6th Circuit Reverses Dismissal of Muslim Inmate's Religious Accommodation Complaints

 In Mustin v. Wainwright, (6th Cir., Aug. 27, 2024), the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of free exercise, RLUIPA, equal protection and certain retaliation claims brought by a Muslim inmate who objected to the manner in which space was made for religious services and objected to inadequate Ramadan meals.  The court said in part:

Mustin contends that defendants ... substantially burdened his ability to attend Jummah and Taleem by (1) “constantly” moving Jummah and Taleem to small rooms that could safely accommodate only half of the attendees, and (2) inconsistently allowing inmates to attend Taleem services and sending inmates back to their cells to accommodate other religious events.... Mustin properly alleged that defendants ... substantially burdened Mustin’s ability to safely attend Jummah and Taleem by forcing him to put his personal safety at risk in order to fulfill his religious obligations by attending services in a room packed with roughly twice the number of people it can safely house....

At this early stage, Mustin has alleged facts sufficient to support an inference that defendants’ provision of expired, offending, and otherwise nutritionally insufficient meals during Ramadan pressured him to violate his religious beliefs or face potential malnutrition.  Mustin alleges that he was served raw food and expired drinks in his breakfast bags, and that his dinner bags often contained pork-based main courses, which Muslims are forbidden from eating.... Mustin plausibly alleged that the non-expired and non-pork-based foods he received during Ramadan were insufficient in quantity and nutrition quality to meet his nutritional needs.

PA Supreme Court: Yard Signs Responding to Neighbors' Antisemitism Protected by Pennsylvania Constitution

In a 4-2 decision in Oberholzer v. Galapo, (PA Sup. Ct., Aug. 20, 2024), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, relying on the broad free speech protections in Art. I, Sec. 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, dissolved an injunction issued by a trial court in an unusual dispute between neighbors. As described by Justice Dougherty's majority opinion:

In November 2014, a brewing feud between the neighbors over landscaping issues reached a boiling point after Dr. Galapo confronted Mr. Oberholzer about a resurveyed property line and Mrs. Oberholzer responded by calling him a “fucking Jew.”  This prompted the Galapos in June 2015 to erect the first of many signs primarily displaying anti-hate and anti-racist messages “along the back tree-line directly abutting [the Oberholzers’] property line, pointed directly at [the Oberholzers’] house, and in direct sight of [other] neighbors’ houses.” ...  All told, the Galapos posted twenty-three signs over a years-long span, during which the neighbors continued to quarrel over other minor nuisances.

Among other things, the Oberholzers sued claiming the signs placed them in a false light. The majority concluded:

We hold the Galapos engaged in protected speech when they posted in their own yard stationary signs decrying hatred and racism.  We further hold the Oberholzers failed to prove that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner by the Galapos’ pure residential speech.  As such, Article I, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and this Court’s precedents precluded the trial court from enjoining the signs, regardless of the nature of the torts alleged.  The injunction imposed an improper prior restraint on speech in violation of Article I, Section 7.

Justice Wecht filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

The Galapos argue that the present injunction violates the no-injunction rule, that it is an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech, and that it fails strict scrutiny.  These arguments are unpersuasive.  The no-injunction rule does not exist in Pennsylvania.  Moreover, even if it did exist, it would not apply here because the equity court did not purport to enjoin defamatory speech.... The argument that the injunction constitutes a prior restraint is also mistaken because the injunction does not restrict speech in advance of its publication.  Finally, the injunction withstands application of strict scrutiny because it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.

Justice Brobson also filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

I would conclude that the trial courts of this Commonwealth have the authority to enjoin residential speech protected by Article I, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution that rises to the level of a private nuisance and disrupts the quiet enjoyment of a neighbor’s home.  I would further find that the Injunction is content neutral, furthers the Commonwealth’s significant interest in protecting the privacy and quiet enjoyment of the Oberholzers’ home, and burdens no more of the Galapos’ speech than necessary to protect the Oberholzers’ right to residential privacy.

AP reports on the decision.

Churches Challenge Constitutionality of Johnson Amendment

The Johnson Amendment which prohibits 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations from supporting or opposing political candidates was challenged this week as being unconstitutional as applied to churches. The complaint (full text) in National Religious Broadcasters v. Werfel, (ED TX, filed 8/28/2024) alleges in part:

Churches are placed in a unique and discriminatory status by the IRC. Under § 508(c)(1) of the IRC, churches need not apply to the Internal Revenue Service [“IRS”] to obtain recognition of their 501(c)(3) status. The IRC places them automatically within the ambit of 501(c)(3) and thereby silences their speech, while providing no realistic alternative for operating in any other fashion. Churches have no choice; they are automatically silenced vis-à-vis political candidates.

Hundreds of newspapers are organized under § 501(c)(3), and yet many openly endorse political candidates....

Many 501(c)(3) organizations engage in electoral activities that are open, obvious, and well known, yet the IRS allows some, but not all, such organizations to do so without penalty. Again, Plaintiffs believe that such churches have the constitutional right to engage in such participation; they simply want the same right for themselves. ...

The IRS operates in a manner that disfavors conservative organizations and conservative, religious organizations in its enforcement of § 501(c)(3). This is a denial of both religious freedom and equal protection....

Plaintiffs contend that the Johnson Amendment, as written and as applied by the IRS, violates the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause, Free Exercise Clause, the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause (Void for Vagueness), the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause (Equal Protection), and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.

Catholic News Agency reports on the lawsuit.

Pregnancy Resource Center Sues Massachusetts Officials Over Opposition Campaign

Suit was filed last week in a Massachusetts federal district court by Your Options Medical Center, an anti-abortion pregnancy resource center, against Massachusetts officials and an abortion rights foundation, alleging deprivation of free speech, free exercise and equal protection rights. The complaint (full text) in A Woman's Concern v. Healy, (D MA, filed 8/19/2024), alleges in part:

This case is necessitated by an overt viewpoint-based campaign of harassment, suppression, and threats against YOM and other PRCs. Directed by Governor Healey and the other Defendants, this campaign involves selective law enforcement prosecution, public threats, and even a state-sponsored advertising campaign with a singular goal – to deprive YOM, and groups like it, of their First Amendment rights to voice freely their religious and political viewpoints regarding the sanctity of human life in the context of the highly controversial issue of abortion. 

Defendants’ retaliation and selective-enforcement campaign accuses YOM and other PRCs of being a public health threat, of carrying out false and misleading advertising, and of other falsehoods, while actively urging citizens to report PRCs to State law enforcement....

It is well-settled that viewpoint discrimination applied through threats of legal sanctions and other means of coercion and intimidation violates the United States Constitution where, as here, such measures chill protected First Amendment activities. That very kind of selective censorship scheme is evidenced here. Moreover, the threats in this case were targeted explicitly against the religious speech of PRCs in violation of the Free Exercise Clause.

Catholic News Agency reports on the lawsuit.

5th Circuit Reopens Lipan-Apache's Suit Objecting to Park Modifications

 In 2021, Texas voters approved an amendment to the state constitution that provides:

This state or a political subdivision of this state may not enact, adopt, or issue a statute, order, proclamation, decision, or rule that prohibits or limits religious services, including religious services conducted in churches, congregations, and places of worship, in this state by a religious organization established to support and serve the propagation of a sincerely held religious belief.

The amendment was a response to orders during the Covid pandemic that limited the size of gatherings for religious services. (Background.)

In Perez v. City of San Antonio, (5th Cir., Aug. 28, 2024), the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals certified to the Texas Supreme Court the question of whether this ban is an absolute one, or whether the amendment merely imposes a strict scrutiny requirement on any limitation. The issue arises in a suit by members of the Lipan-Apache Native American Church who claim that improvements to a park that include tree removal and rookery management destroy their ability to use a sacred site in the park for certain religious ceremonies. In a prior decision, the 5th Circuit rejected plaintiffs' claim under the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act. It then held that plaintiffs had not adequately briefed the question of whether the Religious Services Amendment to the constitution covers a compelled preservation of spiritual ecology. (See prior posting.) Plaintiffs filed a motion for a rehearing, and in this week's decision the panel withdrew its original opinion and certified the question of the meaning of the Religious Services Amendment to the Texas Supreme Court, saying in part:

Neither party has cited any cases interpreting this constitutional provision, nor has this court found any. This potentially outcome determinative issue raises novel and sensitive questions....

11th Circuit Reinstates, Pending Appeal, Florida Ban on Gender-Affirming Care for Minors

In Doe v. Surgeon General, State of Florida, (11th Cir., Aug. 26, 2024), the U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 decision, allowed Florida's ban on prescribing puberty blockers and cross-sex hormones to minors suffering from gender dysphoria to go back into effect, pending appeal of a district court injunction against enforcement of the ban. The district court had concluded that the ban was motivated by anti-transgender animus. (See prior posting.) 

First, the district court likely misapplied the presumption that the legislature acted in good faith when it concluded that the prohibition and regulation provisions, and the implementing rules, were based on invidious discrimination against transgender minors and adults....

... [E]ven if the district court were correct in its animus decision, heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause does not apply to invidious discrimination based on a non-suspect class, and “[n]either the Supreme Court nor this court has recognized transgender status as a quasi-suspect class.”

The majority ordered an expedited calendar for hearing of the appeal. 

Judge Wilson dissented, saying in part:

First, the district court appropriately recognized the presumption of legislative good faith, but identified sufficient record evidence to support concluding that the act’s passage was based on invidious discrimination against transgender adults and minors....

The district court found that the statute is subject to intermediate scrutiny because it is (1) based on sex and (2) based on gender nonconformity.

Tallahassee Democrat reports on the decision.

3rd Circuit: District Court Did Not Show Compelling Interest in Denying Muslim Inmate Religious Accommodations

In Nunez v. Wolf, (3d Cir., Aug. 27, 2024), the U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals, in a suit under RLUIPA, held that the district court had not established that the Department of Corrections had a compelling interest in denying a Muslim inmate religious accommodations so that he could consummate his marriage, have ongoing conjugal visits with his wife, engage in congregate prayer with visitors and be circumcised. The court said in part:

To be clear, we are not holding that the DOC’s denials of Nunez’s requests cannot satisfy strict scrutiny if properly supported on remand.  What we do hold is that this determination cannot be made on the current record and that, as we have now clarified the nature of its burden, the DOC should have the opportunity to supplement the record before renewing its motion for summary judgment.

6th Circuit: Off-Duty Police Did Not Violate Dismissed Pastor's Free Exercise Rights

In Couzens v. City of Forest Park, Ohio, (6th Cir., Aug. 27, 2024), the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a church's former pastor against off-duty city police officers who assisted the congregation in physically removing a pastor who had been dismissed from his position by the congregation. The court concluded that the off-duty officers acted reasonably in threatening to arrest the pastor if he did not leave the premises. It also concluded that the pastor's free exercise rights had not been infringed, saying in part:

Couzens contends that the Forest Park Defendants interfered with his free exercise of religion when the officers threatened to arrest him during a church service. He relies primarily on Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94 (1952)....

Kedroff’s church-autonomy doctrine, though, guarantees the independence of ecclesiastical bodies, not individuals.... And, unlike in Kedroff, the officers’ actions here did not reflect the state’s preference for one contender for a church’s control over another. Instead, the officers attempted to enforce what, from their perspective, appeared to be a settled matter: Couzens’s removal as IBC’s pastor....

Arkansas Supreme Court Keeps Abortion Rights Measure Off November Ballot

 In Cowles v. Thurston,(AR Sup. Ct., Aug. 22, 2024), the Arkansas Supreme Court in a 4-3 decision held that the Secretary of State properly refused to count signatures collected by paid canvassers on petitions to have an abortion rights amendment submitted to the voters in November. Proponents failed to submit paid canvasser training certifications along with the petitions, and there were insufficient signatures collected only by volunteer canvassers. Proponents claimed that an employee in the Secretary of State's Office told them that filing the certifications was unnecessary.

Chief Justice Kemp dissented contending that the Secretary of State should complete counting the signatures and grant a provisional cure period.  Justice Baker, Joined by Justice Hudson dissented contending that proponents later filing of certifications adequately complied with the filing requirements, saying that "nothing in the statute requires that the certification and the petition be filed simultaneously." She said in part:

In my view, the majority has reconfigured the relevant statute in order to cater the initiative process to the preference of the respondent while this process is the first power reserved for the people. In fact, despite the majority’s acknowledgment that “[t]his court cannot rewrite the statute[,]” the majority has done just that multiple times to achieve a particular result.

AP reports on the decision. [Thanks to Scott Mange and Thomas Rutledge for the lead.]

Australian Court Upholds Gender Identity Discrimination Ban

 In Tickle v Giggle for Girls Pty. Ltd., (Australia Fed. Ct., Aug. 23, 2024), an Australian Federal Court judge upheld the constitutionality of the ban on discrimination on the basis of gender identity in Australia's Sex Discrimination Act. The suit was brought by Roxanne Tickle, a transgender woman, who was denied access to a women's-only online app. The court explained:

The respondents do not accept that a person’s sex can be a matter for self-identification. Correspondingly, they do not accept either the validity or legitimacy of the gender identity discrimination provisions of the SDA....

In about February 2021, Ms Tickle downloaded the Giggle App. The Giggle App had been marketed as being a means for women to communicate with one another in what was described as a digital women-only safe space. Ms Tickle undertook a registration process to gain access to the Giggle App, which including providing information and uploading a self-taken photograph of her face, commonly known as a selfie.

The photograph provided by Ms Tickle to Giggle was assessed by third-party artificial intelligence (AI) software, designed to distinguish between the facial appearance of men and women.... Ms Tickle gained access to the Giggle App.

In the period between February and sometime in September 2021, Ms Tickle had access to the Giggle App’s features and used it to read content posted by other users. In September or early October 2021, Ms Tickle logged on to the Giggle App, but found that she could no longer post content or comment on other users’ posts, or read comments on posts made by other users.... When she attempted to purchase premium features on the Giggle App, she received a “User Blocked” message. Her attempts to contact Giggle via the in-App contact form received no response....

It is most likely that Ms Tickle was denied user access to the Giggle App as a result of a general review process by a natural person of the AI acceptances of registration, rather than by reason of her being singled out....

Law & Religion Australia has an extensive discussion of the decision.

11th Circuit Enjoins New Title IX Rules in 4 States, Pending Appeal

 In State of Alabama v. U.S. Secretary of Education, (11th Cir., Aug. 22, 2024), the U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 decision, issued an injunction pending appeal barring enforcement in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina of the Department of Education's new rules under Title IX.  The new rules define discrimination on the basis of sex as including discrimination on the basis of gender identity. They also reduce the threshold for concluding that conduct amounts to sex discrimination. The majority pointed out:

Before this action, every court to consider the issue across the nation—seven district courts and two courts of appeals— preliminarily enjoined enforcement of the rule.  The district court here, by contrast, refused to enjoin the rule a day before it was supposed to go into effect.

Judge Wilson dissented contending that plaintiffs have not shown the irreparable injury required for obtaining an injunction. ADF issued a press release announcing the decision.

Anti-Injunction Act Precludes RLUIPA Claim, But Church's Constitutional Claims Move Ahead

 In Resurrection House Ministries, Inc. v. City of Brunswick, (SD GA, Aug. 23, 2024), a Georgia federal district court held that the federal Anti-Injunction Act required dismissal of a RLUIPA lawsuit brought by a Ministry against which the city had filed a nuisance action.  The ministry had attempted to open a shelter for the homeless, to which the city objected. However, the court permitted the Ministry to move ahead with its 1st, 4th, 5th and 14th Amendment claims against the city, concluding that the Younger abstention doctrine did not apply. It concluded that plaintiff had adequately alleged that the nuisance action had been brought against it in bad faith, saying in part:

RHM alleges providing a shelter to needy individuals is a tenet of its Christian religion and, therefore, institution of the temporary emergency shelter is a practice of such religion. And practice of RHM’s religion is constitutionally protected by the Free Exercise Clause.... Therefore, RHM has satisfied its burden under the first prong of the Court’s analysis because it has sufficiently alleged that “the conduct allegedly retaliated against or sought to be deterred was constitutionally protected.”...  

The Court also finds that RHM’s allegations are sufficient to set forth that Defendants’ institution of the Nuisance Proceedings “was motivated at least in part by a purpose to retaliate for or to deter that conduct.”

NY AG Enjoined from Enforcing False Advertising Ban Against Clinics Promoting Abortion Pill Reversal

In National Institute for Family & Life Advocates v. James, (WD NY, Aug. 22, 2024), a New York federal district court preliminarily enjoined New York's Attorney General from enforcing New York's false advertising law against two pregnancy centers that promote abortion pill reversal in their promotional material and on their websites. The court said in part:

In short, a "morally and religiously motivated offering of free services cannot be described as a bare 'commercial transaction.'"... As such, the speech at issue here is not commercial.... . Nothing could be fundamentally less commercial than this speech about how a woman might save her pregnancy....

Because Plaintiffs' speech is noncommercial, restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny.... The State's enforcement of the New York Statutes against pro-life pregnancy centers based on their speech about APR is a content-based restriction, as it "target[s] speech based on its communicative content."... It is also viewpoint-based. The Attorney General targets statements supporting the APR protocol....

At the preliminary injunction hearing, the State conceded that it does not attempt to satisfy strict scrutiny. And the record is devoid of anything to suggest that this standard could be met....

Recent Articles of Interest

From SSRN:

• Hershey H. Friedman, Transformative Concepts: How Revolutionary Ideas from the Torah Shaped Our World, (July 09, 2024).
• Meg Mary Margaret Penrose, Understanding 303 Creative LLC in a Polycentric Constitutional World, (William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal, Vol. 32, No. 4, 2024, pp. 943-57).
• Joshua J. Craddock, Civic Friendship in the Postmodern Polis: Law as Mediator in Shakespeare's Merchant of Venice, (Journal of Law & Civil Governance at Texas A&M (forthcoming)).
• Asma Uddin, Religion and Identity Capitalism, (Wayne Law Review Vol 70.1:303 (2024).
• Kellen Funk, Sect and Superstition: The Protestant Framework of American Codification, (American Journal of Legal History, 2024).
• Anthony Gill, Of Principals, Agents, and Transaction Costs: A Response to d'Avray, (Public Choice. Forthcoming 2025).
• Terence C. Halliday, Freedom Struggles of China’s Christian Rights Lawyers, (September 19, 2023).
• Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Myth of Second-Class Free Exercise, (Villanova Law Review, Vol. 72, 2025).
• Craig B. Mousin, Nonrefoulement: Responding to Asylum-seekers through the Prism of Subversive Stories: A Study of Three Trials of Innocence, (Chapter 11 in: Furthering Interfaith Biblical Scholarship, A Festschrift in Memory of André LaCocque, (Wipf & Stock, 2024)).
• Raphael Cohen-Almagor, Freedom From Religion: Multiculturalism and the Rights of Women and Children, (July 18, 2024).

From SmartCILP:

• Rabea Benhalim, Contract Customization, Sex, and Islamic Law, 108 Minnesota Law Review 1861-1954 (2024).
• Eleni Polymenopoulou, Sharia and Human Rights Law in the Constitutional Framework of Gulf States, [Abstract], 46 Human Rights Quarterly 1-24 (2024).

Knights of Columbus May Move Ahead with Suit for Denial of Permit for Christmas Program

 In Knights of Columbus Council 2616 v. Town of Fairfield, (D CT, Aug. 22, 2024), a Connecticut federal district court allowed the Knights of Columbus to move ahead with free speech, free exercise and equal protection claims when the town denied its Special Event Permit Application to host a Christmas Vigil in a prominent public park rather than a less centrally located one. The court said in part:

... [P]laintiffs have shown that the defendants’ stated reason for denying their 2020 application, i.e. COVID-19 concerns, was pretextual....

Therefore, the motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims to the extent they are based on the 2020 application, on the grounds that denial of the 2020 application was a valid discretionary action by the Town to mitigate a public health emergency, is being denied. ...

The Special Events Permitting Scheme does not satisfy the requirement that it contain adequate standards to guide the official’s decision. It contains no criteria, restraints, temporal limits, or guidelines to which the Commission must adhere when ruling on an application. Nor does it contain a method to appeal the Commission’s determination or require that the Commission furnish justifications for its decisions with respect to applications for Special Events Permits. Rather, the Special Events Permitting Scheme vests the Commission with unbridled discretion....

 Viewing the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that the defendants’ actions were content-based. They have alleged facts showing that the Commission permitted other groups to use Sherman Green in a manner that was inconsistent with the reasons the Commission gave for denying the plaintiffs’ applications....

The Hartford Courant reports on the decision.

Supreme Court Refuses to Lift Preliminary Injunction Against DOE's Title IX Changes

 In Department of Education v. Louisiana, (US Sup. Ct., Aug. 16, 2024), the U.S. Supreme Court refused to stay preliminary injunctions that two district courts issued to prevent enforcement of the Department of Education's new rules under Title IX. The new rules, in part, expand the definition of sex discrimination under Title IX to include discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. All the Justices agreed that the injunctions should remain in place as to this portion of the new rules. Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan, Gorsuch and Jackson would have allowed other portions of the new rules to go into effect. Liberty Counsel issued a press release announcing the court's decision.

Court Dismisses Church's Suit Over Disaffiliation Request

In North United Methodist Church v. New York Annual Conference, (CT Super. Ct., Aug 14, 2024), a Connecticut trial court dismissed a local church's petition for a declaratory judgment. The local church sought a finding that it submitted its request to disaffiliate from the parent church in "sufficient time" to complete disaffiliation under the Book of Discipline. The court concluded that it would require the court to resolve a question of church policy and administration to resolve this issue. However, the court retained jurisdiction over the church's request for a declaratory judgment as to property rights, its quiet tile claim and its quantum meruit and unjust enrichment claims.

Arizona Supreme Court Keeps Abortion Initiative on the Ballot

In Arizona Right to Life v. Fontes, (AZ Sup. Ct., Aug. 20, 2024), the Arizona Supreme Court rejected challenges to the ballot description of the Arizona Abortion Access Act that will appear on the November ballot. This keeps the abortion rights initiative on the ballot. Politico reports on the decision.

Claim That Deprioritizing Religious Vaccine Exemption Requests Violates Title VII Moves Ahead

 In Desmarais v. Granholm, (D DC, Aug. 16, 2024), a D.C. federal district court refused to dismiss a Title VII complaint by a Department of Energy employee that his request for a religious exemption from the Department's Covid vaccine mandate was given lower priority than requests for medical exemptions. The court said in part:

 Of course, there could well be a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for such a policy—but that is an inquiry for summary judgment, not for a motion to dismiss.  The court therefore concludes that Mr. Desmarais has plausibly alleged a causal connection between his protected characteristic and DOE’s decision to put his accommodation request “on hold.” 

9th Circuit: Religious-Based Hiring Does Not Bar Christian Group from Participating in Oregon Grant Program

 In Youth 71Five Ministries v. Williams, (9th Cir., Aug. 8, 2024), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals issued an injunction pending appeal allowing a Christian organization that mentors at-risk youths to participate in Oregon's Youth Community Investment Grant Program. The state had canceled $410,000 in grants to the organization when it discovered that it only hires those that share its faith in violation of the state's "Certification Rule" that bars grantee from discriminating in its employment practices.  The court said in part:

Although Oregon strictly enforced the Certification Rule against 71Five, it has looked the other way with secular groups that also receive state funding.  The record indicates that the state continues to fund many groups that discriminate—by providing services to only subsets of the population—in violation of the Certification Rule.  For example, a group named Ophelia’s Place continues to receive funds even though it provides services only to “girl-identifying youth.”  And another group called the Black Parent Initiative receives funds, despite only serving African and African American families....

The Free Exercise Clause bars the government from treating religious groups worse than secular ones—but Oregon has apparently done just that in selectively enforcing its Certification Rule against 71Five....