Certiorari Granted In College Student Religious Speech Case

Yesterday the U.S. Supreme Court granted review in Uzuegbunam v. Preczwski, (Docket No. 19-968, certiorari granted 7/9/2020). (Order List). The case grows out of a challenge to Georgia Gwinnett College's speech policies that led to a student being stopped from distributing religious literature on campus. Subsequently, the school changed its policies.  The U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals held that the change mooted plaintiff's claim for nominal damages. (Full text of 11th Circuit opinion.) Appellants challenge that conclusion. ADF issued a press release on the grant of review.

Supreme Court GVR's 3 Challenges To Contraceptive Mandate Exemptions

Today the U.S. Supreme Court summarily granted certiorari, vacated the judgment below and remanded to the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals three cases involving challenges to the Trump Administration's broadened contraceptive mandate exemptions.  The Court remanded for further consideration in light of its decision yesterday in Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania. The cases involved in today's GVR Order are Department of Health and Human Services v. California (Docket No. 19-1038), March for Life Education v. California (Docket No. 19-1040), and Little Sisters of the Poor v. California (Docket No. 19-1053). (Order List).

Supreme Court Interprets "Ministerial Exception" To Employment Discrimination Claims Broadly

In Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, (Sup. Ct., July 8, 2020), the U.S. Supreme Court in a 7-2 decision held that two elementary school teachers in separate Catholic schools, are covered by the "ministerial exception" so that they cannot sue for employment discrimination. Justice Alito's majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Breyer, Kagan, Gorsuch and Kavanaugh deferred in significant part to churches' own definitions of their employees:

In a country with the religious diversity of the United States, judges cannot be expected to have a complete understanding and appreciation of the role played by every person who performs a particular role in every religious tradition. A religious institution’s explanation of the role of such employees in the life of the religion in question is important. 

Comparing the teachers here with the one in the Supreme Court's prior ministerial exemption decision in Hosanna-Tabor, the Court said in part:

When we apply this understanding of the Religion Clauses to the cases now before us, it is apparent that Morrissey-Berru and Biel qualify for the exemption.... There is abundant record evidence that they both performed vital religious duties. Educating and forming students in the Catholic faith lay at the core of the mission of the schools where they taught, and their employment agreements and faculty handbooks specified in no uncertain terms that they were expected to help the schools carry out this mission and that their work would be evaluated to ensure that they were fulfilling that responsibility. As elementary school teachers responsible for providing instruction in all subjects, including religion, they were the members of the school staff who were entrusted most directly with the responsibility of educating their students in the faith. And not only were they obligated to provide instruction about the Catholic faith, but they were also expected to guide their students, by word and deed, toward the goal of living their lives in accordance with the faith. They prayed with their students, attended Mass with the students, and prepared the children for their participation in other religious activities.... Their titles did not include the term “minister,” and they had less formal religious training, but their core responsibilities as teachers of religion were essentially the same. And both their schools expressly saw them as playing a vital part in carrying out the mission of the church, and the schools’ definition and explanation of their roles is important.

Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:

I write separately, however, to reiterate my view that the Religion Clauses require civil courts to defer to religious organizations’ good-faith claims that a certain employee’s position is “ministerial.”

Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented, saying in part:

In foreclosing the teachers’ claims, the Court skews the facts, ignores the applicable standard of review, and collapses Hosanna-Tabor’s careful analysis into a single consideration: whether a church thinks its employees play an important religious role. Because that simplistic approach has no basis in law and strips thousands of school teachers of their legal protections, I respectfully dissent....

[T]he Court’s apparent deference here threatens to make nearly anyone whom the schools might hire “ministers” unprotected from discrimination in the hiring process. That cannot be right....

NBC News reports on the decision.

Supreme Court Upholds Expanded Exemptions From ACA Contraceptive Coverage Mandate

In a 7-2 decision in Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, (Sup. Ct., July 8, 2020), the U.S. Supreme Court rejected challenges to the Trump Administration's expanded exemptions from the Affordable Care Act contraceptive coverage mandate.  The challenged rules allowed employers with religious exemptions and most employers with moral objections to opt out of furnishing coverage. Justice Thomas' majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Gorsuch and Kavanaugh held that the ACA gives the relevant federal departments authority to provide these exemptions from the contraceptive mandate. It went on:

The Departments also contend, consistent with the reasoning in the 2017 IFR and the 2018 final rule establishing the religious exemption, that RFRA  independently compelled the Departments’ solution or that it at least authorized it.  In light of our holding that the ACA provided a basis for both exemptions, we need not reach these arguments. We do, however, address respondents’ argument that the Departments could not even consider RFRA as they formulated the religious exemption from the contraceptive mandate. Particularly in the context of these cases, it was appropriate for the Departments to consider RFRA.

The Court also rejects challenges to the procedural process used to adopt the rules-- including the claim that the Departments did not maintain an open mind in considering comments on the rules before their adoption in final form, saying in part:

We decline to evaluate the final rules under the open-mindedness test. We have repeatedly stated that the text of the APA provides the “‘maximum procedural requirements’” that an agency must follow in order to promulgate a rule.

Justice Alito, joined by Justice Gorsuch, filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:

I would hold not only that it was appropriate for the Departments to consider RFRA, but also that the Departments were required by RFRA to create the religious exemption (or something very close to it). I would bring the Little Sisters’ legal odyssey to an end.

Justice Kagan, joined by Justice Breyer, concurred in the judgment, filing an opinion agreeing that the Departments had statutory authority to differentiate among health plans, but concluding that petitioner's challenge that the Departments' actions were arbitrary and capricious remain open upon remand:

That issue is now ready for resolution, unaffected by today’s decision.  An agency acting within its sphere of delegated authority can of course flunk the test of “reasoned decision making.”... The agency does so when it has not given “a satisfactory explanation for its action” .... Assessed against that standard of reasonableness, the exemptions ... give every appearance of coming up short.

Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Sotomayor, saying in part:

In accommodating claims of religious freedom, this Court has taken a balanced approach, one that does not allow the religious beliefs of some to overwhelm the rights and interests of others who do not share those beliefs.... Today, for the first time, the Court casts totally aside countervailing rights and interests in its zeal to secure religious rights to the nth degree.

CNN reports on the decision.

Justice Kavanaugh Refuses To Enjoin Illinois District Court's Upholding of COVID-19 Limits On Political Gatherings

As previously reported, on July 2 an Illinois federal district court rejected arguments by state and local Republican organizations that the governor's COVID Order placing more restrictions on political party gatherings than religious gatherings violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments. On July 3, the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals denied plaintiffs' application for a injunction pending appeal. Plaintiffs immediately filed an Emergency Application for an Injunction (full text) with the U.S. Supreme Court, through a filing with Justice Kavanaugh who is Circuit Justice for the 7th Circuit.  The petition requested relief by 5:00 pm on July 4. On July 4, Justice Kavanaugh denied the request. Washington Examiner reports on the Supreme Court's action.

Supreme Court Denies Review To Deported Iraqi Christians, Yezidis, Kurds

The U.S. Supreme Court yesterday denied review in Hamama v. Adducci,  (Docket No. 19-294, cert denied 7/2/2020). (Order List). According to the petition for certiorari:

Petitioners are Iraqis with final orders of removal who lived for years or decades in the United States under orders of supervision...  Petitioners and others similarly situated were suddenly detained and threatened with immediate removal, without the opportunity to challenge their removal in immigration court. Petitioners, who include Christians, Yezidis, Kurds, and other religious and ethnic minorities in Iraq, faced likely torture and death in Iraq. After their final orders of removal were issued, country conditions in Iraq had changed drastically, such that Petitioners had strong claims for deportation protection under, inter alia, the Convention Against Torture. In order to assert those claims, Petitioners needed to move to reopen their final orders in the appropriate immigration court.... Petitioners requested a temporary stay of removal so they could access the immigration court system. The district court granted the stay, giving Petitioners 90 days after receipt of the necessary immigration court files to file motions to reopen in immigration court. The court of appeals reversed, holding that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) divested the district court of jurisdiction and that the elimination of jurisdiction was consistent with the Suspension Clause. 

Supreme Court Clears Docket In Light of Two Recent Major Decisiions.

In orders released yesterday (Order List), the U.S. Supreme Court cleared its docent of a number of abortion cases in light of its decision earlier this week in June Medical Services v. Russo.  The court granted certiorari and summarily vacated the judgment below and remanded to the 7th Circuit two appeals in Box v. Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky (Docket No. 18-1019 and 19-816). The Court also denied certiorari in Yost v. Planned Parenthood, (Docket No. 19-677) and Hill v. Whole Woman's Health, (Docket No. 19-743).

In light of its school aid decision earlier this week in Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, the Court granted certiorari, summarily vacated the judgment below and remanded to the 7th Circuit the appeal in St. Augustine School v. Stand.

White House Praises Espinoza Decision

The White House press secretary yesterday issued the following statement (full text) on the Supreme Court's decision in Espinoza v.Montana Department of Revenue:

We celebrate today’s Supreme Court decision on religious schools, which removes one of the biggest obstacles to better educational opportunities for all children.  States may no longer hide behind rules motivated by insidious bias against Catholics, known as Blaine Amendments, to exclude religious schools from public benefits.  Laws that condition public benefits, like need-based academic scholarships, on religious status demonstrate state-sanctioned hostility to religion, pressure people and institutions to censor their religious views, and stigmatize disfavored religions.  The Trump Administration believes that school choice is a civil rights issue, and that no parent should be forced to send their child to a failing school.  President Donald J. Trump will fight for school choice, and he will always defend our first freedom: the free exercise of religion.

Supreme Court Says Montana Cannot Exclude Religious Schools From Tax-Credit Program

In Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, (US Sup. Ct., June 30, 2020), the U.S. Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision held that Montana's exclusion of religious schools from its scholarship tax credit program violates the Free Exercise clause of the U.S. Constitution.  The Montana Supreme Court had invalidated the entire scholarship program because it included religious schools, relying on the "no aid" provision of the Montana constitution.  Chief Justice Roberts majority opinion, joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch and Kavanaugh, said in part:

This case also turns expressly on religious status and not religious use. The Montana Supreme Court applied the no-aid provision solely by reference to religious status. The Court repeatedly explained that the no-aid provision bars aid to “schools controlled in whole or in part by churches,” “sectarian schools,” and “religiously-affiliated schools.”... Applying this provision to the scholarship program, the Montana Supreme Court noted that most of the private schools that would benefit from the program were “religiously affiliated” and “controlled by churches,” and the Court ultimately concluded that the scholarship program ran afoul of the Montana Constitution by aiding “schools controlled by churches.”... The Montana Constitution discriminates based on religious status just like the Missouri policy in Trinity Lutheran, which excluded organizations “owned or controlled by a church, sect, or other religious entity.”...

...Status-based discrimination remains status based even if one of its goals or effects is preventing religious organizations from putting aid to religious uses.

Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion which was joined by Justice Gorsuch, saying in part:

I write separately to explain how this Court’s interpretation of the Establishment Clause continues to hamper free exercise rights. Until we correct course on that interpretation, individuals will continue to face needless obstacles in their attempts to vindicate their religious freedom.

Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:

Respondents argue that Montana’s no-aid provision merely reflects a state interest in “preserv[ing] funding for public schools,”... known as “common schools” during the Blaine era. Yet just as one cannot separate the Blaine Amendment from its context, “[o]ne cannot separate the founding of the American common school and the strong nativist movement.”  Spearheaded by Horace Mann, Secretary of the Massachusetts Board of Education from 1837 to 1848, the common-school movement did not aim to establish a system that was scrupulously neutral on matters of religion. (In a country like ours, that would have been exceedingly difficult, if not impossible.) Instead the aim was to establish a system that would inculcate a form of “least-common denominator Protestantism.”This was accomplished with daily reading from the King James Bible, a curriculum that, Mann said, let the book “speak for itself.” ... Yet it was an affront to many Christians and especially Catholics, not to mention non-Christians.

Mann’s goal was to “Americanize” the incoming Catholic immigrants. In fact, he and other proponents of the common-school movement used language and made insinuations that today would be considered far more inflammatory.

Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:

 I was not sure about characterizing the State’s discrimination in Trinity Lutheran as focused only on religious status, and I am even less sure about characterizing the State’s discrimination here that way....

Maybe it’s possible to describe what happened here as status-based discrimination. But it seems equally, and maybe more, natural to say that the State’s discrimination focused on what religious parents and schools do—teach religion....

Most importantly, though, it is not as if the First Amendment cares. The Constitution forbids laws that prohibit the free exercise of religion. That guarantee protects not just the right to be a religious person, holding beliefs inwardly and secretly; it also protects the right to act on those beliefs outwardly and publicly.

Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Kagan, saying in part:

[T]he Montana court remedied the state constitutional violation by striking the scholarship program in its entirety. Under that decree, secular and sectarian schools alike are ineligible for benefits, so the decision cannot be said to entail differential treatment based on petitioners’ religion.

Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, joined in part by Justice Kagan, saying in part:

It is true that Montana’s no-aid provision broadly bars state aid to schools based on their religious affiliation. But this case does not involve a claim of status-based discrimination. The schools do not apply or compete for scholarships, they are not parties to this litigation, and no one here purports to represent their interests. We are instead faced with a suit by parents who assert that their free exercise rights are violated by the application of the no-aid provision to prevent them from using taxpayer-supported scholarships to attend the schools of their choosing. In other words, the problem, as in Locke, is what petitioners “‘propos[e] to do—use the funds to’” obtain a religious education. ....

I agree with the majority that it is preferable in some areas of the law to develop generally applicable tests. The problem, as our precedents show, is that the interaction of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses makes it particularly difficult to design a test that vindicates the Clauses’ competing interests in all—or even most—cases.That is why, far from embracing mechanical formulas, our precedents repeatedly and frankly acknowledge the need for precisely the kind of “‘judgment-by-judgment analysis’” the majority rejects.

Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

Neither differential treatment nor coercion exists here because the Montana Supreme Court invalidated the tax-credit program entirely....

To be sure, petitioners may want to apply for scholarships and would prefer that Montana subsidize their children’s religious education. But this Court had never before held unconstitutional government action that merely failed to benefit religious exercise....

[T]he Montana Supreme Court remedied a state constitutional violation by invalidating a state program on state-law grounds, having expressly declined to reach any federal issue....

NPR reports on the decision.

Supreme Court Invalidates Louisiana Abortion Law Requiring Clinic Doctors To Have Hospital Admitting Privileges

The U.S. Supreme Court today in June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo, (U.S. Sup. Ct., June 29, 2020), by a 5-4 vote, struck down Louisiana's law that requires doctors at abortion clinics to hold active admitting privileges at a hospital within 30 miles of the clinic.  At issue in the case were (1) whether abortion providers have standing to assert their patients' abortion rights, and (2) whether the Louisiana statute is constitutional.  The Court in 2016 in Whole Women's Health v. Hellerstedt struck down a similar Texas statute.

Justice Breyer wrote today's plurality opinion which was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan.  As to standing, the plurality held:

The State did not mention its current objection until it filed its cross-petition—more than five years after it argued that the plaintiffs’ standing was beyond question.

The State’s unmistakable concession of standing as part of its effort to obtain a quick decision from the District Court on the merits of the plaintiffs’ undue-burden claims bars our consideration of it here.

On the merits, the plurality said in part:

The District Court found that enforcing the admitting privileges requirement would “result in a drastic reduction in the number and geographic distribution of abortion providers.” ... In light of demographic, economic, and other evidence, the court concluded that this reduction would make it impossible for “many women seeking a safe, legal abortion in Louisiana . . . to obtain one” and that it would impose “substantial obstacles” on those who could....

The District Court found that there was “‘no significant health-related problem that the new law helped to cure.’” ...

We conclude, in light of the record, that the District Court’s significant factual findings—both as to burdens and as to benefits—have ample evidentiary support. None is “clearly erroneous.” Given the facts found, we must also uphold the District Court’s related factual and legal determinations. These include its determination that Louisiana’s law poses a “substantial obstacle” to women seeking an abortion; its determination that the law offers no significant health-related benefits; and its determination that the law consequently imposes an “undue burden” on a woman’s constitutional right to choose to have an abortion.

Chief Justice Roberts filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:

I joined the dissent in Whole Woman’s Health and continue to believe that the case was wrongly decided. The question today however is not whether Whole Woman’s Health was right or wrong, but whether to adhere to it in deciding the present case.....

The legal doctrine of stare decisis requires us, absent special circumstances, to treat like cases alike. The Louisiana law imposes a burden on access to abortion just as severe as that imposed by the Texas law, for the same reasons. Therefore Louisiana’s law cannot stand under our precedents.

Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

Despite the fact that we granted Louisiana’s petition specifically to address whether “abortion providers [can] be presumed to have third-party standing to challenge health and safety regulations on behalf of their patients,” ... a majority of the Court all but ignores the question. The plurality and THE CHIEF JUSTICE ultimately cast aside this jurisdictional barrier to conclude that Louisiana’s law is unconstitutional under our precedents. But those decisions created the right to abortion out of whole cloth, without a shred of support from the Constitution’s text. Our abortion precedents are grievously wrong and should be overruled.

Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Gorsuch, and joined in part by Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh, saying in part:

The plurality concludes that the Louisiana law does nothing to protect the health of women, but that is disproved by substantial evidence in the record. And the plurality upholds the District Court’s finding that the Louisiana law would cause a drastic reduction in the number of abortion providers in the State even though this finding was based on an erroneous legal standard and a thoroughly inadequate factual inquiry....

Both the plurality and THE CHIEF JUSTICE hold that abortion providers can invoke a woman’s abortion right when they attack state laws that are enacted to protect a woman’s health. .... [T]he idea that a regulated party can invoke the right of a third party for the purpose of attacking legislation enacted to protect the third party is stunning. Given the apparent conflict of interest, that concept would be rejected out of hand in a case not involving abortion.

Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

The judicial power is constrained by an array of rules. Rules about the deference due the legislative process, the standing of the parties before us, the use of facial challenges to invalidate democratically enacted statutes, and the award of prospective relief. Still more rules seek to ensure that any legal tests judges may devise are capable of neutral and principled administration. Individually, these rules may seem prosaic. But, collectively, they help keep us in our constitutionally assigned lane, sure that we are in the business of saying what the law is, not what we wish it to be.

Today’s decision doesn’t just overlook one of these rules. It overlooks one after another....

Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissent, saying in part:

[I]n my view, additional fact finding is necessary to properly evaluate Louisiana’s law. As JUSTICE ALITO thoroughly and carefully explains, the factual record at this stage of plaintiffs’ facial, pre-enforcement challenge does not adequately demonstrate that the three relevant doctors ... cannot obtain admitting privileges or, therefore, that any of the three Louisiana abortion clinics would close as a result of the admitting-privileges law.

New York Times reports on the decision.

Supreme Court Rejects Asylum Seeker's Challenge To Limits On Review Of Claims

The U.S. Supreme Court today in Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, (US Sup. Ct., June 25, 2020) upheld against constitutional attack a provision in the immigration law that prevents applicants for asylum from appealing to federal courts through a habeas corpus petition an immigration judge's conclusion that the applicant lacks a "credible fear of persecution".  The court rejected arguments that the limitation violates the Constitutional ban on suspending habeas corpus and violates due process. Justices Breyer and Ginsburg concurrd, but would limit the holding to the facts of this case. Justices Sotomayor and Kagan dissented. NPR reports on the decision.

Cert. Petition Filed In Title VII Reasonable Accommodation Case

A petition for certiorari (full text) was filed this week in Small v. Memphis Light, Gas and Water, (Sup. Ct., file 6/16/2020). In the case, the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of an employment discrimination claim by a Jehovah's Witness, concluding that Memphis Light adequately accommodated their employee's religious beliefs when it allowed him to swap shifts with other employees. (See prior posting.) The petition for review presents the question as:

Whether Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977), which stated that employers suffer an “undue hardship” in accommodating an employee’s religious exercise whenever doing so would require them “to bear more than a de minimis cost,” misinterprets § 2000e(j) and should be overruled.

[Thanks to Jim Sonne for the lead.]

Supreme Court: Title VII Bans LGBT Discrimination

The U.S. Supreme Court today in a 6-3 decision in Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, (Sup. Ct., June 15, 2020), held that the provisions of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act which prohibit discrimination in employment "because of sex" protect gay, lesbian and transgender individuals.  In an opinion written by Justice Gorsuch, and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan, the court said in part:

Today, we must decide whether an employer can fire someone simply for being homosexual or transgender. The answer is clear. An employer who fires an individual for being homosexual or transgender fires that person for traits or actions it would not have questioned in members of a different sex. Sex plays a necessary and undisguisable role in the decision, exactly what Title VII forbids.

Those who adopted the Civil Rights Act might not have anticipated their work would lead to this particular result. Likely, they weren’t thinking about many of the Act’s consequences that have become apparent over the years, including its prohibition against discrimination on the basis of motherhood or its ban on the sexual harassment of male employees. But the limits of the drafters’ imagination supply no reason to ignore the law’s demands.  When the express terms of a statute give us one answer and extratextual considerations suggest another, it’s no contest.  Only the written word is the law, and all persons are entitled to its benefit.

Justice Alito filed a dissent, joined by Justice Thomas, saying in part:

The Court tries to convince readers that it is merely enforcing the terms of the statute, but that is preposterous. Even as understood today, the concept of discrimination because of “sex” is different from discrimination because of “sexual orientation” or “gender identity.”  And in any event, our duty is to interpret statutory terms to “mean what they conveyed to reasonable people at the time they were written.” A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 16 (2012) (emphasis added)…. 

The Court attempts to pass off its decision as the inevitable product of the textualist school of statutory interpretation championed by our late colleague Justice Scalia, but no one should be fooled. The Court’s opinion is like a pirate ship. It sails under a textualist flag, but what it actually represents is a theory of statutory interpretation that Justice Scalia excoriated––the theory that courts should “update” old statutes so that they better reflect the current values of society.

Justice Kavanaugh also filed a dissent, saying in part:

Under the Constitution’s separation of powers, the responsibility to amend Title VII belongs to Congress and the President in the legislative process, not to this Court.

The Court's opinion covered three cases, Bostock, Altitude Express, and R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes. Religion News Service reports on the decision.

Supreme Court Says Druze Immigrant Can Appeal Factual Findings Under Convention Against Torture

Yesterday the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that factual findings relating to relief under the Convention Against Torture can be appealed from the Board of Immigration Appeals to the federal circuit courts. In Nasrallah v. Barr, (Sup. Ct., June 1, 2020), a member of the Druze religion claimed he would likely be tortured by Hezbollah if he returned to Lebanon. In a 7-2 decision, in an opinion written by Justice Kavanaugh, the Court said in part:

It would be easy enough for Congress to preclude judicial review of factual challenges to CAT orders, just as Congress has precluded judicial review of factual challenges to certain final orders of removal. But Congress has not done so, and it is not the proper role of the courts to rewrite the laws passed by Congress and signed by the President.

Justices Thomas and Gorsuch dissented. The Hill reports on the decision.

US Supreme Court, 5-4, Refuses To Enjoin California's Limits On Worship Services

On Friday night, by a vote of 5-4, the U.S. Supreme Court refused a church’s request to enjoin application to it of California’s COVID-19 restrictions that limit attendance at religious worship services to 25% of building capacity or 100 attendees.  In South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, (US Sup. Ct., May 29, 2020), Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor voted to deny the injunction without writing an opinion. Chief Justice Roberts concurred in denying the injunction, filing a 2-page opinion explaining his vote. He said in part:

Although California’s guidelines place restrictions on places of worship, those restrictions appear consistent with the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Similar or more severe restrictions apply to comparable secular gatherings, including lectures, concerts, movie showings, spectator sports, and theatrical performances, where large groups of people gather in close proximity for extended periods of time. And the Order exempts or treats more leniently only dissimilar activities, such as operating grocery stores, banks, and laundromats, in which people neither congregate in large groups nor remain in close proximity for extended periods.

Justice Kavanaugh filed a 3-page dissenting opinion which was joined by Justices Thomas and Gorsuch, saying in part:

The Church and its congregants simply want to be treated equally to comparable secular businesses. California already trusts its residents and any number of businesses to adhere to proper social distancing and hygiene practices. The State cannot “assume the worst when people go to worship but assume the best when people go to work or go about the rest of their daily lives in permitted social settings”…

Justice Alito dissented without filing or joining an opinion.

Earlier in the day, the Court had issued a brief order similarly denying an injunction against Illinois restrictions on worship services, but here because the challenged Illinois restrictions had expired the day before.. Full text of order in Elim Romanian Church v. Pritzker, (US Sup. Ct., May 29, 2020). SCOTUSblog reports on the decisions.

Supreme Court Oral Arguments In Ministerial Exception Cases Live Today

At 11:00 AM today, the U.S. Supreme Court will hear oral arguments in Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru (SCOTUSblog case page), and St. James School v. Biel (SCOTUSblog case page). In the cases, the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Catholic school teacher in each of the cases was not prevented from bringing an employment discrimination lawsuit. The 9th Circuit held that they are not "ministers" for purposes of the "ministerial exception" doctrine.  The oral arguments, which will be held via teleconference may be heard on C-Span live at this link.   Los Angeles Times reports on the cases.

UPDATE: Here is the transcript of the full arguments in the cases. Reuters reports on the oral arguments.

Supreme Court Will Broadcast Contraceptive Mandate Case Arguments Today In Real Time

Beginning at 10:00 am (EDT) this morning, the U.S. Supreme Court will hear consolidated oral arguments in Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania  (SCOTUSblog case page) and Trump v. Pennsylvania (SCOTUSblog case page). In the case, the 3rd Circuit upheld a nationwide preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Trump Administration's final rules expanding exemptions under the Affordable Care Act for employers with religious or moral objections to contraceptive coverage. Little Sisters of the Poor were intervenors in the 3rd Circuit case. (See prior posting.)  Under the Supreme Court's special procedures for arguments during the COVID-19 crisis, arguments will be conducted via teleconference which will be broadcast live by C-Span at this link.

Cert. Filed In Pittsburgh Abortion Clinic Buffer Zone Ordinance

A petition for certiorari (full text) was filed with the U.S. Supreme Court yesterday in Bruni v. City of Pittsburgh. In the case, the U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a Pittsburgh ordinance that creates a 15-foot buffer zone outside any health care facility, including a Planned Parenthood clinic. In Bruni v. City of Pittsburgh, (3d Cir., Feb. 6, 2019), the court upheld the ordinance by interpreting it to not cover sidewalk anti-abortion counseling. ADF issued a press release announcing yesterday's filing of the petition for review.

Supreme Court Postpones Oral Arguments For Public Health Reasons

The U.S. Supreme Court announced yesterday that it is postponing oral arguments currently scheduled for it March session because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Included in the cases postponed are Tanzin v. Tanvir (availability of money damages under RFRA) and the consolidated arguments in two cases involving the scope of the Ministerial Exception doctrine (Our Lady of Guadalupe v. Morrissey-Berru and St. James School v. Biel). The Court's press release added:

The Court’s postponement of argument sessions in light of public health concerns is not unprecedented.  The Court postponed scheduled arguments for October 1918 in response to the Spanish flu epidemic.  The Court also shortened its argument calendars in August 1793 and August 1798 in response to yellow fever outbreaks.

Transcript of Oral Arguments In June Medical Services Case Now Available

Here is the transcript of today's oral arguments in the U.S. Supreme Court in June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo -- the constitutional challenge to Louisiana's abortion law. Vox reports on the oral arguments, headlining it "Abortion rights had a surprisingly hopeful day in the Supreme Court". CNN however headlines its report "Supreme Court appears split after hearing first major abortion case with strong conservative majority".