Cert. Filed In Scientology Arbitration Case

A petition for certiorari (full text) was filed last week in Church of Scientology International v. Bixler, (cert. file 7/19/2022). In the case, a California state appellate court held that former Church of Scientology members were not bound by their agreement to submit all disputes with the Church to the Church's Religious Arbitration system when the dispute involves conduct that occurred after plaintiffs left the Church. (See prior posting.) Law & Crime reports on the filing.

House Hearing On Impact of Dobbs Decision

On July 13, the House Committee on Oversight and Reform held a hearing on The Impact of the Supreme Court’s Dobbs Decision on Abortion Rights and Access Across the United States. Video of the full hearing and written transcripts of the prepared testimony of six witnesses who appeared before the Committee are available here at the Committee's website.

Maine AG Says Christian Schools May Still Be Ineligible For Tuition Assistance Program

 As previously reported, last week in Carson v. Makin, the U.S. Supreme Court held that sectarian schools could not be excluded from Maine's tuition aid program that is open to nonsectarian private schools. In a press release posted immediately after the Court's decision, Maine's Attorney General said that many religious schools may still not be able to participate in the program because they:

refuse to admit gay and transgender children, and openly discriminate in hiring teachers and staff....  Educational facilities that accept public funds must comply with anti-discrimination provisions of the Maine Human Rights Act, and this would require some religious schools to eliminate their current discriminatory practices.

Insurance Journal reports that in response to the AG's statement, a spokesperson for the American Association of Christian Schools said:

We don’t look at it as discrimination at all. We have a set of principles and beliefs that we believe are conducive to prosperity, to the good life, so to speak, and we partner with parents who share that vision....

Certiorari Denied In Christian Ministry's Challenge To Defamation Standard

Yesterday the U.S. Supreme Court denied review in Coral Ridge Ministries Media, Inc. v. Southern Poverty Law Center, (Docket No. 21-802, certiorari denied 6/27/2022). In the case, the U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed an Alabama federal district court's dismissal of a defamation suit brought by a Christian ministry and media company. Coral Ridge is designated as a "hate group" by the Southern Poverty Law Center because of Coral Ridge's religious beliefs opposing LGBTQ conduct. The Circuit Court dismissed the defamation claim because plaintiff failed to adequately plead actual malice (i.e., knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth). Justice Thomas filed an opinion dissenting from the denial of certiorari, saying in part:

I would grant certiorari in this case to revisit the “actual malice” standard. This case is one of many showing how New York Times and its progeny have allowed media organizations and interest groups “to cast false aspersions on public figures with near impunity.” ... SPLC’s “hate group” designation lumped Coral Ridge’s Christian ministry with groups like the Ku Klux Klan and Neo-Nazis. It placed Coral Ridge on an interactive, online “Hate Map” and caused Coral Ridge concrete financial injury by excluding it from the AmazonSmile donation program.

Law & Crime reports on the case.

Supreme Court Upholds Football Coach's Prayer Rights; Repudiates the "Lemon Test"

 In Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, (Sup. Ct., June 27, 2022), the U.S. Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision, held that a school district violated the First Amendment's Free Speech and Free Exercise clauses by disciplining a football coach for visibly praying at midfield immediately after football games. Justice Gorsuch wrote the majority opinion. In discussing whether the school district could regulate Coach Kennedy's speech because Kennedy was a government employee, Justice Gorsuch said in part:

[W]hat matters is whether Mr. Kennedy offered his prayers while acting within the scope of his duties as a coach. And taken together, both the substance of Mr. Kennedy’s speech and the circumstances surrounding it point to the conclusion that he did not.

In reaching its contrary conclusion, the Ninth Circuit stressed that, as a coach, Mr. Kennedy served as a role model “clothed with the mantle of one who imparts knowledge and wisdom.”... Teachers and coaches often serve as vital role models. But this argument commits the error of positing an “excessively broad job descriptio[n]” by treating everything teachers and coaches say in the workplace as government speech subject to government control.... On this understanding, a school could fire a Muslim teacher for wearing a headscarf in the classroom or prohibit a Christian aide from praying quietly over her lunch in the cafeteria. Likewise, this argument ignores the District Court’s conclusion (and the District’s concession) that Mr. Kennedy’s actual job description left time for a private moment after the game to call home, check a text, socialize, or engage in any manner of secular activities.... That Mr. Kennedy chose to use the same time to pray does not transform his speech into government speech To hold differently would be to treat religious expression as second-class speech and eviscerate this Court’s repeated promise that teachers do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”.... 

Justice Gorsuch also found it clear that Coach Kennedy seeks to engage in a sincerely motivated religious exercise. The more difficult question was whether the school district could bar this because of Establishment Clause concerns. In deciding that it could not, the Court repudiated the Lemon test which had been relied upon by the lower courts in deciding the case. Justice Gorsuch said in part:

It is true that this Court and others often refer to the “Establishment Clause,” the “Free Exercise Clause,” and the “Free Speech Clause” as separate units. But the three Clauses appear in the same sentence of the same Amendment.... A natural reading of that sentence would seem to suggest the Clauses have “complementary” purposes, not warring ones where one Clause is always sure to prevail over the others....

To defend its approach, the District relied on Lemon and its progeny....

What the District and the Ninth Circuit overlooked, however, is that the “shortcomings” associated with this “ambitiou[s],” abstract, and ahistorical approach to the Establishment Clause became so “apparent” that this Court long ago abandoned Lemon and its endorsement test offshoot.... This Court has since made plain, too, that the Establishment Clause does not include anything like a “modified heckler’s veto, in which . . . religious activity can be proscribed” based on “‘perceptions’” or “‘discomfort.’” ...

In place of Lemon and the endorsement test, this Court has instructed that the Establishment Clause must be interpreted by “‘reference to historical practices and understandings.’” Town of Greece, 572 U. S., at 576.... “‘[T]he line’” that courts and governments “must draw between the permissible and the impermissible” has to “‘accor[d] with history and faithfully reflec[t] the understanding of the Founding Fathers.’”... An analysis focused on original meaning and history, this Court has stressed, has long represented the rule rather than some “‘exception’” within the “Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence.”

Justice Gorsuch then focused on the alternative argument that students were being coerced to pray. He said in part:

No doubt, too, coercion along these lines was among the foremost hallmarks of religious establishments the framers sought to prohibit when they adopted the First Amendment. Members of this Court have sometimes disagreed on what exactly qualifies as impermissible coercion in light of the original meaning of the Establishment Clause..... But in this case Mr. Kennedy’s private religious exercise did not come close to crossing any line one might imagine separating protected private expression from impermissible government coercion....

Naturally, Mr. Kennedy’s proposal to pray quietly by himself on the field would have meant some people would have seen his religious exercise. Those close at hand might have heard him too. But learning how to tolerate speech or prayer of all kinds is “part of learning how to live in a pluralistic society,” a trait of character essential to “a tolerant citizenry.”

Justice Thomas filed a brief concurring opinion, saying in part:

[W]e have held that “the First Amendment protects public employee speech only when it falls within the core of First Amendment protection— speech on matters of public concern.”... It remains an open question, however, if a similar analysis can or should apply to free-exercise claims in light of the “history” and “tradition” of the Free Exercise Clause...

Justice Alito filed a brief concurring opinion, saying in part:

The Court does not decide what standard applies to such expression under the Free Speech Clause but holds only that retaliation for this expression cannot be justified based on any of the standards discussed. On that understanding, I join the opinion in full.

Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Breyer and Kagan, filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

Official-led prayer strikes at the core of our constitutional protections for the religious liberty of students and their parents, as embodied in both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.

The Court now charts a different path, yet again paying almost exclusive attention to the Free Exercise Clause’s protection for individual religious exercise while giving short shrift to the Establishment Clause’s prohibition on state establishment of religion....

Properly understood, this case is not about the limits on an individual’s ability to engage in private prayer at work. This case is about whether a school district is required to allow one of its employees to incorporate a public, communicative display of the employee’s personal religious beliefs into a school event, where that display is recognizable as part of a longstanding practice of the employee ministering religion to students as the public watched. A school district is not required to permit such conduct; in fact, the Establishment Clause prohibits it from doing so....

The Court now goes much further, overruling Lemon entirely and in all contexts. It is wrong to do so....

The Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause are equally integral in protecting religious freedom in our society. The first serves as “a promise from our government,” while the second erects a “backstop that disables our government from breaking it” and “start[ing] us down the path to the past, when [the right to free exercise] was routinely abridged.” ...

Today, the Court once again weakens the backstop. It elevates one individual’s interest in personal religious exercise, in the exact time and place of that individual’s choosing, over society’s interest in protecting the separation between church and state, eroding the protections for religious liberty for all. Today’s decision is particularly misguided because it elevates the religious rights of a school official, who voluntarily accepted public employment and the limits that public employment entails, over those of his students, who are required to attend school and who this Court has long recognized are particularly vulnerable and deserving of protection. In doing so, the Court sets us further down a perilous path in forcing States to entangle themselves with religion, with all of our rights hanging in the balance. As much as the Court protests otherwise, today’s decision is no victory for religious liberty.

CNN reports on the decision.

Supreme Court Overrules Roe v. Wade and Casey

In a 5-1-3 opinion today, the U.S. Supreme Court in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, (Sup. Ct., June 24, 2022), overruled Roe v. Wade  and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey.  The majority, in a 108-page opinion written by Justice Alito and joined by Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett said in part:

The Constitution makes no reference to abortion, and no such right is implicitly protected by any constitutional provision, including the one on which the defenders of Roe and Casey now chiefly rely—the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That provision has been held to guarantee some rights that are not mentioned in the Constitution, but any such right must be “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”...

The right to abortion does not fall within this category. Until the latter part of the 20th century, such a right was entirely unknown in American law....

Stare decisis, the doctrine on which Casey’s controlling opinion was based, does not compel unending adherence to Roe’s abuse of judicial authority. Roe was egregiously wrong from the start. Its reasoning was exceptionally weak, and the decision has had damaging consequences. And far from bringing about a national settlement of the abortion issue, Roe and Casey have enflamed debate and deepened division.

It is time to heed the Constitution and return the issue of abortion to the people’s elected representatives....

In interpreting what is meant by the Fourteenth Amendment’s reference to “liberty,” we must guard against the natural human tendency to confuse what that Amendment protects with our own ardent views about the liberty that Americans should enjoy....

[T]he dissent suggests that our decision calls into question Griswold, Eisenstadt, Lawrence, and Obergefell.... But we have stated unequivocally that “[n]othing in this opinion should be understood to cast doubt on precedents that do not concern abortion.”... We have also explained why that is so: rights regarding contraception and same-sex relationships are inherently different from the right to abortion because the latter (as we have stressed) uniquely involves what Roe and Casey termed “potential life.” ... Therefore, a right to abortion cannot be justified by a purported analogy to the rights recognized in those other cases or by “appeals to a broader right to autonomy.”... It is hard to see how we could be clearer....

We must now decide what standard will govern if state abortion regulations undergo constitutional challenge and whether the law before us satisfies the appropriate standard....

Under our precedents, rational-basis review is the appropriate standard for such challenges....

A law regulating abortion, like other health and welfare laws, is entitled to a “strong presumption of validity.”... It must be sustained if there is a rational basis on which the legislature could have thought that it would serve legitimate state interests....

These legitimate interests justify Mississippi’s Gestational Age Act.... The Mississippi Legislature’s findings recount the stages of “human prenatal development” and assert the State’s interest in “protecting the life of the unborn.”.... The legislature also found that abortions performed after 15 weeks typically use the dilation and evacuation procedure, and the legislature found the use of this procedure “for nontherapeutic or elective reasons [to be] a barbaric practice, dangerous for the maternal patient, and demeaning to the medical profession.” ... These legitimate interests provide a rational basis for the Gestational Age Act....

Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion arguing that "'substantive due process' is an oxymoron that 'lack[s] any basis in the Constitution.'" He goes on to say: "in future cases, we should reconsider all of this Court’s substantive due process precedents, including Griswold, Lawrence, and Obergefell.

Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion emphasizing that the Court's decision does not threaten or cast doubt on substantive due process decisions on non-abortion issues. He also reiterated: "Because the Constitution is neutral on the issue of abortion, this Court also must be scrupulously neutral."

Chief Justice Roberts filed an opinion concurring only in the judgment and saying in part:

I agree with the Court that the viability line established by Roe and Casey should be discarded under a straightforward stare decisis analysis. That line never made any sense. Our abortion precedents describe the right at issue as a woman’s right to choose to terminate her pregnancy. That right should therefore extend far enough to ensure a reasonable opportunity to choose, but need not extend any further— certainly not all the way to viability. Mississippi’s law allows a woman three months to obtain an abortion, well beyond the point at which it is considered “late” to discover a pregnancy.... I see no sound basis for questioning the adequacy of that opportunity.

But that is all I would say, out of adherence to a simple yet fundamental principle of judicial restraint: If it is not necessary to decide more to dispose of a case, then it is necessary not to decide more....

Here, there is a clear path to deciding this case correctly without overruling Roe all the way down to the studs: recognize that the viability line must be discarded, as the majority rightly does, and leave for another day whether to reject any right to an abortion at all.

Justices Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan filed a 66-page joint dissenting opinion, saying in part:

The majority tries to hide the geographically expansive effects of its holding. Today’s decision, the majority says, permits “each State” to address abortion as it pleases.... That is cold comfort, of course, for the poor woman who cannot get the money to fly to a distant State for a procedure. Above all others, women lacking financial resources will suffer from today’s decision. In any event, interstate restrictions will also soon be in the offing. After this decision, some States may block women from traveling out of State to obtain abortions, or even from receiving abortion medications from out of State. Some may criminalize efforts, including the provision of information or funding, to help women gain access to other States’ abortion services. Most threatening of all, no language in today’s decision stops the Federal Government from prohibiting abortions nationwide, once again from the moment of conception and without exceptions for rape or incest....

Whatever the exact scope of the coming laws, one result of today’s decision is certain: the curtailment of women’s rights, and of their status as free and equal citizens. Yesterday, the Constitution guaranteed that a woman confronted with an unplanned pregnancy could (within reasonable limits) make her own decision about whether to bear a child, with all the life-transforming consequences that act involves. And in thus safeguarding each woman’s reproductive freedom, the Constitution also protected “[t]he ability of women to participate equally in [this Nation’s] economic and social life.”... But no longer. As of today, this Court holds, a State can always force a woman to give birth, prohibiting even the earliest abortions. A State can thus transform what, when freely undertaken, is a wonder into what, when forced, may be a nightmare. Some women, especially women of means, will find ways around the State’s assertion of power. Others—those without money or childcare or the ability to take time off from work—will not be so fortunate. Maybe they will try an unsafe method of abortion, and come to physical harm, or even die. Maybe they will undergo pregnancy and have a child, but at significant personal or familial cost. At the least, they will incur the cost of losing control of their lives. The Constitution will, today’s majority holds, provide no shield, despite its guarantees of liberty and equality for all....

[I]n this Nation, we do not believe that a government controlling all private choices is compatible with a free people. So we do not (as the majority insists today) place everything within “the reach of majorities and [government] officials.”... We believe in a Constitution that puts some issues off limits to majority rule. Even in the face of public opposition, we uphold the right of individuals—yes, including women—to make their own choices and chart their own futures. Or at least, we did once....

Those responsible for the original Constitution, including the Fourteenth Amendment, did not perceive women as equals, and did not recognize women’s rights. When the majority says that we must read our foundational charter as viewed at the time of ratification (except that we may also check it against the Dark Ages), it consigns women to second-class citizenship....

The Framers (both in 1788 and 1868) understood that the world changes. So they did not define rights by reference to the specific practices existing at the time. Instead, the Framers defined rights in general terms, to permit future evolution in their scope and meaning. And over the course of our history, this Court has taken up the Framers’ invitation. It has kept true to the Framers’ principles by applying them in new ways, responsive to new societal understandings and conditions.

[This post was corrected to make it clear that the Dissent was a Joint Dissent, not a dissent by one Justice joined by the others.]

Supreme Court Says Maine Cannot Exclude Sectarian Schools From Its Tuition Reimbursement Program

In Carson v. Makin, (Sup. Ct., June 21, 2022), in a 6-3 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Maine's program that pays tuition (up to a statutory limit) to out-of-district public or private high schools for students whose districts do not operate a high school, but which requires participating schools to be nonsectarian, violates the Free Exercise Clause. The majority opinion by Chief Justice Roberts says in part:

The State pays tuition for certain students at private schools— so long as the schools are not religious. That is discrimination against religion. A State’s antiestablishment interest does not justify enactments that exclude some members of the community from an otherwise generally available public benefit because of their religious exercise....

Maine’s “nonsectarian” requirement for its otherwise generally available tuition assistance payments violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Regardless of how the benefit and restriction are described, the program operates to identify and exclude otherwise eligible schools on the basis of their religious exercise.

Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Kagan and for the most part by Justice Sotomayor, filed a dissenting opinion which says in part:

Nothing in our Free Exercise Clause cases compels Maine to give tuition aid to private schools that will use the funds to provide a religious education.... [T]his Court’s decisions in Trinity Lutheran and Espinoza prohibit States from denying aid to religious schools solely because of a school’s religious status—that is, its affiliation with or control by a religious organization.... But we have never said that the Free Exercise Clause prohibits States from withholding funds because of the religious use to which the money will be put....

Maine’s decision not to fund such schools falls squarely within the play in the joints between those two Clauses. Maine has promised all children within the State the right to receive a free public education. In fulfilling this promise, Maine endeavors to provide children the religiously neutral education required in public school systems.... The Religion Clauses give Maine the ability, and flexibility, to make this choice. 

Justice Sotomayor also filed a dissenting opinion which says in part:

This Court continues to dismantle the wall of separation between church and state that the Framers fought to build.... 

If a State cannot offer subsidies to its citizens without being required to fund religious exercise, any State that values its historic antiestablishment interests more than this Court does will have to curtail the support it offers to its citizens.

CNN reports on the decision.

Supreme Court Denies Review In Challenge To California Time Extension For Sex Abuse Claims

The U.S. Supreme Court today denied review in Roman Catholic Bishop of Oakland v. Superior Court of the State of California, (Docket No. 21-1377, certiorari denied 6/21/2022). (Order List.) In the case, 9 dioceses and archdioceses challenged California legislation that extended the limitation period for suits alleging childhood sexual assault to plaintiff’s 40th birthday or 5 years after discovery; created a 3-year window to bring previously time-barred civil actions for for childhood sexual assault; and provided for treble damages in cover-up cases. Here is the Supreme Court case page.

Certiorari Denied In Wisconsin Parochial School Bussing Case

The U.S. Supreme Court today denied review in St. Augustine School v. Underly, (Docket No. 21-1295, certiorari denied 6/6/2022). (Order List). In the case, the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals sent back to the district court a suit challenging Wisconsin's refusal to provide bus transportation to students at St. Augustine School. The decision was based on a Wisconsin statute that requires school districts to bus private school students, but limits the obligation to only one private school affiliated with the same religious denomination or sponsoring group in each attendance district. The case has a complicated litigation history. (See prior posting.)

Certiorari Denied In Church's Challenge To Colorado COVID Restrictions

The U.S. Supreme Court today denied review in Community Baptist Church v. Polis, (Docket No. 21-1328, certiorari denied 5/31/2022). (Order List). In the case, the U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a district court's denial of a preliminary injunction in a free exercise challenge by two churches and one of their pastors to COVID restrictions imposed by the state of Colorado.  It similarly affirmed the dismissal of a challenge to the federal government's award of COVID relief aid to the state. (See prior posting.)

Certiorari Denied In Synagogue Picketers Case

On May 16, the U.S. Supreme Court denied review in Gerber v. Herskovitz, (Docket No, 21-1263, certiorari denied, 5/16/2022) (Order List). In the case, the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed a suit by synagogue members against anti-Israel pickets who have picketed services at the Beth Israel Synagogue in Ann Arbor, Michigan every week since 2003. (See prior posting).

Cert. Denied In Challenge To NY Repeal Of Religious Exemption To School Vaccinations

The U.S. Supreme Court yesterday denied review in F.F. v. New York, (Docket No. 21-1003, certiorari denied 5/23/2022). (Order List). In the case, a New York state appellate court rejected parents' constitutional challenges to New York's repeal of the religious exemption from mandatory vaccination for school children. (See prior posting). SCOTUSblog's case page has links to the filings in the case.  Christian Post reports on the denial of certiorari.

Certiorari Filed On Whether Falun Gong Tables Are Protected Under FACEA

A petition for certiorari (full text) was filed yesterday in Zhang Jingrong v. Chinese Anti-Cult World Alliance, Inc., (Docket No. 21-1429, filed 5/10/2022). In the case, the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals held that five tables on the sidewalk in Flushing, Queens, New York where Falun Gong adherents passed out flyers and displayed posters were not a "place of religious worship" under the Freedom of Access To Clinics Entrances Act that prohibits intentionally injuring, intimidating, or interfering with anyone who is exercising 1st Amendment religious freedom rights “at a place of religious worship.” (See prior posting.) [Thanks to James A. Sonne for the lead.]

Cert. Filed In Challenge To California's Extension Of Time To Bring Childhood Sex Assault Claims

A petition for certiorari (full text) was filed last month with the U.S. Supreme Court in Roman Catholic Bishop of Oakland v. Superior Court of the State of California,, (Docket No. 21-1377, filed 4/15/2022). In the case, 9 dioceses and archdioceses challenge California legislation that extended the limitation period for suits alleging childhood sexual assault to plaintiff’s 40th birthday or 5 years after discovery; created a 3-year window to bring previously time-barred civil actions for for childhood sexual assault; and provided for treble damages in cover-up cases. National Catholic Register reports on the cert. petition.

Draft SCOTUS Opinion Overruling Roe v. Wade Is Leaked To The Press

Benefitting from an apparently unprecedented breach of Supreme Court confidentiality, Politico has obtained and published the first draft of a 67-page (plus Appendix) majority opinion written by Justice Alito in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization.  The draft opinion (full text) overrules Roe v. Wade.  It reads in part:

We hold that Roe and Casey must be overruled. The Constitution makes no reference to abortion, and no such right is implicitly protected by any constitutional provision, including the one on which the defenders of Roe and Casey now chiefly rely-- the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That provision has been held to guarantee some rights that are not mentioned in the Constitution, but any such right must be "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" and "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."...

The right to abortion does not fall within this category.

The draft opinion goes on to discuss the standards that should apply to challenges of state laws limiting abortion, saying in part:

Under our precedents, rational basis review is the appropriate standard for such challenges.... It must be sustained if there is a rational basis on which the legislature could have thought that it would serve legitimate state interests.... These legitimate interests include respect for and preservation of prenatal life at all stages of development, ... the mitigation of fetal pain; and the prevention of discrimination on the basis of race, sex, or disability.

Unanimous Supreme Court Says Boston Violated Free Speech Clause In Barring Christian Flag Outside City Hall

In Shurtleff v. City of Boston, (Sup.Ct., May 2, 2022), the U.S. Supreme Court held unanimously that Boston violated the free speech rights of Camp Constitution when it refused to allow it to briefly fly a Christian flag on a third flagpole outside city hall which private groups have used to fly flags of their choice for ceremonies. In the past, the city had approved some 50 different flags and had never before refused a request. Boston contended that the flag was government speech and cited Establishment Clause concerns in barring the Christian flag. The Court rejected that contention, saying in part:

We conclude that, on balance, Boston did not make the raising and flying of private groups’ flags a form of government speech. That means, in turn, that Boston’s refusal to let Shurtleff and Camp Constitution raise their flag based on its religious viewpoint “abridg[ed]” their “freedom of speech.”

Justice Breyer wrote the majority opinion which was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett. Justice Kavanaugh also filed a concurring opinion. Justice Alito, joined by Justices Thomas and Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring only in the judgment, saying in part:

...I cannot go along with the Court’s decision to analyze this case in terms of the triad of factors—history, the public’s perception of who is speaking, and the extent to which the government has exercised control over speech.... [T]reating those factors as a test obscures the real question in government-speech cases: whether the government is speaking instead of regulating private expression.

Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Thomas, filed a concurring opinion saying in part:

Not a single Member of the Court seeks to defend Boston’s view that a municipal policy allowing all groups to fly their flags, secular and religious alike, would offend the Establishment Clause.

How did the city get it so wrong? To be fair, at least some of the blame belongs here and traces back to Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971)....

To justify a policy that discriminated against religion, Boston sought to drag Lemon once more from its grave. It was a strategy as risky as it was unsound. Lemon ignored the original meaning of the Establishment Clause, it disregarded mountains of precedent, and it substituted a serious constitutional inquiry with a guessing game. This Court long ago interred Lemon, and it is past time for local officials and lower courts to let it lie.

Prayer At The 50-Yard Line: SCOTUS Hears Football Coach's Case This Morning

This morning, the U.S. Supreme Court will hear oral arguments in Kennedy v. Bremerton School District. In the case, the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a high school's actions against a football coach who insisted on praying at the 50-yard line immediately after football games. The coach was placed on paid administrative leave and given negative performance reviews. He did not reapply to coach the following year. A divided 9th Circuit denied en banc review. (See prior posting.) Amy Howe at SCOTUSblog previews the case, saying in part:

... Kennedy and the school district disagree not only about the legal issues and their implications, but also about many of the facts, including exactly why Kennedy lost his job. Kennedy says he was fired for briefly and privately praying at midfield; Laser and the school district counter that he was suspended for “refusing to stop holding public prayers at the 50-yard line,” which created both pressure for students to join him and “genuine safety concerns for students on the fields because of the spectacle that ensued from his media outreach on praying.”

The SCOTUSblog case page has links to the filings in the case, including the dozens of amicus briefs that have been submitted. Live audio of the oral arguments, which begin at 10:00 AM, will be available at this link. When the transcript and recording of the oral arguments become available later today, I will update this post with links to them.

UPDATE Here are links to the transcript and audio of the oral arguments.

Certiorari Denied In Synagogue Picketing Case

Last week, the U.S. Supreme Court denied review in Brysk v. Herskovitz, (Docket No. 21-1024, certiorari denied 3/21/2022). (Order List). In the case, the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed a suit by synagogue members against anti-Israel pickets who have picketed services at the Beth Israel Synagogue in Ann Arbor, Michigan every week since 2003.  A majority held that the picketers were protected by the First Amendment. (See prior posting).

Supreme Court Stays District Court's Ban On Navy Applying Vaccine Mandate To SEALs With Religious Objections

Yesterday in Austin v. U.S. Navy Seals 1-26, (Sup.Ct., March 25, 2022), in a case on its shadow docket, the U.S. Supreme Court by a vote of 6-3 stayed a Texas district court's order that barred the Navy from considering the COVID vaccination status of 35 service members in making deployment, assignment and operational decisions. The service members all have religious objections to the vaccines. The Court's stay remains in effect while appeals to the 5th Circuit and, subsequently if necessary, to the Supreme Court are pending. The stay was granted through an unsigned one-paragraph order.  However, Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:

[T]he District Court, while no doubt well-intentioned, in effect inserted itself into the Navy’s chain of command, overriding military commanders’ professional military judgments. The Court relied on the Religious Freedom Restoration Act... But even accepting that RFRA applies in this particular military context, RFRA does not justify judicial intrusion into military affairs in this case. That is because the Navy has an extraordinarily compelling interest in maintaining strategic and operational control over the assignment and deployment of all Special Warfare personnel—including control over decisions about military readiness. And no less restrictive means would satisfy that interest in this context.

Justice Thomas dissented without opinion.  Justice Alito, joined by Justice Gorsuch, filed a dissenting opinion, which concluded that the Navy had not satisfied the requirements of RFRA or the 1st Amendment.  However, the opinion would grant limited relief to the Navy while appeals are pending.  The opinion said in part:

While I am not sure that the Navy is entitled to any relief at this stage, I am also wary, as was the District Court, about judicial interference with sensitive military decision making. Granting a substantial measure of deference to the Navy, I would limit the [district court's] order to the selection of the Special Warfare service members who are sent on missions where there is a special need to minimize the risk that the illness of a member due to COVID–19 might jeopardize the success of the mission or the safety of the team members.

NBC News reports on the decision. [Thanks to Joshua Sarnoff via Religionlaw for the lead.]

Supreme Court Says Pastor Should Be Allowed To Pray Audibly And Lay Hands On Prisoner Being Executed

In Ramirez v. Collier, (Sup.Ct., March 24, 2022), the U.S. Supreme court in n 8-1 decision held that a death row prisoner was likely to succeed in his RLUIPA lawsuit challenging limits on his pastor's activities in the execution chamber.  The Court held that petitioner is entitled to a preliminary injunction barring Texas from proceeding with his execution without permitting his pastor, during the execution, to lay hands on the prisoner and audibly pray with him. Chief Justice Roberts majority opinion said in part:

First, prison officials say that absolute silence is necessary in the execution chamber so they can monitor the inmate’s condition through a microphone suspended overhead. They say that audible prayer might impede their ability to hear subtle signs of trouble or prove distracting during an emergency.... But respondents fail to show that a categorical ban on all audible prayer is the least restrictive means of furthering their compelling interests....

Second, prison officials say that if they allow spiritual advisors to pray aloud during executions, the opportunity “could be exploited to make a statement to the witnesses or officials, rather than the inmate.” ... But there is no indication in the record that Pastor Moore would cause the sorts of disruptions that respondents fear...

Respondents’ categorical ban on religious touch in the execution chamber fares no better.... Under Texas’s current protocol, spiritual advisors stand just three feet from the gurney in the execution chamber.... A security escort is posted nearby, ready to intervene if anything goes awry.... We do not see how letting the spiritual advisor stand slightly closer, reach out his arm, and touch a part of the prisoner’s body well away from the site of any IV line would meaningfully increase risk.

Justices Sotomayor and Kavanaugh each filed a concurring opinion.  Justice Thomas filed a 23-page dissent, saying in part:

Petitioner John Henry Ramirez stabbed Pablo Castro 29 times during a robbery that netted $1.25. Castro bled to death in a parking lot. Since that day, Ramirez has manufactured more than a decade of delay to evade the capital sentence lawfully imposed by the State of Texas. This Court now affords yet another chance for him to delay his execution. Because I think Ramirez’s claims either do not warrant equitable relief or are procedurally barred, I respectfully dissent.

CNN reports on the decision.