Thursday, August 07, 2025

5th Circuit: Anti-Vax Belief in Bodily Autonomy Can Support Title VII Religious Discrimination Claim

In Wright v. Honeywell International, Inc., (5th Cir., Aug. 5, 2025), the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a trial court's dismissal of a Title VII religious discrimination suit brought by a dock operator who in 2022 refused to comply with Honeywell's Covid vaccine mandate. Honeywell refused to grant plaintiff a religious exemption on the ground that he did not identify a sincerely held religious belief as the basis for his refusal. The court said in part:

Wright sought a religious exemption from the vaccination policy, citing on his exemption request form his belief that “our creator gave us this gift to choose and decide for ourselves,” and also that it is “in our constitution no man should be forced to do something he . . . is not comfortable with.”  Wright is a Baptist Christian.  He explained that his religion does not “prevent[]” him from receiving the vaccine, “but cert[ai]n passages le[ad him] to feel very strongly about” his decision.  Wright also attested on his exemption request form that he “didn[’]t like the respon[s]e [his] body had” to a tetanus vaccine in 2015.  And he stated that this was the first time that he had sought a religious exemption from a mandatory vaccine. 

Wright also submitted Honeywell’s required third-party attestation of his religious beliefs, completed by his daughter.  Citing scripture, his daughter explained, “It is in our belief that humans should only use things that are created of the earth by God.  We believe the vaccine is a claim of the mark of the beast[;] it is man made and goes against our religion.”...

“Bona fide religious beliefs include ‘moral or ethical beliefs as to what is right and wrong which are sincerely held with the strength of traditional religious views.’”...

Wright’s evidence demonstrates a “moral or ethical” belief in bodily autonomy and freedom to choose what to put in his body.... The fact that he gave additional reasons for his vaccine refusal does not show that his belief is “merely a preferred practice.”...  Instead, it simply shows that his vaccine refusal is grounded on both religious and non-religious reasons.  Furthermore, the inquiry on this prong is not “whether [Wright’s specific] belief is a true religious tenet” of the Baptist faith, but rather whether the belief is, “in his own scheme of things, religious.”

7th Circuit: Jury Must Decide Whether Religious Accommodation Would Create Undue Hardship

In a Title VII case that has been in litigation for six years, in Kluge v. Brownsburg Community School Corp., (7th Cir., Aug. 5, 2025), the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision reversed a district court's grant of summary judgment to the Brownsburg school district and sent the case back to the trial court for a jury to determine disputed facts. At issue is a music teacher's religious objections to following school policy that requires him to refer to transgender students by the names and pronouns that the students and their parents have asked that the school use. Initially the school accommodated the teacher by permitting him to address transgender students using only their last names. However, this led to student dissatisfaction and the accommodation was rescinded. The primary disputed facts are whether the accommodation created an "undue hardship" under the standard defined by the Supreme Court in its 2023 decision in Groff v. DeJoy, and whether the teacher's religious objections were sincere.  The majority said in part:

... [T]he record contains material factual disputes about whether the accommodation disrupted Brownsburg’s learning environment, precluding summary judgment to the school....

... [T]he complaints ...  all deal with the effects on the two students from Kluge’s use of the last-name-only practice. Nowhere do these documents support an inference that the students had a problem with Kluge’s religion or “the mere fact [of] an accommodation.”...  Instead, the complaints are leveled against the impacts on students and teachers, regardless of whether the accommodation was for religious or secular reasons. 

... [T]here is still a genuine material factual dispute about whether those complaints rose to an undue hardship on the school’s educational mission....

...  [A] genuine issue of material fact exists regarding Kluge’s sincerity. Even though a claimant’s sincerity does not hinge on whether he is “scrupulous in his [religious] observance,” it would still be premature to take this issue away from the jury on this question. ...

Judge Rovner filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

Until today, when confronted with a Title VII employment discrimination claim, we have deferred to an employer’s good-faith assessment of how an employee performed in the workplace..... Today the court invites a jury to do what we have always said a federal court will not do, which is to sit as a super-personnel department and second-guess the employer’s good-faith reasoning. In making employment decisions, ... employers will now have to consider not only how successfully an employee is performing his job as modified by a religious accommodation, but how a jury might second-guess its assessment in litigation years down the line. This is an untenable restraint on employers’ decision making. 

Today’s decision also burdens employers in a second important respect. Brownsburg successfully argued below that Kluge’s accommodation proved inconsistent with its mission, which is to provide a supportive learning environment for all of its students. Although the majority accepts this mission for present purposes, it also suggests that evidence of an employer’s mission must be limited to policies that are formally documented and adopted prior to any litigation. I think many employers will be surprised to learn that their ability to define their own missions is restricted to formal policies prepared long before an employment dispute arrives in court....

See prior related posting. ADF issued a press release announcing the decision.

Wednesday, August 06, 2025

9th Circuit: Ministerial Exception Requires Dismissal of Customer Service Representative's Title VII Suit

In McMahon v. World Vision, Inc., (9th Cir., Aug. 5, 2025), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals held that the ministerial exception doctrine requires dismissal of a Title VII employment discrimination suit brought by a World Vision customer service representative ("CSR") whose job offer was revoked when the organization learned that she was in a same-sex marriage. World Vision is a Christian ministry which shares the gospel through outreach to poor and underserved children and families. The court said in part: 

We hold that the ministerial exception applies to a CSR not merely because they interface with the public, pray with their colleagues, or abide by World Vision’s requirements to embody Christian values.  Rather, CSRs qualify for the exception because (1) they are World Vision’s “voice,” responsible for “effectively communicat[ing] World Vision’s involvement in ministries and projects around the world”; (2) their engagement with donors is a form of ministry itself; and (3) they “give people an opportunity to join [World Vision] in the mission of God.”  Each of these religious responsibilities is “vital” to World Vision’s particular religious mission. 

[Corrected] 

Prosecution of Religious Leader for Psilocybin Use Is Enjoined

In Jensen v. Utah County, (D UT, Aug. 4, 2025), a Utah federal district court enjoined Utah County from continuing its prosecution of plaintiff Bridger Lee Jensen for violating the Utah Controlled Substances Act's prohibition on psilocybin. Jensen is the founder of Singularism, an entheogenic religion. The court said in part:

... [A]t this procedural juncture ... it would be wisest to assume—without deciding—that the Utah constitution’s free exercise clause provides protections equal to those of the Federal Constitution’s Free Exercise Clause. Doing so adheres to “the general rule that courts should avoid reaching constitutional issues if the case can be decided on other grounds.”...

... [T]he Utah Controlled Substances Act’s restrictions on psilocybin possession and use, though neutral, are not generally applicable due to the secular exemption for behavioral-health treatment by certain healthcare systems and accordingly trigger strict scrutiny if a plaintiff can show that the restrictions burden its religious exercise. And Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges facts sufficient for the court to conclude that Plaintiffs have alleged a burden on their free exercise....

Only after this court determined that Plaintiffs were likely to prevail on the merits of their state RFRA claim did Defendants institute criminal proceedings against Mr. Jensen and invoke Younger abstention. From this sequence of events, the court finds that Defendants commenced the state criminal action (the basis for their abstention argument now) in order to relitigate the RFRA issue on which they appear to be poised to lose in this court—in other words, to get a second bite at the apple. The court will not allow the shield of the Younger doctrine to be used as a gamesmanship sword.  

Even if Defendants had not waived their Younger abstention defense by voluntarily invoking federal jurisdiction, the court finds that the bad-faith and irreparable-injury exceptions apply....

Based on the record in this case, the court notes once again its finding that the prosecution was brought in bad faith as part of a larger effort to harass Plaintiffs for their entheogenic religious practices and in hopes of giving the government a second opportunity to litigate the free-exercise issues presented squarely in this case. The prosecution has already caused Singularism to lose many of its practitioners and affiliates, and forcing Plaintiffs to wait until the conclusion of the criminal proceedings to secure their free-exercise rights would be the equivalent of issuing a death warrant for their nascent religion....

Court Enjoins Compliance with Arkansas Law Requiring Posting of 10 Commandments in All Classrooms

Earlier this year, Arkansas enacted Act 573 requiring display of the Ten Commandments in public school and college classrooms. In Stinson v. Fayetteville School District No. 1, (WD AR, Aug. 4, 2025), an Arkansas federal district court issued a preliminary injunction barring four school districts that are defendants in the case from complying with the new law.  The court said in part:

Forty-five years ago, the Supreme Court struck down a Ten Commandments law nearly identical to the one the Arkansas General Assembly passed earlier this year. That precedent remains binding on this Court and renders Arkansas Act 573 plainly unconstitutional. Why would Arkansas pass an obviously unconstitutional law? Most likely because the State is part of a coordinated strategy among several states to inject Christian religious doctrine into public-school classrooms. These states view the past decade of rulings by the Supreme Court on religious displays in public spaces as a signal that the Court would be open to revisiting its precedent on religious displays in the public school context. ...

Despite the Kennedy [v. Bremerton School District] Court’s rather sweeping announcement that the Lemon test had been “abandoned,” ..., there is no cause to believe that all Supreme Court precedent that relied on the Lemon test has been—or will be—overruled. The Kennedy opinion itself makes that crystal clear....

...  Act 573’s mandate is incompatible with the Founding Fathers’ conception of religious liberty. The Founders were deeply committed to the principle that government must not compel religious observance or endorse religious doctrine, and that commitment is reflected in multiple foundational texts....

The State has not established that burdening Plaintiffs’ Free Exercise rights “serve[s] a compelling interest and [is] narrowly tailored to that end.”... Even if the State were to meet its burden of showing a compelling interest, it would fail the “narrowly tailored” prong. There are many ways in which students could be taught the relevant history of the Ten Commandments without the State approving an official version of scripture and then displaying it to students in every classroom on a permanent, daily basis....

ACLU issued a press release announcing the decision. [Thanks to Thomas Rutledge for the lead.]

Tuesday, August 05, 2025

European Court Says Russia Violated Religious Rights in Its War with Ukraine

In Ukraine and Netherlands v. Russia, (ECHR, July 9, 2025), the European Court of Human Rights in a 1652 paragraph Grand Chamber opinion held Russia has violated a large number of provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights in its conflict with Ukraine. The opinion covers the period from 2014 until 2022 when Russia withdrew as a party to the Convention. Among the violations were intimidation, harassment and persecution of religious groups other than the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP), in violation of Article 9 of the Convention which protects freedom of religion. The Court said in part:

1269.  The evidence shows that since May 2014 freedom of religion has been significantly curtailed in occupied Ukrainian territory. The separatists in the “DPR” [Donetsk] and the “LPR” [Lugansk] quickly declared the UOC-MP to be the main religious group in occupied territory. They harassed and persecuted religious figures of other religions or Christian churches as well as civilians engaging in worship ... in breach of the requirements of international humanitarian law.... There are numerous reports of religious leaders being ill-treated, abducted during religious activities and, in some cases, killed by separatists in eastern Ukraine. It is clear from the context of many of these instances that these individuals had been targeted on account of their positions as leaders of religious communities and in the context of a generalised practice of disrupting and preventing the right of those not adhering to the UOC-MP to practise their religions.... There is also evidence of the banning of religious material, which was deemed to be “extremist” by separatist administrations and institutions.... Members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses appear to have been particularly targeted.

1270.  From 2016 the evidence shows that the “DPR” and the “LPR” began to put in place formal requirements for the registration and operation of religious groups..... Some religious organisations were identified as “extremist” organisations and banned on this ground with their religious material and publications seized, destroyed and banned... Religious leaders and parishioners were pursued on charges of organising or attending illegal gatherings....

1271.  ... In 2022 the Russian occupation administration “nationalised” property from religious communities and repurposed it for their own ends....

The Court also issued a press release summarizing the full decision.

Challenge to Church's Switch in Denominations Fails

In Wimber v. Scott, (CA App., July 30, 2025), a California state appellate court held that plaintiffs who were tithing congregants of a Protestant church formerly known as Vinyard Christian Fellowship and now known as Dwelling Place lack standing to sue the church's pastors and board of directors on behalf of the church for fraud, misrepresentation, breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty. It also held that the First Amendment precludes granting the relief sought. Following the wishes of the church's senior pastor, the pastor and the board of directors disaffiliated the church from the Vinyard Movement and used the church's $62 million in assets to start and fund a new movement. Plaintiffs included the widow of the founder of the Vinyard Movement and a congregant who had contributed over $500,000 to the church. The court said in part:

The NRC [California Nonprofit Religious Corporations Code] limits who may bring a representative lawsuit to, as relevant here, a “member” alleging a director violated their authority (§ 9141, subd. (a)) and a “member” or “former member” alleging breach of a trust. (§ 9142, subd. (a)(1).)  

Because churches are these unique species of corporation, the NRC recognizes the church may refer to persons who are part of its congregation as “‘members.”’ (§ 9332, subd. (a).) But the NRC does not allow these individuals to assert representative lawsuits. Only those persons explicitly authorized to do so by the corporation’s articles or bylaws have the power to bring a representative lawsuit. (Ibid.) Otherwise, any one of a church’s potentially hundreds or thousands of congregants could at any time bring a representative lawsuit....

Appellants’ allegations demonstrate they are members of the congregation, not the corporation....

 Although the statements may constitute misrepresentations, the Scotts made the statements to the “Search Committee and the Board,” of which only Director Appellants were a part. As such, [those plaintiffs who were not directors] ... have not alleged a cause of action for fraud based on misrepresentation....

Even assuming the complaint stated sufficient facts to allege causes of action, the First Amendment would bar this case from going forward....

Appellants ask the court to impose a trust over Dwelling Place’s assets in favor of Vineyard USA and to require the Scotts to keep Dwelling Place a part of the Vineyard Movement and Vineyard USA. Even if the facts alleged in the complaint entitled Appellants to such relief, they are essentially asking the court to manage and run Dwelling Place in a manner consistent with their religious beliefs. We would have to administer Dwelling Place’s assets to further a religious doctrine to which Appellants ascribe. 

Worse, we would then potentially violate the Scotts’ religious beliefs by forcing them to minister Dwelling Place in a mode Appellants see appropriate. We will not do any of this....

We note the ministerial exception also bars Appellants’ claims....  We cannot litigate Appellants’ claims or grant the relief they seek without in some way punishing the church for its hiring of the Scotts, retention of the Scotts, or ratification of the Scotts’ decisions and actions. 

Monday, August 04, 2025

Recent Articles of Interest

From SSRN:

From SSRN (Non-U.S. Law):

From SmartCILP:

Crisis Pregnancy Center Gets Injunction Against Abortion Reversal Ban

In Bella Health and Wellness v. Weiser, (D CO, Aug. 1, 2025), the Colorado federal district court that had previously granted a preliminary injunction in the case now granted a permanent injunction barring enforcement against plaintiffs of Colorado's law that defines providing medication abortion reversal as unprofessional conduct by doctors, nurses and pharmacists. Bella Health operates two faith-based Catholic crisis pregnancy centers. The court said in part:

The parties do not dispute that Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs are sincerely held or that they are substantially burdened by application of Section Three and the Boards’ rules....  And it is not within the province of this Court to second-guess the truth of Bella Health’s religious callings or suggest alternative means of satisfying them.... The only question, therefore, is whether this section’s prohibition against medication abortion reversal is generally applicable to other non-religious uses of progesterone. It is not....

Overall, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that Plaintiffs’ use of progesterone is not being regulated neutrally—it is being singled out....

ADF issued a press release announcing the decision.

Friday, August 01, 2025

Fact Questions Remain as to Whether Sex Abuser's Confession Was Privileged

In Doe v. Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, (AZ App., July 29, 2025), an Arizona state appellate court, reversing a trial court's dismissal of a case, held that issues of fact remain in order to decide whether two bishops in the Church had a duty to report to authorities Paul Adams' confession that he had sexually abused his minor daughter. While clergy are mandatory reporters, Arizona law excludes clergy reporting of a communication or confession if the member of the clergy determines that it is "reasonable and necessary within the concepts of the religion" to do so. The court held that a fact finder could conclude that Paul waived the clergy-penitent privilege when he repeated his confession in the presence of his wife who was invited by the bishop to hear it, or when Paul repeated it at a church council meeting convened to excommunicate him. The court also held that it was unclear whether under church doctrine it was "reasonable and necessary" to withhold the information. The court said in part:

[Paul's wife] Leizza did not meet the bishop with her husband for confession but met with Paul and [Bishop] Herrod after Paul had already confessed to Herrod.  Paul then confessed directly to Leizza in Herrod’s presence.... Herrod had invited Leizza “so [she] would know what Paul had done and so she could protect her children.”  A reasonable fact finder could conclude that in such circumstances, Herrod did not receive Paul’s confession to Leizza; he merely observed it.  As noted, § 13-3620(A)(2) does not exempt a clergy member’s personal observations....

... [T]he Does argued the Church Defendants’ failure to report Paul’s confession was not “reasonable and necessary” according to Church doctrine because the Church’s General Handbook nullifies the confidentiality of confessions in instances where “serious injury,” such as child sex abuse, occurs....

This ... raises the question of whether the Church Defendants violated Church doctrine by not reporting Paul to the authorities.

Axios reports on the decision.

Columbia and UCLA Settle Antisemitism Charges

Last week (July 23), Columbia University announced that it had reached a settlement with the federal government to restore its research funding and federal grants that had been frozen. The University entered a Resolution Agreement (full text) with the Justice Department, Department of Education and HHS. It also entered a separate EEOC Agreement settling Title VII discrimination claims charging antisemitism suffered by Columbia employees.  According to the EEOC's press release:

Columbia University will pay $21 million for a class settlement fund to resolve alleged civil rights violations against Columbia employees occurring on its campus following the Oct. 7 Hamas terror attacks.... This settlement resolves EEOC charges, including a Commissioner’s Charge brought ... on behalf of a class of all Jewish employees, alleging that since at least Oct. 7, 2023, Columbia engaged in a pattern or practice of harassment based on national origin, religion, and/or race, in violation of Title VII....

The full text of the EEOC Agreement does not appear to have been publicly released even though it is incorporated by reference in the Resolution Agreement. 

The broader Resolution Agreement provides in part that Columbia will appoint new faculty members with joint appointments in the Institute for Israel and Jewish Studies and economics, political science or public affairs. It also calls for the appointment of a new administrator who will act as a liaison on antisemitism issues.

A statement by Columbia's president says in part:

The agreement builds on Columbia’s broader commitment to combating antisemitism, reflected most recently in a set of additional institutional actions announced on July 15, 2025, including the incorporation of the IHRA definition of antisemitism into the work of the University’s Office of Institutional Equity (OIE), the appointment of Title VI and Title VII coordinators in OIE, and the expansion of university-wide education and training initiatives.

On July 29, the University of California announced that it had reached a settlement in Frankel v. Regents of the University of California. In the case, a California federal district court previously issued a preliminary injunction sought by Jewish students at UCLA who were blocked from accessing portions of the campus by pro-Palestinian encampments protesting Israel's retaliation in Gaza. (See prior posting.) The Settlement Agreement (full text) (fact sheet) provides for a permanent injunction barring defendants from allowing the exclusion of Jewish students, faculty or staff from programs, activities or campus areas. It also provides for payment of $320,000 to UCLA's Initiative to Combat Antisemitism, $50,000 to each of the four student plaintiffs, $2,300,000 in contributions to eight Jewish non-profit organizations, and $3,600,000 for plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and costs.