Religion Clause

Tuesday, June 03, 2025

HHS Rescinds Prior Administration's Interpretation of Emergency Room Abortion Practices Under EMTALA

In January 2025, the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld an injunction issued by a Texas federal district court barring enforcement of a 2022 Guidance Document and related Letter on emergency abortion care issued by the Department of Health and Human Services. HHS had taken the position that under the Emergency Medical Treatment & Labor Act, emergency rooms must sometimes perform abortions as a method of stabilizing pregnant women who have pregnancy complications. HHS also took the position that this federal requirement pre-empts Texas laws barring abortions. The 5th Circuit concluded that EMTALA requires hospitals to stabilize both the pregnant woman and her unborn child and that doctors must comply with state law in balancing those obligations. (See prior posting.) On May 29, 2025, HHS placed a statement on the 2022 Guidance Document that it was being rescinded. However, it went on to apparently limit the rescission to plaintiffs in the 5th Circuit case, saying:

HHS may not enforce the Guidance and Letter’s interpretation of EMTALA—both as to when an abortion is required and EMTALA’s effect on state laws governing abortion—within the State of Texas or against the members of the American Association of Pro-Life Obstetricians and Gynecologists (AAPLOG) and the Christian Medical and Dental Association (CMDA).

Then today (June 3, 2025), HHS issued a Statement (full text) saying that it is rescinding the prior policy for all hospitals, not just for parties to the prior litigation. The Statement said in part that the 2022 Guidance Document and Letter (which has also been stamped "Rescinded"):

do not reflect the policy of this Administration. CMS will continue to enforce EMTALA, which protects all individuals who present to a hospital emergency department seeking examination or treatment, including for identified emergency medical conditions that place the health of a pregnant woman or her unborn child in serious jeopardy. CMS will work to rectify any perceived legal confusion and instability created by the former administration’s actions.

Meanwhile, ADF today issued a press release saying that in light of the rescission of this policy it has filed a voluntary dismissal of another lawsuit it had filed challenging the Guidance Document.

Sunday, June 01, 2025

Suit Challenges Exclusion of Religious Training from Virginia Tuition Grant Programs

Suit was filed last week in a Viginia federal district court challenging the exclusion from Virginia's Tuition Assistance Grant Program and its National Guard Grants of educational programs that provide religious training or theological education. The complaint (full text) in Johnson v. Fleming, (ED VA, filed 5/28/2025), alleges that the exclusions violate the Free Exercise, Establishment and Equal Protection clauses. The complaint reads in part:

297. Defendants’ religious exclusions violate the Free Exercise Clause several ways....

298. The government violates the Free Exercise Clause when it disqualifies otherwise eligible persons or organizations from receiving otherwise available government benefits “solely because of their religious character,”....

327. Because the VTAG and National Guard religious exclusions are not neutral or generally applicable, they trigger strict scrutiny....

335. So the State Council [of Higher Education] considers CIP Code 39 programs as too religious and excludes them from participation in the Tuition Assistance Grant Program. This requires the State Council to entangle itself in religious matters.

336. The [Virginnia] Department [of Military Affairs] likewise does not deem religious majors at secular private schools and public schools to be for “religious training or theological education” and students who pursue those programs at those schools can receive a National Guard Grant.

337. The Department favors students who pursue religious programs at secular private schools and public schools to the detriment of students who pursue religious programs at religious schools....

347. Defendants’ religious exclusions create arbitrary and irrational distinctions based on nothing more than government officials’ discretion about whether a certain program is too religious.

ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

3rd Circuit: Fireman's Free Exercise and Title VII Challenge to Grooming Rules Should Move Forward

In Smith v. City of Atlantic City, (3d Cir., May 30, 2025), the U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals vacated a New Jersey federal district court's grant of summary judgment for Atlantic City in a suit by a fireman claiming violation of his free exercise rights and his right to reasonable religious accommodation under Title VII. However, the court affirmed dismissal of plaintiff's equal protection and retaliation claims. In the case, plaintiff who is a Christian challenged the city's requirements that prohibit him from growing a beard of any length, contending that the requirement violates his religious beliefs. Finding free exercise and Title VII reasonable accommodation violations, the court said in part:

Firefighters engaged in fire suppression face danger from smoke and fume inhalation. The City protects its firefighters by requiring them to don air masks in “hazardous” and “confined” spaces.... These “self-contained breathing apparatuses,” or “SCBAs,” form a seal on the firefighter’s face to keep out hazardous air and pump in clean air....

... [T]wo exceptions—one practical exception and one discretionary regime—render the City’s policy not generally applicable. First, the City has long permitted administrative staff, all of whom are firefighters subject to the SCBA rule, to forgo fit testing...

Second, the City’s grooming regime has built-in discretion. Captains may “deviate” from the SCBA policy and permit any sort of conduct as long as they “bear[] full responsibility for the results of any deviation.” ...

Strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard in all free-exercise cases failing either Smith’s neutrality requirement or its general-applicability requirement....

But the City fails narrow tailoring. “[N]arrow tailoring requires the government to show that measures less restrictive of the First Amendment activity could not address its interest.”... The City could remove Smith from fire suppression duty as it did before 2020 or reclassify him as a civilian who is not subject to the SCBA and grooming policies. It could, as a simple fix, at least try and fit test Smith with facial hair to see if his facial hair, at any length, would interfere with the SCBA to a point that creates the risk of air leakage that the City fears.

Judge Chung dissented in part, saying she would affirm the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's free exercise claim, because "the Grooming Standards are facially neutral and were applied equally to both religiously-motivated and secularly-motivated requests for accommodation...."

Judge Porter dissented in part, saying he would have upheld plaintiff's Title VII retaliation claim.

First Liberty issued a press release announcing the decision.

Friday, May 30, 2025

Texas Passes 3 Bills Promoting Religion in Public Schools

In addition to the much-publicized Ten Commandments bill (see prior posting), the Texas legislature this week gave final passage to three other bills relating to religion in public schools:

S.B. 11 (full text) (legislative history) creates an elaborate structure that school districts may adopt to provide for a daily period of prayer and reading of the Bible or other religious text in each school. The daily ceremony is to be open to both students and employees but must be outside the hearing of those who are not participants. Also, it may not be a substitute for instructional time. To participate, a student's parent must sign a consent form that includes a waiver of a right to bring an Establishment Clause claim to challenge the prayer/ Bible reading policy. For an employee to participate in the daily sessions, they must sign a similar consent and waiver. Districts may not broadcast the prayer or Bible reading over the school's public address system.

SB 965 (full text) (legislative history) provides:

The right of an employee of a school district ... to engage in religious speech or prayer while on duty may not be infringed on by the district or school or another state governmental entity, unless the infringement is: (1) necessary to further a compelling state interest; and (2) narrowly tailored using the least restrictive means to achieve that compelling state interest.

SB 1049 (full text) (legislative history) requires all public schools to adopt policies that provide for students, at their parents' request, to attend for 1 to 5 hours per week off-premises released time programs operated by private entities and which offer religious instruction. Under the mandated policy, students remain responsible for any schoolwork issued during the student's absence.

Texas Legislature Passes Bill to Require Ten Commandments in Every Classroom

The Texas legislature this week gave final approval to SB10 (full text) which requires public schools to post a copy of the Ten Commandments in every classroom. The bill sets out the language of the version of the Ten Commandments that must be used. Schools must accept privately donated posters or framed copies that meet the requirements of the Act and may also use school district funds to buy posters or copies. Three civil liberties groups yesterday announced that they will sue Texas to challenge the new law once it is signed by Governor Gregg Abbott.

Missouri Supreme Court Orders Re-evaluation of Injunction Barring Enforcement of Abortion Clinic Licensing

In State ex rel. Kehoe v. Zhang, (MO Sup. Ct., May 27, 2025) the Missouri Supreme Court held that a state trial court judge who enjoined enforcement of licensing requirements imposed on abortion clinics applied the wrong standard in determining whether preliminary injunctions should be granted. The Court ordered the trial court judge to vacate her orders granting preliminary relief and re-evaluate the requests under the new stricter standard two abortion clinics' requests for preliminary injunctions. St. Louis Public Radio reports on the Court's decision.

Suit Challenges Refusal to Recognize Ministers Ordained Online

Suit was filed last week in a Virginia federal district court challenging Augusta County and the City of Staunton's refusal to recognize ministers of the Universal Life Church who obtained ordination online as ministers authorized to perform marriage ceremonies under Virginia Code §20-23. Instead, they are required to register under §20-25 as a civil officiant which includes posting a $500 bond. The complaint (full text) in Universal Life Church Monastery Storehouse v. Landes, (WD VA, filed 5/22/2025) alleges that this violates the 1st and 14th Amendment, saying in part:

69. The Clerk defendants violate the Establishment Clause by interpreting and applying Va. Code Ann. §§20-23 and 20-26 to categorically deny ULC Monastery ministers the authority to solemnized marriages as religious officiants, solely because they were ordained by and are in regular communion with the ULC Monastery and not another approved religious society. This conduct impermissibly prefers certain denominations over others.....

77. Many of plaintiff ULC ministers ... choose to exercise their religion by officiating marriage ceremonies.... The Clerk Defendants' interpretation an application of Va. Code Ann. §§20-23 and 20-26 ... accordingly places an impermissible burden on Plaintiffs' religious practice in violation of the Free Exercise Clause....

84. ... The Equal Protection Clause prohibits intentional discrimination against similarly situated individuals and prohibits state action that burdens fundamental rights, including religious freedom. Discrimination based on religious affiliation must survive strict scrutiny....

91. Defendants' actual and threatened enforcement of Va. Code Ann. §§20-23, 20-26 and 20-28 against ULC Monastery and its ministers burdens speech based on its content and viewpoint, and is accordingly subject to strict scrutiny....

Augusta Free Press reports on the lawsuit.

[Thanks to Dusty Hoesly for the lead.]

Thursday, May 29, 2025

Teacher's Refusal to Use Student's Preferred Pronouns Justified Her Being Fired

In Ramirez v. Oakland Unified School District, (ND CA, May 27, 2025), a California federal district court dismissed claims by a former kindergarten teacher that her free speech and free exercise rights were violated by her termination for refusing to refer to a student using male pronouns when the student appeared to be biologically female. Both school officials and the student's parents requested that male pronouns be used. Plaintiff contended that her Catholic faith does not allow her to refer to a person using pronouns that differ from the person’s “divinely-intended gender.” The court held that the school district itself was protected by sovereign immunity and that the individual plaintiffs have qualified immunity as to any action for damages. The court went on to hold that plaintiff also failed to adequately allege either a speech or religious exercise claim, saying in part:

The complaint fails to state a claim because the alleged speech was not protected. Ms. Ramirez agreed to serve as an elementary school teacher at a public school. To do the job, a teacher must address and interact with their students. As other courts have observed, while addressing students is not part of the curriculum itself, “it is difficult to imagine how a teacher could perform [their] teaching duties on any subject without a method by which to address individual students.”,,,

The plaintiff’s main argument in opposition — that the above analysis does not apply because this case concerns compelled speech — fails both legally and factually. While the Supreme Court has suggested that compelled speech outside of an employee’s official duties warrants heightened protection, the government may insist that the employee deliver any lawful message when the speech is part of the employee’s official duties....

Here, the plaintiff does not contest that the district’s anti-discrimination policy is facially neutral. Instead, she contends that school officials were impermissibly hostile towards her religious beliefs when enforcing the policy. The argument fails because, even accepted as true, the well-pleaded facts do not plausibly allege hostility.

Sports Apparel Company Challenges Colorado's Public Accommodation Law Protection of Transgender Athletes

Suit was filed this week in a Colorado federal district court by an online athletic apparel company, "XX-YY Athletics," that promotes banning of transgender women from women's sports through logos on its apparel and through advertisements. The company claims that Colorado's Anti-Discrimination Act violates the 1st and 14th Amendments when its public accommodation provisions declare that Coloradans have a right to access advertising that is free from discrimination on the basis of gender expression and chosen name. The complaint (full text) in Committee of Five, Inc. v. Sullivan, (D CO, filed 5/27/2025), alleges in part:

191. The most common way that XX-XY Athletics demonstrates why male competition in women’s sports is unfair or unsafe is by reference to specific transgender-identifying male athletes....

206. Although CADA prohibits XX-XY Athletics from speaking consistently with its view that sex is immutable, the law allows other businesses that also qualify as public accommodations to speak according to their view that sex can be changed.

207. This distinction in treatment is based on a particular view that the business holds about human sexuality and gender identity....

222. The First Amendment’s Free Speech, Press, and Assembly Clauses protect XX-XY Athletics’ ability to speak, create, publish, sell, and distribute speech; to associate with others and with their messages for expressive purposes; to adopt and act on certain speech-related policies; to decline to associate with others and their message for expressive purposes; to decline to create, publish, sell, and distribute speech; to be free from content-based and viewpoint-based discrimination; and to be free from overbroad and vague restrictions on speech that give enforcement officials unbridled discretion....

225. As applied to XX-XY Athletics, CADA impermissibly discriminates against the company’s speech based on content and viewpoint by prohibiting it from referring to individuals by their given name and with pronouns and terminology consistent with their biological sex.

226. As applied to XX-XY Athletics, CADA impermissibly inhibits the company’s ability to form expressive associations it desires to form and to avoid expressive associations it desires to avoid by requiring the company to refer to individuals by their preferred name, pronouns, and other terminology and prohibiting the company from referring to individuals by their given name and with pronouns and terminology consistent with their biological sex....

The complaint also alleges that the Colorado law is void for vagueness and violates the Equal Protection clause. ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Wednesday, May 28, 2025

Suit Challenges Display of Statues of Saints on Public Safety Building

Suit was filed yesterday in a Massachusetts state trial court seeking to enjoin the city of Quincy and its mayor from installing statues of two Catholic saints, St. Michael and St. Florian, on the facade of its new public safety building. The city has already spent over $760,000 for creation of the statues. The suit also seeks to bar additional expenditures. The complaint (full text) in Fitzmaurice v. City of Quincy, (MA Super., filed 5/27/2025), alleges that the decision to acquire the statues was made by the city's mayor without notice to the public. Only some members of City Council knew of the plan before it was disclosed in a February 2025 news article. The complaint alleges that installation and display of the statues will violate Art. III of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.

Americans United issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Court Vacates EEOC Rule Requiring Accommodation of Employees' Abortions

In State of Louisiana v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, (WD LA, May 21, 2025), a Louisiana federal district court set aside an EEOC rule that interprets the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act to require employers to provide reasonable accommodation for abortions. The court had previously issued a preliminary injunction ("PI") in the case. In setting the rule aside, the court said in part:

Given the political, social, and religious significance of the abortion issue in this country, the PI Ruling explained that EEOC must point to “clear congressional authorization” for the power it claims in the Final Rule.... And as the PI Ruling emphasized, “[n]ot only is the EEOC unable to point to any language in the PWFA empowering it to mandate the accommodation of elective abortions, but there can be little doubt in today’s political environment that any version of the PWFA that included an abortion accommodation requirement would have failed to pass Congress.”... That finding remains true today, and the Court concludes that the EEOC has failed to point to clear congressional authorization for the inclusion of abortion protection in a statute intended only to accommodate and protect female employees during pregnancy.

The case was consolidated with U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops v. EEOC.

AP reports on the decision.

Supreme Court Denies Cert. In School's Ban on Anti-Transgender T-Shirt

The U.S. Supreme Court yesterday denied review in L.M. v. Town of Middleborough, Massachusetts, (Sup. Ct., certiorari denied May 27, 2025). In the case, the U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals upheld middle school officials' decision that a student was in violation of school rules by wearing a T-shirt that proclaims: "There Are Only Two Genders." Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas filed an opinion dissenting from the denial of certiorari, saying in part:

The First Circuit held that the school did not violate L. M.’s free-speech rights. It held that the general prohibition against viewpoint-based censorship does not apply to public schools. And it employed a vague, permissive, and jargon-laden rule that departed from the standard this Court adopted in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503 (1969).

The First Circuit’s decision calls out for our review....

I would grant the petition for two reasons. First, we should reaffirm the bedrock principle that a school may not engage in viewpoint discrimination when it regulates student speech. Tinker itself made that clear.... Curiously, however, the First Circuit declined to follow Tinker in this regard, instead cherry-picking which First Amendment principles it thought worthy of allowing through the schoolhouse gates. By limiting the application of our viewpoint-discrimination cases, the decision below robs a great many students of that core First Amendment protection.

Second, we should also grant review to determine whether the First Circuit properly understood the rule adopted in Tinker regarding the suppression of student speech on the ground that it presents a risk of material disruption.

Justice Thomas also filed a separate brief dissenting opinion. NBC News reports on the Court's action.

Tuesday, May 27, 2025

Supreme Court Denies Review of Apache's Loss of Sacred Land

By a vote of 6-2, the U.S. Supreme Court today denied review in Apache Stronghold v. United States, (Sup.Ct., certiorari denied May 27, 2025). In the case, the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals sitting en banc, by a vote of 6-5, refused to enjoin the government from transferring to a copper mining company federally-owned forest land that is of significant spiritual value to the Western Apache Indians. Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Thomas, today filed a lengthy dissent to the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari, saying in part:

Exactly nothing in the phrase “substantial burden”—or anything else in RFRA’s text—hints that a different and more demanding standard applies when (and only when) the “disposition” of the government’s property is at issue....

... [A]t bottom, it seems the Ninth Circuit was concerned that a ruling for Apache Stronghold would effectively afford tribal members a “‘religious servitude’” on federal land at Oak Flat.... And, the argument goes, those who adopted RFRA could not have intended to afford Tribes or others that kind of power over the disposition of federal property.... But unexpressed legislative intentions are not the law. And even if we were to abandon the statutory text in favor of guesswork about unenacted congressional purposes, it is far from clear why we should make the guess the Ninth Circuit did....

While this Court enjoys the power to choose which cases it will hear, its decision to shuffle this case off our docket without a full airing is a grievous mistake—one with consequences that threaten to reverberate for generations. Just imagine if the government sought to demolish a historic cathedral on so questionable a chain of legal reasoning. I have no doubt that we would find that case worth our time. Faced with the government’s plan to destroy an ancient site of tribal worship, we owe the Apaches no less. They may live far from Washington, D. C., and their history and religious practices may be unfamiliar to many. But that should make no difference. “Popular religious views are easy enough to defend. It is in protecting unpopular religious beliefs that we prove this country’s commitment to . . . religious freedom.”

AP reports on the Court's action.

Evidence of Religious Differences Between Accused and Victim Did Not Require Reversal of Murder Conviction

In State of Washington v. Darraji, (WA App., May 22, 2025), a Washington state appellate court by a 2-1 vote affirmed a second-degree felony murder conviction of defendant, an Iraqi immigrant. Defendant, Yasir, was charged with murdering his former wife, Ibthal. The court explained:

At trial, the State’s theory was that Ibtihal’s rejection of traditional Iraqi culture and Islamic beliefs, and her embrace of American culture and Christianity, was the source of conflict between the former spouses. Their fighting and insults escalated until Yasir strangled Ibtihal to death in her car, drove the vehicle to a different location, and lit the car on fire with Ibtihal’s body inside.

On appeal, Yasir argues that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by introducing irrelevant and inflammatory evidence of Islamic beliefs to invoke anti-Muslim bias with jurors.

The majority rejected defendant's arguments, saying in part:

The comments and questions by the prosecutor were based on evidence and introduced to show motive. The State maintained that Yasir believed Ibtihal’s changing behaviors failed to conform to Iraqi culture and Islamic beliefs and were disrespectful, insulting, and reflected poorly on him.... The non-conforming behavior included drinking, smoking, going to bars, dating, driving, working, not covering her hair, and attending a Christian church. While Yasir’s appeal focuses primarily on evidence of the couples’ religious differences, the State maintained that Ibtihal’s conversion to Christianity and decision to wear her hair uncovered was part of the larger picture....

The foregoing questions and comments were based on relevant evidence and reasonable inferences ... and were introduced to show motive. An objective observer could not view these questions and comments as an appeal to bias or prejudice against Muslims or persons from Iraq.

Judge Fearing dissented, saying in part:

... [B]ecause of the divisive subject of Islam and stereotypes of Middle Eastern men, the State needed to selectively, thoughtfully, and carefully present its evidence rather than turn the trial into a contest between American culture and Christianity, on the one hand, and Iraqi culture and Islam, on the other hand....

The State gratuitously painted victim Ibtihal Darraji as Christian and American and defendant Yasir Darraji as Muslim and un-American. The State even went as far as suggesting Ibtihal was a martyr to Christianity. With its testimony and arguments to the jury, the State employed the ancient, but common, practice of portraying the victim as “us” and the accused as “them” in order to assure a conviction. I would reverse and remand for a new trial because Yasir Darraji did not receive a fair trial....

Monday, May 26, 2025

Memorial Day Proclamation

Today is Memorial Day. President Trump's Proclamation Prayer for Peace, Memorial Day 2025 (full text) reads in part:

Memorial Day is a sacred day of remembrance, reverence, and gratitude for the brave patriots who have laid down their lives in service to our great Nation....

We are eternally indebted to our Nation’s fallen heroes. On this solemn day, as we honor their sacrifice, the First Lady and I ask all citizens to join us in prayer that Almighty God may comfort those who mourn, grant protection to all who serve, and bring blessed peace to the world.

In honor of all of our fallen heroes, the Congress, by a joint resolution approved May 11, 1950, as amended (36 U.S.C. 116), has requested the President issue a proclamation calling on the people of the United States to observe each Memorial Day as a day of prayer for permanent peace and designating a period on that day when the people might unite in prayer. The Congress, by Public Law 106-579, has also designated 3:00 p.m. local time on that day as a time for all Americans to observe, in their own way, the National Moment of Remembrance....

Sunday, May 25, 2025

Plaintiff May Move Ahead with Claim That Iowa RFRA Protects His Religious Use of Cannabis

In Olsen v. State of Iowa, (IA Dist. Ct., May 22, 2025), an Iowa state trial court allowed plaintiff, a member of the Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church, to move ahead with his suit seeking an injunction to bar enforcement of Iowa's controlled-substance laws against his religious use of cannabis. The suit contends that his religious use of marijuana is protected by Iowa's Religious Freedom Restoration Act enacted last year. That Act contains its own definition of "compelling governmental interest." Even though in federal court litigation in 2008 plaintiff lost his claim that the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act exempts his religious use of marijuana from federal and state controlled-substance laws, the Iowa state court rejected the state's argument that this suit should be dismissed on collateral estoppel grounds, saying in part:

The issue raised in this litigation is the same as the Petitioner’s prior actions as cited in the briefing, that being whether the compelling state interest test was met regarding the restriction of the Petitioner’s use of cannabis. This issue was central to the Petitioner’s prior cases.

The Petitioner argues the legal landscape has changed since the prior rulings were issued. Collateral estoppel does not apply if controlling facts or legal principles have changed significantly since the Petitioner's prior judgments. Olsen v. Mukasey, 541 F.3d at 831. The court finds that based on this particular argument, that the Petitioner’s should not be dismissed at this time....

In this case, the Petitioner is asserting the claim under Iowa Code Chapter 675. Although it is markedly similar to the federal RFRA and the Petitioner has made similar unsuccessful claims in the past, this court cannot conclude to a certainty that there is no possibility of success under the newly-passed Iowa RFRA.

Plaintiff, who is litigating pro se, issued a press release announcing the decision.

Saturday, May 24, 2025

Supreme Court Gives Emergency Relief to State Legislator Who Was Disenfranchised After Anti-Transgender Social Media Post

In Libby v. Fecteau, (Sup. Ct., May 20, 2025), the U.S. Supreme Court by a vote of 7-2 granted an injunction pending appeal to a member of the Maine House of Representatives. Petitioner's Emergency Application for an Injunction describes the issue before the Court:

Maine State Representative Laurel Libby spoke out on social media about an intensely debated issue—the participation of transgender athletes in girls’ high school sports. Maine requires girls to compete alongside transgender athletes; Libby criticized that policy after a transgender athlete won the girls’ pole vault at the state track-and-field championship. Displeased with Libby’s criticism, the Maine House voted along party lines to censure her.

The verbal censure (unwise as it may be) is not what Applicants challenge here. It’s what happened next. The Speaker declared Libby was barred from speaking or voting until she recants her view. This means her thousands of constituents in Maine House District 90 are now without a voice or vote for every bill coming to the House floor for the rest of her elected term, which runs through 2026.....

In this application, Petitioners seek an injunction pending appeal requiring the Clerk to count Libby’s votes. That interim relief simply restores the status quo of equal representation, bringing the Maine House back into conformity with every other State and Congress.

The Supreme Court granted the injunction in a one-paragraph order that did not give reasons for the decision. Justices Sotomayor and Jackson voted to deny the injunction. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

Not very long ago, this Court treaded carefully with respect to exercising its equitable power to issue injunctive relief at the request of a party claiming an emergency. The opinions are legion in which individual Justices, reviewing such requests in chambers, declined to intervene—reiterating that “such power should be used sparingly and only in the most critical and exigent circumstances.” ...

Those days are no more. Today’s Court barely pauses to acknowledge these important threshold limitations on the exercise of its own authority. It opts instead to dole out error correction as it sees fit, regardless of the lack of any exigency and even when the applicants’ claims raise significant legal issues that warrant thorough evaluation by the lower courts that are dutifully considering them....

SCOTUSblog and The Washington Stand report on the decision.

Friday, May 23, 2025

Suit Challenges School District's Speech Policy

Suit was filed this week in an Oregon federal district court by a clinical social worker employed by an Oregon school district challenging the application of the district's Speech Policy to his display on a shelf in his office of three books that reject notions of transgender identity. The complaint (full text) in Theis v. InterMountain Education Service District Board of Directors, (D OR, filed 5/21/2025), alleges in part:

He is He and She is She ... explain how every child should embrace and love herself exactly as God made her to be....

... [A]n employee at one of Mr. Theis’ schools saw the covers of the Books and complained that they were “transphobic.” IMESD labeled the display as “a hostile expression of animus toward another person relating to their actual or perceived gender identity” and ordered Mr. Theis to remove them. IMESD then warned him that “further conduct of this nature” may result in discipline, including termination of his employment....

2. Plaintiff is ... a professing Christian who bases his beliefs on the Bible and strives to live out his Christian faith at work and in the community.

3. Plaintiff’s sincerely held religious beliefs govern his views about all aspects of life, including human nature, sex, and gender....

217. Defendants’ censorship of Plaintiff’s display of the Books while permitting books and other decorations with different messages on related topics is content and viewpoint discrimination, which is unconstitutional in any type of forum....

220. Defendants’ Speech Policy and practice also impose an unconstitutional heckler’s veto because they permit the restriction of protected employee expression merely because school officials deem an employee’s expression “offensive” to others....

249. Plaintiff’s sincerely held religious beliefs motivated him to display the Books in his office.

250. Defendants substantially burdened Plaintiff’s religious exercise when they forced Plaintiff to choose between exercising his religious beliefs and being dismissed or violating his conscience.