Sunday, March 02, 2025

Iowa Governor Signs Law Ending Anti-Discrimination Protection for Transgender Individuals

On Feb. 28, Iowa Governor Kim Reynolds signed Senate File 418 (full text) which removes "gender identity" as a protected class under the state's anti-discrimination laws. It also provides that in construing state statutes, a reference to "sex" means "the state of being either male or female as observed or clinically verified at birth." The law also bars issuance of a new birth certificate reflecting a sex change. In her signing statement (full text), Governor Reynolds said in part:

It is common sense to acknowledge the obvious biological differences between men and women. In fact, it is necessary to secure genuine equal protection for women and girls....

I know this is a sensitive issue for some, many of whom have heard misinformation about what this bill does. The truth is that it simply brings Iowa in line with the federal Civil Rights Code, as well as most states.

We all agree that every Iowan, without exception, deserves respect and dignity. We are all children of God, and no law changes that.

Iowa Public Radio reports on the bill.

Friday, February 28, 2025

Wyoming Passes Bill Barring State from Requiring Employees to Use Preferred Pronouns of Other Employees

The Wyoming legislature this week gave final approval to SF077 (full text) which provides in part:

The state and its political subdivisions shall not compel or require an employee to refer to another employee using that employee's preferred pronouns.

The Act allows  person aggrieved by a violation to seek injunctive or declaratory relief.

Wyoming Governor Mark Gordon allowed the bill to become law without his signature. In his No Signature Letter to Senate yesterday, Governor Gordon called the law "a solution in search of a problem."

Wyoming PBS has background on the bill.

10th Circuit Upholds State Insurance Regulator's Closure of Christian Health Care Sharing Ministry

In Renteria v. New Mexico Office of the Superintendent of Insurance, (10th Cir., Feb. 27, 2025), the U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 decision, upheld a trial court's refusal to preliminarily enjoin the enforcement of a New Mexico cease and desist order issued by the Office of the Superintendent of Insurance against a Mennonite church's health care sharing ministry. The ministry claimed that the order violated its free exercise rights.  The court said in part:

OSI’s enforcement action here was not because of Gospel Light’s religious beliefs, it was because they operated outside of the bounds of the NMIC [New Mexico Insurance Code] that applied to their business activities. In other words, OSI’s asserted interests were to protect New Mexico consumers by regulating the insurance industry, not to burden or regulate religious conduct. That other organizations, not entirely secular and not comparable to Gospel Light, merit partial exemptions under the NMIC does not carry the water for Plaintiffs that the NMIC treats a secular activity more favorably than a comparable religious activity. Consequently, rational-basis review applies.....

OSI sought to enforce the NMIC to protect consumers. The “regulation and licensure of insurance producers” are “important state interests,”... and OSI’s final order, which enforces the NMIC against Gospel Light, is rationally related to the regulation of health insurance. As such, the government action here satisfies rational-basis review, and Plaintiffs have not shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits on their Free Exercise claims....

Judge Carson dissented, saying in part: 

State governments must enforce statutes in a neutral and generally applicable manner.  In this case, that means the New Mexico Office of the Superintendent of Insurance (“OSI”) cannot regulate Gospel Light Mennonite Church Medical Aid Plan (“Gospel Light”), a religious organization, more stringently than it regulates similarly situated secular organizations like labor unions and fraternal organizations.  But the district court reached the opposite conclusion when it allowed the OSI to impose statutory restrictions upon Gospel Light while exempting similarly situated secular organizations.  The majority upholds the OSI’s impermissible action.  Because the district court’s and the majority’s conclusions run contrary to established Tenth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent precluding discrimination based on religious views, I respectfully dissent.

New Study of U.S. Religious Landscape Released

This week, the Pew Research Center released the findings from its 2023-24 Religious Landscape Study, a survey of 36,908 U.S. adults. (Full text). (Web version). The 392-page report covers data on the demographics and viewpoints of various Christian and non-Christian religious denominations in the U.S. Of particular interest to readers of Religion Clause may be the Report's section on Religion and Public Life which surveys attitudes on three questions. It reports in part:

Americans are about evenly divided on whether the federal government should declare the U.S. a Christian nation, with 47% either favoring or strongly favoring the idea and 50% either opposing or strongly opposing it.

Among religious groups, this idea is most widely supported by evangelical Protestants, 78% of whom say that they favor or strongly favor the federal government declaring the U.S. a Christian nation....

Interestingly, 16% of respondents who identify with non-Christian religions and 19% of religiously unaffiliated favor this.

The new Religious Landscape Study finds that about half of Americans, or a little more, support allowing teacher-led prayer in public schools, whether that be praying to Jesus explicitly (52%) or, alternatively, praying to God without mentioning any specific religion (57%). Seven-in-ten U.S. Christian adults say they favor permitting teacher-led prayers to Jesus in public schools and 73% say they favor teacher-led prayers to God that don’t mention any specific religion.

Compared with Christians, far lower shares of religiously unaffiliated Americans (28%) and adults who affiliate with other, non-Christian religions (39%) say they favor public school teachers leading classes in prayers that refer to God without mentioning any specific religion. There is even less support among non-Christian groups for allowing public school teachers to lead classes in prayers to Jesus....

 About half of Americans (53%) favor or strongly favor allowing cities and towns to display religious symbols on public property. Support for this stance is particularly strong among Christians, including 80% of evangelical Protestants and 73% of Latter-day Saints who favor or strongly favor allowing public displays of religious symbols.

Much lower shares of Buddhists (39%), Muslims (35%), Hindus (31%) and Jews (25%) say they favor allowing religious displays on public property....

Thursday, February 27, 2025

8th Circuit: Damages Available Under RLUIPA When Defendant Received Federal Funds

In Barnett v. Short, (8th Cir., Feb. 28. 2025), the U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part the dismissal of a suit brought by a former inmate who alleges that while in administrative segregation in the Jefferson, Missouri County jail he was denied access to a Bible. The court held that damages are available in suits under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, at least where the defendant does not enjoy sovereign immunity, saying in part:

Though damages against a defendant that enjoys sovereign immunity may not be "suitable" or "proper," damages against those that don't are the norm....

We therefore conclude that the district court erred in dismissing Barnett's RLUIPA claim against the county.

The court however affirmed the dismissal of the suit against the jail administrator in her individual capacity, saying in part: 

RLUIPA permits claims against a "government," see 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–2(a), and it defines "government" to include county officials and "any other person acting under color of State law." ... That language permits suits against individual defendants in both their official and individual capacities....

But we conclude that Congress's authorization of suits against non-recipients of federal money in their individual capacities exceeds its spending power. That's because "the legitimacy of Congress' power to enact Spending Clause legislation rests not on its sovereign authority to enact binding laws, but on whether the recipient voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of that 'contract.'"...

The court also reversed the dismissal of plaintiff's free exercise claim against the jail administrator, but affirmed dismissal of that claim against the county because " Short did not possess the authority needed to render the county liable for her decision."

Judge Loken dissented in part, saying that he would affirm the decision to dismiss the free exercise claim against the jail administrator, agreeing with the trial court that the deprivation of the Bible did not impose a substantial burden on plaintiff's religious exercise.

Utah RFRA Protects Psilocybin-Using Religious Sect

In Jensen v. Utah County, (D UT, Feb. 20, 2025), a Utah federal district court issued a preliminary injunction under Utah's Religious Freedom Restoration Act barring law enforcement personnel from interfering with the sincere religious use of psilocybin by members of a new religious group known as Singularism. The court also ordered return of items that had been seized from the group. The court said in part:

Plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the Utah Controlled Substances Act as applied to their psilocybin ceremonies....

Based on the evidence in this case, Plaintiffs have established that the government has substantially burdened their sincere religious exercise. Simply put, Plaintiffs offer a sacramental psilocybin tea to their voyagers, who then embark on a spiritual journey by which they write their own scripture. A law that categorically prohibits the possession and use of the psilocybin sacrament—thereby preventing Singularism’s adherents from pursuing their spiritual voyages and hindering them from producing their sacred scripture—substantially burdens the free exercise of Singularism and its adherents....

Defendants observe that Singularism “does not claim special access to divine truths,” instead encouraging its practitioners to more deeply “discover and define their own beliefs,” and explicitly states that “no organization, including [it], has all the answers to life’s most difficult questions.” In Defendants’ view, these features weaken Singularism’s claim to be a religion because they show that Singularism’s beliefs are not comprehensive....  As the court sees it, however, these features less so detract from Singularism’s religious nature than they illustrate Singularism’s commitment to existential humility...

From all the evidence in the record, the court is hard-pressed to find, as Defendants urge, that Singularism is essentially a drug-dealing business cloaked in a minister’s robe. To the contrary, the court is convinced that Singularism is a legitimate religion and that Plaintiffs are sincere practitioners of it. This is not a case where a group of people claim a religious right to do little more than use and distribute large quantities of drugs.... By establishing the sincerity of their religious beliefs, Plaintiffs have fulfilled their responsibility of establishing a prima facie case under the Utah RFRA, shifting the burden to the government to demonstrate that the Utah Controlled Substances Act accomplishes a compelling state interest using the least restrictive means....

Whatever legal regime a society chooses, however, it must apply its protections equally to unpopular or unfamiliar religious groups as to popular or familiar ones if that commitment to religious liberty is to mean anything. As sang Jonas Gwangwa, a South African jazz musician who was exiled by the apartheid government, “Freedom for some is freedom for none.” Indeed, the very founding of the State of Utah reflects the lived experience of that truth by members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Perhaps it is ironic then that not long after enacting its RFRA to provide special protections for religious exercise, the State of Utah should so vigorously deploy its resources, particularly the coercive power of its criminal-justice system, to harass and shut down a new religion it finds offensive practically without any evidence that that religion’s practices have imposed any harms on its own practitioners or anyone else. 

Wednesday, February 26, 2025

Civil Courts Can Decide Dispute Over Catholic Organization's Bylaws

In Foundation for the Advancement of Catholic Schools, Inc. v. Blair, (CT App., Feb. 25, 2025), a Connecticut state appellate court held that a controversy over interpretation of the Foundation's bylaws can be adjudicated by civil courts.  At issue is whether under the Foundation's bylaws, the archbishop can appoint Board members who are not nominated by the Foundation's Governance Committee. The court said in part:

We need not decide whether FACS is a religious organization because, even if we assume, without deciding, that it qualifies as such, we conclude that the claims raised in the plaintiffs’ action can be resolved by applying neutral principles of law.....

We ...must review the plaintiffs’ requested relief and the relevant language of FACS’ bylaws to determine whether resolving this dispute requires an inquiry into purely ecclesiastical questions of religious doctrine or practice or the governance, administration or policies of a church....

Read plainly, the relevant language in the bylaws concerning the procedure for appointments to the board is entirely secular and cannot reasonably be interpreted as implicating issues of religious doctrine or practice or of church government, policy or administration. Put another way, nothing in the pertinent bylaw provision indicates that an analysis of the claims raised by the plaintiffs would require a court to go beyond the secular legal principles governing corporations and the interpretation of bylaws and to resolve impermissible ecclesiastical issues....

Indeed, the defendants concede that the plaintiffs’ claims do not require resolution of doctrinal issues but argue, nonetheless, that because of the archbishop’s status in the [Archdiocese of Hartford], he exercises his ‘‘religious discretion’’ when making decisions as to board appointments, which constitutes a matter of church governance and the governance of a presumably religious organization that a civil court cannot review. This argument fails because the dispositive question is whether the bylaws authorize the board to limit the universe of individuals who may be appointed to the board by the archbishop to only those individuals submitted for nomination by the committee. That question can be determined by applying secular legal principles.

7th Circuit: Visa Regulations for Temporary Religious Workers Do Not Violate RFRA or 1st Amendment

In Society of the Divine Word v. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, (7th Cir., Feb. 24, 2025), the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals held that USCIS regulations that makes the process for obtaining a immigrant worker status and subsequent permanent residence more difficult for temporary religious workers than other categories of temporary workers does not violate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act or the 1st Amendment.  The court said in part:

Plaintiffs do not identify a belief or set of beliefs they have to violate because of the regulation. Instead, they offer a broader, structural argument—that the regulation places a substantial burden on their religious exercise because it allows for “undue Government interference” with their ability to “select and employ their own ministers.” Taking this claim on its own terms, it does not rise to the level of a substantial burden for purposes of stating a RFRA violation. There is no assertion that the regulation prevents Plaintiffs from practicing their religion. It does not require them to select or refrain from selecting any particular minister. And it does not otherwise pressure or coerce Plaintiffs into violating any tenet of their religion, as far as we can tell from the complaint and declarations. We agree with the district court that, at most, the regulation “requires employers to plan the timing of employment decisions based on immigration status, and potentially limits the pool of qualified applicants that plaintiffs can choose from if they fail to plan accordingly.” ... That is not a substantial burden on religious beliefs or practice....

Tuesday, February 25, 2025

Court Preliminarily Enjoins Enforcement Against Plaintiffs of New Guidelines for Immigration Raids at Churches

In Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security(D MD, Feb. 24, 2025), a Maryland federal district court issued a preliminary injunction barring immigration authorities from enforcing against the Society of Friends, Baptist, and Sikh plaintiffs the January 2025 policy change on immigration enforcement at sensitive locations such as places of worship. Instead, they must comply with the previous 2021 Guidelines. The court found that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their 1st Amendment Freedom of Association claim as well as their claim under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. It concluded that enforcement of the new policy would likely significantly burden both plaintiffs' right to expressive association and their religious exercise. The court said in part:

... Plaintiffs have provided facts showing that, in light of their religious beliefs and practices relating to immigrants, they can reasonably expect to face immigration enforcement actions at their places of worship pursuant to the 2025 Policy, that such actions will likely result in declines in attendance at their worship and ministry services, and that such declines are, in fact, already occurring.... They have further demonstrated that, as a result ..., certain core religious beliefs and practices will be significantly burdened, including the beliefs that each of the Plaintiffs' religions require regular, communal worship; that at least CBF requires, as part of its religious exercise, that its congregations engage in services to support immigrants and refugees; and that, for the Quaker Plaintiffs in particular, the presence of any firearms in worship services, such as those of armed law enforcement officers, violates their faith.

CBS News reports on the decision.

Certiorari Denied in Abortion Buffer Zone Challenge

Yesterday, the U.S. Supreme Court denied review in Coalition Life v. City of Carbondale, Illinois, (Docket No. 24-57, certiorari denied 2/24/2025) (Order List.) In the case, the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a city ordinance creating a buffer zone around abortion clinics in which sidewalk counselors may not approach closer than 8 feet to those accessing the clinic. The 7th Circuit said it was bound by the Supreme Court's 2000 decision in Hill v. Colorado.  Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion saying in part:

Following our repudiation in Dobbs, I do not see what is left of Hill. Yet, lower courts continue to feel bound by it.  The Court today declines an invitation to set the record straight on Hill’s defunct status.  I respectfully dissent.

Monday, February 24, 2025

Recent Articles of Interest

From SSRN:

From SSRN (Islamic Law):

From SmartCILP:

Foster Parent Requirements for Affirming Transgender Children Are Upheld

Last week, a Vermont federal district court in a series of opinions in two cases focused on challenges to the state's rules on licensing of foster parents. The suits were brought by couples who objected on religious grounds to the state's requirement that they be willing to accept any child regardless of sexual orientation or gender identity.

In Antonucci v. Winters I, (D VT, Feb. 20, 2025), the foster care license of plaintiffs was withdrawn because of their inability to comply with the state's non-discrimination requirement that included a commitment to facilitate the social and medical transition of a hypothetical future foster child. Plaintiffs asserted that complying with the requirement would violate their Christian religious beliefs about gender and sexuality. They sued seeking a preliminary injunction, contending that the requirement violated their free speech and free exercise rights. The court denied the preliminary injunction, saying in part:

Plaintiffs argue that, in this case, the state’s interest is not compelling because there is national, and even global, disagreement about the propriety of medical transitioning....

Evaluating the efficacy or safety of a particular procedure is not within this Court’s purview.  The Court’s role is to determine whether the Rules and Policies enforced here, which pertain to medical and social transitioning as well as the use of gender-appropriate pronouns, serve a compelling state interest.  At this stage in the case, Defendants have submitted sufficient evidence of the benefits of those policies to satisfy that portion of the strict scrutiny test....

The Court ... finds, based upon the current record, that the Rules and Policies established and implemented by DCF and Defendants serve the compelling interest of protecting the health and welfare of LGBTQ youth, and are narrowly-tailored to necessarily address that interest....

In Antonucci v. Winters II, (D VT, Feb. 20, 2025), the court on qualified immunity grounds dismissed plaintiffs' claim for damages for free exercise and free speech violations. It allowed plaintiffs to proceed on claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. The court did not dismiss plaintiffs' retaliation or equal protection claims because defendants had not offered specific arguments that they were covered by qualified immunity.

In Wuoti v. Winters, (D VT, Feb. 20, 2025), two couples whose foster parent licenses were not renewed challenged the state's foster parent policy on free speech, freedom of association and free exercise grounds. The court denied their motion for a preliminary injunction, saying in part:

Plaintiffs argue that Defendants are compelling them to “speak the State’s views while prohibiting them from expressing their religious views.”...  Compliance with DCF Rules and Policies, however, is different from speech.  Defendants did not compel Plaintiffs to change their beliefs, or to make any statements that disavowed those beliefs.  Instead, Defendants were pursuing their mission of ensuring a welcoming, affirming, and safe home for each child....

Plaintiffs further argue that Defendants were compelling them to use preferred pronouns and to otherwise speak in ways that are contrary to their religious beliefs about gender and sexuality, while at the same time restricting them from expressing their own views on those issues.  The DCF Rules and Policies at issue, however, are based upon research and feedback regarding outcomes for LGBTQ youth.  The record does not establish that they are targeted at any religious viewpoint.  Indeed, the alleged restrictions are at most incidental to rules of conduct designed to promote healthy and affirming homes....

Nothing in the record indicates that Defendants are compelling Plaintiffs to associate with any specific person or group.  Plaintiffs protest that their license denials were based in part on their professed inability to associate with certain events, as in a pride parade.  When DCF raised the possibility of attending a gay pride parade, however, the suggestion was merely hypothetical.  Indeed, while Policy 76 suggests that staff “encourage” such activities, there is no requirement that foster families engage in them.  Nor are Defendants preventing Plaintiffs from associating with others who share their beliefs, as in attending church.  What foster parents may not do is require children in their care to engage in activities that are non-affirming....

Here, nothing on the face of DCF’s Rules and Policies targets religious practices or religious applicants....

... [T]he Court finds that Rules and Policies at issue are generally applicable, and that Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on their free exercise claim....

Plaintiffs are concerned about foster families whose religious beliefs are not consistent with DCF policies, DCF does not compel such families to change or reject their beliefs.  What it does require is the provision of an affirming environment for children who are, or who come to identify as, LGBTQ.  

Sunday, February 23, 2025

Title VII Applies to Liberty University's Firing of Transgender Employee

In Zinski v. Liberty University, Inc., (WD VA, Feb. 21, 2025), a Virginia federal district court refused to dismiss a Title VII sex discrimination lawsuit against Liberty University brought by a former employee whose employment as an IT Apprentice was terminated because she underwent a male to female sex transition. In an extensively reasoned 70-page opinion, the court rejected several defenses asserted by the University. First the University contended that §§702 and 703 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act allow a religious employer to discriminate on the basis of transgender status when that is consistent with the employer’s religious belief. Those section allow a religious employer to discriminate "with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion." The court said in part:

Having determined that no source of law—from statutory text to legislative history to precedent—answers the question before us, the Court is left to weigh the imperfect arguments above, alongside the potential legal and social consequences of our decision. Drawing upon all of these considerations, we conclude that Sections 702 and 703 must be narrowly construed so as to permit discrimination only on the basis of an employee’s espoused religious belief or practice, such that religious employers have no license to discriminate on the basis of any other protected class. Where a religious employer discriminates on the basis of any other protected class in a but-for fashion, a statutory violation occurs, even if the decision was religiously motivated....

To decide that sex discrimination is acceptable so long as it is religiously motivated would allow employers to achieve all manner of discrimination under the banner of religion. So long as the religious institution can show that its view—despite directly implicating sex, race, or national origin—is a sincerely held religious belief, the religious institution would have free license to discriminate at will and evade the scrutiny of civil law. Not only would this subject potentially thousands of people to discrimination..., but it would supply religious institutions with a power not afforded to secular institutions, thereby generating favorites under the law and raising Establishment Clause questions....

The court also rejected the University's RFRA defense, concluding first that RFRA applies only to suits in which the government is a party. It added:

And even if Liberty were entitled to raise RFRA as a defense, we find that Title VII likely passes strict scrutiny....

On the record before us, enforcing this statute in Zinksi’s case merely requires Liberty to maintain an employee who has not followed the university’s Doctrinal Statement to the letter, i.e., an employee who has sinned. It does not require Liberty to change its belief, to endorse Zinksi’s behavior, or to allow Zinksi to spread a new message within the organization.... The minimal inroad on religious liberty here is easily justified by the exceedingly compelling governmental interest in eradicating sex discrimination in employment. Accordingly, we find that Liberty’s brief argument as to burden is insufficient to show substantial burden at this stage of litigation. Thus, strict scrutiny does not apply, and our analysis can come to an end.....

The court rejected the ministerial exception defense, saying in part that "nothing in the record suggests that Zinski was a minister." The court also rejected the University's freedom of expressive association claim, saying in part:

... [W]e must defer Liberty’s claim that it opposes transgender identification and seeks to avoid any promotion of transgender status as an appropriate form of behavior. However,... we cannot conclude that Zinksi’s presence at Liberty would “force the organization to send a message” that Liberty accepts transgender conduct as a “legitimate form of behavior.”... Zinksi is an IT employee who has limited to no interactions with students, has no role in influencing or promoting Liberty’s value system, and has no role in Liberty’s religious curriculum or programming. The only inference that we can draw for Liberty is that Liberty may be seen as a hypocrite for employing a transgender person when it opposes transgender identity; but the same could be said for Liberty’s employment of any other type of person who “sins” despite Liberty’s opposition to sin in general....

Finally, the court rejected the University's ecclesiastical abstention defense, saying in part:

Zinski’s complaint asks the Court to determine whether Title VII prohibits a religious institution from firing a transgender person, not whether a religious institution, like Liberty, has properly interpreted its religious doctrine when determining that a transgender person violates religious law and must be fired.