Ohio's School Choice Program Violates State Constitution

In Columbus City School District v. State of Ohio, (OH App., Oct. 15, 2026), an Ohio state appellate court held that Ohio's Education Choice Scholarship Program, which is available to almost all Ohio K-12 students, regardless of family income or quality of their public school district, violates Ohio's state Constitution. The court said in part:

EdChoice, as presently structured and funded, secures with taxpayer funds a competing system of uncommon schools that is not subject to the same obligations imposed on Ohio’s system of common schools.  This system of uncommon schools violates the mandate of Ohio Const. art. VI, § 2 to secure “a thorough and efficient system of common schools throughout the state.”  Although statutes are entitled to a strong presumption of constitutionality, that presumption has been overcome here.  Participating non-public schools are subject to materially less extensive state oversight, they cherry-pick students from public schools, they are geographically isolated in Ohio’s urban centers, and they receive taxpayer funding in a manner that operates at the expense and detriment of Ohio’s public schools, and, consequently, the children who depend on those public schools for instruction, support, and opportunities that shape their future.

The court however stayed enforcement of its decision pending an anticipated appeal to the state Supreme Court.

AP reports on the decision.

Recent Articles of Interest

From SSRN:

• Krishna Janni & Ruchit Yadav, The Wall of Places of Worship Act, 1991 (December 09, 2025).
• Zalman Rothschild, Anti-Zionism, Antisemitism, Antidiscrimination , 6 Am. J.L. & Equal. 137 (2026).
• Abdul Aziz Meslat, The Jurisprudence Of Constitutional Conscience: Religious Exemptions, Third-Party Harms, and Equality in Modern U.S. Supreme Court Jurisprudence, (October 13, 2026).
• Cemal Yilmaz, Islamic University of Rotterdam: From Interfaith Dialogue to Pluralistic Cooperation (October 08, 2026).
• Larry Backer, Catá, God, Golem, Monster, or Instrument: Belief, Cognition, and the Covert Premises of AI Regulation, (October 10, 2026).
• Muhammad Irfan Haroon, Shiqaq Recognised: The Supreme Court on Khula, Dower and the Residuary Ground in Section 2(ix) of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, (October 10, 2026).
• Bhargav Umathe, The Concept of Hiba (Gift) in Muslim Law vis-à-vis the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, (September 10, 2026).

From SmartCILP:

• Shahar Lifshitz, Nonmarriage? Rethinking Religious Marriage in Modern States, 47 Cardozo Law Review 1589-1622 (2026).

India's Supreme Court Says Backward Class Benefits Do Not Remain After Religious Conversion

In Secretary to Government v. Sameer Ahamed N., (Sup. Ct. India, Oct. 15, 2026), India's Supreme Court held that when a Hindu who is entitled to affirmative action benefits as a member of a Hindu "backward class" converts to Islam, he loses the Hindu backward class benefits. Moreover, the convert cannot acquire membership in any of the seven Notified Backward Class Muslim communities merely by converting to Islam. The court said in part:

39. Where a person was entitled to affirmative action under Article 16(4) of the Constitution by reason of the social backwardness within the Hindu social order, such entitlement is founded upon the disabilities which arose within, and were produced by, that social structure. Upon conversion to Islam or Christianity, or to any other non-Hindu social order in which caste is not recognised as the basis of social status and classification, that foundational basis ceases to operate in the same manner. The fact that the consequences of the earlier disability may continue in the form of educational deprivation, occupational disadvantage, economic hardship or other material circumstances cannot carry the antecedent social backwardness into the new religion. To permit such continuation would be to detach the consequences from the social structure which produced them and to transpose social backwardness of one religion into another religion in which such backwardness is not recognised as the basis of social classification. The constitutional benefit cannot be made to travel in this manner from the religion in which the relevant backwardness arose to a religion whose basic theological structure or otherwise does not recognise caste as its foundational basis...

41. Consequently, where a person was receiving affirmative action under Article 16(4) of the Constitution in the Hindu social order, upon conversion to Islam, Christianity or to any other non-Hindu social order brings such entitlement norms to an end.

42, The fundamental premise of G.O. dated 09.03.2024 is that a person belonging, before conversion, to a Backward Class, Most Backward Class, Denotified Community or Scheduled Caste, who thereafter embraces Islam, may be treated as a Backward Class Muslim and may be issued a community certificate under one of the seven Muslim communities notified by the State for which the State has reserved 3.5% of seats and posts for Backward Class Muslims under Tamil Nadu Act 33 of 2007.  

56. .... There is no doubt on the proposition that the issuance of a statutory community certificate is a public function, but the State cannot abdicate the statutory determination to a private body like Jamath. The responsibility for determining entitlement of a person to a statutory reservation must remain with the competent public authority...

62.. A person who converts to Islam does not, by that act alone, become a member of any one of the seven notified Backward Class Muslim communities in the State. His former caste or community status cannot automatically be transposed into the Muslim Backward Class category, nor can a private religious body conclusively determine such statutory entitlement....

The Economic Times reports on the decision.

3rd Circuit: Chilling Effect of Unadopted Proposal Does Not Give Standing for Free Exercise or Establishment Clause Claim

In Bagal v. Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey, (3rd Cir., Oct. 14, 2026), the U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal for lack of standing of a suit alleging that Rutgers University discriminated against Hindus. The court said in part:

Bagal’s complaint stemmed from an August 2024 report issued by a Rutgers University Task Force ... which recommended that the university include “caste” as a protected category in Rutgers’ Policy on Discrimination and Harassment...  Rutgers did not adopt the Report’s recommendation and did not add caste to the Policy because Rutgers concluded that caste-based discrimination was already covered by the Policy’s prohibition of discrimination based on religion, ancestry, national origin, and race.... 

...  Bagal’s alleged injury for his First Amendment free exercise claim is that he has been inhibited from practicing his religious beliefs.  But he cannot establish standing “simply by claiming [he] experienced a ‘chilling effect’ that resulted from a governmental policy that does not regulate, constrain, or compel any action on [his] part.”...  Because the Report has not been adopted into Policy, has not been enforced, and has not been discussed by the defendants in any of Bagal’s engagements with them, he also lacks standing for his Establishment Clause claim....

Bagal similarly lacks standing for his Equal Protection, Due Process, and remaining statutory discrimination claims....

Judge May Not Bar Parents from Influencing Child's Religious Participation When There Is No Threat of Harm to Child

In Lajara v. McMenamin, (PA Super. Ct., Oct. 14, 2026), a mother appealed an order entered by a Pennsylvania trial court awarding limited joint legal custody to both parents of their 11-year-old child. The appellate court vacated the portion of the trial court's final custody order that prohibits either parent from influencing, restricting or limiting their child's participation in religious services, events or activities. The order also provides that the child may decline to attend any religious service, event or activity once the child reaches the age of 14. Neither parent had asked the trial court to enter an order regarding religious exercise, but the trial judge did so because "the tumultuous history of this case does not produce any optimism on the part of this trial court that they will be able to communicate and cooperate if religious participation becomes an issue.  As such, it is in … Child’s best interests to preemptively place parameters on his attendance and participation in religious activities…. " The appellate court rejected that reasoning, saying in part:

... [T]he restrictions set forth in paragraph 111 are contrary to our case law since there is no indication the parties’ religious beliefs or practices present a “grave threat of harm,” “a substantial threat of present or future, physical or emotional harm to the child[,]” or that the physical or mental health, or safety of the child would be jeopardized absent a restriction....  Consistent with precedent, both parents shall be permitted to practice his or her religion with Child during their respective periods of custody, so long as there is no substantial threat of present or future physical or emotional harm to Child.

Britain Issues Statistics on Hate Crimes in 2025-26

On October 8, the United Kingdom's Home Office released the Official Statistics on Hate Crimes in England and Wales for the Year Ending March 2026. The total number of hate crimes was 146,825, up 7% from the prior year. Religion-based hate crimes for 2025-26 totaled 11,419, up 13% from the prior year. The largest number of religion-based hate crimes targeted Muslims-- 5,132, up 15% from the prior year. The next largest number targeted Jewish individuals-- 3,162, up 10% from the prior year.  However, based on the rate per 10,000 population, anti-Muslim hate crimes were 13 per 10,000. Anti-Jewish hate crimes were 117 per 10,000. By far, the largest number of hate crimes-- 73.5%-- were racially motivated. [Thanks to Law & Religion UK for the lead.]

California Requires Employers to Provide Anti-Hate Speech Training to Employees

On September 27, California Governor Gavin Newsom signed A.B. 1803 (full text) which amends Cal. Gov. Code §12950.1 to require that beginning January 1, 2028, employers must provide anti-hate speech training to employees every two years. The training must provide supervisors and employees with "practical guidance on recognizing, reporting, and confronting workplace speech that vilifies, humiliates, or incites hatred against people based on"  race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, reproductive health decision making, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sex, gender, gender identity, gender expression, age, sexual orientation, or veteran or military status. The training requirement applies to any employer having five or more employees. Calif. Gov. Code §12926(d), however, provides that "employer" as used in these civil rights provisions does not include a non-profit religious association of corporation. 

ReligiousLiberty.tv discusses the impact of the new provisions on religious organizations.

5th Circuit: Section 1981 Does Not Bar Purely Religious Discrimination Against Jews

In Domanic v. Christian Brothers Automative Corporation, (5th Cir., Sept. 30, 2026), the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals held that a Texas religion-based franchisor of auto-repair stores did not violate 42 USC §1981 by requiring that its franchisees be professing Christians. Christian Brothers described its mission as one to "glorify God by providing ethical and excellent services to its customers." The court said in part:

All of [Christian Brothers] more than 250 franchisees—a group which includes some ethnic Jews—are professing Christians. When the company refused to franchise to Evan Domanic, who is an ethnic and religious Jew, Domanic sued for racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §1981. The district court granted Christian Brothers summary judgment, ruling that its franchise policy constituted not racial but religious discrimination, which is not cognizable under § 1981. 

On appeal, Domanic’s main argument is that discrimination against Jews is ipso facto racial discrimination, even when (as here) the differential treatment is motivated purely by religion and not ancestry. We decline to adopt this novel argument, which is in tension with the Supreme Court’s longstanding precedent that § 1981 does not reach religious discrimination.... [T]he Seventh Circuit ... has twice rejected similar contentions about the indivisibility of Jewish ethnicity and faith under § 1981. 

... [N]o evidence suggests that Christian Brothers’s franchise policy is a façade for ethnic discrimination against Jews....

Judge Oldham filed an opinion concurring in the result, saying in part:

...   In an appropriate case, our en banc court should reconsider our use of McDonnell Douglas at summary judgment generally and in § 1981 cases specifically.

Heartlander News reports on the decision.

Evangelist Sues Over Exclusion of Leafleting at Neighborhood Christmas Festival

Suit was filed earlier this month in an Arizona federal district court by a Christian evangelist challenging Tucson's decision in 2025 to exclude religious, political, and issue-based leafleting at the annual Winterhaven Festival of Lights, a neighborhood display of Christmas and seasonal lights. Instead, leafleting was permitted outside the Festival in a "free expression zone." The complaint (full text) in Hoffman v. City of Tucson, (D AZ, filed 10/2/2026), alleges that the exclusion violates plaintiff's free speech, free exercise and due process rights. First Liberty Institute issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Christian Counselors Sue to Invalidate Lincoln, Nebraska's Conversion Therapy Ban

Suit was filed last week in a Nebraska federal district court asking the court to enjoin enforcement of Lincoln, Nebraska Ordinances that prohibit conversion therapy for minors. The complaint (full text) in Dierks v. City of Lincoln, Nebraska, (D NE, filed 10/6/2026), alleges that that the challenged Ordinance is almost identical to the Colorado statute that the U.S. Supreme Court found unconstitutional on free speech grounds in Chiles v. Salazar. The complaint alleges in part:

3. Since Chiles was decided, Plaintiffs' attorneys have contacted the Lincoln City Attorney several times, beginning on April 16, 2026. By letter of that date, Plaintiffs requested the City of Lincoln to repeal the Ordinance no later than June 15, 2026.... 

4. There followed one telephone call and two phone messages with the Lincoln City Attorney....

5. By way of another email on July 16, the Plaintiffs' attorneys then requested to know whether, even if the City of Lincoln is unwilling to repeal the Ordinance, the City of Lincoln at least is willing to agree not to enforce it as applied to talk therapy.... The City of Lincoln was informed in that email that if the City took no action, Plaintiffs would have no alternative but to sue the City. The City of Lincoln has not responded to Plaintiffs' attorneys as of the date of this filing.

Thomas More Society issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Recent Articles of Interest

From SSRN:

• Brian Broderick, Back To Square One Could St. Mary Catholic Parish V. Roy Facilitate The Return Of Segregated Schooling?, (October 08, 2026).
• Faisal Kutty, What Happens When a Government Can Override Constitutional Rights? (Quebec's Act Respecting the Laicity of the State -- Bill 21), (March 31, 2026).
• Annika Boone, Intent and Facially Neutral Blaine Amendments, (September 24, 2026).
• Joshua Segev, The Biblical Origins of Law: Towards a Living Originalist Reading of the Bible, 9 Cardozo Int'l. & Comp. L. Rev 503, (November 01, 2025).
• Wes Henricksen, Why "Hate Speech" Is Constitutionally Protected: A First Amendment Analysis in Verse, (October 05, 2026).
• Jonathan Yovel, The Existential Argument Against Capital Punishment, (October 05, 2026).
• Kingsun Lim, The World Philanthropy Funding Framework (WPFF): A Policy Architecture for Transforming Global Philanthropy into a Permanent Global Public Good, (October 07, 2026).
• Michelle Oberman, The Pronatalist Problem, (Santa Clara Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 7557300 (March 2026)).

From SmartCILP:

• Adam P. Grogan, Whose RFRA Is It Anyway?: Bostock, Braidwood, and a Current Circuit Split, (88 Albany Law Review 603-642 (2025)).
•  Timon Cline, Josh Hammer & Yoram Hazony, Everson Must Fall, (48 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 719-776 (2025)).
•  'Arafa, Mohamed, Veiled Justice: Secularism and the Hijab across Democracies, 49 Seattle University Law Review. 693-744 (2026).

Bankruptcy Court Rejects Diocese's Reorganization Plan Because of Abuse Survivors' Objections

In In re Roman Catholic Bishop of Oakland, (ND CA Bkrptcy., Oct. 2, 2026), the federal Northern District of California Bankruptcy Court, in a 109-page opinion, rejected the Oakland Diocese's proposed Plan of Reorganization, finding that the Plan does not satisfy the Bankruptcy Code's requirement that it be in the best interest of any non-consenting class of creditors.

Under to proposed Plan, a Survivor's Trust would be set up and would pay known abuse claimants $172.3 million in total, which amounts to just over $499,000 per claimant. A reserve of $7.7 million would be set aside for unknown future abuse claimants. The Abuse Claimants voted overwhelmingly (331-8) against approval of the Plan.

The court rejected the Diocese's claim that certain requirements for confirmation of the Plan violate its rights under the 1st Amendment's Free Exercise Clause or under RFRA, saying in part:

First, the Court is unaware of any Code provision, or any case law interpreting the Code, that applies any of the requirements of the Code ... differently or more leniently, because the debtor is a religious entity....   

Second, the Court does not believe that the Debtor has articulated any basis on which the actual requirements for confirmation of a plan of reorganization would implicate any of the protections provided under the First Amendment or RFRA....  

Third, even if there were some theoretical basis to consider the application of the First Amendment or RFRA to this case, the actual provisions and requirements of those laws would either (a) render them inapplicable to plan confirmation issues or (b) make it impossible to assess the effect of those laws on the Debtor’s requirements for confirmation....

The Debtor argues that the Court would violate the Church Autonomy Doctrine, and by analogy, the Ministerial Exception, if it were to “weigh in on a dispute between the Committee and Debtor regarding how many Churches the Debtor needs to fulfill its mission...."

Here, the court is not resolving a dispute between the Committee and the Debtor about the number of churches to sell, nor is it requiring Debtor to sell anything.  It is also not second guessing the decisions Debtor has, in good faith, made. ....

... Debtor simply does not articulate a basis for the Court to conclude that the confirmation standards are imposing a substantial burden on Debtor ‘s exercise of religious rights.... 

However, the Court concluded that it could not find that the plan satisfied the "best interest of creditors" test, questioning the accuracy of the amount of assets the Diocese claimed would be available to creditors. The court, though, rejected claims that the Diocese had not proposed the Plan in good faith.

NBC Bay Area reports on the court's decision.

Federal Antisemitism Task Force Is Beginning a National Tour

The Department of Justice yesterday announced that its Task Force to Combat Anti-Semitism is beginning its American Tour Against Hate. Its first stop, on October 14, will be in Southfield, Michigan. According to the DOJ's press release:

The Tour is a first-of-its-kind federal initiative, bringing government resources and officials directly to local communities experiencing hate and discrimination.

“President Trump has made clear that this Administration will not tolerate antisemitism, and the Department of Justice is committed to implementing that directive,” said Attorney General Todd Blanche. “This national tour is an important step in ensuring communities across the country know the federal government stands ready to work with them to confront antisemitic threats, protect public safety, and uphold civil rights.”

"No American should live in fear of unjust discrimination or violence,” said Associate Attorney General Stanley E. Woodward, Jr. “The Department of Justice is working tirelessly to protect and defend all Americans’ right to freedom of speech and free exercise of religion. This event is sure to be a powerful evening.”...

Trump's Columbus Day Proclamation Includes References to Religious Faith

Yesterday, President Trump issued a Proclamation (full text) declaring October 12 as Columbus Day. The Proclamation contains several religious references. It reads in part:

More than five centuries ago, Christopher Columbus embarked westward across uncharted waters and discovered the New World — bringing with him the rich traditions of Western civilization.... Above all, we remember with gratitude that the triumph of freedom and the glory of our Republic are the fruits of his faith and unrelenting devotion.....

When Columbus and his crew made landfall on the islands of the present-day Bahamas, they first believed they had reached the shores of Asia.... When they arrived, as a sign of devotion to God and respect to Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain, Columbus raised a mighty cross in the newly discovered land as a sign that “Your Highnesses hold this land for your own, but chiefly as a sign of our Lord Jesus Christ.” ...

Coumbus Day also holds special significance for our incredible Italian-American citizens.  Like Columbus, they have embodied a steadfast love of country and faith in God, and they continue to strengthen our communities and propel our country to even greater heights.

In 1892, on the occasion of the 400th anniversary of Columbus’ epic voyage, Pope Leo XIII published an encyclical hailing “the greatness of his mind and heart,” which “can be compared to but few in the history of humanity.”  The Pope continued:  Columbus “looked for a something greater and higher than did these others.”  Today, as we celebrate the anniversary of Christopher Columbus’ arrival in the New World, we honor his unrivaled greatness.  We embrace our duty to prove worthy of the inheritance he left us, to match his courage with our own, and to never abandon, forsake, or forget the beauty of our faith, the glories of our culture, and the stories of our heroes.

Catholic Clergy Sue ICE Detention Center for Restricting Their Ability to Minister to Detainees

 A suit was filed on Monday in a Missouri federal district court alleging that a detention center housing 150 immigration detainees is violating the free exercise rights of detainees and Catholic clergy. The complaint (full text) in Rozanski v. Stolzer, (ED MO, filed 10/5/2026), the Archdiocese of St. Louis alleges in part:

1. Under the First Amendment—and federal and state statutes that protect the rights enshrined in it—the government may not (a) ban the exercise of religion or (b) treat religious practice differently than it treats analogous secular activity.  Yet the Ste. Genevieve County Detention Center manages to commit both sins by imposing a visitation policy that prevents Catholic priests from meaningfully ministering to Catholic federal detainees housed there (while readily allowing exceptions to the policy for non-religious reasons). 

2.   ...The jail’s visitation policy prohibits this basic religious exercise in two ways.  First, it allows only “no contact” visits, which are not private and prevent face-to-face interactions.  This prevents priests from administering the sacraments of confession and communion.  Second, the policy permits clergy visits for only a single, four-hour period once a week.  This severely restricts priests’ ability provide pastoral care, as priests cannot meet with all detainees who wish to see a Catholic priest (and have only limited time with those they do visit).   Priests are also prohibited from saying Mass.... 

3. Worse still, the policy applies to clergy but not to lawyers or consular officials, for whom exceptions to the policy are readily made.  That constitutes more favorable treatment for secular activity than religious exercise....   

4. ... [T]he visitation policy violates the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, the Missouri Religious Freedom Restoration Act ... and the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”)....

St. Louis Public Radio reports on the lawsuit.

Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine Leads to Dismissal of Complaint By 37 Churches Over Disaffiliation Rules

In Methodist Church of Cape St. Claire v. Baltimore Washington Conference of the United Methodist Church, (MD App., Oct. 5, 2026), a Maryland state appellate court held that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine prevents civil courts from adjudicating the claim of 37 local churches that their parent body wrongly imposed a charge of 50% of the value of a church's property on local congregations that wished to disaffiliate and retain their property. The General Conference had created a procedure for local congregations that objected to the church's policy on human sexuality to disaffiliate, with regional Conferences being able to add conditions. The 50% payment requirement was added by the BW Conference. The appeals court said in part:

The Local Churches argue first that the circuit court ignored viable exceptions to the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine and dismissed their constructive fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract claims incorrectly....

Resolving the claims alleged in this case would require a trial court to examine the UMC’s religious doctrine and the Conference’s management of church resources in a manner prohibited by the First Amendment. We look first at the Local Churches’ allegation that the Conference engaged in constructive fraud and breached its fiduciary duty by failing to act in their best interest and in accordance with the UMC’s doctrine, custom, and practices....

We reach the same conclusions with respect to the Local Churches’ claims that the Conference committed constructive fraud and breached its fiduciary duty by mismanaging church funds or by making misrepresentations about its use and management of those funds....

In this case, the circuit court properly declined to enforce the Book of Discipline against the Conference as the Local Churches requested because it couldn’t interpret the Book of Discipline “under ‘neutral principles of [contract] law,’ without court involvement ‘in any theological or doctrinal matter.’” ...

Whether the General Conference’s amendment of the Book of Discipline to include Paragraph 2553 contradicted longstanding church practices and existing provisions of the Book of Discipline allegedly allowing local churches to disaffiliate without forfeiting their real property is a question for the UMC’s Judicial Council to answer. And according to the Conference, the Judicial Council has, in fact, answered it.

Finally, the court held that the trial judge who is a Methodist did not need to recuse himself, saying in part:

Ultimately, the judge’s sole connection to the controversy in this case is that he is a parishioner of a church that falls under the regional purview of a party to the case, the BW Conference. His religious affiliation and status as a parishioner, without more, do not qualify as grounds to question his impartiality and do not, on their own, suggest that the judge had an interest in the outcome of the case one way or the other....

Pennsylvania Supreme Court: 1st Amendment Free Exercise Claim Requires "Burden", Not "Substantial Burden" On Religious Practice

In  Alsyrawan v. Department of Human Services, (PA Sup. Ct., Oct. 5, 2026), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that to show a 1st Amendment free exercise violation, litigants only need to show a "burden", rather than a "substantial burden", on their religious exercise. At issue in the case was the denial of a Muslim family's application for a waiver of a rule (the 40/60 Rule) that limited the number of hours each week that a state program would compensate relatives for acting as caregivers, here for a Down Syndrome adult male. According to the court:

 Alsyrawan adheres to Islamic law, as established in the Quran, which forbids unrelated males and females from being alone together and prohibits unrelated males from offering personal care concerning nudity or uncovered private parts to other males....  As articulated by Mother, due to Alsyrawan’s religious obligations, only immediate relatives (such as sisters, brothers, father, mother, and grandparents) are permitted to administer private personal care to him.... Mother testified further that even if an unrelated male aide did not provide Alsyrawan with private personal care — thus, not breaching Alsyrawan’s religious obligations — her religious beliefs prohibit her from being alone with an unrelated male, even if this unrelated male is taking care of Alsyrawan.

The majority reviewed a number of recent U.S. Supreme Court free-exercise opinions and found that the Supreme Court has been referring only to a "burden" and not to a "substantial burden" in those opinions. The majority concluded:

... [A] litigant satisfies the threshold showing of a burden on their religious practice by demonstrating that they must choose between receiving a government benefit or abiding by their religious beliefs.  In other words, they must make a “forced choice” – the state actor does not provide a benefit option where the litigant can have both.

RFPA [Pennsylvania’s Religious Freedom Protection Act ] and the Free Exercise Clause are different legal routes for litigants to allege violations of their right to freely exercise their religion.  The Supreme Court’s recent decisions indicate that a violation of the Free Exercise Clause may occur only when an individual’s religious exercise is simply burdened, as opposed to substantially burdened as required prior to Smith. Therefore, analysis of constitutional claims under the U.S. Constitution and statutory claims under RFPA cannot be conflated.  Evidence of a substantial burden is required for claims under RFPA, but only a burden is required for such claims under the Free Exercise Clause. The appropriate standard of review — strict scrutiny or rational basis — is determined by assessing whether the burden is imposed by government policy or conduct that is not neutral or generally applicable....

Justice Mundy filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

I would hold that because the 40/60 Rule is neutral and generally applicable, and survives rational basis scrutiny, Appellant lacks a valid First Amendment claim.  I would also conclude the 40/60 Rule does not impose a substantial burden on Appellant’s religious exercise, meaning he also lacks a valid RFPA Claim.  Therefore, I would affirm the order of the Commonwealth Court.

Justice Wecht filed an opinion concurring in the majority's analysis, but contending that the court should have vacated and remanded the lower court's decision, rather than reversing and remanding it so the lower court could more fully consider whether the 40/60 Rule was generally applicable.

Backers of Hasidic School May Move Ahead with Challenges to Zoning Denials

Congregation Rabbinical Institute of Tartikov, Inc. v. Village of Pomona, NY, (SD NY, Sept.28, 2026), is the latest decision in a long-running attempt by members of the Hasidic Jewish community to build a rabbinical institute in Pamona, New York, that will provide facilities to train rabbinical judges and will include housing for its students and their families.  In an 80-page opinion, a New York federal district court allowed plaintiffs to move ahead with their as-applied federal and state equal protection, free exercise, freedom of speech and association, Fair Housing Act and RLUIPA claims. At issue are plaintiff's compliance with two local laws--one allowing only accredited educational institutions to be constructed in the village, and the second placing a number of restrictions on design of dormitories.

The court said in part:

... Plaintiffs plausibly allege that Defendants enforced the Challenged Laws with discriminatory intent.

  ... [T]he New York State Education Department no longer provides institutional accreditation....  

Plaintiffs further allege that Tartikov explained to the ZBA that it cannot obtain accreditation through private means because AARTS requires a rabbinical institute to be operational before it can obtain accreditation, leaving Tartikov unable to obtain accreditation without first operating and unable to operate in the Village without first obtaining accreditation....  Rather than address this alleged “Catch-22,” the ZBA chairperson suggested that Tartikov rent a facility outside the Village, operate there until it obtained accreditation, and then return to the Village....  

The ZBA subsequently denied Tartikov’s variance application because Tartikov had not sufficiently established that it could not become accredited.... It did so despite the Rockland County Department of Planning’s conclusion that lack of accreditation, standing alone, presented no significant land-use impacts....

Thus, despite Tartikov’s repeated efforts to obtain permission for student-family housing, Defendants effectively conditioned consideration of that request on Tartikov first overcoming the Accreditation Law—the same requirement that Plaintiffs allege Tartikov cannot satisfy without first operating its rabbinical institute....  These procedural irregularities and alleged delays further support an inference that Defendants acted with discriminatory intent....

At this early stage, Plaintiffs’ allegations of repeated procedural irregularities, the circumstances surrounding Defendants’ application of the Challenged Laws, and alleged anti-Hasidic animus among Village officials and community members plausibly support an inference that Defendants applied the Challenged Laws in a discriminatory manner. ...

The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that Defendants’ application of the Challenged Laws imposes a substantial burden on their religious exercise. 

... Plaintiffs allege that the Institute requires a Torah community, which in turn requires prospective students to reside with their families....  Yet the Dormitory Law prohibits the very housing necessary to accommodate Tartikov’s Torah community by excluding single-family, two-family, and multifamily dwelling units from the definition of a dormitory and prohibiting separate cooking, dining, or housekeeping facilities.... These allegations plausibly establish more than a “minimal impact on religious exercise”.... 

These allegations plausibly allege that the Institute would foster protected expression and that Defendants burdened that expression through their application of the Accreditation Law....

Plaintiffs have also plausibly alleged that the Accreditation Law burdens their ability to associate for the purpose of engaging in that protected activity...

Although Plaintiffs will ultimately bear the burden of demonstrating that the Dormitory Law has a significantly adverse or disproportionate impact on Hasidic Jews, they need not make that evidentiary showing at this stage in the litigation....

Supreme Court Opens Its October 2026 Term

The Supreme Court opened its October 2026 Term yesterday, issuing its traditional long list of certiorari denials. Yesterday's 42-page Order List includes a denial of certiorari in Peterson v. Snohomish Regional Fire & Rescue, (Docket No. 25-1210, cert. denied 10/5/2026). In the case, the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals rejected claims by eight firefighters that the Snohomish fire department violated Title VII and Washington state law by refusing to accommodate their requests for religious exemptions from the state's Covid vaccine mandate for all healthcare providers. (See prior posting.)

The Court already has four religion cases on its Merits Docket for this Term. They are (links are to each case's SCOTUSblog page): 

• St. Mary Catholic Parish, et al. v. Roy. (25‑581)  
• International Partners for Ethical Care, Inc. v. Ferguson (25-840) 
• Missionaries of Saint John the Baptist, Inc. v. Frederic (25-1131)
• Grand v. City of University Heights (25-965)

Student Organizations Challenge University's Consolidation of Christian Student Groups Under One Campus Minister

Suit was filed last month in a Virginia federal district court by two Christian student groups at Virginia State University challenging the school's new Campus Ministries Policy.  The complaint (full text) in Women of Victory at Virginia State University v. Branch, (ED VA, filed 9/24/2026), alleges in part:

3. ... VSU recently instituted a Campus Ministries Policy ... that strips religious organizations of their registered student organization (“RSO”) status and accompanying benefits, brings student-led ministries under the “governance and influence” of a University-appointed Campus Minister, and yet exempts secular student groups as well as the Muslim and non-Christian student ministries on campus from the Policy’s onerous requirements. 

4. The burden of this Policy falls on the Plaintiff chapters of Women of Victory and Bethel Campus Fellowship. These are VSU chapters of national organizations that provide religious support to students on college campuses through Bible studies, leadership trainings and events, and numerous other opportunities for spiritual growth, both on- and off-campus....

8. ... [O]n August 6, 2026, VSU’s Campus Ministries office circulated its new Campus Ministries Policy, informing student leaders that “student-led ministries” could no longer affiliate with their national organizations or hold RSO status. Instead, faith-based groups (unlike secular groups) would be absorbed into VSU’s Campus Ministries, subject to the sole authority of VSU’s Campus Minister and a newly appointed Board of Advisors, made up of various faculty members, including a Public Safety officer, a Facility Quality Assurance Director, and the VSU President’s Deputy Chief of Staff, among others. 

9. Under the new Policy, Christian organizations lose access to RSO benefits, including funding, event-planning resources, and event-promotion rights. Further, the VSU Campus Minister is granted control of all Christian, student-led ministries, with complete discretion to approve or reject requests for religious meetings, events, guest speakers, and all other religious activities on campus....

148. Forcing Christian student organizations to submit to a single religious figure employed by a public university violates religious students’ constitutional rights.....

The complaint alleges that the new policy violates plaintiffs' rights under the Free Exercise Clause, Establishment Clause, and Equal Protection Clause and violates their rights of expressive association and freedom of assembly.  Christian Post reports on the lawsuit.