the religious court system that handles personal status issues-- especially divorces.  Four urgent appeals will finally be heard this week, but the court faces a backlog of 2900 other cases. Six permanent judges are need for the High Rabbinical Court and 25 are needed for regional religious courts. (See prior related posting.)

UPDATE:  Jerusalem Post reports that on Monday June 1,  Justice Minister Ayelet Shaked approved the temporary appointment, for a period of 6 months, of three new judges to the High Rabbinical Court.

Canadian Court Rejects Claim For Damages For Breach of Ketubah

In Zalik v. Zalik, (BC Sup. Ct., Dec. 31, 2014), a British Columbia (Canada) trial court rejected a claim brought by a husband in a divorce proceeding seeking damages from his wife for her breach of their Ketubah (Jewish marriage contract).  The breach cited by the husband was a failure to maintain a lifetime marriage.  The court held that if the Ketubah contains a religious obligation to maintain a lifetime marriage, that obligation is inconsistent with the parties legal rights under Canada's Divorce Act. Metro News reports on the decision.

Mexican Destination Wedding Using Internet-Ordained Clergy Did Not Create Lawful New York Marriage

In Ponorovskaya v. Stecklow, (NY County Sup. Ct., May 29, 2014), a New York state trial court dismissed a divorce action, finding that the parties were never legally married.  At issue was what the court described as:

a license-less marriage supposedly solemnized in what can only be described as a "pseudo-Jewish" wedding ceremony conducted at a Mexican beach resort by a New York dentist who became a Universal Life Church minister on the internet solely for the purpose of performing weddings for friends and relatives.

The wife who was suing for divorce claimed that even though the ceremony was invalid under Mexican law, the parties were still married because  New York Domestic Relations Law §25 provides in part:

Nothing in this article ... shall be construed to render void by reason of a failure to procure a marriage license  any  marriage  solemnized  between  persons of full age....

However the court held that "DRL § 25 should be construed to apply to weddings that take place outside of New York State only under the most extraordinary of circumstances."

The court went on to discuss, but not decide, whether the marriage was properly solemnized:

These provisions call into question whether a person like Dr. Arbeitman, the dentist/Universal Life Church minister who conducted the ceremony here, is a "clergyman" or "minister" under New York law and thus authorized to officiate at weddings.....

Whether the ULC is a church or not, and whatever its belief system may be, compared to other online "religions" that enable people to pay a small fee, obtain a certificate of ordination and then perform religious wedding ceremonies, it seems practically mainstream. There is, for instance, the Church of the Flying Spaghetti Monster, a religious group comprised of atheists, which, upon the payment of a $20 fee, will make an online applicant a "pastafarian minister." Then there is Dudeism, also referred to the Church of the Latter Day Dude, which portends to be a religious philosophy based on the protagonist in the Coen Brothers' cult classic The Big Lebowski. One can be ordained online for free and be authorized to perform weddings as a Dudeist Priest.

Fortunately, this court need not wade into the treacherous waters of attempting to determine what is a "real" religion and what is not, something that would seem to "necessarily involve an impermissible inquiry into religious doctrine or practice".... Given the finding that ... the parties' purported marriage is invalid because it was "an absolute nullity" under the law of the jurisdiction where it took place, it is not of great moment whether Dr. Arbeitman was legally entitled under New York law to solemnize the marriage.