Noise Ordinance Arrest Did Not Violate First Amendment or State RFRA

In Acevedo v. Zatora,(ND IL, May 11, 2026), an Illinois federal district court dismissed plaintiff's claims that police officers violated his free speech and free exercise rights when they arrested him for violating Chicago's noise ordinance. The ordinance prohibits amplified sound on public property that is louder than average conversational level at 100 feet distance. Acevedo and six others set up a microphone on a public sidewalk across from a Planned Parenthood clinic. Acevedo contends that his amplified speech was no louder than permitted under the Ordinance. The court said in part:

Acevedo’s First Amendment grievance ... is not with the noise ordinance’s constitutionality, either facially or as applied to his circumstances. He instead challenges defendants’ decision to arrest him for violating the noise ordinance despite his compliance with it and purportedly owing to his protected speech. This claim is indistinguishable from Acevedo’s First Amendment retaliation claim ... where he alleges that he was unjustly arrested in retaliation for his protected speech, despite his compliance with the noise ordinance....

In dismissing Acevedo's retaliation claim, the court concluded that Acevedo was arrested for disobeying an officer's order to stop using the microphone, not because of the religious or political content of his speech.

The court also dismissed Acevedo's claim against the city of Chicago. Acevedo contended that the city has a policy of  "preventing Christian street preachers (and presumably others) from using voice amplification on the public way by misapplying the noise ordinance to prohibit all amplified religious speech (and possibly other speech) regardless of volume or compliance with the ordinance’s actual requirements." The court said that the complaint did not give the city fair notice of the action Acevedo was challenging. The court said in part:

Do officers involved in the allegedly problematic practice exclusively target Christian street preachers engaged in religious speech, or do the officers also target street preachers of “all” faiths and other individuals not engaged in religious speech at all? Do officers consistently invoke the noise ordinance when they encounter Christian street preachers, or do they arrest Christian street preachers for other alleged infractions and without invoking the noise ordinance at all.

Dismissing Acevedo's claim under the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the court said in part:

Acevedo has not alleged that he faced a “coercive choice” between abandoning his religious convictions or complying with a City regulation. Rather, Acevedo alleges that he did comply with the City’s ordinance while exercising his religious convictions.

The court allowed Acevedo to move ahead on his 4th Amendment false arrest claim.

Street Preachers Can Move Ahead with Free Exercise Claims Against Police

In Raio v. City of Chicago, (ND IL, Feb. 24, 2026), two street preachers and a Gospel singer who had been cited and, on another occasion, arrested for violating Chicago's sound ordinance brought a civil rights action against the city. The three use a microphone connected to a battery-operated speaker for their preaching and music. Ruling on the city's motion to dismiss, the court said that Plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged First Amendment retaliation, free exercise, false arrest, retaliatory arrest, and IRFRA claims, but dismissed plaintiffs' vagueness, equal protection, and free speech claims. The court said inn part:

Plaintiffs allege that Chicago police officers “cite all street preachers, regardless of whether they meet the requirements of the [Amplification Ordinance] and regardless of the evidence,”... and “engag[e] in a targeted practice of enforcing their interpretation of the [Amplification Ordinance] against only religious speakers,”... Defendants argue that the Amplification Ordinance is instead a content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation....

Plaintiffs have failed to allege a single instance in which they, or anyone similarly situated, used amplification to communicate a non-religious message without consequence.  Nor do they allege that secular speakers regularly violate the Amplification Ordinance without any police intervention.  Plaintiffs instead include only conclusory allegations ... extrapolated from the two instances in which the Defendant Officers interacted with them.  Thus, Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged that Defendants have selectively enforced the Amplification Ordinance....

Plaintiffs do not allege that the Amplification Ordinance burdens their religious exercise....  Plaintiffs instead contend that Defendants violated their First Amendment free exercise rights by burdening their religious beliefs via an unwritten policy and custom of targeting religious activity....

... Plaintiffs provide enough facts that Defendants’ unwritten policy targeting amplified religious speech imposes, at least plausibly, an unjustifiably substantial burden on Plaintiffs’ free exercise of religion for the claim to move forward....

... Plaintiffs have not alleged any instances where police officers declined to cite or arrest any similarly situated secular individuals under similar conditions....  As such, Plaintiffs’ non-conclusory allegations fail to suggest that Defendants acted with a discriminatory intent and, consequently, the Court must dismiss Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim...