The County has passed, and the City is enforcing, regulations limiting the operations of certain businesses and activities, and imposing social distancing requirements in response to the recent pandemic, but those requirements have been applied in an inconsistent and unconstitutional manner with respect to peaceful conduct and charitable religious activities in Greensboro.
Defendant Conway testified that he ... placed a beeping cart in between plaintiffs and festival attendees because people were “getting aggravated” and “becoming aggressive” towards plaintiffs’ group.... Defendant Conway testified that individuals waived a rainbow flag in plaintiff O’Connell’s face and yelled at him.... In the past, individuals threw Mountain Dew bottles at plaintiff O’Connell, threatened plaintiff O’Connell with violence, and assaulted the police officers guarding plaintiff O’Connell.... Because “[l]isteners’ reaction to speech is not a content-neutral basis for regulation,” the court applies strict scrutiny to defendant Conway’s decision to order plaintiffs to the sidewalk and place a beeping cart between them and festival attendees in 2015.
[T]he Court will grant Plaintiff’s preliminary injunction [as to] the portion of the Special Events Ordinance prohibiting “[a]ny conduct deemed to be disruptive . . . to participants or attendees of the special event” and “[a]busive . . . language that disrupts a special event or festival.” However, the City may still enforce the ... [ban on] "language ... that abuses or threatens another person in a manner likely to cause a fight or brawl at a special event or festival,” “... conduct deemed to be ... dangerous to participants or attendees of the special event,” and “threatening language that disrupts a special event or festival.”The court also upheld the city's Unnecessary Noise ban.
Defendant’s apparent policy of refusing to recognize the validity of marriages performed by ULC Monastery ministers officially prefers certain religions or religious denominations over ULC Monastery by allowing other religious leaders to solemnize marriages but declining to extend that same benefit to ULC Monastery ministers.Charlotte Observer reports on the lawsuit.
Plaintiffs’ claim is not barred by the First Amendment because determining whether Bishop Jugis and the Diocese knew or had reason to know of Defendant’s proclivities for sexual wrongdoing requires only the application of neutral principles of tort law, and “the application of a secular standard to secular conduct that is tortious is not prohibited by the Constitution.”
[T]he Sixth and Fourth Circuits are now split on the legality of legislator-led prayer. State and local lawmakers can lead prayers in Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, and Michigan, but not in South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, or West Virginia. This Court should have stepped in to resolve this conflict.[Thanks to Blog From the Capital for the lead on Bormuth.]
An ongoing Associated Press investigation has exposed years of abuse in the evangelical sect, with dozens of former members saying congregants are regularly beaten, punched and choked in an effort to "purify" sinners.
... [T]he state had opposed the agreement between Word of Faith and the county social services agency because it contains stipulations that limit such investigative tactics as what can trigger an abuse inquiry and how social workers can question minors....
Several former members have told the AP that [child protection director] Carroll’s department has either cited the settlement in refusing to act on child abuse allegations or given Word of Faith members advance notice of investigations.
7. Because of her Catholic faith, [plaintiff] objects to assisting in abortions, dispensing birth control and contraceptives, and receiving as well as administering vaccines. Ms. Pedro’s employer, Defendant Duke, discriminated against her because of these religious beliefs and practices.
8. Furthermore, after Ms. Pedro made known her religious beliefs and requested religious accommodations, Defendant Duke subjected her to a degrading series of actions designed to punish and retaliate against her for engaging in federally-protected activity.Apparently the Hospital was willing to accommodate Pedro's objection to receiving vaccines, but not her objection to participating in abortions.
We conclude that the Constitution does not allow what happened in Rowan County. The prayer practice served to identify the government with Christianity and risked conveying to citizens of minority faiths a message of exclusion. And because the commissioners were the exclusive prayer-givers, Rowan County’s invocation practice falls well outside the more inclusive, minister-oriented practice of legislative prayer described in Town of Greece. Indeed, if elected representatives invite their constituents to participate in prayers invoking a single faith for meeting upon meeting, year after year, it is difficult to imagine constitutional limits to sectarian prayer practice.
The great promise of the Establishment Clause is that religion will not operate as an instrument of division in our nation. Consistent with this principle, there is a time- honored tradition of legislative prayer that reflects the respect of each faith for other faiths and the aspiration, common to so many creeds, of finding higher meaning and deeper purpose in these fleeting moments each of us spends upon this earth. Instead of drawing on this tradition, Rowan County elevated one religion above all others and aligned itself with that faith. It need not be so. As the history of legislative invocations demonstrates, the desire of this good county for prayer at the opening of its public sessions can be realized in many ways that further both religious exercise and religious tolerance.Judge Motz, joined by Judges Keenan and Harris, filed a concurring opinion emphasizing that the majority’s holding is consistent with Supreme Court precedent in Marsh and Town of Greece cases.
The outcome here is in no way a comment on same-sex marriage as a matter of social policy. The case before us is far more technical—whether plaintiffs, simply by virtue of their status as state taxpayers, have alleged a personal, particularized injury for the purposes of Article III standing. Based on a century of Supreme Court precedent, we conclude that they have not.Asheville Citizen-Times reports on the decision.
Our courts have not yet considered whether a statement issued by a religious leader or made from the pulpit creates an actionable defamation claim capable of adjudication under neutral principles of tort law. However, several federal courts and out-of-state courts have confronted this question and concluded the First Amendment does not create a categorical bar to such defamation claims....
This line between an ecclesiastical and a secular dispute can be difficult to discern, and requires an intensive inquiry into the relevant facts and applicable laws. Defamation and religious questions are legally contextual. Libel may sometimes cloak itself in religious terminology, but that would not prevent civil adjudication of a claim.
This law I’m signing today is not just about North Carolina’s reputation – or jobs and sports. It’s about working to end discrimination. Under HB2, North Carolina had zero LGBT protections. Today’s law not only provides for LGBT protections, but opens the door for more.
This is not a perfect deal or my preferred solution. It stops short of many things we need to do as a state.
In a perfect world, we would have repealed HB2 today and added full statewide protections for LGBT North Carolinians. Unfortunately, our supermajority Republican legislature will not pass these protections. But this is an important goal that I will keep fighting for.Washington Post reports on these developments.