9th Circuit: Question of Fact Remains on Whether Airline Flight Attendants Were Fired Because of Their Religious Beliefs

In Brown v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., (9th Cir., June 24, 2026), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals held that there is a genuine dispute of material fact that precludes dismissing before trial a suit by two Alaska Airlines flight attendants (Brown and Smith) who were fired after they posted comments on an internal intranet communications network opposing the Airline's support for the proposed federal Equality Act. That proposed Act protected LGBTQ+ rights. At issue is whether the firings were because of the flight attendants' religious beliefs or instead because their comments violated the company’s anti-discrimination and anti-harassment policies. The court said in part:

... [T]he issue is not whether Alaska can punish employees who engage in discrimination and harassment (it can).  The issue here is instead a factual one of whether Brown was in fact fired for engaging in discrimination or harassment, or whether Alaska instead used the cover of its employee policies to fire Brown because of her religious beliefs.  Construing the facts in the light most favorable to Brown, there is a genuine dispute of material fact on this point, and so summary judgment for Alaska was improper....

Under our cases, a union under Title VII “has an affirmative obligation to oppose employment discrimination against its members,” and if the union instead “acquiesce[s] or join[s] in the Company’s discrimination practices, it too is liable to the injured employees.”

The record raises factual questions about whether AFA’s representation of Brown was colored by potential disagreement with her religious views....

Judge Christen dissented in part, saying in part:

I dissent from my colleagues’ decision to reverse the district court’s entry of summary judgment on Lacey Smith’s claims against Alaska because I do not agree that Smith demonstrated a genuine dispute of material fact about whether Alaska terminated her because of her religion...

During Alaska’s investigation, Smith insisted that she was merely posing a philosophical question rather than asserting to the investigators that her Christian beliefs caused her to conclude that the Equality Act was immoral.  The majority posits that “‘morality’ is often associated with religious beliefs,” but references to morality are not inherently religious....

First Liberty Institute issued a press release announcing the decision.

Parents Sue California School District Over Opt-Out Rights

Suit was filed this week in a California federal district court challenging a California school district's refusal to allow parents to opt their children out of LGBTQ+ instruction that conflicts with the family's religious beliefs. Plaintiff parents contend that the Supreme Court's 2025 decision in Mahmoud v. Taylor gives them the right to opt their children out of this instruction. The complaint (full text) in Taylor v. Sunnyvale School District, (ND CA, filed 6/22/2026), alleges in part:

12.... As devout members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, they, like “[m]any Americans,” including the parents in Mahmoud, “believe that biological sex reflects divine creation, that sex and gender are inseparable, and that children should be encouraged to accept their sex and to live accordingly.”...  

13. The Taylors also believe that Sunnyvale’s curriculum is age-inappropriate and inconsistent with their religious beliefs, practices, and child-raising philosophies, and that forcing their children to participate in Sunnyvale’s LGBTQ+ instruction will undermine their efforts to raise their children in accordance with their religious beliefs....

18. ... [A]fter months of cordial conversation, Sunnyvale abruptly reversed course and denied the Taylors’ request for notice and opt-outs, stating in a letter that LGBTQ+ instruction “is not optional and is not subject to parent opt-out provisions.” ...  According to Sunnyvale, “the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Mahmoud v. Taylor … addressed a specific set of facts in another state,” did not create a “general or automatic right for parents to opt their children out of required curriculum,” and “does not override California’s statutory requirements governing instructional content.”... With that, the denial letter concluded that Sunnyvale is “not granting opt-outs from LGBTQ+-inclusive curriculum or storybooks that are part of our adopted educational program.”...

Plaintiffs contend that the school's refusal violates their parental right to control the education of their children as well as their free exercise and free speech rights. Becket Fund issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Supreme Court Rejects Suit Against Cisco for Aiding Persecution of Falun Gong

Yesterday, in Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe, (Sup. Ct., June 23, 2026), the U.S. Supreme Court rejected claims by practitioners of Falun Gong, that Cisco Systems violated the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act by aiding and abetting actions against Falun Gong carried out by the government of China. Cisco created a surveillance technology used by the Chinese Communist Party to identify, track, arrest, subject to forced labor and torture Falun Gong practitioners. At issue is whether the two U.S. statutes permit suits in U.S. courts against Cisco for its role.

The majority opinion written by Justice Barrett and joined by Chief Justice Roberets and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch and Kavanaugh Held that "Courts cannot create new rights of action to remedy violations of international law, so there is necessarily no liability for aiding and abetting such violations." They also held that there is no liability under the Torture Victim Protection Act for aiding and abetting.

Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion. Justices Kagan and Jackson joined the dissenting opinion insofar as it disagreed with the majority's interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute. They contended that there is an implied right of action under the Alien Tort Statute for violations of international law. Justice Sotomayor alone went on to argue that the Torture Victim Protection Act allows victims to sue for aiding and abetting torture.

Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Kagen, filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. They agreed with the dissent's views on the Alien Tort Statute. However, they agreed with the majority, though with somewhat different reasoning, that the Torture Victim Protection Act does not create an aiding-and-abetting cause of action.

Reuters reports on the decision. [Thanks to Dusty Hoesly for the lead.]

Massachusetts Supreme Court Invalidates Initiative Petition That Excludes Religious Housing from Rent Controls

The Massachusetts Constitution Art. 48 which sets out the procedures for initiative petitions provides in part that no measure relating to religion, religious practices or religious institutions may be proposed by an initiative petition.  In Cella v. Attorney General, (MA Sup. Judicial Ct., June 23, 2026), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that this provision is violated by a petition proposing an end to the statewide ban on rent control and instituting a limit on rent increases. The new rent control limits, however, would not apply to several categories of dwellings, including dwelling units in facilities operated solely for religious purposes. The court said in part:

The Attorney General argues that the petition does not discriminate in favor of religious institutions because it also provides exemptions for secular dwelling units, including facilities operated for educational and nonprofit purposes.  The presence of secular exemptions does not negate that the petition, on its face, uses religion as "a factor in its application" .... Nor do these secular exemptions change the fact that the petition, by including a carveout for religious facilities, brings "religious questions into the politics of this State"...

The court rejected the Attorney General's argument that the petition should be allowed because its "main purpose" is unrelated to religion. The Court said in part:

Applying a less exacting standard -- permitting at least some measures that by their own terms govern religion, religious practices, or religious institutions -- would contravene not only the plain language of art. 48, but also the intent of its framers.  The convention delegates intended to strictly maintain "the entire separation of church and State" by "mak[ing] it as difficult as possible to bring religious questions into the politics of this State." 

The Court however pointed out:

 ... [A]lthough religious beliefs may encompass a wide array of human conduct, an initiative petition does not "relate[]" to religion within the meaning of art. 48 just because a person's personal religious beliefs might inform his or her views on an otherwise secular subject matter; rather, the measure itself must relate to religion....

Some Claims for Football Injuries at Catholic School Are Barred by Ecclesiastical Abstenition Doctrine

In In re Fort Bend Christian Academy, (TX App., June 23, 2026), a Texas state appellate court held that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine bars some of the claims brought by parents of a high school student who suffered traumatic brain injury during football practice at the Christian college preparatory high school. The court said in part:

... [T]he Hagans alleged that the Academy breached its obligation to make academic accommodations for B.H. after he suffered the brain injury. The Academy, however, is a college preparatory school committed to offering “a superior academic experience integrated with a consistent, Christian worldview and biblical perspective.” Accordingly, the Hagans’s claims alleging the Academy failed to accommodate B.H. do not turn on neutral principles of law but on the Academy’s application of its policy governing when — and to what extent — it modifies its biblically-based curriculum for students....

Additionally, the Hagans alleged that, before B.H.’s enrollment, Academy officials made specific promises that he would not be subjected to bullying and harassment....

We conclude these claims too concern ecclesiastical matters over which the trial court lacks jurisdiction because they arise from the Academy’s application of internal policies grounded in religious doctrine. These claims are premised on the Academy’s alleged failure to enforce its anti-bullying policy and prevent students from bullying B.H. But the policy states the Academy will provide “discipline that [is] Bibliocentric,” and that its approach to discipline is for students “to grow in self-discipline according to God’s Word so that external discipline measures become less needed.”... Consequently, the trial court cannot adjudicate these claims without deciding questions of religious doctrine and interfering with the Academy’s internal governance....

[The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine] does not bar the Hagans’s negligence claim, brought on B.H.’s behalf for personal-injury damages, because that claim arises from duties imposed by law — independent of any agreement between the Academy and the Hagans — and may be adjudicated under neutral tort principles without imposing liability on the Academy for complying with its religious-based policies.... 

Finally, we consider the doctrine’s application to the Hagans’s breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and DTPA claims to the extent those claims allege that the Academy breached concussion-management obligations arising from its TAPPS [Texas Association of Private and Parochial Schools] membership....

We conclude that the claims seeking to hold the Academy liable for breaching alleged concussion-management obligations arising from its TAPPS membership present secular, non-ecclesiastical issues over which the trial court may exercise jurisdiction....

Supreme Court: Damages Under RLUIPA Not Available Against Prison Guards

In Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections and Public Safety, (Sup. Ct., June 23, 2026), the U.S. Supreme Court in a 6-3 decision held that a Rastafarian inmate whose knee-length hair was forcibly shaved by prison guards does not have a claim for damages under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act against the guards in their private capacities. The majority's holding turns on the fact that RLUIPA was enacted under Congress' taxing and spending power. The majority said in part:

As a condition of funding, Congress called on state prison systems to agree to answer suits by private plaintiffs alleging substantial burdens on their religious exercises. Specifically, the law asked those systems to consent to suit by any injured party “assert[ing] a violation of” RLUIPA and seeking “appropriate relief.”  §2000cc–2(a)....

Under the Spending Clause, Congress lacks regulatory authority to impose liability on [the officers] directly and must depend instead on consent.  And because they never agreed to answer suits like this one, Mr. Landor’s case cannot proceed against them any more than a breach of contract action might proceed against a defendant who never formed a contract....

Under the Spending Clause, Congress’s power to spend money does not include the power to regulate.  Spending Clause statutes can bind only those who voluntarily and knowingly undertake obligations by agreement with the federal government. Because that essential element is missing here, we affirm the judgment of the Fifth Circuit.

Justice Jackson, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

Neither respondents nor the Court contests Congress’s power to impose RLUIPA’s substantive directive accommodating religious freedom.  The majority nevertheless adopts the peculiar position that Congress is powerless to create, and a State is powerless to accept, the natural next step: a damages remedy against officials who violate that directive. 

This severance of rights and remedies is a sleight of hand; it comes by way of the majority’s full-throated endorsement of a contract analogy even though what secures the rights at issue is not a contract but a law.  Today’s decision magically transforms a federal statute into an invitation to be accepted or declined, deemed binding only if each particular defendant has explicitly agreed to be penalized.  No matter that laws, as opposed to contracts, don’t ordinarily work 

AP reports on the decision.

7th Circuit Upholds Alcohol Ban as Condition of Supervised Release for Messianic Jew

 In United States v. Broadfield, (7th Cir., June 22, 2026), Brian Broadfield, who had served a prison term on drug charges, sought to have the conditions of his supervised release modified. A condition of his supervised release was that he refrain from all alcohol use.  He argued that the condition should be modified so that he can consume a glass of wine each Friday during a Messianic Jewish religious ceremony. Broadfield had previously violated the terms of a supervised release through conduct caused in part by alcohol consumption. The court said in part:

[Broadfield] contends, as a practicing Messianic Jew, the district court’s supervised release condition prohibiting him from the use of alcohol violates his free exercise of religion, in violation of RFRA.  ...

Here, Broadfield concedes that the government has a compelling interest in preventing him from using alcohol outside his religious services. But the government goes further, contending that it has a compelling interest in prohibiting Broadfield from consuming alcohol entirely. We agree....

The evidence here shows that completely prohibiting Broadfield from consuming alcohol is the least restrictive means to further the government’s compelling interest in protecting the community from him, preventing his recidivism, promoting his rehabilitation and successful completion of supervised release, and treating his alcoholism. For that reason, we need not opine on whether monitoring Broadfield’s alcohol use with a breathalyzer would be a “viable alternative.”...  

U.S. and Florida Launch Investigations of Religious Discrimination by Major League Baseball

Major League Baseball's apparent selective enforcement of its rules regarding players' uniforms has led to religious discrimination investigations by both the EEOC at the behest of the Department of Justice and by Florida's Attorney General.  A June 18 letter (full text) from the U.S. Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights Harmeet Dhillon to Commissioner of Baseball Robert Manfred says in part:

According to media reports, Major League Baseball ("MLB") has warned and/or is considering disciplining three players on the San Francisco Giants who refused to participate in "Pride Night." The three players expressed their opposition to MLB's pro-Pride orthodoxy by inscribing Bible verses on their rainbow-colored hats....

MLB has asserted that its warning to the Giants players "had absolutely nothing to do with the content of the message" and that it merely is enforcing a policy that prohibits writing on uniforms. Yet MLB has allowed players to wear uniform patches reading "Black Lives Matter."  This double standard-- under which players may not inscribe Bible verses on hats for one game only but may wear "Black Lives Matter" patches for one game only-- calls MLB's true motives into question and raises serious concerns about MLB's compliance with Title VII....

I have referred this matter to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for further investigation.

A June 19 press release from Florida Attorney General James Uthmeier says that his office has sent a letter and issued an investigative subpoena to MLB, indicating that Florida is also launching a formal probe into whether MLB is engaging in religious discrimination in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act by selectively enforcing its rules regarding uniforms.

Nassau County Buffer and Bubble Zones Around Houses of Worship Violate Free-Speech Rights

In Borecky v. County of Nassau, (ED NY, June 18, 2026), a New York federal district court issued a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the Nassau County Religious Safety Act. The law prohibits picketing, literature distribution or oral advocacy within 35 feet of a place of religious worship (Buffer Provision). It also creates a bubble zone of 100 feet around a place of religious worship in which an advocate may not, without a person's consent, approach within 10 feet of a person to engage in oral advocacy, deliver literature or carry signs (Bubble Provision). Plaintiffs were advocates for immigrant rights. The court (in its 63-page opinion) said in part:

If the goal is to avoid harassment, intimidation, violence, or threatening speech, the County could have drafted a law that criminalized such conduct.  It need not have also banned peaceful conversation, polite exchange, and information distribution on public streets—what amounts to the “extreme step of closing a substantial portion of a traditional public forum to all speakers.”... There is no evidence in this record that Nassau County considered any alternative laws or seriously engaged in any exercise of limiting the First Amendment damage inflicted by the RSA on individuals like Plaintiffs....

There might have been a record that justified the impositions on protected speech from the Buffer Provision.  But it is not here....

Defendants have failed to articulate any rationale for having both a buffer and bubble provision to advance their interests in protecting religious liberty and public safety.  The combined effect of the two exacts a chilling of free expression that neither does alone....

The Buffer Provision makes no attempt to accommodate the diversity and types of institutions around which the restriction operates.  There are nearly 1000 such places, some are in storefronts, some which abut private business, others on detached pieces of property, others abutting sidewalks and public thoroughfares.... And as a result, the 35-foot radius around a driveway or entrance prohibits activity in all manner of places—including core public forums like sidewalks and streets—without regard to the particular site or location of any individual place of worship....

The differences between the Buffer and Bubble Provisions do not save the latter from facial invalidity....

Given the breadth of the expressive conduct and speech implicated by the law, an officer is left with the discretion to determine whether the individual standing in silence wearing a t-shirt with a political message is violating the statute or not engaging in expressive conduct at all.  “Because of its overbreadth, the statute vests local law enforcement officers with too much arbitrary discretion in determining whether or not a certain emblem is grounds for prosecution.  It permits only that expression which local officials will tolerate[.]” ...

amNY reports on the decision.

Canada Enacts New Hate Crime Law

The Canadian Parliament's Bill C-9, the Combatting Hate Act (full text), received Royal Assent on June 18. It comes into force on July 18. The Act provides in part:

 (2.‍2) Everyone commits an offence who wilfully promotes hatred against any identifiable group by displaying, in any public place, (a) a symbol that is principally used by, or principally associated with, a listed entity, as defined in subsection 83.‍01(1); (b) the Nazi Hakenkreuz or the Nazi double Sig-Rune, also known as the SS bolts; or (c) a symbol that so nearly resembles a symbol described in paragraph (a) or (b) that it is likely to be a symbol described in paragraph (a) or (b)....

320.‍1001 (1) Everyone who commits an offence ... under this Act or any other Act of Parliament, if the commission of the included offence is motivated by hatred based on race, national or ethnic origin, language, colour, religion, sex, age, mental or physical disability, sexual orientation or gender identity or expression, is (a) guilty of an indictable offence and liable to the punishment provided for in subsection (5); or (b) guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction....

Clarification. (3) For greater certainty, the commission of an offence under this Act or any other Act of Parliament is not, for the purposes of this section, motivated by hatred based on any of the factors mentioned in subsection (1) solely because it discredits, humiliates, hurts or offends....

423.‍3 (1) Every person commits an offence who engages in any conduct with the intent to provoke a state of fear in a person in order to impede their access to (a) a building or structure, or part of a building or structure, that is primarily used (i) for religious worship, or (ii) by an identifiable group, as defined in subsection 318(4), (A) for administrative, social, cultural or sports activities or events, (B) as an educational institution, including a daycare centre, or (C) as a residence for seniors; or (b) a cemetery....

(2) Every person commits an offence who, without lawful authority, intentionally obstructs or interferes with another person’s lawful access to a building or structure, or part of a building or structure, referred to in paragraph (1)‍(a) or to a cemetery....

Exception. (4) No person is guilty of an offence under subsection (2) by reason only that they attend at or near, or approach, a building or structure referred to in paragraph (1)‍(a) or a cemetery for the purpose only of obtaining or communicating information.

  A press release from the Canadian Department of Justice summarizes the Act.

Sixty-three Canadian civil rights groups issued a statement (full text) expressing concern about the new law. The Statement says in part:

... Legislative responses to hate ... must be carefully tailored to ensure that they are consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and do not create unintended consequences for the civil liberties they seek to protect. 

Bill C-9 introduces several provisions that raise significant concerns regarding freedom of expression, freedom of peaceful assembly, and the potential for arbitrary or disproportionate enforcement....

Recent Articles of Interest

From SSRN:

• Johnny Davis, The Church, Statism, and a Biblical Worldview of Government, (May 03, 2026).
• Abraham Chan, When Tithing Becomes Fraud: Registration-Contingent Criminalization of Religious Economic Life in China, (June 04, 2026).
• Levi Cooper, Rabbi Mosheh Isserles and the Codification of Jewish Law, (Historical Atlas of Jewish Galicia and Bukovina, eds. Nathan Shifriss, Judith Kalik, and Levi Cooper, 2025).
• Jermaine E. Whiteside, Faithful Intelligence: A Theological Governance Framework for Artificial Intelligence in Interreligious Religious Education, (May 30, 2026).
• Robert J. Miller, Unraveling the International Law of Colonialism - The Doctrine of Discovery, (Arizona State University Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law Paper No. 6884840 (2026)).
• Victoria Litman, Rethinking the Religious Purpose Test After Catholic Charities Bureau: The Sincerity-Then-Standards Framework, (August 01, 2025).
• Cynthia Soohoo, True Abolition: Dismantling Criminal Abortion Laws and Building Policies to Realize Reproductive Justice, (The Harbinger | VOL. 53 | June 2026).
• Tristin K. Green, Beyond Personal Offense in Antidiscrimination Law, (Loyola Law School, Los Angeles Legal Studies Research Paper No. 101 (2026)).
• Hosea Michael Horneman, Wrongful Death of Frozen Human Embryos (June 12, 2026). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6928859

From SSRN (Islamic Law):

• Irfan Haroon, When Husband and Wife Commit Zina - A Prophetic Warning and Its Manifestation in Contemporary Muslim Society — A Study in the Light of Sahih Bukhari, Islamic Jurisprudence, and Pakistani Family Law, (May 30, 2026).
• Ahmer Bilal Soofi, Article 1 of the Genocide Convention 1948 and the Qur'an (4:75) Are Pari Materia, (May 28, 2026).
• Ahmad M. Dipu, Competing Models of Islamic Legal Modernity: Jurisprudential Authority, Codification, and State Legitimacy in Saudi Arabia and Iran with Implications for Bangladesh, (June 04, 2026).
• Ekaterina Ryzhkova, Evolution of Fiqh: Lessons from the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries, (March 20, 2026).

From Elsewhere:

• Osama S. Qatrani, When a Latin Chronicle Made the Muslim Caliph Judge the Christian King: King John's Alleged Embassy to the Almohad Court (1212), (Zenodo, June 18, 2026).
• Osama S. Qatrani, Justice, Mercy, and the Spirit of Law: Is Law a Tool of Punishment, Guidance, Accountability, Protection, or Revenge?, (Academia, 2026).
• Steven H. Sholk, A Guide to Election Year Activities of Section 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) Organizations, (June 2, 2026 Edition).

Court Invalidates Most of Missouri's Abortion Regulations

In Comprehensive Health of Planned Parenthood Great Plains v. State of Missouri, (MO Cir. Ct., June 18, 2026), a Missouri state trial court found that some 30 state statutes and regulations dealing with abortions conflict with the Reproductive Freedom amendment to the state constitution adopted in 2024. The court though upheld the statutory requirement for an in-person visit to a physician to confirm gestational age to determine whether medication abortion would be safe and appropriate and to rule out an ectopic pregnancy. However, the court invalidated the requirement that prescribed abortion medication be taken in the presence of the prescribing physician. A preliminary injunction issued in 2024 had left in place various abortion facility requirements that impeded the reopening of abortion clinics. (See prior posting.) The permanent injunction issued last week appears to have now invalidated those provisions.  The Hill reports on the decision.

Cert. Petition Filed Challenging Grant of Qualified Immunity In 1st Amendment Case

A petition for certiorari (full text) was filed with the U.S Supreme Court last week seeking review of the 5th Circuit's decision in Hershey v. City of Bossier City. In the case, a 3-judge panel in a splintered decision reversed a Louisiana federal district court's dismissal of a suit against the city by plaintiff who was passing out booklets for the Christian Vegetarian Association outside an arena in which a Christian rock concert was taking place. However, the court affirmed the trial court's qualified immunity dismissal of the claims against police and security guards. (See prior posting.) It is this aspect of the 5th Circuit's decision that is being appealed in the certiorari petition. At issue is whether in free speech and free exercise claims, officers can claim qualified immunity where a reasonable officer should have understood their action to be unconstitutional, but their particular action has not been previously held unconstitutional by a court.

First Liberty Institute issued a press release announcing the filing of the cert. petition.

9th Circuit Grants En Banc Review in Church Autonomy Case

In  Union Gospel Mission of Yakima Washington v. Brown, (9th Cir., June 18, 2026), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals voted to review en banc the 3-judge panel's decision that barred enforcement of Washington's Law Against Discrimination against a Christian ministry that gives hiring preference to co-religionists for non-ministerial positions. (See prior posting.)

Judge Bumatay, joined by Judges VanDyke and Tung, filed an opinion dissenting from the grant of en banc review, saying in part:

... [T]he Ninth Circuit has relegated religious liberty to a second-class right.  In case after case, our court has condoned governmental interference with the rights of the religious to practice their faith as they believe. 

Now, with this en banc vote, we continue down this disturbing path.  In what is likely a foregone conclusion, our court steps toward endorsing the view that States can force a religious organization to hire individuals who openly flout its religious beliefs and teachings.  As a matter of constitutional first principles and precedent, that’s wrong.... 

FTC and States Sue Organization Setting Standards for Pediatric Trans Care

The Federal Trade Commission along with the states of Alaska, Iowa, Nebraska and Texas, filed suit yesterday against the World Professional Association for Transgender Health (WPATH) alleging violations of federal and state fraud and consumer protection laws. WPATH develops Standards of Care (SOC) for pediatric medical gender transitioning. Its SOC are relied upon by clinicians and insurance companies. The 123-page complaint (full text) in Federal Trade Commission v. World Professional Association for Transgender Health, Inc., (ND TX, filed 6/17/2026), alleges in part:

9. In addition to representing that the SOC itself, and the life-altering surgeries it recommends, reflect expert consensus and high-quality evidence, WPATH represents in the SOC that these and other transition services are medically necessary and effective at preventing suicide in children, that puberty blockers are fully reversible, that cross-sex hormones improve mental health, and that breast amputations are safe, effective, and consistently and directly increase children’s health-related quality of life....

14. The success of WPATH’s systematic efforts to expand eligibility for transition services to children in order to profit its members is difficult to overstate. Through the SOC and its other efforts, WPATH has created and currently sustains a lucrative industry of pediatric medical transition services. Over roughly the past two decades, the number of pediatric medical transition providers has multiplied rapidly. The first pediatric medical transition clinic in the United States opened in 2007. By 2015, there were at least forty-one pediatric medical transition clinics across the United States, many embedded within major children’s hospitals and academic medical centers. Between 2017 and 2021, the number of children who were diagnosed yearly with distress about their sex traits in the U.S. nearly tripled from around 15,000 in 2017 to about 42,000 in 2021....

18.  WPATH falsely asserts that its recommendations are the result of rigorous scientific procedures and expert consensus, even though WPATH disregarded established guideline‑development standards, ignored the results of its own evidence reviews, and removed age limits in response to external pressure rather than scientific evidence....

The FTC issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.  AP reports on the lawsuit.

State AG's Urge FDA To Investigage Whether Mifepristone Is Contaminating Drinking Water Supplies

In a press release issued on Monday, Liberty Counsel announced that 14 Republican state attorneys general have sent a letter (full text of letter dated June 5) to the Food and Drug Admninistation urging it to investigate whether the abortion drug mifepristone is contaminating drinking water. The letter said in part:

The upsurge in home-setting chemical abortions has serious implications for the Safe Drinking Water Act. The metabolites in mifepristone and its approved generics remain active post-excretion... On top of this, conventional wastewater treatment is not designed to remove these type of contaminants, so there is strong reason to conclude that the compounds persist in both the environment and the water supply.....

We therefore urge this agency to abide by its duty to identify the contaminants most harmful to “sensitive subgroups,” including “pregnant women,” 42 U.S.C. § 300g–1(b)(1)(C), and amend the 6th CCL to include mifepristone and its approved generics. The health of pregnant women and Americans everywhere may depend on it.

According to the press release announcing the letter:

The coalition of attorneys general ...  urge the EPA to add Mifepristone to the Contaminant Candidate List (CCL). The CCL is a regulatory tool under the Safe Drinking Water Act that identifies contaminants that are not yet subject to any water protection regulations. Once a substance is on the CCL, it triggers federal safety studies on its health effects whereby the EPA must then decide how to regulate the substance.

Cert. Denied In School's Discipline of Pro-Life Student Group

The Supreme Court yesterday denied review in E.D. v. Noblesville School District, (Docket No. 25-906, certiorari denied 6/15/2026). At issue in the case is a high school's refusal to permit a student pro-life group to post flyers in the school because of the political content of the flyers. The dispute eventually led to the suspension of the pro-life group for several months. The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the school's action. 

Justice Alito filed an opinion dissenting from the denial of certiorari, saying in part:

Hazelwood ... concerned the regulation of “school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.”  ...  When regulating the content of such activities, the Court held, a school need only meet the low bar of showing that the censorship is “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.” 

... “[C]ourts must be very careful when a government claims that speech by one or more private speakers is actually government speech,” because “it can be difficult to tell whether the government is using the doctrine ‘as a subterfuge for favoring certain private speakers over others based on viewpoint.’”...

I would grant the petition to clarify the relationship between Hazelwood and our subsequent government-speech decisions.

Recent Articles and Books of Interest

From SSRN:

• Edgar A. Fernandez-Lopez, Turandot and the Exhaustion of Power: Ritual, Genealogy, Sacrifice, and the Twilight of Civilizations (June 06, 2026).
• Amir Downing, Religious Land Use Exceptionalism: The Meaning of "Substantial Burden" in RLUIPA, (Virginia Law Review, forthcoming March 2027).
• Dwight G. Newman & Kenechukwu Aneke, Associational Freedom in the Contexts of Religion and Sports. (Supreme Court Law Review, 3rd Series, Volume 14 (forthcoming)).
• Johnny Davis, Christian Nationalism, Trump, the Rise of the Far Right vs. a True Biblical Worldview, March 21, 2026).
• Gaston Rey, Magnifica Humanitas as the Constitution of Human Supremacy in the Digital Age, (May 28, 2026).
• Irfan Haroon, Redefining Harassment at the Workplace: A Critical Analysis of the Supreme Court of Pakistan’s Landmark Review Judgment, (May 28, 2026).
• Mahmoud A. El-Gamal, Zakāh as Tithe: Fiscal Engineering in Early Islamic Jurisprudence, (June 11, 2026).
• Stephen Greenway, Distinguishing Religion From Nonreligion After Catholic Charities, (Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics, & Public Policy, Volume 40 (forthcoming 2026)).
• Laura Snyder, A Tale of Two Emigrations: Why the Pope Needs Protection from the United States, (May 18, 2026).

From SmartCILP:

• Alex Reed, The Class Action Fairness Act Amendments Act: A Proposal, 46 Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labor Law 271-312 (2025).
• Yael Efron, Religious Conflicts in Disguise: The Limits of the Law in Tackling Conflicts with Religious Dimensions, 27 Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution 39-66 (2025).
• Bahman Khodadadi, The Theocratic Agency of the Iranian Legal System at the Legislative and Judicial Levels, 36 Yale Journal of Law & Humanities 251-274 (2025).
• S. Spencer Wells, Disciplining Conscience: Judging Ecclesiastical Courts in the Early American Republic, 36 Yale Journal of Law & Humanities 327-345 (2025).

Recent and Forthcoming Books:

• John Witte, Jr. & Andrea Pin, The Legal Foundations of Religious Freedom: Human Rights in the United States and Europe, (Notre Dame Press, April 2026).
• Mark A. Walters, Imran Awan, Mika Hagerlid, Alexander Kondakov, & Jennifer Schweppe, De Gruyter European Handbook on Hate Crime, (Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG, April 2026).
• John Duddington, The Legal Legacy of the Reformation: Catholic and Protestant Approaches to Law, (Routledge, forthcoming July 2026).
• Donald L. Drakeman, The Free Exercise Clause and the Rights of Conscience, (Harvard University Press, forthcoming November 2026).

President Issues Message on Catholic Bishops' Honoring of US 250th Anniversary

Yesterday the White House posted a Presidential Message on U.S. Catholic Bishops Honoring the 250th Anniversary of American Independence (full text). The Message reads in part:

Today, Melania and I join in prayer with Catholic Bishops gathered in Orlando, Florida, as they consecrate the United States of America to the Sacred Heart of Jesus on the occasion of our 250th year of American Independence—a powerful moment in our national story and a poignant reminder that America has always been guided by the loving hand of God....

This year’s Feast of the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus also fittingly marks the anniversary of one of the most momentous days in Western civilization’s long twilight struggle against atheistic communism.  On June 12, 1987, President Ronald Reagan delivered his historic address at Brandenburg Gate in Berlin, Germany, in which he famously implored Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev to “tear down this wall.”

Toward the end of his remarks, President Reagan identified what he called “the most fundamental distinction of all between East and West:  The totalitarian world produces backwardness because it does such violence to the spirit, thwarting the human impulse to create, to enjoy, to worship.”...

Thanks to the moral leadership of President Reagan and Pope Saint John Paul II, the tireless work and determination of free men and women around the world, and the moral witness of millions who endured prolonged suffering within the Captive Nations, the godless forces of Soviet communism were vanquished—and the human spirit triumphed.

Today, nearly four decades later, our Nation and our culture confront a new set of menacing ideologies seeking once again to cast God out from our society.  But today, as Catholic Bishops consecrate the United States of America to the Sacred Heart of Jesus in this 250th year of our Independence, we recommit ourselves, like President Reagan and Pope Saint John Paul II, to defending our spiritual identity and great civilizational inheritance.  Above all, we pray that America will continue for the next 250 years, and beyond, to be a land of faith, a country of miracles, and a light and glory to all nations.

DC Circuit Gives Pleading Leeway to Pro Se Muslim Plaintiff Who Claims Religious Discrimination

 In Naz v. Wright, (DC Cir., June 9, 2026), the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision reversed a district court's dismissal of a religious discrimination claim brought by a Muslim woman of Pakistani origin who was fired from her position at the Department of Energy.  The majority said in part:

Naz alleged that, in May or June 2019, she asked Gross—who by then had become her supervisor—whether during the month of Ramadan, he could adjust the start time of their weekly team meetings by 30 minutes and grant her a flexible work schedule to accommodate her religious observance....  But “instead of accommodating m[y] request,” Naz alleges, Gross “bluntly replied to me that [the Department] is a workplace, not a religious institution, and he does not believe in Islamic religious extremism.” ...   

The district court’s opinion, though, does not expressly take account of Naz’s allegation about Gross’s statement. Granted, Naz did not include the allegation in her complaint, instead stating it in her opposition to the Department’s motion to dismiss.  But as noted, our precedents generally call for considering a pro se plaintiff’s allegations in an opposition to a dismissal motion even if they are not in the complaint....

Judge Katsas filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

... [M]y colleagues vacate the dismissal of the discrimination claims, based on a contestable argument raised neither by Naz nor by the amicus curiae whom we appointed to support her position.  Specifically, my colleagues conclude that the district court erred in not plucking an allegation out of Naz’s 148-page opposition to the government’s motion to dismiss, deeming that allegation to be part of Naz’s complaint, and then considering whether it tipped the balance against dismissal.  Rather than inject that contention into this appeal, I would instead apply ordinary party-presentation principles, which compel an affirmance....

HRD reports on the decision.