Parties Agree To $2 Million + Attorneys' Fees in Christian Flag Case

After plaintiffs' win in the Supreme Court in Shurtleff v. City of Boston (the Christian flag case), plaintiffs sought to recover attorneys' fees and costs for the five years of litigation. On Nov. 8, the parties filed a Joint Notice of Settlement in the case in a Massachusetts federal district court. The City of Boston will pay $2,125,000 to Liberty Counsel, attorneys for plaintiffs.  Liberty Counsel issued a press release announcing the settlement.

SCOTUS Hears Arguments in Indian Child Welfare Act Case

Yesterday the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Haaland v. Brackeen. (Audio and transcript of full oral arguments). SCOTUSblog reported on the arguments. At issue is the constitutionality of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 which attempts to prevent child welfare and adoption agencies from placing Native American children outside of their tribe. (SCOTUSblog case page.) A number of commentators have pointed out that issues of religion underlie the controversy in the four consolidated cases heard yesterday. Religion News Service explains, saying that the Act was a reaction to past efforts by the U.S. government to remove Native American children from their homes and place them in boarding schools:

The U.S. is only now reckoning with the history of its boarding schools, which separated generations of children from their families and prohibited them from speaking Native languages, dressing and wearing their hair in traditional styles and taking part in traditional spiritual practices in an effort to assimilate them into the dominant white Christian culture.

Half of boarding schools likely were supported by Christian institutions, according to a report released earlier this year by the U.S. Department of the Interior. A number of denominations are now researching and repenting for their past involvement.

Emergency Injunction Against NYC City-Worker Vaccine Mandates Sought from Supreme Court

An Emergency Application for an Injunction Pending Appellate Review (full text) was filed with the U.S. Supreme Court yesterday in New Yorkers for Religious Liberty v. City of New York.  The petition seeks an injunction against enforcing New York City's Covid vaccine mandates for city workers against those with religious objections to the vaccine. Petitioners argue in part:

Because the City’s Mandates provide for individualized exemptions, play denominational favorites, grant the government substantial discretion, and treat religious objectors less favorably than secular (e.g., economic) objectors, the Mandates violate Applicants’ free-exercise rights.

ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the application.

Cert. Denied in Mootness Dismissal of Free Exercise Challenge to Mask Mandate

The U.S. Supreme Court this morning denied review in Resurrection School v. Hertel, (Docket No. 22-181, certiorari denied 10/31/2022). (Order List.) In the case, an en banc panel of the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals held by a vote of 13-1-3 that a free exercise challenge to Michigan's COVID mask mandate for school children is moot. (See prior posting.)

Certiorari Filed in Challenge to Arkansas Anti-BDS Law

 A petition for certiorari (full text) has been filed with the U.S. Supreme Court in Arkansas Times, LP v. Waldrip, (Sup. Ct., filed 10/20/2022). In the case, the U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals sitting en banc, in a 9-1 opinion, upheld against a free speech challenge Arkansas' law requiring public contracts to include a certification from the contractor that it will not boycott Israel. (See prior posting.) ACLU issued a press release announcing the filing of the petition for review.

Certiorari Denied In Scientology Arbitration Case and Falun Gong Leafleting Case

Today's 48-page Order List from the U.S. Supreme Court on its opening day of the term includes the denial of review in two cases of interest:

Church of Scientology v. Bixler (Docket No. 22-60, cert. denied 10/3/2022): In the case, a California state appellate court held that former Church of Scientology members were not bound by their agreement to submit all disputes with the Church to the Church's Religious Arbitration system when the dispute involves conduct that occurred after plaintiffs left the Church. (See prior posting.)

Zhang Jingrong v. Chinese Anti-Cult World Alliance, Inc. (Docket No. 21-1429, cert. denied 10/3/2022) and Chinese Anti-Cult World Alliance, Inc. v. Zhang Jinrong (Docket No. 21-1556, cert. denied 10/3/2022)- In the case the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals held that five tables on the sidewalk in Flushing, Queens, New York where Falun Gong adherents passed out flyers and displayed posters were not a "place of religious worship" under the Freedom of Access To Clinics Entrances Act that prohibits intentionally injuring, intimidating, or interfering with anyone who is exercising 1st Amendment religious freedom rights “at a place of religious worship.” In addition, the cross-petition for review raised the issue of the validity of the statute under the commerce clause. (See prior posting.)

Supreme Court Opens Its October 2022 Term Today

The Supreme Court opens its new term this morning.  Washington Times reports that the traditional Red Mass that precedes the Court's new term was held yesterday at Washington's Cathedral of St. Matthew the Apostle.  Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Barret and retired Justice Breyer attended. Among the cases already on the Court's docket for this term is 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis (SCOTUS blog case page). The date for its oral argument has not yet been set. In the case, the U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the application of Colorado's Anti-Discrimination Act to a wedding website design company whose owner for religious reasons refuses to create websites that celebrate same-sex marriages. (See prior posting.) The Court granted review only on the free speech issue in the case. The Court will continue to broadcast live audio feed of oral arguments at this link. We can also expect the traditional First Monday long Order List to be released this morning.

Yeshiva University Suspends All Student Organization Activities Rather Than Recognize LGBTQ Organization

As previously reported, the U.S. Supreme Court last week in Yeshiva University v. YU Pride Alliance ordered Yeshiva University to first seek relief through appeals in state courts before asking the U.S. Supreme Court to stay a state trial court order requiring it to recognize an LGBTQ student group. Now, as reported by CNN, the University on Friday announced that it would put all undergraduate club activities on hold while it "takes steps to follow the roadmap provided by the US Supreme Court..."

UPDATE: Religion News Service reports:

A Jewish LGBTQ organization [JQY] announced Tuesday (Sept. 20) that it will step in to provide funding for all student clubs at Yeshiva University after school officials suspended all undergraduate student groups rather than recognize an LGBTQ campus group, the YU Pride Alliance.

UPDATE 2: In a statement (full text) issued Sept. 21, YU Pride Alliance announced that it would agree to a stay of the order requiring the University to recognize it while the litigation continues because it does not want YU to punish fellow-students. As reported by The Commentator, the University welcomed the response, saying it offers an opportunity for continuing discussions.

Supreme Court Vacates Stay of Injunction Against Yeshiva University, Sending Case Back To State Courts

The U.S. Supreme court yesterday in Yeshiva University v. YU Pride Alliance, (Sup. Ct., Sept. 14, 2022), vacated the stay issued on Sept. 9 by Justice Sotomayor of a New York state trial court's injunction that required Yeshiva University to officially recognize as a student organization an LGBTQ group, YU Pride Alliance. In a 5-4 vote, the Court issued the following opinion directing the University to first seek expedited review and interim relief from New York trial courts.  Here is the full opinion [paragraph breaks added]:

The application (22A184) for stay pending appeal of a permanent injunction entered by the New York trial court, presented to Justice Sotomayor and by her referred to the Court, is denied without prejudice to applicants again seeking relief from this Court if, upon properly seeking expedited review and interim relief from the New York courts, applicants receive neither. The order heretofore entered by Justice Sotomayor is vacated.

Applicants Yeshiva University and its president seek emergency relief from a non-final order of the New York trial court requiring the University to treat an LGBTQ student group similarly to other student groups in its student club recognition process. The application is denied because it appears that applicants have at least two further avenues for expedited or interim state court relief. First, applicants may ask the New York courts to expedite consideration of the merits of their appeal. Applicants do not assert, nor does the Appellate Division docket reveal, that they have ever requested such relief. Second, applicants may file with the Appellate Division a corrected motion for permission to appeal that court’s denial of a stay to the New York Court of Appeals, as the Appellate Division clerk’s office directed applicants to do on August 25. Applicants may also ask the Appellate Division to expedite consideration of that motion.

If applicants seek and receive neither expedited review nor interim relief from the New York courts, they may return to this Court.

Justice Alito, with whom Justice Thomas, Justice Gorsuch, and Justice Barrett join, dissent.

NY Jewish Week reports on the decision. [Thanks to Rabbi Michael Simon for the lead.]

UPDATE: Here is the full text of Justice Alito's dissent. He said in part:

At least four of us are likely to vote to grant certiorari if Yeshiva’s First Amendment arguments are rejected on appeal, and Yeshiva would likely win if its case came before us. A State’s imposition of its own mandatory interpretation of scripture is a shocking development that calls out for review. The Free Exercise Clause protects the ability of religious schools to educate in accordance with their faith.

Certiorari Petition Filed Again In Bakery's Refusal To Design Wedding Cake For Same-Sex Marriage

Last week, a petition for certiorari (full text) was filed with the U.S. Supreme Court in Klein v. Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industries, (Sup. Ct., filed 9/7/2022). This is the second time the case has worked its way up to the Supreme Court. (See prior posting.) At issue is a finding by the state Bureau of Labor and Industries that Sweetcakes bakery violated the state's public accommodation law when it refused on religious grounds to design and create a wedding cake for a same-sex wedding. In January, the state court of appeals remanded the case to the Bureau of Labor and Industries for it to determine a remedy after finding that the Bureau's first determination of damages was tainted by non-neutrality. (See prior posting.) In August, the Bureau imposed damages of $30,000. First Liberty has additional background.

Justice Sotomayor Stays NY Order Requiring Yeshiva University To Recognize LGBTQ Group

In Yeshiva University v. YU Pride Alliance, (Sup. Ct., Sept. 9, 2022),  U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor today issued an order staying a New York trial court's injunction that required Yeshiva University to officially recognize as a student organization an LGBTQ group, YU Pride Alliance. The New York trial court held that applying the public accommodation provisions of the New York City Human Rights Law to Yeshiva does not violate its First Amendment free exercise or free speech rights. (See prior posting.) Justice Sotomayor granted the University's Emergency Application for a Stay Pending Appellate Review without referring the petition to the full Court. However she wrote that her stay was granted "pending further order of the undersigned or of the Court." CNN reports on developments.

Postal Worker Seeks Supreme Court Modification Of Title VII Precedents On Reasonable Accommodation

A petition for certiorari (full text) was filed yesterday with the U.S. Supreme Court in Groff v. DeJoy. In the case, the U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 decision, held that accommodating a Sunday sabbath observer by allowing him not to report for work on Sunday would cause an "undue hardship" to the U.S. Postal Service.  Thus, failure to grant that accommodation did not violate Title VII. (See prior posting.) Appellants are asking the Supreme Court to repudiate the definition of "undue hardship" which the Court approved in its 1977 decision in TWA v. Hardison. First Liberty issued a press release announcing the filing of the petition for review.

Cert. Filed In Scientology Arbitration Case

A petition for certiorari (full text) was filed last week in Church of Scientology International v. Bixler, (cert. file 7/19/2022). In the case, a California state appellate court held that former Church of Scientology members were not bound by their agreement to submit all disputes with the Church to the Church's Religious Arbitration system when the dispute involves conduct that occurred after plaintiffs left the Church. (See prior posting.) Law & Crime reports on the filing.

House Hearing On Impact of Dobbs Decision

On July 13, the House Committee on Oversight and Reform held a hearing on The Impact of the Supreme Court’s Dobbs Decision on Abortion Rights and Access Across the United States. Video of the full hearing and written transcripts of the prepared testimony of six witnesses who appeared before the Committee are available here at the Committee's website.

Maine AG Says Christian Schools May Still Be Ineligible For Tuition Assistance Program

 As previously reported, last week in Carson v. Makin, the U.S. Supreme Court held that sectarian schools could not be excluded from Maine's tuition aid program that is open to nonsectarian private schools. In a press release posted immediately after the Court's decision, Maine's Attorney General said that many religious schools may still not be able to participate in the program because they:

refuse to admit gay and transgender children, and openly discriminate in hiring teachers and staff....  Educational facilities that accept public funds must comply with anti-discrimination provisions of the Maine Human Rights Act, and this would require some religious schools to eliminate their current discriminatory practices.

Insurance Journal reports that in response to the AG's statement, a spokesperson for the American Association of Christian Schools said:

We don’t look at it as discrimination at all. We have a set of principles and beliefs that we believe are conducive to prosperity, to the good life, so to speak, and we partner with parents who share that vision....

Certiorari Denied In Christian Ministry's Challenge To Defamation Standard

Yesterday the U.S. Supreme Court denied review in Coral Ridge Ministries Media, Inc. v. Southern Poverty Law Center, (Docket No. 21-802, certiorari denied 6/27/2022). In the case, the U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed an Alabama federal district court's dismissal of a defamation suit brought by a Christian ministry and media company. Coral Ridge is designated as a "hate group" by the Southern Poverty Law Center because of Coral Ridge's religious beliefs opposing LGBTQ conduct. The Circuit Court dismissed the defamation claim because plaintiff failed to adequately plead actual malice (i.e., knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth). Justice Thomas filed an opinion dissenting from the denial of certiorari, saying in part:

I would grant certiorari in this case to revisit the “actual malice” standard. This case is one of many showing how New York Times and its progeny have allowed media organizations and interest groups “to cast false aspersions on public figures with near impunity.” ... SPLC’s “hate group” designation lumped Coral Ridge’s Christian ministry with groups like the Ku Klux Klan and Neo-Nazis. It placed Coral Ridge on an interactive, online “Hate Map” and caused Coral Ridge concrete financial injury by excluding it from the AmazonSmile donation program.

Law & Crime reports on the case.

Supreme Court Upholds Football Coach's Prayer Rights; Repudiates the "Lemon Test"

 In Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, (Sup. Ct., June 27, 2022), the U.S. Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision, held that a school district violated the First Amendment's Free Speech and Free Exercise clauses by disciplining a football coach for visibly praying at midfield immediately after football games. Justice Gorsuch wrote the majority opinion. In discussing whether the school district could regulate Coach Kennedy's speech because Kennedy was a government employee, Justice Gorsuch said in part:

[W]hat matters is whether Mr. Kennedy offered his prayers while acting within the scope of his duties as a coach. And taken together, both the substance of Mr. Kennedy’s speech and the circumstances surrounding it point to the conclusion that he did not.

In reaching its contrary conclusion, the Ninth Circuit stressed that, as a coach, Mr. Kennedy served as a role model “clothed with the mantle of one who imparts knowledge and wisdom.”... Teachers and coaches often serve as vital role models. But this argument commits the error of positing an “excessively broad job descriptio[n]” by treating everything teachers and coaches say in the workplace as government speech subject to government control.... On this understanding, a school could fire a Muslim teacher for wearing a headscarf in the classroom or prohibit a Christian aide from praying quietly over her lunch in the cafeteria. Likewise, this argument ignores the District Court’s conclusion (and the District’s concession) that Mr. Kennedy’s actual job description left time for a private moment after the game to call home, check a text, socialize, or engage in any manner of secular activities.... That Mr. Kennedy chose to use the same time to pray does not transform his speech into government speech To hold differently would be to treat religious expression as second-class speech and eviscerate this Court’s repeated promise that teachers do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”.... 

Justice Gorsuch also found it clear that Coach Kennedy seeks to engage in a sincerely motivated religious exercise. The more difficult question was whether the school district could bar this because of Establishment Clause concerns. In deciding that it could not, the Court repudiated the Lemon test which had been relied upon by the lower courts in deciding the case. Justice Gorsuch said in part:

It is true that this Court and others often refer to the “Establishment Clause,” the “Free Exercise Clause,” and the “Free Speech Clause” as separate units. But the three Clauses appear in the same sentence of the same Amendment.... A natural reading of that sentence would seem to suggest the Clauses have “complementary” purposes, not warring ones where one Clause is always sure to prevail over the others....

To defend its approach, the District relied on Lemon and its progeny....

What the District and the Ninth Circuit overlooked, however, is that the “shortcomings” associated with this “ambitiou[s],” abstract, and ahistorical approach to the Establishment Clause became so “apparent” that this Court long ago abandoned Lemon and its endorsement test offshoot.... This Court has since made plain, too, that the Establishment Clause does not include anything like a “modified heckler’s veto, in which . . . religious activity can be proscribed” based on “‘perceptions’” or “‘discomfort.’” ...

In place of Lemon and the endorsement test, this Court has instructed that the Establishment Clause must be interpreted by “‘reference to historical practices and understandings.’” Town of Greece, 572 U. S., at 576.... “‘[T]he line’” that courts and governments “must draw between the permissible and the impermissible” has to “‘accor[d] with history and faithfully reflec[t] the understanding of the Founding Fathers.’”... An analysis focused on original meaning and history, this Court has stressed, has long represented the rule rather than some “‘exception’” within the “Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence.”

Justice Gorsuch then focused on the alternative argument that students were being coerced to pray. He said in part:

No doubt, too, coercion along these lines was among the foremost hallmarks of religious establishments the framers sought to prohibit when they adopted the First Amendment. Members of this Court have sometimes disagreed on what exactly qualifies as impermissible coercion in light of the original meaning of the Establishment Clause..... But in this case Mr. Kennedy’s private religious exercise did not come close to crossing any line one might imagine separating protected private expression from impermissible government coercion....

Naturally, Mr. Kennedy’s proposal to pray quietly by himself on the field would have meant some people would have seen his religious exercise. Those close at hand might have heard him too. But learning how to tolerate speech or prayer of all kinds is “part of learning how to live in a pluralistic society,” a trait of character essential to “a tolerant citizenry.”

Justice Thomas filed a brief concurring opinion, saying in part:

[W]e have held that “the First Amendment protects public employee speech only when it falls within the core of First Amendment protection— speech on matters of public concern.”... It remains an open question, however, if a similar analysis can or should apply to free-exercise claims in light of the “history” and “tradition” of the Free Exercise Clause...

Justice Alito filed a brief concurring opinion, saying in part:

The Court does not decide what standard applies to such expression under the Free Speech Clause but holds only that retaliation for this expression cannot be justified based on any of the standards discussed. On that understanding, I join the opinion in full.

Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Breyer and Kagan, filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

Official-led prayer strikes at the core of our constitutional protections for the religious liberty of students and their parents, as embodied in both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.

The Court now charts a different path, yet again paying almost exclusive attention to the Free Exercise Clause’s protection for individual religious exercise while giving short shrift to the Establishment Clause’s prohibition on state establishment of religion....

Properly understood, this case is not about the limits on an individual’s ability to engage in private prayer at work. This case is about whether a school district is required to allow one of its employees to incorporate a public, communicative display of the employee’s personal religious beliefs into a school event, where that display is recognizable as part of a longstanding practice of the employee ministering religion to students as the public watched. A school district is not required to permit such conduct; in fact, the Establishment Clause prohibits it from doing so....

The Court now goes much further, overruling Lemon entirely and in all contexts. It is wrong to do so....

The Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause are equally integral in protecting religious freedom in our society. The first serves as “a promise from our government,” while the second erects a “backstop that disables our government from breaking it” and “start[ing] us down the path to the past, when [the right to free exercise] was routinely abridged.” ...

Today, the Court once again weakens the backstop. It elevates one individual’s interest in personal religious exercise, in the exact time and place of that individual’s choosing, over society’s interest in protecting the separation between church and state, eroding the protections for religious liberty for all. Today’s decision is particularly misguided because it elevates the religious rights of a school official, who voluntarily accepted public employment and the limits that public employment entails, over those of his students, who are required to attend school and who this Court has long recognized are particularly vulnerable and deserving of protection. In doing so, the Court sets us further down a perilous path in forcing States to entangle themselves with religion, with all of our rights hanging in the balance. As much as the Court protests otherwise, today’s decision is no victory for religious liberty.

CNN reports on the decision.

Supreme Court Overrules Roe v. Wade and Casey

In a 5-1-3 opinion today, the U.S. Supreme Court in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, (Sup. Ct., June 24, 2022), overruled Roe v. Wade  and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey.  The majority, in a 108-page opinion written by Justice Alito and joined by Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett said in part:

The Constitution makes no reference to abortion, and no such right is implicitly protected by any constitutional provision, including the one on which the defenders of Roe and Casey now chiefly rely—the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That provision has been held to guarantee some rights that are not mentioned in the Constitution, but any such right must be “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”...

The right to abortion does not fall within this category. Until the latter part of the 20th century, such a right was entirely unknown in American law....

Stare decisis, the doctrine on which Casey’s controlling opinion was based, does not compel unending adherence to Roe’s abuse of judicial authority. Roe was egregiously wrong from the start. Its reasoning was exceptionally weak, and the decision has had damaging consequences. And far from bringing about a national settlement of the abortion issue, Roe and Casey have enflamed debate and deepened division.

It is time to heed the Constitution and return the issue of abortion to the people’s elected representatives....

In interpreting what is meant by the Fourteenth Amendment’s reference to “liberty,” we must guard against the natural human tendency to confuse what that Amendment protects with our own ardent views about the liberty that Americans should enjoy....

[T]he dissent suggests that our decision calls into question Griswold, Eisenstadt, Lawrence, and Obergefell.... But we have stated unequivocally that “[n]othing in this opinion should be understood to cast doubt on precedents that do not concern abortion.”... We have also explained why that is so: rights regarding contraception and same-sex relationships are inherently different from the right to abortion because the latter (as we have stressed) uniquely involves what Roe and Casey termed “potential life.” ... Therefore, a right to abortion cannot be justified by a purported analogy to the rights recognized in those other cases or by “appeals to a broader right to autonomy.”... It is hard to see how we could be clearer....

We must now decide what standard will govern if state abortion regulations undergo constitutional challenge and whether the law before us satisfies the appropriate standard....

Under our precedents, rational-basis review is the appropriate standard for such challenges....

A law regulating abortion, like other health and welfare laws, is entitled to a “strong presumption of validity.”... It must be sustained if there is a rational basis on which the legislature could have thought that it would serve legitimate state interests....

These legitimate interests justify Mississippi’s Gestational Age Act.... The Mississippi Legislature’s findings recount the stages of “human prenatal development” and assert the State’s interest in “protecting the life of the unborn.”.... The legislature also found that abortions performed after 15 weeks typically use the dilation and evacuation procedure, and the legislature found the use of this procedure “for nontherapeutic or elective reasons [to be] a barbaric practice, dangerous for the maternal patient, and demeaning to the medical profession.” ... These legitimate interests provide a rational basis for the Gestational Age Act....

Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion arguing that "'substantive due process' is an oxymoron that 'lack[s] any basis in the Constitution.'" He goes on to say: "in future cases, we should reconsider all of this Court’s substantive due process precedents, including Griswold, Lawrence, and Obergefell.

Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion emphasizing that the Court's decision does not threaten or cast doubt on substantive due process decisions on non-abortion issues. He also reiterated: "Because the Constitution is neutral on the issue of abortion, this Court also must be scrupulously neutral."

Chief Justice Roberts filed an opinion concurring only in the judgment and saying in part:

I agree with the Court that the viability line established by Roe and Casey should be discarded under a straightforward stare decisis analysis. That line never made any sense. Our abortion precedents describe the right at issue as a woman’s right to choose to terminate her pregnancy. That right should therefore extend far enough to ensure a reasonable opportunity to choose, but need not extend any further— certainly not all the way to viability. Mississippi’s law allows a woman three months to obtain an abortion, well beyond the point at which it is considered “late” to discover a pregnancy.... I see no sound basis for questioning the adequacy of that opportunity.

But that is all I would say, out of adherence to a simple yet fundamental principle of judicial restraint: If it is not necessary to decide more to dispose of a case, then it is necessary not to decide more....

Here, there is a clear path to deciding this case correctly without overruling Roe all the way down to the studs: recognize that the viability line must be discarded, as the majority rightly does, and leave for another day whether to reject any right to an abortion at all.

Justices Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan filed a 66-page joint dissenting opinion, saying in part:

The majority tries to hide the geographically expansive effects of its holding. Today’s decision, the majority says, permits “each State” to address abortion as it pleases.... That is cold comfort, of course, for the poor woman who cannot get the money to fly to a distant State for a procedure. Above all others, women lacking financial resources will suffer from today’s decision. In any event, interstate restrictions will also soon be in the offing. After this decision, some States may block women from traveling out of State to obtain abortions, or even from receiving abortion medications from out of State. Some may criminalize efforts, including the provision of information or funding, to help women gain access to other States’ abortion services. Most threatening of all, no language in today’s decision stops the Federal Government from prohibiting abortions nationwide, once again from the moment of conception and without exceptions for rape or incest....

Whatever the exact scope of the coming laws, one result of today’s decision is certain: the curtailment of women’s rights, and of their status as free and equal citizens. Yesterday, the Constitution guaranteed that a woman confronted with an unplanned pregnancy could (within reasonable limits) make her own decision about whether to bear a child, with all the life-transforming consequences that act involves. And in thus safeguarding each woman’s reproductive freedom, the Constitution also protected “[t]he ability of women to participate equally in [this Nation’s] economic and social life.”... But no longer. As of today, this Court holds, a State can always force a woman to give birth, prohibiting even the earliest abortions. A State can thus transform what, when freely undertaken, is a wonder into what, when forced, may be a nightmare. Some women, especially women of means, will find ways around the State’s assertion of power. Others—those without money or childcare or the ability to take time off from work—will not be so fortunate. Maybe they will try an unsafe method of abortion, and come to physical harm, or even die. Maybe they will undergo pregnancy and have a child, but at significant personal or familial cost. At the least, they will incur the cost of losing control of their lives. The Constitution will, today’s majority holds, provide no shield, despite its guarantees of liberty and equality for all....

[I]n this Nation, we do not believe that a government controlling all private choices is compatible with a free people. So we do not (as the majority insists today) place everything within “the reach of majorities and [government] officials.”... We believe in a Constitution that puts some issues off limits to majority rule. Even in the face of public opposition, we uphold the right of individuals—yes, including women—to make their own choices and chart their own futures. Or at least, we did once....

Those responsible for the original Constitution, including the Fourteenth Amendment, did not perceive women as equals, and did not recognize women’s rights. When the majority says that we must read our foundational charter as viewed at the time of ratification (except that we may also check it against the Dark Ages), it consigns women to second-class citizenship....

The Framers (both in 1788 and 1868) understood that the world changes. So they did not define rights by reference to the specific practices existing at the time. Instead, the Framers defined rights in general terms, to permit future evolution in their scope and meaning. And over the course of our history, this Court has taken up the Framers’ invitation. It has kept true to the Framers’ principles by applying them in new ways, responsive to new societal understandings and conditions.

[This post was corrected to make it clear that the Dissent was a Joint Dissent, not a dissent by one Justice joined by the others.]

Supreme Court Says Maine Cannot Exclude Sectarian Schools From Its Tuition Reimbursement Program

In Carson v. Makin, (Sup. Ct., June 21, 2022), in a 6-3 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Maine's program that pays tuition (up to a statutory limit) to out-of-district public or private high schools for students whose districts do not operate a high school, but which requires participating schools to be nonsectarian, violates the Free Exercise Clause. The majority opinion by Chief Justice Roberts says in part:

The State pays tuition for certain students at private schools— so long as the schools are not religious. That is discrimination against religion. A State’s antiestablishment interest does not justify enactments that exclude some members of the community from an otherwise generally available public benefit because of their religious exercise....

Maine’s “nonsectarian” requirement for its otherwise generally available tuition assistance payments violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Regardless of how the benefit and restriction are described, the program operates to identify and exclude otherwise eligible schools on the basis of their religious exercise.

Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Kagan and for the most part by Justice Sotomayor, filed a dissenting opinion which says in part:

Nothing in our Free Exercise Clause cases compels Maine to give tuition aid to private schools that will use the funds to provide a religious education.... [T]his Court’s decisions in Trinity Lutheran and Espinoza prohibit States from denying aid to religious schools solely because of a school’s religious status—that is, its affiliation with or control by a religious organization.... But we have never said that the Free Exercise Clause prohibits States from withholding funds because of the religious use to which the money will be put....

Maine’s decision not to fund such schools falls squarely within the play in the joints between those two Clauses. Maine has promised all children within the State the right to receive a free public education. In fulfilling this promise, Maine endeavors to provide children the religiously neutral education required in public school systems.... The Religion Clauses give Maine the ability, and flexibility, to make this choice. 

Justice Sotomayor also filed a dissenting opinion which says in part:

This Court continues to dismantle the wall of separation between church and state that the Framers fought to build.... 

If a State cannot offer subsidies to its citizens without being required to fund religious exercise, any State that values its historic antiestablishment interests more than this Court does will have to curtail the support it offers to its citizens.

CNN reports on the decision.

Supreme Court Denies Review In Challenge To California Time Extension For Sex Abuse Claims

The U.S. Supreme Court today denied review in Roman Catholic Bishop of Oakland v. Superior Court of the State of California, (Docket No. 21-1377, certiorari denied 6/21/2022). (Order List.) In the case, 9 dioceses and archdioceses challenged California legislation that extended the limitation period for suits alleging childhood sexual assault to plaintiff’s 40th birthday or 5 years after discovery; created a 3-year window to bring previously time-barred civil actions for for childhood sexual assault; and provided for treble damages in cover-up cases. Here is the Supreme Court case page.