Religious Discrimination Claim for Denial of Personal Leave Moves Ahead

In Balchan v. New Rochelle City School District, (SD NY, May 7, 2024), a New York federal district court refused to dismiss claims of religious discrimination, retaliation for submitting claims of religious discrimination, and a due process claim for stigmatization plus loss of employment. Plaintiff is a Jewish woman who was employed as the school district's Medial Director. At issue are disciplinary charges brought against her for allegedly using personal leave days for a vacation and the stigmatizing report by a hearing officer in connection with those charges. The court details the factual background in part as follows:

Plaintiff observes Jewish holidays including, but not limited to, Yamim Nora’im (a/k/a the “Days of Awe”), Rosh Hashanah, and Yom Kippur..... Plaintiff alleges that her personal scheme of things religious evolved over the course of her life, and that marriage to her Trinidadian husband resulted in her “meld[ing] many of her Jewish religious beliefs into her new Trinidadian identity.” ...

... Specifically, Plaintiff’s “personal scheme of things religious required that she take personal leave during [the Days of Awe] to adjust, meditate, repair her connection to [God], and re-focus . . . .” Accordingly, she planned a trip with her family to Trinidad and Tobago which she alleges was “religious in nature given its relation to the Jewish high holy days” and what had been going on in her personal and professional life....

4th Circuit: Ministerial Exception Bars Suit by Catholic School Teacher Fired Over Same-Sex Marriage Plans

In Billard v. Charlotte Catholic High School, (4th Cir., May 8, 2024), the U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals held that a Catholic high school teacher's suit alleging sex discrimination in violation of Title VII should be dismissed. The court's majority held that the ministerial exception doctrine defeated the suit by the teacher of English and drama who was not invited back to teach after he announced plans to marry his same-sex partner. The majority, finding that the teacher should be classified as a "minister" for purposes of the ministerial exception, said in part:

[F]aith infused CCHS’s classes – and not only the expressly religious ones.  Even as a teacher of English and drama, Billard’s duties included conforming his instruction to Christian thought and providing a classroom environment consistent with Catholicism.  Billard may have been teaching Romeo and Juliet, but he was doing so after consultation with religious teachers to ensure that he was teaching through a faith-based lens....  The record makes clear that CCHS considered it “vital” to its religious mission that its teachers bring a Catholic perspective to bear on Shakespeare as well as on the Bible.   

Moreover, we note that Billard did – on rare occasions – fill in for teachers of religion classes.... CCHS’s apparent expectation that Billard be ready to instruct in religion as needed is another “relevant circumstance” indicating the importance of Billard’s role to the school’s religious mission.   

Our court has recognized before that seemingly secular tasks like the teaching of English and drama may be so imbued with religious significance that they implicate the ministerial exception.

The majority rejected the school's argument for broadening statutory defenses to the Title VII claim.

Judge King filed an opinion concurring in the result but differing as to rationale. He said in part:

... I would neither reach nor resolve the First Amendment ministerial exception issue on which the majority relies.  I would decide this appeal solely on Title VII statutory grounds, that is, § 702 of Title VII.... [M]y good friends of the panel majority have unnecessarily resolved the appeal on the First Amendment constitutional issue.  In so ruling, they have strayed from settled principles of the constitutional avoidance doctrine and our Court’s precedent.

Feds Sue Texas Correctional Authorities for Failing to Accommodate Employee's Religious Head Covering

The Justice Department today filed suit against the Texas Department of Criminal Justice alleging that it violated Title VII by failing to accommodate a clerical employee's religious practice of wearing a head covering pursuant to her Ifa faith. The complaint (full text) in United States v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice, (SD TX, filed 5/3/2024), alleges in part:

34. Though Spears identified her belief in the Ifa faith and her religious practice of wearing a head covering, TDCJ was not satisfied that her religious beliefs were sincere or should be accommodated. 

35. Instead, when Spears turned in her accommodation form, Fisk informed her that TDCJ would further research her religion and its practices. Spears questioned whether it was a normal practice to research religions. Specifically, she asked whether research would be done for more mainstream religions. Fisk indicated that it was not TDCJ’s normal practice.

 36. On October 15, 2019, Fisk conducted an internet search of the Ifa religion and practices and faxed the search results along with Spears’s accommodation request to Terry Bailey for her consideration. 

37. Then, on October 16, 2019, TDCJ further questioned the sincerity of Spears’s faith when Bailey mailed a letter demanding documentation or a statement from a religious institution pointing to the specific Ifa belief or doctrine that supported the necessity of Spears’s head covering. The letter also stated that TDCJ would not take any further action to review Spears’s accommodation request until the additional information was submitted.

The Department of Justice issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Accommodating Teacher's Anti-Transgender Beliefs Created Undue Hardship for School Under Title VII

In Kluge v. Brownsburg Community School Corporation, (SD IN, April 30, 2024), an Indiana federal district court in a 46-page opinion that sets out extensive factual background information, dismissed an orchestra teacher's Title VII claim that the school had failed to reasonably accommodate his religious objections to referring to transgender students by their preferred names and pronouns. The school had initially permitted the teacher to refer to students by their last names only, but later withdrew that accommodation and forced the teacher's resignation. A primary issue in the case was whether continuing to allow a last-names-only accommodation would create an "undue hardship" for the school under the Supreme Court's definition of that term in its 2023 decision in Groff v. DeJoy. Finding that it would, the court said in part:

BCSC's business is "educating all students," which it achieves by "fostering a learning environment of respect and affirmation."...  Part of that is BCSC's mission to "afford[] dignity and empathy toward transgender students."...  Parents, medical professionals, administrators, and many students all agree that pursuing that mission would require transgender students to be addressed by their preferred names and pronouns....

Lest there be any doubt about disruption, Mr. Kluge himself believed that the Last Names Only Accommodation would result in disruption and indeed was encouraged by it.  He explained to Dr. Daghe that far from resigning, he was "encouraged all the more to stay." ...  After all, he believed, his "persecution" was "a sign that [his] faith as witnessed by using last-names-only . . . was being effective."...  Faced with Mr. Kluge's own statements—"pleading" with the school to avoid going down the "transgender path," seeking to discuss with students their "eternal destination," and hoping to stay because his "persecution" surrounding the Last Names Only Accommodation was being "effective"—complaints from others were hardly necessary.  While the Last Names Only Accommodation might have been intended as neutral, it ultimately was perceived as intentional....

As the Supreme Court held in Groff, undue hardship is to be viewed within the context of a particular business, not a particular employee.  The Court compares the cost to BCSC's mission, not Mr. Kluge's.  BCSC could either support its transgender students in pursuit of its mission and comply with the law, or accede to Mr. Kluge's accommodation and risk harm to students and the learning environment and/or substantial and disruptive litigation.... The law of Title VII does not require BCSC to continue an accommodation that actually resulted in substantial student harm, and an unreasonable risk of liability, each sharply contradicting the school's legally entitled mission to foster a supportive environment for all.  The Last Names Only Accommodation was an undue burden to BCSC as a matter of law.....

Supreme Court Clarifies Harm Requirement in Title VII Job Transfer Claims

 In Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, (Sup. Ct., April 17, 2024), the U.S. Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Kagan, clarified the extent to which harm must be shown in a Title VII employment discrimination case in which plaintiff alleges a discriminatory job transfer. The court said in part:

The courts below rejected the claim on the ground that the transfer did not cause Muldrow a “significant” employment disadvantage.  Other courts have used similar standards in addressing Title VII suits arising from job transfers. 

Today, we disapprove that approach. Although an employee must show some harm from a forced transfer to prevail in a Title VII suit, she need not show that the injury satisfies a significance test.  Title VII’s text nowhere establishes that high bar....

To make out a Title VII discrimination claim, a transferee must show some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment.

What the transferee does not have to show, according to the relevant text, is that the harm incurred was “significant.” ... Or serious, or substantial, or any similar adjective suggesting that the disadvantage to the employee must exceed a heightened bar.

Justices Thomas, Alito and Kavanaugh each filed a separate opinion concurring in the judgment, but differing to some extent with the majority's reasoning. 

Although this case involved sex discrimination, the test would apply equally to religiously discriminatory job transfers. Wisconsin Public Radio reports on the decision.

8th Circuit Hears Oral Arguments on Employee's Religious Discrimination Claim Over Objection To LGBTQ+ Display Online

The U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals on Tuesday heard oral arguments in Snyder v. Arconic Corp. (Audio of full oral arguments.) In the case, an Iowa federal district court in Snyder v. Arconic Corp., (SD IA, Aug. 31, 2023), dismissed a Title VII religious discrimination claim brought by an employee who was fired for placing a post on the company's intranet objecting to a rainbow-colored heart on the company's intranet publicizing a support group for LGBTQ+ employees. The employee's post read:  "Its a (sic.) abomination to God. Rainbow is not meant to be displayed as a sign for sexual gender." He contended that the post was religiously motivated. The district court held that the employee had not shown a conflict between his religious practices and the company's diversity policy. Thomas More Society issued a press release announcing the oral arguments.

DOJ Sues California Prisons for Failing to Accommodate Officers' Religious Beard Requirements

The Department of Justice this week filed suit in a California federal district court seeking to enjoin the California correctional system from requiring its peace officers to be clean shaven in contravention of their sincerely held religious beliefs.  The problem arose for Muslim and Sikh correctional employees when they were required to meet the conditions for wearing tight-fitting respirators.  The complaint (full text) in United States v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, (ED CA, filed 3/25/2024), contends that the Department of Corrections has not attempted to accommodate the peace officers' concerns by offering them positions in the Department that do not require wearing of respirators or by offering alternative respirators that could be worn with beards.  The complaint alleges in part:

The Charging Parties allege that CDCR has discriminated against them on the basis of religion in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a)(2), by: a. Failing to provide a religious accommodation;  b. failing to adequately engage in the interactive process with the Charging Parties, including by failing to make good faith efforts to consider whether alternative accommodations will eliminate the conflict between the Charging Parties’ religious beliefs and CDCR’s clean  shaven policy; and c. failing to demonstrate that implementing the alternative accommodations proposed by the Charging Parties would pose an undue hardship.

The Department of Justice issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit. AP reports on the lawsuit.

Denial of Religious Exemption from Vaccine Mandate Did Not Violate Title VII or Constitution

In White v. University of Washington, (WD WA, March 22, 2024), a Washington federal district court rejected Title VII as well as constitutional challenges brought by a healthcare worker who was denied a religious exemption from Washington's Covid vaccine mandate. In discussing Plaintiff's Title VII claim of failure to reasonably accommodate, the court said in part:

With respect to COVID-19 in particular, guidance from the EEOC indicates that “increasing ‘the risk of the spread of COVID-19 to other employees or to the public’” is a ground for finding undue hardship on employers asked to grant religious exemptions to COVID-19 vaccination mandates....

 The Ninth Circuit also has found on a motion to dismiss that undue hardship is established as a matter of law where a religious accommodation would require an employer to violate state or federal law.

The court also rejected plaintiff's due process, equal protection and free exercise claims, saying in part:

Plaintiff has made no allegations regarding what her religious beliefs are, let alone how they were burdened by Defendants’ adherence to Proclamation 21-14.

7th Circuit: Refusal to Dismiss Under Church Autonomy Doctrine Is Not Appealable Interlocutory Order

 In Garrick v. Moody Bible Institute, (7th Cir., March 18, 2024), the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 decision, held that that an order refusing to dismiss a Title VII employment discrimination case under the church autonomy doctrine is not an appealable interlocutory order. The suit was brought by a former communications instructor who claimed sex discrimination.  According to the Bible Institute, the instructor's firing resulted from her disagreement with the Institute's doctrine that only men should serve as clergy. Plaintiff contended that this was merely a pretext for sex discrimination. In denying appealability, the court said in part:

... Moody’s argument that it will experience irreparable harm without immediate review and reversal of the district court’s order is unavailing. Religious autonomy to shape and control doctrine will not be threatened. Within its discretion to manage discovery, the district court should limit discovery to instances of discriminatory treatment in situations not implicated by Moody’s complementarian beliefs.

Judge Brennan dissented, arguing that the interlocutory dismissal order should be appealable. Americans United issued a press release announcing the decision.

Christian Employers Protected from Requirement to Provide Insurance for Gender Transition Procedures

 In Christian Employers Alliance v. U.S. EEOC, (D ND, March 4, 2024), a North Dakota federal district court enjoined the Department of Health and Human Services from enforcing the Affordable Care Act, and the EEOC from enforcing Title  to require the Christian Employers Alliance or its present or future members to provide their employees insurance coverage for gender transition procedures. The court said in part:

... [I]f CEA had to comply with these mandates, its members would have to violate their sincerely held religious beliefs which is an impermissible exercise under the First Amendment and RFRA. ...

While protecting the right of transgender patients to access crucial healthcare and protecting workers from sex discrimination is certainly a compelling interest, the Defendants here have done nothing more than identify a broadly formulated interest in an attempt to justify the general applicability of the government mandates....  Even if the Court were to accept the Defendants’ purpose for the mandates as a compelling interest, the Defendants failed to provide any evidence showing this policy was the only feasible means to achieve its compelling interest....

Just The News reports on the decision.

Certiorari Denied in Ministerial Exception Case

Yesterday the U.S. Supreme Court denied review in two companion appeals, Bowes v. Liberty University, Inc. (Docket No. 23-550) and Liberty University, Inc. v. Bowes (Docket No. 23-703, certiorari denied 3/4/2024) (Order List.).  The three judges on the 4th Circuit panel deciding the case below each had a different view on application of the ministerial exception doctrine in this age discrimination case brought by a Liberty University art professor. (See prior posting.) The case also posed other interpretive questions under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.

Title VII Challenge to Denial of Vaccine Exemption Survives Motion to Dismiss

In Prodan v. Legacy Health, (D OR, Feb. 12, 2024), an Oregon federal district court refused to dismiss a Title VII religious discrimination claim brought by two former employees of Legacy Health who were denied religious exemptions from the Covid vaccine mandate for healthcare workers. The court said in part:

... [C]ourts appear to be in agreement that a general allegation of religious conflict without identifying a conflicting belief is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss....

... [However] allegations of an allegedly religious belief coupled with an assertion that the COVID-19 vaccine conflicts with that belief is enough to plead a prima facie case of religious discrimination.

 In the case, one plaintiff alleged that her body is a temple of God and taking the Covid vaccine violates her conscience. The second defendant alleged that her body is a Temple of the Holy Spirit and refraining from injecting it with harmful chemicals and unknown substances honors the Temple.

Muslim Employee Recovers $70,000 From Employer Who Refused Grooming Rule Accommodation

The EEOC announced on Wednesday that it has entered a consent decree in its lawsuit against Blackwell Security Services, Inc.  The EEOC's lawsuit charged that the company violated Title VII by failing to give an exemption from its no-beard policy to a Muslim employee who worked as a concierge in Chicago, even though granting the accommodation would have imposed no cost and not created an operating burden on Blackwell.  According to the EEOC:

To avoid losing his job, the employee complied and shaved his beard, causing him significant distress....

Under the consent decree resolving the lawsuit, Blackwell will pay $70,000 in compensation to the now-former employee. Blackwell will also provide training to relevant management employees on federal laws prohibiting religious discrimination and will report any additional complaints of religious discrimination to the EEOC for the decree’s duration.

Court Rules On Class Action Certification of Claims by Religious Objectors to Covid Vaccine

 In Chavez v. San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District, (ND CA, Jan. 28,2024), a California federal district court refused to certify as a class action a suit on behalf of employees of the Transit District (BART) who were denied a religious exemption or accommodation from BART's Covid vaccine mandate. The court concluded that the disparate factual issues underlying the claims under Title VII and California's Fair Employment and Housing Act means that common issues of law or fact do not predominate. The court said in part:

Plaintiffs submitted nearly as many systems of belief and grounds for objection as they did applications. Whether or not any one request rests on a bona fide religious belief presents an individual inquiry that requires the consideration of evidence pertaining only to the response in question....

BART’s undue hardship showing—likely to be the dispositive issue in this action—also rests on individual factual issues....

It similarly concluded that common issues did not predominate in plaintiffs' First Amendment Free Exercise Claim, saying in part:

Plaintiffs cite myriad scripture and personal experiences, CDC VARS data and concerns regarding health consequences ... among others, as grounds for objection. Many identify non-vaccination as a core religious tenant, some characterize their decision as a “personal choice,” a number discuss medical concerns.... [T]he need to determine whether plaintiffs have met the bona fide religious belief threshold generates “an unmanageable variety of individual . . . factual issues,” and forecloses on class certification....

Finally, the court concluded that plaintiffs also failed to meet the requirement that a class action is the superior way to adjudicate the claims.

In UnifySCC v. Cody, (ND CA, Jan. 29, 2024), a different Northern District of California judge certified a class action (except as to damages) on behalf of 463 individuals who obtained a religious exemption from the Covid vaccine mandate of San Jose County but who, because they were in high risk roles, were placed on administrative leave until reassignments or transfers to lower risk positions became available.  The court ruled:

This Class is certified with respect to the following common questions regarding Defendants’ liability: 

1. Whether Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ right to free exercise and equal protection of the law by prioritizing medical exemptions over religious exemptions in high-risk settings; 

2. Whether Defendants’ Risk Tier System violated the Free Exercise Clause and Equal Protection Clause because it relegated Plaintiffs and the Class members to unpaid leave but allowed some unvaccinated or non-boosted employees to continue to work; 

3. Whether the County’s religious exemption and/or accommodation procedure was either non-neutral or not generally applicable such that it constitutes an individualized assessment ... and is thereby subject to strict scrutiny; 

4. Whether Defendants provided Individual Plaintiffs and the Class members with reasonable accommodation as required under FEHA and Title VII; and 

5. Whether Defendants violated the Establishment Clause by demonstrating hostility towards religion. 

The Class is NOT certified with respect to questions of damages.

Court Decides 7 Cases of Health Care Employees' Refusal to Receive Covid Vaccine

 A Delaware federal district court judge yesterday handed down opinions in seven lawsuits against the same medical center that terminated employees who requests for religious exemptions from the Covid vaccine mandate were denied. In 5 of the cases, the court refused to dismiss plaintiffs' Title VII failure to accommodate claims because plaintiffs had plausibly alleged a sincere religious belief and that their objections to the Covid vaccine were related to that belief. Aiken v. Bayhealth Medical Center, Inc., (D DE, Jan. 25, 2024); Hernandez v. Bayhealth Medical Center, Inc., (D DE, Jan. 25, 2024); Massotti v. Bayhealth Medical Center, Inc., (D DE, Jan. 25, 2024); Proud v. Bayhealth Medical Center, Inc., (D DE, Jan. 25, 2024); White v. Bayhealth Medical Center, Inc., (D DE, Jan. 25, 2024). In 2 cases, the court concluded that plaintiffs' objections to the vaccine were not plausibly connected to a sincerely held religious belief. McDowell v. Bayhealth Medical Center, Inc., (D DE, Jan. 25, 2024); Osborne v. Bayhealth Medical Center, Inc., (D DE, Jan.25, 2024). Each opinion details the religious claim asserted by plaintiff.

Nurse Sues Clinic for Refusing to Accommodate Her Objection to Prescribing Contraceptives

A religious discrimination lawsuit was filed last week in a Florida federal district court by a nurse-practitioner who was fired from her position at a Florida CVS MinuteClinic. The complaint (full text) in  Kristofersdottir v. CVS Health Corp., (SD FL, filed 1/18/2024), alleges that CVS revoked all religious accommodations that allowed employees to refuse to prescribe contraceptives, including the accommodation it had given to plaintiff for more than 7 years.  Plaintiff, a Roman Catholic, objected to prescribing hormonal contraceptives for patients. According to the complaint:

CVS corporate culture changed around 2021. Instead of protecting religious freedom, CVS began to treat religious practice as a source of "privilege."...

CVS never discussed possible accommodation options with Ms. Kristofersdottir even though CVS had numerous ways to provide a reasonable accommodation without undue hardship on the business.

When Florida subsequently passed a law protecting conscience-based objections by employees, CVS offered plaintiff her job back, but she declined the offer. The complaint alleges violations of Title VII and the Florida Civil Rights Act.

First Liberty issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

EEOC Religious Discrimination Suit Against Hospital That Refused Vaccine Exemption Settled For $50,000

The EEOC announced yesterday that Trinity Health Grand Rapids, a Michigan hospital, has agreed to pay $50,000 in damages to settle a Title VII religious discrimination lawsuit brought on behalf of a job applicant whose job offer was rescinded when the applicant applied for a religious exemption to the requirement that employees receive a flu shot. The applicant had received a conditional offer for a position as business office coordinator. The consent decree also enjoins the hospital from refusing to hire applicants because of their sincerely held religious beliefs opposing taking flu vaccine, or denying religious exemptions from vaccination in the future, unless doing so would impose an undue hardship. It also calls for compliance training of personnel.

Denial of Vaccine Mandate Exemption for Nurse Is Upheld

 In St. Hillaire v, Montefiore Medical Center, (SD NY, Jan. 16, 2024), a New York federal district court rejected claims of religious discrimination brought by a hospital's Patient Safety Manager who was denied a religious exemption from a state Covid vaccine mandate and subsequently was fired. Plaintiff is an Apostolic Pentecostal Christian.  Denying Plaintiff's claim under Title VII, the court said in part:

As a New York hospital system, Defendant is legally obligated to comply with the DOH Mandate and is subject to stringent penalties for non-compliance, including loss of its license.... Defendant could not have accommodated Plaintiff’s request because Plaintiff was a registered nurse... and was a person covered by the DOH Mandate. Had Defendant granted Plaintiff’s request for an exemption, it would have been in direct violation of New York State law, thus suffering an undue hardship.

The court also rejected plaintiff's 1st Amendment free exercise claim because defendant is not a state actor. 

School Did Not Violate Title VII in Denying Religious Exemption to Covid Rules

In Russo v. Patchogue-Medford School District, (ED NY, Jan. 12, 2024), a New York federal district court held that a school district did not violate title VII's ban on religious discrimination in employment when it refused to accommodate a school psychologist's religious objection to a state mandate to either test weekly for Covid or show proof of vaccination.  Plaintiff considered both of these alternatives to be medical interventions that would violate her faith in God's ability to protect her and keep her healthy.  She instead sought as an accommodation either periodically completing a health questionnaire or working remotely. Rejecting those alternatives, the school placed her on unpaid leave. The court said in part:

The state’s test-or-vaccination requirement was a neutral law of general applicability that only incidentally affected employees with religious objections and did not “target[] religious conduct for distinctive treatment.” ... The requirement is, therefore, constitutionally permissible if it survives rational basis review.... The state’s requirement clearly satisfies this standard....

Plaintiff’s claim that she was unlawfully denied a religious accommodation also fails....

A proposed accommodation becomes an undue hardship for an employer if it would cause the employer to violate the law....

Defendant’s rejection of Plaintiff’s proposed accommodation of working remotely also did not violate Title VII.... [H]er proposal that she be permitted to work remotely going forward included a request that Defendant cut back on her job responsibilities to accommodate remote work.... Plaintiff, therefore, implicitly conceded that her proposed accommodation would “involve the elimination of an essential function of [her] job,” thereby rendering the proposal unreasonable....

The court also concluded that plaintiff's employer did not violate the Genetic Information Nondisclosure Act.

Denial of Religious Exemption to Vaccine Mandate Did Not Violate Title VII

 In Craven v. Shriners Hospital for Children, (D OR, Jan. 2, 2024), an Oregon federal district court dismissed a Title VII religious discrimination claim brought by a hospital maintenance technician who was fired after his claim for a religious exemption from the hospital's Covid vaccine mandate was denied. The court concluded that plaintiff had not adequately alleged that his objections to the vaccine were religious in nature. It also concluded that filing an amended complaint would be futile.  The court said in part:

As Plaintiff wrote, he objected to the COVID-19 vaccine because its “ingredients include carcinogens, neurotoxins, animal viruses, animal blood, allergens, and heavy metals,” which “can cause serious harm and even death to the body.” ... This judgment—on the potential danger of the vaccine due to its physical composition—was scientific and medical, not religious. Of course, this Court does not question the sincerity of Plaintiff’s belief that his “body is a temple of the Holy Spirit.”...  But Plaintiff’s beliefs about the composition of his body and that of the vaccine are independent of one another; whether Plaintiff’s body is a temple has no bearing on whether the vaccine contains carcinogens or whether, as a result of its ingredients, it “can cause serious harm.” 

Therefore, Plaintiff’s allegations, even if fleshed out in a subsequent filing, would fail to state a claim of religious discrimination under Title VII.