This decision continues the error of our Establishment Clause cases. It does not align with the historical understanding of an “establishment of religion” and thus with what the First Amendment actually prohibits.After an extensive examination of the history of the Establishment Clause, they say:
[T]he public display of memorials with historical significance should generally not be construed as an “establishment of religion,” even if one of the monuments also happens to be religious in nature.
The States argue that the Executive Order violates the Establishment and Equal Protection Clauses because it was intended to disfavor Muslims. In support of this argument, the States have offered evidence of numerous statements by the President about his intent to implement a “Muslim ban” as well as evidence they claim suggests that the Executive Order was intended to be that ban, including sections 5(b) and 5(e) of the Order. It is well established that evidence of purpose beyond the face of the challenged law may be considered in evaluating Establishment and Equal Protection Clause claims. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993) (“The Free Exercise Clause, like the Establishment Clause, extends beyond facial discrimination. . . . Official action that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment cannot be shielded by mere compliance with the requirement of facial neutrality.”); Larson, 456 U.S. at 254-55 (holding that a facially neutral statute violated the Establishment Clause in light of legislative history demonstrating an intent to apply regulations only to minority religions); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266-68 (1977) (explaining that circumstantial evidence of intent, including the historical background of the decision and statements by decision makers, may be considered in evaluating whether a governmental action was motivated by a discriminatory purpose).
The States’ claims raise serious allegations and present significant constitutional questions. In light of the sensitive interests involved, the pace of the current emergency proceedings, and our conclusion that the Government has not met its burden of showing likelihood of success on appeal on its arguments with respect to the due process claim, we reserve consideration of these claims until the merits of this appeal have been fully briefed.
The UK has internationally important populations of bats which are at risk due to decreases in precious woodland habitats. Churches offer alternative sanctuaries for maternity roosts and hibernation. However, bats in churches can cause serious problems as bat droppings can restrict activities, damage historic artifacts and put a strain on the volunteers who look after the buildings.
Thanks to input from skilled professionals who will work with volunteers, solutions to these problems will be shared with hundreds of churches.[Thanks to Law & Religion UK for the lead.]
Nowhere ... is there a single allegation that Cambridge Christian or any of its members were deprived of their right to pray at the Championship Game. On the contrary, both Cambridge Christian’s team and the opposing team were permitted to pray together at the most centrally focused and public area of the Stadium—the 50-yard line.... There are no allegations that Cambridge Christian was prohibited from passing out flyers with pre-printed prayers or that the cheerleaders were prohibited from holding up large signs spelling out prayers for those in the stands to say in concert with the team.The opinion also rejected free speech and Establishment Clause claims. WUSF reports on the decision.
President Trump has repeatedly made clear his intent to enact policies that exclude Muslims from entering the United States and favor Christians seeking to enter the United States.HIAS issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.
no mental health provider shall engage in sexual orientation or gender identity change efforts with any person.The ordinance provides for a fine of $250 for each violation. According to Toledo City Paper, the new ordinance passed City Council by a vote of 12-0.
[N]o conflict existed between Plaintiff observing religious holidays and following MWAA’s neutral rules requiring advance approval of leave following specified procedures. Nor could she establish such a conflict. The Leave Policy merely requires employees to request leave by form or email, and obtain advance approval.The court also rejected plaintiff's disparate treatment argument. Discussion of the decision from plaintiff's perspective is provided by a Huffington Post contributor.
The President and his aides have made it abundantly clear that they intend to exclude individuals of the Muslim faith, and that this Order—which bans travel only with respect to certain Muslim-majority countries—is part of that plan.... Sections 5(b) and 5(e) also explicitly direct the government to prioritize religious refugee claims if the “religion of the individual is a minority religion in the individual’s country”—a system of religious preference that President Trump told the media was expressly designed to favor Christians....
In the Establishment Clause context, these statements matter. Because Lemon’s first step is concerned with “whether [the] government’s actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion,” courts routinely look to the public declarations of an act’s originator to discern its true aim.West Hawaii Today reports on the lawsuit.
(j) Speech alone is not sufficient to support an action ... except upon a showing that the speech itself threatens violence against a specific person or group of persons; and the person or group of persons against whom the threat is directed reasonably fears that, because of the speech, violence will be committed against them or their property and that the person threatening violence had the apparent ability to carry out the threat.In this case, brought by a California inmate who complained about the standards for kosher meals he received and about the failure to provide Jewish religious services on many occasions, a federal magistrate judge had held that plaintiff had not stated a claim because he did not allege violence or the threat of violence. Rejecting that portion of the magistrate's recommendation, the district court judge in this case held:
An allegation of either violence or the threat of violence is only necessary if the alleged violations of the Bane Act are based entirely on speech.... [Here] plaintiff stated a cognizable retaliation claim because he alleged the defendants threatened to use their authority to purposefully continue to violate his free exercise rights if he did not withdraw his administrative appeals.... Following this threat and plaintiff’s decision not to withdraw his appeal, defendants allegedly did inhibit plaintiff’s ability to engage in the free exercise of religion.... As alleged, these actions constitute threats and coercion and are sufficient to state a cognizable Bane Act claim.
From 2009 until 2012, Plaintiff Alamrani was ... constantly assigned to posts which do not allow her to earn overtime and was called discriminatory names on a daily basis like terrorist and Taliban. Also on a daily basis she would be told that she should not be a police officer, that she should not be allowed to wear the Hijab, that nobody wanted to work with her, that she was a disgrace to the NYPD and that nobody liked her along with other deriding comments.In late 2012, fellow-officers tried to rip her hijab off her head. In subsequent years she was limited to working the night shift, and other retaliatory actions allegedly occurred. The suit claims violations of Title VII as well as of New York City and New York state law. The Gothamist reports on the lawsuit.