Ban On Supreme Court Plaza Demonstrations Does Not Violate RFRA

In Payden-Travers v. Talkin, (D DC, May 31, 2017), the D.C. federal district court dismissed plaintiffs' claim that the statute and court rule that prohibit demonstrations on the Plaza in front of the Supreme Court violate their rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. They contended that their faith requires them to speak out against war, torture and the death penalty, and that merely demonstrating on the sidewalk adjacent to the Court would not make clear to passers-by that their objections were connected to the Court.  The district court held, however, that the ban does not rise to the level of a "substantial burden" as required by RFRA, saying in part:

Plaintiffs do not allege in their complaint that their religions require them to demonstrate and pray in ways such that the public will associate their activities with the United States Supreme Court. It simply alleges that their religions require them to “speak out” and “distance themselves” from certain practices.... [T]here are still countless other means by which Plaintiffs could satisfy this religious obligation, many of which may have nothing to do with the Supreme Court at all. Section 6135 and Regulation 7 prohibit only one. Accordingly, although section 6135 and Regulation 7 prevent Plaintiffs from engaging in religiously motivated conduct at a particular location, the Court concludes that they do not “substantially burden” Plaintiffs’ religious exercise.

Law.com reports on the decision.

Oklahoma Supreme Court Rejects Challenge To Driver's License Photo

In Beach v. Oklahoma Department of Public Safety, (OK Sup. Ct., May 16, 2017), the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that under the Oklahoma Religious Freedom Act, plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of a substantial burden on his or her free exercise of religion before the government needs to demonstrate a compelling government interest and least restrictive means.  The court concluded that plaintiff here failed to make a prima facie showing supporting her allegation that her sincere religious beliefs prohibit her, in obtaining a driver's license, from allowing a biometric photo to be taken and placed into a database that is accessible by other countries or international organizations.  The court also concluded that plaintiff's complaint is moot because plaintiff had already submitted biometric photos and fingerprints in the past. Two justices concurred only in the result and one dissented in part, saying that the case is moot.

8th Circuit Rejects RFRA Defense To Heroin Distribution Charges

In United States v. Anderson, (8th Cir., April 28, 2017), the U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Timothy Anderson's claim that his indictment on charges of heroin distribution should have been dismissed because the decision to prosecute him violated his rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.  Anderson claimed that as a student of Esoteric and Mysticism studies he created a religious non-profit organization to distribute heroin to "the sick, lost, blind, lame, deaf, and dead members of Gods' Kingdom."  The court held that even if Anderson's religious beliefs were sincerely held, the government here chose the least restrictive means to achieve its compelling interest in preventing distribution of heroin to others for non-religious uses. Vox reports on the decision.

Court Rejects RFRA Challenge To Dakota Access Pipeline

In Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, (D DC, March 7, 2017), the D.C. federal district court denied a preliminary injunction requested by the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe which objects to the presence of oil in the pipeline under Lake Oahe.  It asserted a claim under RFRA that the easement under the lake will cause irreparable harm to its members’ religious exercise. The court held first:

Because of the Plaintiff’s delay in raising this religious-exercise objection and the negative impact of that delay on the Corps and Dakota Access, the Court concludes that the requested preliminary-injunctive relief is barred by laches.

Moving to the merits, the court also concluded that the Tribe has failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success, saying in part:

The government action here — i.e., granting the easement to Dakota Access and thereby enabling the flow of oil beneath Lake Oahe — does not impose a sanction on the Tribe’s members for exercising their religious beliefs, nor does it pressure them to choose between religious exercise and the receipt of government benefits. Cheyenne River argues that whether it has been subjected to such sanction or pressure is irrelevant ... and contends instead that it is sufficient for purposes of showing substantial burden that the effect of the government’s action is to prevent the Tribe’s members from performing required religious sacraments at Lake Oahe.... That argument, however, is directly at odds with Supreme Court precedent.

The Hill reports on the decision.

2nd Circuit Hears Arguments On Whether Money Damages Are Available Under RFRA

The U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals on Wednesday heard oral arguments (MP3 audio of full arguments) in Tanvir v. Comey.  In the case, Muslim plaintiffs sued claiming that when they refused to become FBI informants, partly because doing so would violate their religious beliefs, the government retaliated by placing them on the No-Fly List.  The district court held that RFRA does not provide for money damages against federal officers in their personal capacities. (See prior posting.) Courthouse News Service reports on the oral arguments in the appeal of that decision.

Trump's EEOC Continues To Fight Transgender Employment Discrimination

Slate reported yesterday that it has become clear that the EEOC under the Trump Administration will continue to fight employment discrimination against transgender individuals.  In a brief (full text) filed with the 6th Circuit on Feb. 10, the EEOC argued that Title VII's prohibition on "sex" discrimination includes discrimination based on transgender status and/or transitioning.  It also argued that religious beliefs are not a basis for discriminating against transgender individuals. The brief comes in an appeal in EEOC v. R.G, a suit in which a Michigan federal district court upheld a funeral home's defense under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to a charge that it engaged in gender stereotyping when it dismissed a transgender employee who was in the process of transitioning from male to female. (See prior posting.)

UPDATE: I should add that it has become clear that the EEOC will continue to take this position for now.  Because there is a vacancy on the Commission, a Democratic commissioner's position comes up for appointment later this year and the General Counsel position is vacant, the Commission could change its position in the future. The Slate article points out these possibilities.

6th Circuit Rejects Free Exercise Defense To Marijuana Charges

In United States v. Barnes, (6th Cir., Jan. 26, 2017), the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals refused to dismiss an indictment of a member of the Oklevueha Native American Church who was charged with growing large quantities of marijuana.  Defendant claimed that the 1st Amendment and RFRA allowed him to grow the plants to donate to the church. The court disagreed saying in part:

Barnes did not make an adequate showing that the CSA substantially burdened his practice of religion. Barnes admitted that growing marijuana and donating it to the church is not required by his religion.... [W]hile marijuana is considered a medicine of the church, it is not an essential sacrament of the faith.... Peyote, by contrast, is the only “sacrament” of the church. Barnes did not provide any historical evidence that the manufacturing of marijuana is central to the ONAC religion specifically, or to Native American religion in general.

... [M]anufacturing marijuana and intending to donate it to the Toledo church was a "personal belief" and a choice that he made, not one that was critical to practicing the ONAC faith. While Barnes is correct that it is not the place of the court to decide the "centrality of . . . beliefs to canonical texts," that does not prevent this court from determining whether a particular practice is required by a religion as a part of the substantial-burden analysis.... 

Indiana RFRA Not Defense To Tax Evasion

In Tyms-Bey v. State of Indiana, (IN App., Jan. 13, 2017), an Indiana appeals court, in a 2-1 decision, held that a state RFRA defense cannot be raised in a tax evasion prosecution.  According to the majority opinion:

as a matter of law ..., in the context of Indiana’s RFRA, there is a compelling governmental interest in collecting income tax revenue. Moreover, we hold as a matter of law that the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling interest is uniform and mandatory participation in the income tax system. There are no facts that [defendant] could proffer with respect to his exercise of religion that would not be overcome by the State’s compelling interest and the means used by the State in furthering that interest. 

Judge Najam dissenting said in part:

Tyms-Bey’s alleged RFRA defense may ultimately not succeed, but he is entitled to his day in court. The majority’s holding that, in effect, Tyms-Bey has not stated a claim under RFRA and that he is not even entitled to present evidence in support of his alleged defense is too quick to dispose of Tyms-Bey’s claim and denies him the particularized adjudication that is expressly afforded to him by Indiana’s RFRA.

Cert Filed In RFRA Case Decided By Armed Forces Court of Appeals

On Dec. 23, a petition for certiorari (full text) was filed with the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Sterling.  In the case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces held that a Marine Lance Corporal failed to establish a prima facie case under RFRA in defending against charges growing out of her work space posting of unauthorized signs containing Biblical quotations. (See prior posting.)  The petition for review by the Supreme Court frames the question presented as:

whether the existence of a forced choice between what religion and government command is necessary to establish a "substantial burden" under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.

Independent Journal Review reports on the filing of the cert. petition.

"In God We Trust" On Currency Does Not Substantially Burden Atheists

In New Doe Child #1 v. Congress of the United States, (ND OH, Nov. 30, 2016), an Ohio federal district court rejected several challenges to the United States' use of the motto "In God We Trust" on currency. Various plaintiffs either do not believe in God, or find the use of God's name on currency to be sinful.  The court rejected plaintiffs' 1st Amendment and RFRA free exercise claims as well as their compelled speech and equal protection arguments. The court said in part:

Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that the use of the motto on currency substantially burdens their religious exercise. Credit cards and checks allow Plaintiffs to conduct the bulk of their purchases with currency not inscribed with the motto. And for cash-only transactions, such as a garage sale or a coin-operated laundromat, the use of the motto on currency does not substantially burden Plaintiffs’ free exercise.... Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ other concerns, that they may be subject to peer pressure or ridicule, or that their children may question their beliefs, are unlike the choice between a “basic benefit and a core belief” described in the Supreme Court’s case law....

(See prior related posting.)

Supreme Court Denies Cert. In Ecclesiastical Abstention and RFRA Cases

The U.S. Supreme Court today denied review in Pfeil v. St. Matthews Evangelical Lutheran Church, (Docket No. 16-210, cert. denied 11/28/2016) (Order List).  In the case the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the 1st Amendment's ecclesiastical abstention doctrine prohibits holding a church and its pastors liable in a defamation action for statements made during church disciplinary proceedings seeking to excommunicate plaintiffs. (See prior posting.)

Today the Supreme Court also denied certiorari in Oklevueha Native American Church of Hawaii v. Lynch, (Docket No. 16-418, cert. denied 11/28/2016) (Order List). In the case the 9th Circuit, rejecting a RFRA defense, held that a church and its founder were properly denied an exemption from federal laws that prohibit the possession and distribution of cannabis. (See prior posting.)

Indiana Appeals Court Hears Oral Arguments In RFRA Defense To Tax Evasion

On Monday, the Indiana Court of Appeals heard oral arguments (video of full arguments) in Tyms-Bey v. State of Indiana. In the case, defendant charged with tax evasion filed notice that he intended to raise a religious freedom defense under Indiana's Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The trial court struck the defense and defendant filed this interlocutory appeal.  Washington Post reports in more detail on the case.

RFRA Does Not Protect FLDS Members' Food Stamp Fraud

As previously reported, in February the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Utah announced indictments against eleven leaders and members of the polygamous FLDS Church charging them with conspiracy to commit food stamp fraud and conspiracy to commit money laundering.  Under FLDS doctrine known as the Law of Consecration, faithful members who were food stamp recipients were required to donate their benefits to the FLDS church through a clearinghouse known as the Bishop’s Storehouse. Food and household items were then redistributed to all in the community, whether or not they were food-stamp eligible. Now, in United States v. Jeffs, (D UT, Nov. 15, 2016), a Utah federal district court rejected the argument that this practice is protected by RFRA and the 1st Amendment.

The court held that one of the defendants, FLDS leader Lyle Jeffs, did not have a sincerely held belief in the Law of Consecration; however other defendants did. Only one of those defendants-- the one who was actually eligible to receive SNAP (food stamp) benefits-- though showed a "substantial burden" on his religious beliefs. The court went on, however, to find that the government has shown a compelling interest in limiting SNAP benefits to the purchase of food to be used by the eligible recipient's household, and that the SNAP statutes and regulations are the least restrictive means of furthering that interest.  The court also rejected defendants' 1st Amendment claims. Fox 13 reports on the decision.

3rd Circuit Gives Muslim Inmate Victory On Retaliation and RFRA Claims

In Mack v. Warden, (3d Cir., Oct. 11, 2016), the U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals in a lengthy opinion gave an unusual victory to an inmate who claims that anti-Muslim harassment by two correctional officers caused him to refrain from praying while at his paid work assignment at a federal prison commissary.  He contends that he was terminated from his work assignment for orally complaining to a supervisor about the harassment.  The suit was filed pro se, and inmate Charles Mack lost at the trial court level.  However he prevailed on a number of his claims on appeal at which he was represented by law students from Duke University's Appellate Litigation Clinic.

One of the defendant officers slapped Mack on his back, sticking an "I Love Bacon" sign on him, and then threatened to have him fired when he later objected.  The appeals court held 2-1 that Mack's oral complaint to a prison guard about the mistreatment qualifies as a petition for the redress of grievances protected by the 1st and 14th Amendments.  It thus supports a 1st Amendment retaliation claim. Second the appeals court held unanimously that a claim for damages under RFRA (as opposed to RLUIPA) lies against individual officers for their ultra vires acts, even though a prison policy or regulation is not being challenged, and that the alleged conduct substantially burdened plaintiff's religious exercise. The court however refused to extend a Bivens damage remedy for 1st Amendment free exercise violations and also dismissed plaintiff's equal protection claim. Penn Live reports on the decision.

Interlocutory Appeal Unavailable In Ministerial Exception Case

In Trinity Christian School v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 2016 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2256 (CT Super. Ct., Aug. 22, 2016), a Connecticut trial court dismissed an interlocutory appeal from a decision of the state Commission on Human Rights.  In the case, a Commission referee refused to dismiss a pregnancy discrimination claim brought by an employee against Trinity Christian School.  The school appealed claiming that it is immune from liability under Connecticut's Religious Freedom Restoration Act.  The court held however that any defense the school has is under the ministerial exception doctrine, which is an affirmative defense to liability.  Therefore an interlocutory appeal is not available. The court rejected the school's argument that merely requiring it to defend the case with an affirmative defense would impose a burden on religious belief.

Inmate Has Broader Damage Remedy Under RFRA Than Under RLUIPA

In Crowder v. Lariva, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122966 (SD IN, Sept. 12, 2016), an Indiana federal district court permitted a Hebrew Israelite inmate to move ahead against one of the prison chaplains on his complaint that he was denied a kosher diet. Because plaintiff was a federal inmate, he sued (in addition to his 1st Amendment claim) under RFRA instead of RLUIPA, and the court held that he had broader remedies as a result:

Jones [the chaplain] also argues that because the Seventh Circuit in Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 887 (7th Cir. 2009), held that the similarly-worded RLUIPA does not allow for the collection of money damages against individuals, the same reasoning should apply to RFRA. But there are at least two important differences between RLUIPA and RFRA that compel a different conclusion. First, ... the statutory language of RFRA defines "government" as, among other things, an "official (or other person acting under color of law)." ...Congress thus envisioned at least some individual-capacity suits under RFRA.... Second, RFRA, which applies to federal action, and RLUIPA, which is applicable to state action, arise from different principles.,,, [T]he portion of RFRA that authorizes lawsuits against the states was held unconstitutional because such an application exceeded Congress's power under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in City of Boerne v. Flores.... RLUIPA was enacted in response to City of Boerne ... as an exercise of Congress's spending power[.] ...[I]nterpreting that statute to allow damages actions against state officials in their individual capacities would 'raise serious questions regarding whether Congress had exceeded its [constitutional] authority.'" ... [S]uch considerations are not at issue when applying RFRA because RFRA's application to federal action is not based on the Spending Clause.... For these reasons, the Court concludes that RFRA does allow for the recovery of monetary damages against officers in their individual capacities

RFRA Does Not Impact Bankruptcy Code's Denial of Discharge

The Bankruptcy Code, Sec. 727(a)(2)(A) provides that a bankruptcy court should deny a discharge if the debtor has within one year of filing for bankruptcy transferred property with the intent to hinder, defraud or delay a creditor.  In In re Crabtree, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 2922 (MN Bkr., Aug. 8, 2016), a Minnesota federal bankruptcy judge held that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act does not prevent applying this provision to a family's donation of a box of 500 silver coins, valued at $12,000.00, to their church, Firestarters Worship Center.

RFRA Allows Insured To Refuse Contraceptive Coverage

In Wieland v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, (ED MO, July 21, 2016), a Missouri federal district court enjoined the federal government from enforcing the Affordable Care Act against a couple who, on religious grounds, object to participating in a healthcare plan that provides coverage for contraceptives and similarly object to providing contraceptive coverage to their daughters who are on their health insurance policy. Plaintiff, a Roman Catholic, is a Missouri state legislator and receives health insurance through the state's health care plan.  Finding that plaintiffs have standing because they might be able to find a plan that does not offer contraceptive coverage, the court went on to hold that RFRA bars enforcement of the mandate against plaintiffs, saying in part:

Defendants further argue that “[i]t is not a substantial burden on a person’s religion to subscribe to a group health plan that covers services that the person will not use for religious reasons, or that other individuals covered by the plan will elect, in the exercise of their personal choice, to utilize.” Plaintiffs contend that Defendants’ argument is, in essence, an attack on the sincerity of their religious beliefs, which the Supreme Court most recently in Hobby Lobby cautioned against. This Court agrees. Defendants’ argument is, in effect, an argument that Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs are unreasonable. However, the sincerity of Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs has not been disputed, and it is not for the Court “to say that [Plaintiffs’] religious beliefs are mistaken or insubstantial.”

The court went on to hold that even assuming that the government has a compelling interest in "a workable insurance system that covers a wide range of preventative health services," there are less restrictive means of achieving this goal:

the government could allow a system like that in place in Missouri before the Mandate, where individuals could simply check a box to opt out of contraceptive coverage.

Modern Healthcare reports on the decision. (See prior related posting.) [Thanks to Jeff Pasek for the lead.] 

Title VII Is Sole Basis For Claims of Religious Discrimination Against Federal Employee

In Holly v. Jewell, (ND CA, July 11, 2016), a California federal magistrate judge held that Title VII is the sole remedy for discrimination in federal employment.  Neither the First Amendment nor RFRA may be used as the basis for a religious discrimination claim by a federal employee.  In the case, plaintiff who was employed as a maintenance worker at the  San Francisco Maritime National Historic Park was also a Baptist minister.  While on a break and out of uniform, he performed a baptism at the seashore adjoining the park.  He was terminated for this-- though plaintiff also complained that he was questioned about a Bible that he kept to read on breaks.  The court dismissed plaintiff's RFRA claim, holding that recent Supreme Court RFRA decisions have not changed the rule that Title VII is the exclusive remedy for discrimination in federal employment.  The court also dismissed plaintiff's free exercise claim to the extent that it challenges conduct protected by Title VII, but held that plaintiff can file an amended complaint to the extent that he has a First Amendment claim that is separate from his Title VII claim.

9th Circuit Rejects RFRA Defense Raised By Hawaii Cannabis Ministers

In United States v. Christie, (9th Cir., June 14, 2016), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the convictions of the founder of the Hawaii Cannabis Ministry and his wife on charges of conspiracy to manufacture and distribute marijuana.  The court rejected defendants' claim that their convictions violate their rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.  The court held that the government had a compelling interest in mitigating the risk that cannabis from the Ministry would be diverted to recreational users, and that the government achieved that compelling interest in the least restrictive manner. The court said in part:

there is specific evidence that the Ministry’s distribution methods created a realistic possibility that cannabis intended for members of the Ministry would be distributed instead to outsiders who were merely feigning membership in the Ministry and adherence to its religious tenets. Additionally, the government’s interest in this case is all the more compelling given the Ministry’s well-publicized willingness to extend membership in the Ministry (with all that that entails) to minors.

Courthouse News Service reports on the decision.