Planned Parenthood Fights New Medicaid Funding Cutoff

Planned Parenthood filed suit this week in a Massachusetts federal district court challenging Section 71113 of H.R. 1, One Big Beautiful Bill Act which denies federal Medicaid funds for non-abortion services for one year to any non-profit that provides abortions, and which received in 2023 Medicaid funds exceeding $800,000. (Use of Medicaid funds for abortions is already prohibited under other laws.) The complaint (full text) in Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. v. Kennedy, (D MA, filed 7/7/2025), alleges that the provision was drafted to target and retaliate against Planned Parenthood. The complaint reads in part:

10. There is no legitimate justification for the statute; rather, the true design of the Defund Provision is simply to express disapproval of, attack, and punish Planned Parenthood, which plays a particularly prominent role in the public debate over abortion and (if Planned Parenthood’s Members are treated collectively) is the only nationwide abortion provider. Supporters of the Defund Provision, including President Trump and members of Congress, have made this point unmistakably clear. 

11. For these reasons, the Defund Provision’s exclusion of Planned Parenthood Members from a program designed to provide high-quality medical care to the Nation’s neediest patients—care that Planned Parenthood Members have delivered for decades—is unconstitutional as to all Planned Parenthood Members as a Bill of Attainder and it also violates Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection and First Amendment rights.

On the day the complaint was filed, the court issued a 14-day Temporary Restraining Order (full text) requiring that Medicaid funding continue to be furnished to plaintiffs. After the government responds, the court will decide whether to issue a temporary injunction in the case. Jurist and The Hill report on these developments.

UPDATE: On July 11, the court extended the Temporary Restraining Order through July 21 in a 9-page opinion and Order.  Daily Caller reports on this development.

Barnard College Settles Lawsuit Charging Antisemitism

As previously reported, in March 2024 Jewish and Israeli students sued both Columbia University and Barnard College (which is affiliated with Columbia but is a separate institution) alleging pervasive antisemitism that violates Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act as well as state and local civil rights laws. On Monday, plaintiffs in the case and Barnard College announced a settlement agreement that will resolve plaintiffs' claims against Barnard College. The settlement apparently does not resolve claims against Columbia University. According to the announcement, Barnard will appoint a Title VI Coordinator who will assure compliance with the antidiscrimination provisions of Title VI. According to the announcement:

When enforcing Title VI, the Title VI Coordinator will review and implement all applicable regulations consistent with guidance from the Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (“OCR”), including OCR’s 2021 and 2024 guidance which directs schools to “consider” the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance’s definition of antisemitism and its accompanying examples “to the extent that” any such “examples might be useful as evidence of discriminatory intent.”...

Barnard will also require all students, faculty, and staff to complete training on the Policy Against Discrimination and Harassment, which will address recognizing, combating, and reporting antisemitism.  Beginning in the 2025 fall semester, the Office of the President will communicate to Barnard students, faculty, and staff an annual message conveying the College’s “zero tolerance” for discrimination and harassment based on all protected traits, including Jewish and Israeli identity.... Barnard will also expand its existing relationship with the Jewish Theological Seminary (JTS), so that beginning in the 2025 fall semester, courses at the JTS will be available to all Barnard students at no cost....

...  Barnard will maintain policies limiting the time, place, and manner of demonstrations and prohibiting the use of face masks and other personal disguises to intimidate or interfere with the enforcement of the College’s policies.... [T]he College and its senior leaders ... will not recognize, meet, or negotiate with Columbia University Apartheid Divest, any of its successor or spin-off organizations.... Finally, the College reaffirms that its endowment is intended to maintain intergenerational equity and to ensure the stability of Barnard’s financial position; it is not a vehicle for expressing political positions, which includes taking actions for the purpose of penalizing the government of a country or the commercial/financial activity within that country.... 

IRS Says Houses of Worship Can Endorse Political Candidates

In a Joint Motion for Entry of a Consent Judgment (full text) filed on Monday with a Texas federal district court in National Religious Broadcasters v. Long, (ED TX, 7/7/2025), the Internal Revenue Service agreed that houses of worship can endorse political candidates without violating Internal Revenue Code §501(c)(3). (See prior related posting.)

Section 501(c)(3) bars tax exempt non-profits from "participat[ing] in or interven[ing] in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office." The Motion from both parties seeking entry of a Consent Judgment reads in part as follows:

7. When a house of worship in good faith speaks to its congregation, through its customary channels of communication on matters of faith in connection with religious services, concerning electoral politics viewed through the lens of religious faith, it neither “participate[s]” nor “intervene[s]” in a “political campaign,” within the ordinary meaning of those words. To “participate” in a political campaign is “to take part” in the political campaign, and to “intervene” in a political campaign is “to interfere with the outcome or course” of the political campaign.... Bona fide communications internal to a house of worship, between the house of worship and its congregation, in connection with religious services, do neither of those things, any more than does a family discussion concerning candidates. Thus, communications from a house of worship to its congregation in connection with religious services through its usual channels of communication on matters of faith do not run afoul of the Johnson Amendment as properly interpreted. 

8. This interpretation of the Johnson Amendment is in keeping with the IRS’s treatment of the Johnson Amendment in practice. As recounted in Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, the IRS generally has not enforced the Johnson Amendment against houses of worship for speech concerning electoral politics in the context of worship services....

11. Accordingly, the Parties request this Court enter the attached proposed order enjoining Defendants ... from enforcing the Johnson Amendment against Plaintiff Churches based on speech by a house of worship to its congregation in connection with religious services through its customary channels of communication on matters of faith, concerning electoral politics viewed through the lens of religious faith.

New York Times reports on the IRS's action.

Virginia Enters Consent Decree Permitting Religiously Motivated Talk Therapy to Change Minors' Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity

In a press release last week, Founding Freedoms Law Center announced that the Virginia Department of Health Professions and the Virginia Board of Counseling last month entered into a consent decree (full text) in Raymond v. Virgnia Department of Health Professions, (Cir. Ct., June 4, 2025). The decree enjoins defendants from enforcing Virginia's ban on conversion therapy for minors against plaintiffs and all similarly situated counselors insofar as they are engaging only in religiously motivated "talk therapy" aimed at aligning a minor's gender identity or romantic attractions with the client's biological sex. The decree provides in part:

11. Plaintiffs are Christians and integrate their religious faith in their counseling of clients through talk therapy, which consists of voluntary conversations, prayer, and sharing of written materials such as Scripture, between an individual counselor and an individual client....

22, ...[T]he parties consider that enforcing the Challenged Provisions with respect to talk therapy between a licensed professional and a client that is motivated or informed by religious beliefs and desired by the client would violate Article I, §§ 11 and 16 of the Virginia Constitution, as well as the Virginia Religious Freedom Restoration Act.

Virginia Mercury reports on the consent decree. [Thanks to Scott Mange for the lead.]

Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine Requires Dismissal of Suit Between Unification Church Factions

In Family Federation for World Peace and Unification International v. Hyun Jin Moon, (DC Ct. App., July 3, 2025), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's final dismissal of a lawsuit surrounding a schism and succession dispute in the Unification Church.  The dispute has been in litigation for 14 years and has been before the Court of Appeals three times previously. (See prior posting.) Among the numerous issues dealt with in the Court's 59-page opinion was whether the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine applies to the dispute. The Court said in part:

... [A]ppellants argue that the trial court erred by (1) finding that resolution of the contract claims required determining questions of disputed religious doctrine; and (2) after making that finding, failing to apply the fraud or collusion exception to nonetheless permit review of the contract claims....

At bottom, appellants have yet to provide a clear, spelled-out answer as to how a court or jury might parse their contract and quasi-contract claims through neutral principles of law.  Pointing us to any and all potential contract conditions in the record does not cure the underlying problem we identified in Moon III—which was reiterated by the trial court on remand—that any path of decision-making analysis would require deciding actual, disputed questions of religious doctrine or leadership.  This necessarily results from the combination of (1) the use of extraordinarily broad, religious language in the purported contract terms and (2) an intrachurch dispute about the meaning of that language.  The contract-related claims therefore must fail under the baseline religious abstention doctrine....

Preston has only fraudulently donated UCI’s assets if he is not the true leader of the Unification Church and he knows it.  We cannot say the first thing without running afoul of the abstention doctrine, as we made clear in Moon III, and if bare allegations of fraud or collusion could get us around that, then the courts would be thrust right back into resolving core theological disputes about religious doctrine, hierarchy, and succession.  “No thanks” to that—that runs afoul of the abstention doctrine’s central animating principles.  And it is well established that we cannot apply any fraud or collusion exception in a way that violates the existing Supreme Court precedent on religious abstention....

The trial court acted well within its discretion to put an end to this decade-old case rather than breathing new life into it on its deathbed years after appellants could have gone after the discovery they now belatedly seek.

Section 1981 Suit Can Move Ahead Against Defendants Who Disrupted Jewish Religious Celebration

Congregation Hazon Ovadya, Inc. v. Rabbinical Council of California, (CD CA, July 1, 2025), is a suit by a Sephardic Jewish synagogue against several individuals of Ashkenazi Jewish origin as well as a group of Ashkenazi rabbis. The court describes the dispute:

On or about July 13, 2022, CHO organized a procession and solemn, religious ceremony centered around the dedication of a Torah.... In preparation for the Ceremony, CHO contracted with various rabbis and vendors, including musicians, a disc jockey, and equipment providers....

Plaintiffs allege that the Rabbinical Defendants contacted hundreds of people, including the Individuals Defendants, to organize a riot and frustrate the Ceremony.... Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants were motivated by their bias and animosity towards people of Sephardic origin.... In addition to playing sirens and other noises, some of the Individual Defendants shouted racial slurs at Plaintiff Vanounou, including but not limited to calling him "Arab."....

Due to the riot, the musicians and other vendors were unable to perform their contractual duties during the Ceremony....

Plaintiffs sued under 42 USC §1981 which prohibits discrimination on account of race in the making and enforcement of contracts. The court denied defendants' motion to dismiss the case under California's anti-SLAPP law, saying that the suit does not seek to hold defendants liable for their speech. The court refused to dismiss the suit against three individual defendants, saying in part:

The Court acknowledges that § 1981 is not "meant to provide an omnibus remedy for all racial injustice."... And the facts at issue in this action certainly do not fall within the typical kinds of claims raised under § 1981. However, having been presented with no authority expressly precluding claims of this nature, the Court does not view dismissal on this ground appropriate at this stage. At bottom, Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled that their contractual rights were impaired...

However the court dismissed charges against the Rabbinical organization, saying in part:

Even if the Rabbinical Defendants organized the riot and some of the participants engaged in racial chants, Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts supporting the idea that the Rabbinical Defendants engaged in this conduct themselves or otherwise ordered or condoned it....

Recent Articles of Interest

From SSRN:

• Brandon L. Paradise, Agape and Law in Byzantium, (November 09, 2015).
• Ahmer Bilal Soofi, Comparative Study of Quranic Perspective on Counter Measures with the Principles of Public International Law, (June 20, 2025).
• Grace Watkins, Piety Police, (Yale Law Journal, Volume 134, No. 8, Pp. 2984-3072 (2025)).
• L. Joe Dunman, What Hath Obergefell Wrought, (52 Northern Ky. L. Rev. ___ (forthcoming)).
• Eric Heinze, Criminalising Hate Speech: A Comparative Study, (December 02, 2024).
• Tracy L. Turner, Gender-Affirming Healthcare Bans as a Hybrid Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process Problem, (May 24, 2025).

From SSRN (Abortion rights):

• Lois A. Weithorn, Dobbs, State Policies, and Minors' Interests in an Open Future, (UC Law SF Gender and Justice Law Journal, Volume 36, Pp. 99-250, 2025).
• Stephen G. Gilles, Why Fourteenth Amendment Personhood Requires Live Birth, (39 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y (forthcoming 2025)).
• Dov Fox, The Personhood Double Standard, (UC Davis Law Review Online (forthcoming 2025)).
• Katherine Shaw, Hidden Harms: Abortion and the Shadow Docket, (Supreme Court Review (forthcoming 2025).

From SSRN (Non-profit organizations):

• David Gilchrist & Ben Perks, Value of the Not-for-profit Sector 2025: The Fourth Examination of the Economic Contribution of the Not-for-profit Human Services Sector in the Northern Territory (June 17, 2025).
• Elaine Wilson, The Fallacies Behind The Excise Tax On "Excessive" Charity Compensation, (Loyola University Chicago Law Journal, Vol. 56, p. 17 (2024)).
• Matthew S. Johnson, Hospitals and Local Taxation:  The Troubled Tale of Property Tax, (October 19, 2023).

From SmartCILP and elsewhere:

• Journal of Law and Religion, Vol. 39, Issue 2 (2024).
• Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, Hemispheric Justice: Awakening to 303 Creative's Troubles—A Glocalized LatCrit Analysis, 22 Seattle Journal of Social Justice 705-746 (2024).
• Steven H. Sholk, A Guide to Election Year Activities of Section 501(c)(3) Organizations, (2025 edition).

New Federal Law Allows Tax Deduction for Contributions to Tuition Assistance Organizations

H.R. 1, One Big Beautiful Bill Act (full text), signed into law by the President on July 4, provides federal tax credits up to $1700 for contributions to private-school scholarship granting organizations in states that do not provide a state tax credit for such contributions. States must elect in to participate in this program. Sec. 70411 of the new law provides in part::

(a) Allowance of Credit.--In the case of an individual who is a citizen or resident of the United States ... there shall be allowed as a credit against the tax imposed by this chapter for the taxable year an amount equal to the aggregate amount of qualified contributions made by the taxpayer during the taxable year.

 (b) Limitations.--   ``(1) In general.--The credit allowed under subsection (a) to any taxpayer for any taxable year shall not exceed $1,700.  ``(2) ...The amount allowed as a credit ... shall be reduced by the amount allowed as a credit on any State tax return of the taxpayer for qualified contributions made by the taxpayer during the taxable year.

 (c) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--  ``(1) ...The term `covered State' means one of the States ... that ...voluntarily elects to participate under this section and to identify scholarship granting organizations in the State.... `

(2) ... The term `eligible student' means an individual who-- (A) is a member of a household with an income which, for the calendar year ...is not greater than 300 percent of the area median gross income.... and (B) is eligible to enroll in a public elementary or secondary school.

(3) ... The term `qualified contribution' means a charitable contribution of cash to a scholarship granting organization that uses the contribution to fund scholarships for eligible students solely within the State in which the organization is listed pursuant to subsection (g).

News media describe the provision as a national school voucher plan. [Thanks to Scott Mange for the lead.]

Secular Officiants Lack Standing to Bring Pre-Enforcement Challenge to Texas Law Barring Them from Performing Weddings

McCutchan v. Nicholson, (ND TX, July 2, 2025), involves a challenge to the Texas statute that sets out who may conduct marriage ceremonies in the state.  The statute limits officiants to judges, Christian clergy, Jewish rabbis or "a person who is an officer of a religious organization and who is authorized by the organization to conduct a marriage ceremony." The Center for Inquiry that certifies secular marriage celebrants along with one of its certified celebrants brings the challenge, seeking to have secular officiants recognized.  However, the state Attorney General intervened in the case and took the position that the Center for Inquiry qualifies as a "religious" organization as that term is used in the Texas statutes and that its officiants are therefore already permitted to officiate at marriages. The Attorney General argued:

CFI is not secular because it adopts clear, specific, and overt religious beliefs, namely that it “denies that a supernatural source is required for life to have and for people to be guided by values and ethics.” The rejection of God and the supernatural is a religious belief; a truly secular organization would take no stance on the issue....

However, the Court disagreed, concluding that CFI is neither a religious organization nor a religion, saying in part:

At oral argument, the Attorney General discarded the history and tradition of the Texas law, stating that Satanism and Atheism were “religion[s]” and “religious organization[s]” under the Texas Family Code. Interpreting the terms “religion” and “religious organization” to cover Satanism and Atheism not only ignores history and tradition but distorts their plain meaning and risks setting a dangerous precedent.

The court went on, though, to hold that plaintiffs lack standing to bring a pre-enforcement action against the District Attorney (one of the defendants in the case), saying in part:

Individual Plaintiff provides no examples of past enforcement, no public statements regarding enforcement of the statute, and no facts about how the District Attorney could know a secular celebrant violated the law.

This led to the court's final conclusion:

Even if the Court rules on behalf of Individual Plaintiff against Defendant Nicholson, thereby enjoining the County Clerk, his injuries would not be redressed without a favorable judgment against the District Attorney. A ruling in Individual Plaintiff’s favor, thus, would not amount to “relief that directly redresses the injury suffered.”... Accordingly, the Court rules that Individual Plaintiff’s action is DISMISSED without prejudice.

Because individual members of CFI lack standing, so does the organization.

Cert. Granted in Street Preacher's Suit Challenging Protest Zone

Yesterday the U.S. Supreme Court granted review in Olivier v. City of Brandon, Mississippi, (Docket No. 24-993, certiorari granted 7/3/2025). (Order List.) In the case, a Christian street preacher challenges a city ordinance that limits demonstrations to a designated area within three hours of an event at the city's amphitheater. The certiorari petition frames the question in part as follows:

Gabriel Olivier is a Christian who feels called to share the gospel with his fellow citizens.  After being arrested and fined for violating an ordinance targeting “protests” outside a public amphitheater, Olivier brought a § 1983 suit under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to declare the ordinance unconstitutional and enjoin its enforcement against him in the future.   

The Fifth Circuit, applying its precedent construing this Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), held that Olivier’s prior conviction barred his § 1983 suit because even the prospective relief it seeks would necessarily undermine his prior conviction....

Links to briefs and pleadings in the case are available here.

Cert. Granted in Challenge to Ban of Transgender Women on Women's Sports Teams

Yesterday, the U.S. Supreme Court granted review in two cases raising the issue of whether laws that bar transgender women from participating on women's sports teams in public schools and colleges violate Title IX or the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. (Order List). The cases are Little v. Hecox, (Docket No. 24-38, certiorari granted 7/3/2025) involving a challenge to Idaho's Fairness in Women's Sports Act, and West Virginia v. B.P.J., (Docket No. 24-43, certiorari granted 7/3/2025) involving West Virginia's Save Women's Sports Act. Links to all the briefs and pleadings in the Hecox case are available here. Links to all the briefs and pleadings in the West Virginia case are available here. SCOTUSblog reports on the Court's action.

Another Suit Challenges Texas Law Mandating 10 Commandments in Every Classroom

Suit was filed yesterday in a Texas federal district court challenging the constitutionality of Senate Bill 10 which requires a copy of the Ten Commandments to be posted in every public-school classroom. The complaint (full text) in Nathan v. Alamo Heights Independent School District, (WD TX, filed 7/2/2025), alleges in part:

S.B. 10 is not neutral with respect to religion. By design, it expressly requires the display of religious scripture—the Ten Commandments—in every public-school classroom. It also requires that schools post a specific, state-approved version of that scripture that is associated with certain Protestant faiths, taking sides on theological questions regarding the correct content and meaning of the Ten Commandments and enshrining in state law an official denominational preference....

As a result of the displays mandated by S.B. 10, students who do not subscribe to the state’s official version of the Ten Commandments or whose faith tenets and values are otherwise contradicted by the displays—including the minor-child Plaintiffs—will be pressured into religious observance, veneration, and adoption of this religious scripture....

Houston Public Media reports on the lawsuit. This is the second lawsuit that has been filed challenging the constitutionality of SB 10. (See prior posting.)

11th Circuit: Florida Can Bar Transgender Teacher's Use of Preferred Pronouns to Refer to Herself in Classroom

In Wood v. Florida Department of Education, (11th Cir., July 2, 2025), the U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 decision, held that a transgender woman teacher's right to free speech was not violated by a Florida statute that  prohibits her from using the title “Ms.” and the pronouns “she,” “her,” and “hers” in exchanges with her high school students during class time. The majority concluded that the teacher "cannot show, with respect to the expression at issue here, that she was speaking as a private citizen rather than a government employee." The majority said in part:

... [W]e needn’t—and don’t—consider whether Wood has a First Amendment right to use gendered identifiers or don a “she/her” pin when conversing with colleagues in the faculty lounge, or, for that matter, even whether she has a right to do those things in her classroom after the students have departed for the day....

When a public-school teacher addresses her students within the four walls of a classroom—whether orally or in writing—she is unquestionably acting “pursuant to [her] official duties.”  Interacting with students during class time, quite literally, is a teacher’s “official dut[y].”  We reiterate that our decision is a narrow one.  We hold only that when Wood identified herself to students in the classroom using the honorific “Ms.” and the pronouns “she,” “her,” and “hers,” she did so in her capacity as a government employee, and not as a private citizen....

Judge Jordan dissented, saying in part:

The preferred personal title and pronouns of a teacher are, like her name, significant markers of individual identity.  They exist outside of, and do not depend on, the school or the government for their existence.... 

The majority’s expansive application of the government speech doctrine essentially leaves the First Amendment on the wrong side of the schoolhouse gate.  As this case demonstrates, “the government speech doctrine [is being] used as a subterfuge for favoring certain private speakers over others based on viewpoint.” ...

The statute at issue here, § 1000.071(3), has nothing to do with curriculum and everything to do with Florida attempting to silence those with whom it disagrees on the matter of transgender identity and status.

Wisconsin Supreme Court: Legislature Impliedly Repealed 1849 Abortion Ban

 In Kaul v. Urmanski, (WI Sup. Ct., July 2, 2025), the Wisconsin Supreme Court in a 4-3 decision held that 1849 state law criminalizing abortions has been impliedly repealed by later legislation. The majority said in part:

We conclude that comprehensive legislation enacted over the last 50 years regulating in detail the “who, what, where, when, and how” of abortion so thoroughly covers the entire subject of abortion that it was meant as a substitute for the 19th century near-total ban on abortion. Accordingly, we hold that the legislature impliedly repealed § 940.04(1) as to abortion, and that § 940.04(1) therefore does not ban abortion in the State of Wisconsin....

Chief Justice Karofsky filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:

I agree with the majority’s decision and its analysis. In deciding that the legislature impliedly repealed WIS. STAT. § 940.04(1), the women and children of our state are shielded from the brutal consequences this statute wrought. Yet I write separately because when courts are called upon to arbitrate significant issues in turbulent times such as these, it is incumbent that we pause to reflect on the import of our decisions in the arc of history....

I conclude by elevating the accounts of four women to illustrate the real-world consequences of severe abortion restrictions. I hold these tragedies up to the light in the hope that Wisconsin’s legacy may remain on the side of history that values the health and well-being of all people....

Justice Ziegler filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

The majority opinion is a jaw-dropping exercise of judicial will, placing personal preference over the constitutional roles of the three branches of our state government and upending a duly enacted law. In this dangerous departure from our constitutional design, four members of the court make up and apply their own version of implied repeal, failing to hew to any semblance of traditional judicial decision-making or jurisprudence....

Justice Bradley filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

Not content with effacing the law, Chief Justice Jill Karofsky rewrites history, erases and insults women by referring to mothers as “pregnant people,” slanders proponents of the pro-life perspective, and broadcasts dangerously false narratives about laws restricting abortion. Laden with emotion, steeped in myth, and light on the law, the concurrence reads as a parody of progressive politics rather than the opinion of a jurist....

With no apparent sense of irony, the concurrence claims abortion restrictions amount to “death warrants” for women, ignoring the people who feel just as passionately that abortion kills innocent human lives—more than 1,000,000 in each of the last two years. The resolution of this divisive question does not belong with the judiciary. The question of abortion belongs with the People....

Justice Hagedorn, joined by Justice Bradley, filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

The Wisconsin Constitution vests the lawmaking power of the people in the state legislature. But today, the Wisconsin Supreme Court effectively deletes a law from the books, taking this power unto itself. Sure, the majority opinion is laden with legal jargon a reader might think reflects a reasoned judicial opinion. Don’t be fooled. This is pure policymaking, driven by antagonism toward a law the majority does not like. The end result is that the policies enacted by the people’s representatives are gone—scratched out with a giant judicial eraser.

Based on its decision in this case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court also dismissed an original action that had asked the Court to interpret the 1849 law as applying only to feticide. Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin v. Urmanski, (WI Sup. Ct., July 2, 2025). See prior posting.

NPR reports on the decisions.

Suit Challenges Oklahoma's Social Studies Standards

Suit was filed yesterday in the Oklahoma Supreme Court by public school teachers, parents, children and clergy asking the court to assume original jurisdiction and enjoin implementation of the State Board of Education's 2025 Academic Standards for Social Studies in grades K-8. The complaint (full text) in Randall v. Walters, (OK Sup. Ct., filed 7/1/2025), in addition to challenges to the procedures used to adopt the Standards, alleges that the Standards violate the religious freedom protections of the Oklahoma Constitution and statutes. The complaint alleges in part:

3. The 2025 Standards require stories from the Bible to be taught to first and second graders.  In accordance with a particular Christian view of the Bible, the 2025 Standards present certain biblical passages as historical fact to older children, contrary to a scholarly consensus that those passages do not accurately represent historical events.  As a whole, the 2025 Standards favor Christianity over all other religions, as they contain numerous references to Christianity but few to other faiths....

The complaint cites numerous specific portions of the Standards that require students to identify historical accounts from the Bible and understand the influence of the Bible and Christianity on the founding of the United States.

Americans United issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

HHS Office of Civil Rights Charges Harvard with Title VI Violations Because of Indifference to Antisemitic Harassment

On June 30, the Department of Health and Human Services Office of Civil Rights issued a Notice of Violation (full text) to Harvard University charging it with antisemitic discrimination in violation of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.  The Notice was transmitted along with a Letter (full text) from the Task Force to Combat Antisemitism. The 57-page Notice of Violation concludes:

5. OCR finds that specific and repeated examples uncovered during our investigation establish a pattern of unlawful and unchecked discrimination at Harvard through: • direct student-on-student harassment; • targeted harassment by student groups; • exclusion from campus spaces; and • institutional-level acceptance of antisemitism....

 As stated above, a school may be held liable under Title VI for its deliberate indifference to student-on-student harassment when it can be shown that: (1) students were “subject to ‘severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive’ … harassment”; (2) the harassment “caused the [students] to be deprived of educational opportunities or benefits”; (3) the school “knew of the harassment”; (4) the harassment occurred “in its programs and activities”; and (5) the school “was deliberately indifferent to the harassment such that its response (or lack thereof) is clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances.” ... Based upon our investigation, OCR finds that Harvard University acted with deliberate indifference towards student-on-student harassment in violation of Title VI.

The Letter from the Task Force on Antisemitism reads in part:

Harvard’s inaction in the face of these civil rights violations is a clear example of the demographic hierarchy that has taken hold of the University. Equal defense of the law demands that all groups, regardless of race or national origin, are protected. Harvard’s commitment to racial hierarchies—where individuals are sorted and judged according to their membership in an oppressed group identity and not individual merit—has enabled anti-Semitism to fester on Harvard’s campus and has led a once great institution to humiliation, offering remedial math and forcing Jewish students to hide their identities and ancestral stories.

Failure to institute adequate changes immediately will result in the loss of all federal financial resources and continue to affect Harvard’s relationship with the federal government. Harvard may of course continue to operate free of federal privileges, and perhaps such an opportunity will spur a commitment to excellence that will help Harvard thrive once again....

JNS reports on these developments.

Recent Articles of Interest

From SSRN:

• Barbara E. Armacost, From Warriors to Servants: Romans 13 and a Theology of Policing, (forthcoming in __ Journal of Law and Religion __ (2025)).
• Giancarlo Anello, Food Justice and the Sacred Meat, (November 20, 2024).
• Gila Stopler, Women's Rights in Liberal States: Patriarchy, Liberalism, Religion and the Chimera of Rights (CUP 2025) - Introduction, (May 30, 2025).
• Hershey H. Friedman, How DEI Failed and What to do about it: Confronting and Eliminating all Forms of Intolerance, (June 15, 2025).
• Thomas Charles Berg, Can First Amendment "History and Tradition" Protect Both Sides in Polarized America? (June 15, 2025).
• Jeremy J. Patrick, The Incompatibility of Theology and Jurisprudence: A Friendly Rejoinder to the Australian School, (Legalities: The Australian and New Zealand Journal of Law and Society (forthcoming)).
• David Scott, Making Space for Sacred Lands: From the Harsh Glare of Lyng to Apache Stronghold, (21 Stanford Journal of Civil Rights & Civil Liberties (Forthcoming 2025)).
• Brandon L. Paradise, Liberalism and Orthodoxy: A Search for Mutual Apprehension, (June 23, 2023).
• Sue H. Mialon, Economic Analysis of Abortion Restrictions. (2025).
• Joanna L. Grossman & Lawrence M. Friedman, The Quick and the Dead: The Uses and Misuses of History in Abortion Jurisprudence, (46 Women’s Rts. L. Rep. 1 (2024)).

Suit Challenges Texas Requirement for 10 Commandments in Classrooms

Suit was filed last week in a Texas federal district court challenging the constitutionality of a recently enacted Texas law that requires the display of the Ten Commandments in every public-school classroom. The complaint (full text) in Alexander v. Morath, (ND TX, filed 6/24/2025) alleges in part:

Senate Bill 10 ... is not religiously neutral, as it mandates the display of a specific version of the Ten Commandments in every public-school classroom. This requirement inherently takes a theological stance on the correct content and meaning of the scripture....

The version mandated by S.B. 10 mostly aligns with a Protestant rendition but does not match any version found in the Jewish tradition, notably omitting key language and context from the Torah. Furthermore, it does not match the version followed by most Catholics, as it includes a prohibition against "graven images" which could be offensive given the role of iconography in the Catholic faith....

84. As a result of the Ten Commandments displays mandated by S.B. 10, Texas students—including minor-child Plaintiffs—will be unconstitutionally coerced into religious observance, veneration, and adoption of the state’s favored religious scripture, and they will be pressured to suppress their personal religious beliefs and practices, especially in school, to avoid the potential disfavor, reproach, and/or disapproval of school officials and/or their peers. ...

85. In addition, by mandating that one version of the Ten Commandments be displayed in public educational institutions and prescribing an official religious text for school children to venerate, S.B. 10 adopts an official position on religious matters, violating the Establishment Clause’s prohibition against taking sides in questions over theological doctrine and violating the “clearest command” of the Establishment Clause that “one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.” Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982).

86. There is no longstanding historical practice or tradition of prominently and permanently displaying any version of the Ten Commandments in American public-school classrooms. On the contrary, the Supreme Court unambiguously held in Stone that such a practice is proscribed by the Constitution.

Texas Tribune reports on the lawsuit.

Ohio's School Voucher Program Held to Violate State Constitution

In Columbus City School District v. State of Ohio, (OH Com. Pl., June 224, 2025), an Ohio state trial court held that Ohio's school voucher program, known as EdChoice, is unconstitutional under the Ohio Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 2 which provides:

The General Assembly shall secure a thorough and efficient system of common schools throughout the state; but no religious or other sect, or sects, shall ever have any exclusive right to, or control of, any part of the school funds of this state.

The court said in part:

... EdChoice procedure mandates that payments be made directly from the State to private schools.... Where EdChoice participating private schools are inexplicably receiving double the per pupil state funding than public schools, it is difficult to say that EdChoice is simply a scholarship that follows and/or benefits the student as opposed to a system that benefits private schools. 

Taken together, the evidence presented by the Plaintiffs supports their assertion that, in expanding the EdChoice program to its current form, the General Assembly has created a system of uncommon private schools by directly providing private schools with over $700 million in funding.  This evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that EdChoice violates Article VI Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution....

Despite receiving more funding in each successive year, the Plaintiffs’ public-school districts struggle to educate their students with inadequate funding....  Meanwhile, private religious schools receive EdChoice funding in addition to unknown amounts of non-public revenue.  Such a system is not thorough and efficient.  Thus, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs have proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the EdChoice voucher program violates Article VI Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution....

... [A]n order determining that the EdChoice voucher program is unconstitutional because it bestows the exclusive right to, or control of, any part of the state’s school funds to one or more “religious or other sect, or sects” does not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment because the voucher program does not prohibit any religious organization from participating based on its religious viewpoint....

Viewing the term through Ohioans’ eyes in 1851, “sect” is not limited to religious groups, but refers to any person or collective of persons with like philosophy.  As such, “other sect, or sects,” distinguishes from a “religious sect,” and refers to any non-religious group or groups... 

Though the notes from the debates occurring during the 1850 Constitutional Convention demonstrate that the delegates were primarily concerned with religious sects attempting to control the school funds of the State, the plain language of this clause evidences their intent to prohibit any non-state actor, actors, entity, or entities from controlling school state funds....

Statehouse News Bureau reports on the decision.

Recent Articles and Books on Islamic Law

From SSRN:

• Asmanadia Zahwa Nur Jannati & Safari Hasan, The Urgency of Seeking Knowledge in Islam to Improve Physical and Spiritual Health in the Modern Era, (April 29, 2025).
• Showkat Ahmad Wani, Arbaz Muzaffer & Janees Rafiq, "Navigating Duality: The Struggle for Self-Determination of Palestine and in Postcolonial Post Westphalian Global Order, (December 01, 2024).
• Shourya Agarwal, WAQF: The Islamic Land 'Propoganda', (June 08, 2025).
• Arooba Maroof Arouba, Consequences of Sharīah Non-Compliance in Islamic Banks, (April 30, 2025).
• Liaba, Sharīʿah Governance in Islamic Financial Institution: A Case Study of Qatar, (April 30, 2025).
• Alishba Zafar, Importance of Sharīʿah Governance in Islamic Financial Institution, (April 29, 2025).
• Mahro Rafiq, Best Practices for Conflict Resolution in Sharīʿah Governance, (May 15, 2025).
• Areeba Azmat, Sustainability and ESG (Environmental, Social, Governance) in Islamic Finance, (April 30, 2025).
• Sofia Kausar, Unveiling the Islamic Law and Practice of Nikah Halala in India: Challenging Misconceptions and Advocating Reforms in Muslim Personal Law, (May 16, 2025).
• Abdullah Bhatti & Aniqa Munir, Fosterage Marriage in Islam: Legal Perspectives on Prohibition, Establishment, Proof, and the Status of Children, (December 04, 2024).
• Ahmer Bilal Sooli, Comparative Study of Quranic Perspective on Counter Measures with the Principles of Public International Law, (June 20, 2025).

Recent Books on Islamic Law:

• Erica Howard, Headscarves and the Court of Justice of the European Union: An Analysis of the Case Law, (Routledge, 2024).
• Tim Lindsey & Kerstin Steiner, Islam, Law and the State in the Philippines, (Routledge, 2025).
• Anver M. Emon, The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Law, (Oxford University Press, forthcoming July 2025).
• Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Goals and Purposes of Shariah: Maqasid in Theory and Practice, (Oxford University Press, forthcoming August 2025).
• Ilias Bantekas, Jonathan G Ercanbrack, Umar A Oseni, Ikram Ullah, Islamic Contract Law, (Oxford Law Pro, 2024).