Teacher's Refusal to Use Student's Preferred Pronouns Justified Her Being Fired

 In Ramirez v. Oakland Unified School District, (ND CA, May 27, 2025), a California federal district court dismissed claims by a former kindergarten teacher that her free speech and free exercise rights were violated by her termination for refusing to refer to a student using male pronouns when the student appeared to be biologically female. Both school officials and the student's parents requested that male pronouns be used. Plaintiff contended that her Catholic faith does not allow her to refer to a person using pronouns that differ from the person’s “divinely-intended gender.” The court held that the school district itself was protected by sovereign immunity and that the individual plaintiffs have qualified immunity as to any action for damages. The court went on to hold that plaintiff also failed to adequately allege either a speech or religious exercise claim, saying in part:

The complaint fails to state a claim because the alleged speech was not protected. Ms. Ramirez agreed to serve as an elementary school teacher at a public school. To do the job, a teacher must address and interact with their students. As other courts have observed, while addressing students is not part of the curriculum itself, “it is difficult to imagine how a teacher could perform [their] teaching duties on any subject without a method by which to address individual students.”,,, 

The plaintiff’s main argument in opposition — that the above analysis does not apply because this case concerns compelled speech — fails both legally and factually. While the Supreme Court has suggested that compelled speech outside of an employee’s official duties warrants heightened protection, the government may insist that the employee deliver any lawful message when the speech is part of the employee’s official duties....

Here, the plaintiff does not contest that the district’s anti-discrimination policy is facially neutral. Instead, she contends that school officials were impermissibly hostile towards her religious beliefs when enforcing the policy. The argument fails because, even accepted as true, the well-pleaded facts do not plausibly allege hostility. 

Sports Apparel Company Challenges Colorado's Public Accommodation Law Protection of Transgender Athletes

Suit was filed this week in a Colorado federal district court by an online athletic apparel company, "XX-YY Athletics," that promotes banning of transgender women from women's sports through logos on its apparel and through advertisements.  The company claims that Colorado's Anti-Discrimination Act violates the 1st and 14th Amendments when its public accommodation provisions declare that Coloradans have a right to access advertising that is free from discrimination on the basis of gender expression and chosen name. The complaint (full text) in Committee of Five, Inc. v. Sullivan, (D CO, filed 5/27/2025), alleges in part:

191. The most common way that XX-XY Athletics demonstrates why male competition in women’s sports is unfair or unsafe is by reference to specific transgender-identifying male athletes....

206. Although CADA prohibits XX-XY Athletics from speaking consistently with its view that sex is immutable, the law allows other businesses that also qualify as public accommodations to speak according to their view that sex can be changed.  

207. This distinction in treatment is based on a particular view that the business holds about human sexuality and gender identity....

222. The First Amendment’s Free Speech, Press, and Assembly Clauses protect XX-XY Athletics’ ability to speak, create, publish, sell, and distribute speech; to associate with others and with their messages for expressive purposes; to adopt and act on certain speech-related policies; to decline to associate with others and their message for expressive purposes; to decline to create, publish, sell, and distribute speech; to be free from content-based and viewpoint-based discrimination; and to be free from overbroad and vague restrictions on speech that give enforcement officials unbridled discretion....

225. As applied to XX-XY Athletics, CADA impermissibly discriminates against the company’s speech based on content and viewpoint by prohibiting it from referring to individuals by their given name and with pronouns and terminology consistent with their biological sex.  

226.  As applied to XX-XY Athletics, CADA impermissibly inhibits the company’s ability to form expressive associations it desires to form and to avoid expressive associations it desires to avoid by requiring the company to refer to individuals by their preferred name, pronouns, and other terminology and prohibiting the company from referring to individuals by their given name and with pronouns and terminology consistent with their biological sex....

The complaint also alleges that the Colorado law is void for vagueness and violates the Equal Protection clause. ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Suit Challenges Display of Statues of Saints on Public Safety Building

Suit was filed yesterday in a Massachusetts state trial court seeking to enjoin the city of Quincy and its mayor from installing statues of two Catholic saints, St. Michael and St. Florian, on the facade of its new public safety building.  The city has already spent over $760,000 for creation of the statues. The suit also seeks to bar additional expenditures. The complaint (full text) in Fitzmaurice v. City of Quincy, (MA Super., filed 5/27/2025), alleges that the decision to acquire the statues was made by the city's mayor without notice to the public. Only some members of City Council knew of the plan before it was disclosed in a February 2025 news article. The complaint alleges that installation and display of the statues will violate Art. III of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.

Americans United issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Court Vacates EEOC Rule Requiring Accommodation of Employees' Abortions

In State of Louisiana v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, (WD LA, May 21, 2025), a Louisiana federal district court set aside an EEOC rule that interprets the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act to require employers to provide reasonable accommodation for abortions. The court had previously issued a preliminary injunction ("PI") in the case. In setting the rule aside, the court said in part:

Given the political, social, and religious significance of the abortion issue in this country, the PI Ruling explained that EEOC must point to “clear congressional authorization” for the power it claims in the Final Rule....  And as the PI Ruling emphasized, “[n]ot only is the EEOC unable to point to any language in the PWFA empowering it to mandate the accommodation of elective abortions, but there can be little doubt in today’s political environment that any version of the PWFA that included an abortion accommodation requirement would have failed to pass Congress.”...  That finding remains true today, and the Court concludes that the EEOC has failed to point to clear congressional authorization for the inclusion of abortion protection in a statute intended only to accommodate and protect female employees during pregnancy.

The case was consolidated with U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops v. EEOC.

AP reports on the decision.

Supreme Court Denies Cert. In School's Ban on Anti-Transgender T-Shirt

The U.S. Supreme Court yesterday denied review in L.M. v. Town of Middleborough, Massachusetts, (Sup. Ct., certiorari denied May 27, 2025).  In the case, the U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals upheld middle school officials' decision that a student was in violation of school rules by wearing a T-shirt that proclaims: "There Are Only Two Genders." Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas filed an opinion dissenting from the denial of certiorari, saying in part:

The First Circuit held that the school did not violate L. M.’s free-speech rights. It held that the general prohibition against viewpoint-based censorship does not apply to public schools. And it employed a vague, permissive, and jargon-laden rule that departed from the standard this Court adopted in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503 (1969). 

The First Circuit’s decision calls out for our review....

I would grant the petition for two reasons. First, we should reaffirm the bedrock principle that a school may not engage in viewpoint discrimination when it regulates student speech. Tinker itself made that clear.... Curiously, however, the First Circuit declined to follow Tinker in this regard, instead cherry-picking which First Amendment principles it thought worthy of allowing through the schoolhouse gates.  By limiting the application of our viewpoint-discrimination cases, the decision below robs a great many students of that core First Amendment protection.

Second, we should also grant review to determine whether the First Circuit properly understood the rule adopted in Tinker regarding the suppression of student speech on the ground that it presents a risk of material disruption.

Justice Thomas also filed a separate brief dissenting opinion.  NBC News reports on the Court's action.

Supreme Court Denies Review of Apache's Loss of Sacred Land

By a vote of 6-2, the U.S. Supreme Court today denied review in Apache Stronghold v. United States, (Sup.Ct., certiorari denied May 27, 2025). In the case, the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals sitting en banc, by a vote of 6-5, refused to enjoin the government from transferring to a copper mining company federally-owned forest land that is of significant spiritual value to the Western Apache Indians. Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Thomas, today filed a lengthy dissent to the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari, saying in part:

Exactly nothing in the phrase “substantial burden”—or anything else in RFRA’s text—hints that a different and more demanding standard applies when (and only when) the “disposition” of the government’s property is at issue....

... [A]t bottom, it seems the Ninth Circuit was concerned that a ruling for Apache Stronghold would effectively afford tribal members a “‘religious servitude’” on federal land at Oak Flat....  And, the argument goes, those who adopted RFRA could not have intended to afford Tribes or others that kind of power over the disposition of federal property....  But unexpressed legislative intentions are not the law. And even if we were to abandon the statutory text in favor of guesswork about unenacted congressional purposes, it is far from clear why we should make the guess the Ninth Circuit did....

While this Court enjoys the power to choose which cases it will hear, its decision to shuffle this case off our docket without a full airing is a grievous mistake—one with consequences that threaten to reverberate for generations.  Just imagine if the government sought to demolish a historic cathedral on so questionable a chain of legal reasoning.  I have no doubt that we would find that case worth our time. Faced with the government’s plan to destroy an ancient site of tribal worship, we owe the Apaches no less.  They may live far from Washington, D. C., and their history and religious practices may be unfamiliar to many.  But that should make no difference. “Popular religious views are easy enough to defend. It is in protecting unpopular religious beliefs that we prove this country’s commitment to . . . religious freedom.”

AP reports on the Court's action.

Evidence of Religious Differences Between Accused and Victim Did Not Require Reversal of Murder Conviction

In State of Washington v. Darraji, (WA App., May 22, 2025), a Washington state appellate court by a 2-1 vote affirmed a second-degree felony murder conviction of defendant, an Iraqi immigrant. Defendant, Yasir, was charged with murdering his former wife, Ibthal.  The court explained:

At trial, the State’s theory was that Ibtihal’s rejection of traditional Iraqi culture and Islamic beliefs, and her embrace of American culture and Christianity, was the source of conflict between the former spouses.  Their fighting and insults escalated until Yasir strangled Ibtihal to death in her car, drove the vehicle to a different location, and lit the car on fire with Ibtihal’s body inside. 

On appeal, Yasir argues that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by introducing irrelevant and inflammatory evidence of Islamic beliefs to invoke anti-Muslim bias with jurors.

The majority rejected defendant's arguments, saying in part:

The comments and questions by the prosecutor were based on evidence and introduced to show motive.  The State maintained that Yasir believed Ibtihal’s changing behaviors failed to conform to Iraqi culture and Islamic beliefs and were disrespectful, insulting, and reflected poorly on him.... The non-conforming behavior included drinking, smoking, going to bars, dating, driving, working, not covering her hair, and attending a Christian church.  While Yasir’s appeal focuses primarily on evidence of the couples’ religious differences, the State maintained that Ibtihal’s conversion to Christianity and decision to wear her hair uncovered was part of the larger picture....

The foregoing questions and comments were based on relevant evidence and reasonable inferences ... and were introduced to show motive.  An objective observer could not view these questions and comments as an appeal to bias or prejudice against Muslims or persons from Iraq.

Judge Fearing dissented, saying in part:

... [B]ecause of the divisive subject of Islam and stereotypes of Middle Eastern men, the State needed to selectively, thoughtfully, and carefully present its evidence rather than turn the trial into a contest between American culture and Christianity, on the one hand, and Iraqi culture and Islam, on the other hand....  

The State gratuitously painted victim Ibtihal Darraji as Christian and American and defendant Yasir Darraji as Muslim and un-American.  The State even went as far as suggesting Ibtihal was a martyr to Christianity.  With its testimony and arguments to the jury, the State employed the ancient, but common, practice of portraying the victim as “us” and the accused as “them” in order to assure a conviction.  I would reverse and remand for a new trial because Yasir Darraji did not receive a fair trial....    

Memorial Day Proclamation

Today is Memorial Day. President Trump's Proclamation Prayer for Peace, Memorial Day 2025 (full text) reads in part:

Memorial Day is a sacred day of remembrance, reverence, and gratitude for the brave patriots who have laid down their lives in service to our great Nation....

We are eternally indebted to our Nation’s fallen heroes.  On this solemn day, as we honor their sacrifice, the First Lady and I ask all citizens to join us in prayer that Almighty God may comfort those who mourn, grant protection to all who serve, and bring blessed peace to the world.

In honor of all of our fallen heroes, the Congress, by a joint resolution approved May 11, 1950, as amended (36 U.S.C. 116), has requested the President issue a proclamation calling on the people of the United States to observe each Memorial Day as a day of prayer for permanent peace and designating a period on that day when the people might unite in prayer.  The Congress, by Public Law 106-579, has also designated 3:00 p.m. local time on that day as a time for all Americans to observe, in their own way, the National Moment of Remembrance....

Recent Articles of Interest

From SSRN:

• Godfrey Lukindo Alternative Dispute Resolution ADR), (May 16, 2025).
• Denis Wieboldt, Our Natural Law Moment(s), (Georgetown Journal of Law and Public Policy (forthcoming)).
• Vincent Phillip Muñoz, Michael W. McConnell & Andrew M. Koppelman, Religious Exemptions? What the Free Exercise Clause Means, (April 28, 2025).
• Tobias Lock, Article 10 CFR (Second Edition of the Oxford Commentary, 2024), (March 02, 2024).
• Joshua J. Craddock,, Personhood After Dobbs , (74 Cath. U. L. Rev. 536 (2025)).
• Marc Greendorfer & Vanessa Hites, When Words Wound: Pure Speech Meets Federal Antidiscrimination Law, (May 22, 2025).
• Katie R. Eyer, Transgender Equality: An Inflection Point for Equal Protection?, (University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 93, Iss. 4 [2025], Art. 1).
• Dale Carpenter, The Volokh Briefs: Drawing the Line Against Compelled Speech in Public Accommodations, (39 Const. Comm. 143 (2024)).
• Hesam Nourooz Pour, Transitional Justice and Online Social Platforms: Facebook and the Rohingya Genocide, (June 10, 2024).
• Katharine Young, Human Rights in the Constitutional Era of Dobbs, (Columbia Human Rights Law Review, Volume 56, 2025).
• Sophia Chima, Religious Tourism as a Means of Fostering Religious Tolerance: A Pathway to Global Understanding and Peace (March 14, 2025).

From SSRN (Islamic Law):

• Mohammad Ibrahim, Book review: Dawood Ahmed and Muhammad Zubair Abbasi, Democracy Under God: Constitutions, Islam and Human Rights in the Muslim World (Cambridge University Press, 2023), (Comparative Constitutional Studies (forthcoming)).
• Saud M. Alholiby Albin Zaid, Mubarak M. Alkhaldi & Mohammad A. Alghamdi, The Zakatability of AI: A Dual Analysis from Sharia and Saudi Law, (Journal of Posthumanism, volume 5, issue 5, 2025).
• Nadia Ahmad, The Imperceptibility of Muslim Identity, (28 CUNY Law Review 169 (2025)).
• Anuqa Munir & Abdullah Bhatti, Fosterage Marriage in Islam: Legal Perspectives on Prohibition, Establishment, Proof, and the Status of Children, (December 01, 2024).
• Badreddine Badreddine, Fatma Lalaymia Berrahlia & M. Kabir Hassan, Waqf Governance in Algeria: Current Status and Future Prospects, (April 16, 2024).

From SSRN (Hindu Law):

• Sanjay Koul, Karma and Rebirth -How Actions Shape Destiny and the Cycle of Samsara, (May 19, 2025).
• Sanjay Koul, The Varna-Ashrama Dharma System: Misconceptions, Relevance and Evolution, (May 20, 2025).

From SmartCILP:

• Michael A. Helfand, Contractual Commitments and the Right to Change Religions, 103 North Carolina Law Review 1-68 (2024).

Plaintiff May Move Ahead with Claim That Iowa RFRA Protects His Religious Use of Cannabis

In Olsen v. State of Iowa, (IA Dist. Ct., May 22, 2025), an Iowa state trial court allowed plaintiff, a member of the Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church, to move ahead with his suit seeking an injunction to bar enforcement of Iowa's controlled-substance laws against his religious use of cannabis.  The suit contends that his religious use of marijuana is protected by Iowa's Religious Freedom Restoration Act enacted last year. That Act contains its own definition of "compelling governmental interest." Even though in federal court litigation in 2008 plaintiff lost his claim that the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act exempts his religious use of marijuana from federal and state controlled-substance laws, the Iowa state court rejected the state's argument that this suit should be dismissed on collateral estoppel grounds, saying in part:

The issue raised in this litigation is the same as the Petitioner’s prior actions as cited in the briefing, that being whether the compelling state interest test was met regarding the restriction of the Petitioner’s use of cannabis. This issue was central to the Petitioner’s prior cases. 

The Petitioner argues the legal landscape has changed since the prior rulings were issued. Collateral estoppel does not apply if controlling facts or legal principles have changed significantly since the Petitioner's prior judgments. Olsen v. Mukasey, 541 F.3d at 831. The court finds that based on this particular argument, that the Petitioner’s should not be dismissed at this time....

In this case, the Petitioner is asserting the claim under Iowa Code Chapter 675. Although it is markedly similar to the federal RFRA and the Petitioner has made similar unsuccessful claims in the past, this court cannot conclude to a certainty that there is no possibility of success under the newly-passed Iowa RFRA. 

Plaintiff, who is litigating pro se, issued a press release announcing the decision.

Supreme Court Gives Emergency Relief to State Legislator Who Was Disenfranchised After Anti-Transgender Social Media Post

In Libby v. Fecteau, (Sup. Ct., May 20, 2025), the U.S. Supreme Court by a vote of 7-2 granted an injunction pending appeal to a member of the Maine House of Representatives.  Petitioner's Emergency Application for an Injunction describes the issue before the Court:

Maine State Representative Laurel Libby spoke out on social media about an intensely debated issue—the participation of transgender athletes in girls’ high school sports. Maine requires girls to compete alongside transgender athletes; Libby criticized that policy after a transgender athlete won the girls’ pole vault at the state track-and-field championship. Displeased with Libby’s criticism, the Maine House voted along party lines to censure her.  

The verbal censure (unwise as it may be) is not what Applicants challenge here. It’s what happened next. The Speaker declared Libby was barred from speaking or voting until she recants her view. This means her thousands of constituents in Maine House District 90 are now without a voice or vote for every bill coming to the House floor for the rest of her elected term, which runs through 2026.....

In this application, Petitioners seek an injunction pending appeal requiring the Clerk to count Libby’s votes. That interim relief simply restores the status quo of equal representation, bringing the Maine House back into conformity with every other State and Congress. 

The Supreme Court granted the injunction in a one-paragraph order that did not give reasons for the decision. Justices Sotomayor and Jackson voted to deny the injunction. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

Not very long ago, this Court treaded carefully with respect to exercising its equitable power to issue injunctive relief at the request of a party claiming an emergency.  The opinions are legion in which individual Justices, reviewing such requests in chambers, declined to intervene—reiterating that “such power should be used sparingly and only in the most critical and exigent circumstances.” ...

Those days are no more. Today’s Court barely pauses to acknowledge these important threshold limitations on the exercise of its own authority.  It opts instead to dole out error correction as it sees fit, regardless of the lack of any exigency and even when the applicants’ claims raise significant legal issues that warrant thorough evaluation by the lower courts that are dutifully considering them....

SCOTUSblog and The Washington Stand report on the decision.

Suit Challenges School District's Speech Policy

Suit was filed this week in an Oregon federal district court by a clinical social worker employed by an Oregon school district challenging the application of the district's Speech Policy to his display on a shelf in his office of three books that reject notions of transgender identity. The complaint (full text) in Theis v.  InterMountain Education Service District Board of Directors, (D OR, filed 5/21/2025), alleges in part:

He is He and She is She ... explain how every child should embrace and love herself exactly as God made her to be....

... [A]n employee at one of Mr. Theis’ schools saw the covers of the Books and complained that they were “transphobic.” IMESD labeled the display as “a hostile expression of animus toward another person relating to their actual or perceived gender identity” and ordered Mr. Theis to remove them. IMESD then warned him that “further conduct of this nature” may result in discipline, including termination of his employment....

2. Plaintiff is ... a professing Christian who bases his beliefs on the Bible and strives to live out his Christian faith at work and in the community.

3. Plaintiff’s sincerely held religious beliefs govern his views about all aspects of life, including human nature, sex, and gender....

217. Defendants’ censorship of Plaintiff’s display of the Books while permitting books and other decorations with different messages on related topics is content and viewpoint discrimination, which is unconstitutional in any type of forum....

220. Defendants’ Speech Policy and practice also impose an unconstitutional heckler’s veto because they permit the restriction of protected employee expression merely because school officials deem an employee’s expression “offensive” to others....

249. Plaintiff’s sincerely held religious beliefs motivated him to display the Books in his office. 

250. Defendants substantially burdened Plaintiff’s religious exercise when they forced Plaintiff to choose between exercising his religious beliefs and being dismissed or violating his conscience.

ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Wedding Photographer Gets Temporary Injunction Excusing Her from Photographing Same-Sex Engagements and Weddings

In Carpenter v. James, (WD NY, May 22, 2025), a New York federal district court granted a preliminary injunction to a wedding photographer who objects to same-sex marriage, enjoining enforcement against her of provisions of New York's public accommodation law that would require her to offer her services for same-sex engagements and weddings and would prevent her from posting her policies on social media. The court said in part:

In light of the Supreme Court’s binding precedent in 303 Creative, and for the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED.  The Court will issue a narrow injunction barring Defendants from applying New York’s public accommodation laws “peculiarly to compel expressive activity” with which Plaintiff disagrees.... Beyond that “peculiar” circumstance, however, Plaintiff remains fully obligated to comply with New York’s public accommodation laws, and she remains subject to all remedies and penalties for their violation.  Conversely, except to the limited extent directed herein, New York’s public officials remain fully empowered to police the public marketplace to ensure that “gay couples [are not] treated as social outcasts . . . inferior in dignity and worth.”

The case was on remand from the Second Circuit. (See prior posting.)

Religious Broadcasters Win Challenge to FCC Disclosure Requirements

In National Religious Broadcasters v. FCC, (5th Cir., May 19, 2025), the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Federal Communications Commission exceeded the authority granted to it by Congress when in 2024 it reinstated the requirement that broadcasters annually file Form 395-B which calls for disclosure of race, ethnicity, and gender data for employees in specified job categories. Co-plaintiff in the case was the American Family Association, a conservative Christian pro-family organization.  Their suit was consolidated with a similar challenge brought by the secular Texas Association of Broadcasters. While the court's opinion does not discuss free exercise rights and avoids adjudicating plaintiffs' free speech arguments, a Press Release by National Religious Broadcasters after the 5th Circuit's decision was handed down focuses on 1st Amendment concerns, saying in part:

NRB has always fought to protect Christian communicators from baseless attempts to restrict their First Amendment liberties which hinder their work of proclaiming the Gospel. This ruling helps ensure that the government cannot create a backdoor to control broadcasters through public intimidation, misuse private data against them, or interfere with the sacred and constitutionally protected mission of religious broadcasters.

Supreme Court Splits 4-4 In Oklahoma Charter School Case

In Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board v. Drummond and the companion case of St. Isidore of Seville Catholic Virtual School v. Drummond, (Sup. Ct. May 22, 2025), the U.S. Supreme court today in a brief order affirmed by an equally divided court the judgment of the Oklahoma Supreme Court. At issue in the cases was whether Oklahoma can authorize and fund a religiously-sponsored charter school. In the cases, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the state Charter School Board's authorization of a Catholic-sponsored publicly-funded charter school violates Oklahoma statutes, the Oklahoma Constitution and the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. The U.S. Supreme Court's Order indicates that today's tie vote, which comes only three weeks after oral arguments in the case, resulted from Justice Barrett's recusing herself from the case. While Justice Barrett gave no reason for recusing herself, earlier media reports suggest it was because of her close friendship with Notre Dame law professor Nicole Stelle Garnett who was an early legal adviser to the school and is a faculty fellow with Notre Dame's Religious Liberty Clinic which represents St. Isidore. Bloomberg reports on today's Supreme Court decision.

California Agrees to Consent Decree Allowing Sectarian Schools to Participate In IDEA

 As previously reported, last October the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a California federal district court's dismissal of a suit by the parents of special needs children and by two Orthodox Jewish schools. The suit challenges as a violation of the Free Exercise and Equal Protection Clauses California's rules that preclude sectarian schools from receiving payments for special needs children under the federal Individuals With Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). This week, in the district court the parties filed a Joint Motion for Entry of Consent Judgment and Permanent Injunction in Loffman v, California Department of Education, (CD CA, May 19, 2025). The injunction bars California from enforcing requirements that schools be nonsectarian in order to participate in the IDEA program. Fox News reports on these developments.

Jewish Teacher Claims Anti-Israel Position of Teachers' Union Violates His 1st Amendment Rights

Suit was filed this week in an Oregon federal district court against the Portland school system and the Portland teacher's union by a Jewish teacher who was born in Israel who contends that his First Amendment rights are violated by forcing him to be part of a bargaining unit represented by a union that promotes anti-Israel, pro-Palestinian positions and by the school becoming a one-sided forum for anti-Israel rhetoric. He also claims a hostile working environment has been created. Even though plaintiff chose not to become a dues-paying member of the teacher's union, under Oregon law the union remained his collective bargaining representative.  The complaint (full text) in Doe v. Portland Association of Teachers, (D OR, filed 5/19/2025) alleges in part:

63. [Palestinian] flags and other symbols were in common spaces such as hallways, the library, as well as shared classrooms. The placement was intentional so as to appear to be an expression of the community and school rather than any individual staff person.

64. These symbols ... cause severe emotional distress to Plaintiff because of his experiences growing up in Israel, including personal exposure to acts of terrorism committed to destroy the State of Israel, and because of his deeply held religious beliefs....

97. When Plaintiff reached out to PAT for support, PAT assigned him a union representative who publicly shared anti-Zionist views on social media, thus the Plaintiff did not receive fair or unbiased representation from PAT....

121. Oregon’s statutory requirement of exclusive representation, placing the Plaintiff in a bargaining unit exclusively represented by PAT, violates the Plaintiff’s free association by forcing him to associate with expression with which he disagrees, and which betrays his deeply held religious and moral beliefs....

127. Oregon’s exclusive representation laws compel Plaintiff ... to tacitly affirm beliefs that violate his deeply held religious beliefs and personal convictions as a condition of employment....

140. ... [C]urricula put forward in the District’s classrooms purports to define aspects of Plaintiff’s faith, which includes the belief in a Jewish homeland, in ways that are inconsistent with his beliefs, but that are consistent with the religious teachings of other faiths, including the beliefs of some Muslims.

141. The District allows displays of overtly anti-Israel messaging, including maps that fail to display the nation of Israel....

144. By these actions, the District prefers and promotes religious views and practices in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment,,,,

The Oregonian reports on the lawsuit.

Exclusion of Religious Organization from Non-Profit Discount Challenged Under California's Unruh Act

Suit was filed yesterday in a California federal district court by a Christian non-profit claiming that OpenAI's non-profit discount policy that excludes academic, medical, religious, and governmental institutions violates plaintiff's rights under California's Unruh Civil Rights Act. The complaint (full text) in Holy Sexuality v. OpenAI, Inc., (SD CA, filed 5/21/2025), alleges in part:

1. Plaintiff Holy Sexuality is a Christian nonprofit based in Texas that uses video courses to teach young people and their families about biblical principles on human sexuality.  

2. To operate more effectively, Holy Sexuality contacted Defendant OpenAI, Inc., a San Francisco-based tech company, to receive OpenAI’s 20% nonprofit discount for a ChatGPT subscription....  

4. But OpenAI and Goodstack denied Holy Sexuality the discount because “religious … institutions are not eligible.” 

5. This categorical denial, OpenAI’s published policy, and Goodstack’s enforcement of that policy are invidious religious discrimination. And they are illegal under California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act....

6. People of faith aren’t second-class citizens in California, and tech companies cannot provide lesser services to customers simply because they are religious....

ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Colorado Law Banning Deadnaming and Misgendering Challenged as Free Speech Violation

Suit was filed this week in a Colorado federal district court challenging on free speech and vagueness grounds provisions in recently enacted Colorado HB25-1312. The lawsuit focuses on provisions that define deadnaming and misgendering as discriminatory acts under Colorado's Anti-Discrimination Act. The complaint (full text) in Defending Education v. Sulivan, (D CO, filed 5/19/2025), alleges in part:

5. ... H.B. 25-1312 amends the definition of “gender expression,” a protected category under the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act, to include the use of a “chosen name” and other words by which an individual “chooses to be addressed.”...

30. Under H.B. 25-1312, then, someone who operates in a public accommodation commits a discriminatory act when they refer to a transgender-identifying individual using the individual’s birth name or biological pronouns instead of their chosen name or preferred pronouns ... because that speech supposedly denies the transgender individual the “full and equal enjoyment” of the place of public accommodation based on their “gender expression.” ...

86. ... Colorado’s public accommodation laws as amended by H.B. 25-1312 make it impossible for [plaintiffs} ... to effectively exercise their constitutionally protected right to speak in a manner that reflects their sincere belief that sex is immutable and fixed at birth....

122. That H.B. 25-1312 does not literally require Coloradans to speak is of no consequence. Even if Plaintiffs and their members could avoid the law’s penalties by holding their tongues, compelled silence is compelled speech..... In any event, using pronouns and names is a “‘virtual necessity’” for engaging in any conversation....

136. The Unwelcome Provision clearly prohibits speech based on content and viewpoint. It prohibits all speech that makes someone feel “unwelcome, objectionable, unacceptable, or undesirable.” But “[g]iving offense is a viewpoint.”... It also compels speech by, for example, requiring published speech to be “[w]elcom[ing]” and “[un]objectionable.” Even assuming this provision only regulated speech based on content, Defendants have no compelling interest for prohibiting this type of speech....

The Lion reports on the lawsuit.

DOJ Sues Idaho City for Denying Zoning Approval for Evangelical Church

The Justice Department announced yesterday that it has filed suit against the City of Troy, Idaho alleging that it violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalize Persons Act when it denied a conditional use permit that would have allowed an evangelical Christian church to hold worship services and church meetings in a building zoned for businesses. The complaint (full text) in United States v. City of Troy, Idaho, (D ID, filed 5/20/2025), alleges in part:

49. At the public hearing, 19 citizens personally appeared to express their views, with one speaking in favor of, one neutral to, and 17 against granting the CUP. 

50. Many of views expressed at the hearing reflected animus against Christ Church’s beliefs or its members, including that the Church was proposing an “evangelical community” that was not “open to everyone.”...

56. The City also received and considered 32 written comments regarding the CUP application that were submitted by residents. Of the written submissions, 26 commenters opposed the CUP and six supported it. 

57. Many of the written comments spoke negatively about Christ Church and its members’ beliefs, practices, and conduct....

The complaint alleges that the City has violated the Equal Terms, the Substantial Burden and the Nondiscrimination provisions of RLUIPA. KMVT News reports on the lawsuit.