Sunday, July 13, 2025

Justice Department Sues California Over Its Gender Identity Policy in School Sports

Last week, the Department of Justice sued California, alleging that it violates Title IX by permitting transgender girls to compete in girls' interscholastic athletics. The complaint (full text) in United States v. California Interscholastic Federation, (CD CA, filed 7/9/2025), alleges in part:

1. Across the State of California, girls must compete against boys in various sports pursuant to policies enforced by the California Department of Education (“CDE”) and the California Interscholastic Federation (“CIF”).  These discriminatory policies and practices ignore undeniable biological differences between boys and girls, in favor of an amorphous “gender identity.”  The results of these illegal policies are stark: girls are displaced from podiums, denied awards, and miss out on critical visibility for college scholarships and recognition.  In the words of the Governor of California, it is “deeply unfair” for girls to compete against boys. 

2. This discrimination is not only illegal and unfair but also demeaning, signaling to girls that their opportunities and achievements are secondary to accommodating boys.  It erodes the integrity of girls’ sports, diminishes their competitive experience, and undermines the very purpose of Title IX: to provide equal access to educational benefits, including interscholastic athletics.  Despite warnings from the United States Department of Education, Defendants continue to require California schools to allow boys to compete against girls.  The United States accordingly files this action to stop Defendants’ illegal sex discrimination against female student athletes....

26. Title IX and the Implementing Regulations use the term “sex” to mean biological sex; the term “sex” thus does not mean “gender identity.”...

47. The California Sex Equity in Education Act, Cal. Educ. Code § 221.5(f), referenced in the CDE’s “Gender Equity/Title IX” guidance, states in part:  “A pupil shall be permitted to participate in sex-segregated school programs and activities, including athletic teams and competitions, and use facilities consistent with his or her gender identity, irrespective of the gender listed on the pupil’s records.”  Cal. Educ. Code § 221.5....

The Justice Department issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Friday, July 11, 2025

Bishops Excuse Those Who Fear ICE Raids from Attending Mass

This week, the Bishop of the Catholic Diocese of San Bernadino issued a Decree (full text) formally dispensing from the obligation to attend Sunday Mass "all members of the faithful in the Diocese of San Bernadino who, due to genuine fear of immigration enforcement actions, are unable to attend...." The Decree encourages those excused from attending Mass to engage in other spiritual practices to maintain their spiritual connection to Christ and His Church. It also suggests that individuals participate in televised or online Masses.

In May, the Diocese of Nashville issued a similar lifting of the obligation to attend Mass by those who are concerned about possibly being confronted or detained.

Axios reports on these developments.

Arresting Person for Praying with Others Violates European Convention on Human Rights

In Rafiyev v. Azerbaijan, (ECHR, July 8, 2025), the European Court of Human Rights in a Chamber Judgment held that it violates Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights to hold a person in violation of law for praying together with others. The court said in part:

1.  The case concerns the arrest and subsequent conviction of the applicant, a follower of the Nurism teachings of Islam, for the administrative offence of holding an unauthorised religious meeting on private premises....

6.  On 4 March 2017 the applicant went to Guba to attend a funeral ceremony. Afterwards, the applicant, together with others, visited their friend, T.A., at his private house. At around 1 p.m. several police officers raided the premises and took the applicant and twenty-one other individuals to the Guba District Police Office.

7.  ... An administrative-offence report ... stated that ... the applicant had violated the rules on holding religious meetings ... and that he had committed an administrative offence under Article 515.0.2 of the Code of Administrative Offences ("the CAO")....

59.  Moreover, as is clear from the meaning of Article 515.0.2 of the CAO, in order to fall under its scope, an administrative offence had to be committed by an individual who either established a religious organisation or operated one. Given that the applicant was not the owner of the private residence at which he was arrested and was merely in attendance there with his friends, it is unclear how he could have been regarded as having committed an administrative offence under Article 515.0.2 of the CAO....

60.  In any event, even assuming that the private residence where the applicant assembled with others was used as a place of religious worship as argued by the Government, the Court finds it necessary to reiterate that, while States can put in place a requirement that religious denominations be registered in a manner compatible with Articles 9 and 11 of the Convention, it does not follow that sanctioning an individual member of an unregistered religious organisation for praying or otherwise manifesting his or her religious belief is compatible with the Convention.... To accept the contrary would amount to the exclusion of minority religious beliefs which are not formally registered with the State, and consequently would amount to admitting that a State can dictate what a person can or cannot believe....

Law & Religion UK reports on the decision.

Thursday, July 10, 2025

New Missouri Laws Require Recognition of Religious Student Groups by Colleges; Allow Public Schools to Employ Chaplains

On July 9, Missouri Governor Mike Kehoe signed S.B. 160. The new law (full text) (legislative history) provides in part:

173.1556.  1.  (1)  No public institution of higher learning shall take any adverse action against a belief- based student association or an applicant to be recognized as such:

(a)  Because such association is political, ideological, or religious;

(b)  On the basis of such association's viewpoint or expression of the viewpoint by the association or the association's members; or

(c)  Based on such association's requirement that the association's leaders be committed to furthering the association's mission or that the association's leaders adhere to the association's sincerely held beliefs, sincere practice requirements, or sincere standards of conduct....

3. The provisions of this section shall not apply to a belief-based student association if there is substantial evidence that such association's viewpoint or expression of the viewpoint by the association or the association's members would cause a material and substantial disruption to the educational environment or interfere with the rights of others on campus, in accordance with the United States Supreme Court's decision in Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972).

St Louis Public Radio reports on the bill. 

The Governor also signed SB 49 (full text) (legislative history) which allows school districts and charter schools to employ chaplains or accept chaplains as screened volunteers to provide support, services, or programs for students. Missouri Independent reports on the new law.

6th Circuit: Ministerial Exception Requires Dismissal of Employment Discrimination Suit by Christian School's Principal

In Pulsifer v. Westshore Christian Academy, (6th Cir., July 9, 2025), the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals held that the ministerial exception doctrine required dismissal of an employment discrimination suit brought by the Dean of Students/ Assistant Principal of a Christian elementary school in Muskegon Heights, Michigan. The court said in part:

No one disputes that the Academy is the type of religious entity that can avail itself of the exception.... The Academy sees its role in inculcating the Christian faith as essential to its students’ salvation, and its “mission of Christian ministry and teaching” marks the school with “clear [and] obvious religious characteristics.”...

The question, then, is whether Pulsifer was the type of employee covered by the exception.  We hold that he was.  Pulsifer played an important role in furthering the school’s mission to provide for the religious education and formation of students.  Judicial review of the way in which the Academy chooses who should fill that type of role “would undermine the independence of religious institutions in a way that the First Amendment does not tolerate.”,,,

... Pulsifer played a role in teaching the faith.  He was tasked with leading the staff in religious devotions each morning and also led devotions at each meeting of the school’s board.  Pulsifer also played an important role in conducting communal prayer with staff and board members....  And by implementing and leading two religious youth programs, he played a public-facing “role in conveying” the school’s religious “message,”,,,  

... Put simply, an employee can fall within the ministerial exception even when “[m]ost” of their “work [is] secular in nature,” ...  so long as the employee, like Pulsifer, also performs the types of religious duties we outline above.  Accordingly, the district court properly granted the Academy’s motion for summary judgment.

Wednesday, July 09, 2025

Planned Parenthood Fights New Medicaid Funding Cutoff

Planned Parenthood filed suit this week in a Massachusetts federal district court challenging Section 71113 of H.R. 1, One Big Beautiful Bill Act which denies federal Medicaid funds for non-abortion services for one year to any non-profit that provides abortions, and which received in 2023 Medicaid funds exceeding $800,000. (Use of Medicaid funds for abortions is already prohibited under other laws.) The complaint (full text) in Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. v. Kennedy, (D MA, filed 7/7/2025), alleges that the provision was drafted to target and retaliate against Planned Parenthood. The complaint reads in part:

10. There is no legitimate justification for the statute; rather, the true design of the Defund Provision is simply to express disapproval of, attack, and punish Planned Parenthood, which plays a particularly prominent role in the public debate over abortion and (if Planned Parenthood’s Members are treated collectively) is the only nationwide abortion provider. Supporters of the Defund Provision, including President Trump and members of Congress, have made this point unmistakably clear. 

11. For these reasons, the Defund Provision’s exclusion of Planned Parenthood Members from a program designed to provide high-quality medical care to the Nation’s neediest patients—care that Planned Parenthood Members have delivered for decades—is unconstitutional as to all Planned Parenthood Members as a Bill of Attainder and it also violates Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection and First Amendment rights.

On the day the complaint was filed, the court issued a 14-day Temporary Restraining Order (full text) requiring that Medicaid funding continue to be furnished to plaintiffs. After the government responds, the court will decide whether to issue a temporary injunction in the case. Jurist and The Hill report on these developments.

UPDATE: On July 11, the court extended the Temporary Restraining Order through July 21 in a 9-page opinion and OrderDaily Caller reports on this development.

Barnard College Settles Lawsuit Charging Antisemitism

As previously reported, in March 2024 Jewish and Israeli students sued both Columbia University and Barnard College (which is affiliated with Columbia but is a separate institution) alleging pervasive antisemitism that violates Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act as well as state and local civil rights laws. On Monday, plaintiffs in the case and Barnard College announced a settlement agreement that will resolve plaintiffs' claims against Barnard College. The settlement apparently does not resolve claims against Columbia University. According to the announcement, Barnard will appoint a Title VI Coordinator who will assure compliance with the antidiscrimination provisions of Title VI. According to the announcement:

When enforcing Title VI, the Title VI Coordinator will review and implement all applicable regulations consistent with guidance from the Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (“OCR”), including OCR’s 2021 and 2024 guidance which directs schools to “consider” the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance’s definition of antisemitism and its accompanying examples “to the extent that” any such “examples might be useful as evidence of discriminatory intent.”...

Barnard will also require all students, faculty, and staff to complete training on the Policy Against Discrimination and Harassment, which will address recognizing, combating, and reporting antisemitism.  Beginning in the 2025 fall semester, the Office of the President will communicate to Barnard students, faculty, and staff an annual message conveying the College’s “zero tolerance” for discrimination and harassment based on all protected traits, including Jewish and Israeli identity.... Barnard will also expand its existing relationship with the Jewish Theological Seminary (JTS), so that beginning in the 2025 fall semester, courses at the JTS will be available to all Barnard students at no cost....

...  Barnard will maintain policies limiting the time, place, and manner of demonstrations and prohibiting the use of face masks and other personal disguises to intimidate or interfere with the enforcement of the College’s policies.... [T]he College and its senior leaders ... will not recognize, meet, or negotiate with Columbia University Apartheid Divest, any of its successor or spin-off organizations.... Finally, the College reaffirms that its endowment is intended to maintain intergenerational equity and to ensure the stability of Barnard’s financial position; it is not a vehicle for expressing political positions, which includes taking actions for the purpose of penalizing the government of a country or the commercial/financial activity within that country.... 

IRS Says Houses of Worship Can Endorse Political Candidates

In a Joint Motion for Entry of a Consent Judgment (full text) filed on Monday with a Texas federal district court in National Religious Broadcasters v. Long, (ED TX, 7/7/2025), the Internal Revenue Service agreed that houses of worship can endorse political candidates without violating Internal Revenue Code §501(c)(3). (See prior related posting.)

Section 501(c)(3) bars tax exempt non-profits from "participat[ing] in or interven[ing] in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office." The Motion from both parties seeking entry of a Consent Judgment reads in part as follows:

7. When a house of worship in good faith speaks to its congregation, through its customary channels of communication on matters of faith in connection with religious services, concerning electoral politics viewed through the lens of religious faith, it neither “participate[s]” nor “intervene[s]” in a “political campaign,” within the ordinary meaning of those words. To “participate” in a political campaign is “to take part” in the political campaign, and to “intervene” in a political campaign is “to interfere with the outcome or course” of the political campaign.... Bona fide communications internal to a house of worship, between the house of worship and its congregation, in connection with religious services, do neither of those things, any more than does a family discussion concerning candidates. Thus, communications from a house of worship to its congregation in connection with religious services through its usual channels of communication on matters of faith do not run afoul of the Johnson Amendment as properly interpreted. 

8. This interpretation of the Johnson Amendment is in keeping with the IRS’s treatment of the Johnson Amendment in practice. As recounted in Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, the IRS generally has not enforced the Johnson Amendment against houses of worship for speech concerning electoral politics in the context of worship services....

11. Accordingly, the Parties request this Court enter the attached proposed order enjoining Defendants ... from enforcing the Johnson Amendment against Plaintiff Churches based on speech by a house of worship to its congregation in connection with religious services through its customary channels of communication on matters of faith, concerning electoral politics viewed through the lens of religious faith.

New York Times reports on the IRS's action.

Tuesday, July 08, 2025

Virginia Enters Consent Decree Permitting Religiously Motivated Talk Therapy to Change Minors' Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity

In a press release last week, Founding Freedoms Law Center announced that the Virginia Department of Health Professions and the Virginia Board of Counseling last month entered into a consent decree (full text) in Raymond v. Virgnia Department of Health Professions, (Cir. Ct., June 4, 2025). The decree enjoins defendants from enforcing Virginia's ban on conversion therapy for minors against plaintiffs and all similarly situated counselors insofar as they are engaging only in religiously motivated "talk therapy" aimed at aligning a minor's gender identity or romantic attractions with the client's biological sex. The decree provides in part:

11. Plaintiffs are Christians and integrate their religious faith in their counseling of clients through talk therapy, which consists of voluntary conversations, prayer, and sharing of written materials such as Scripture, between an individual counselor and an individual client....

22, ...[T]he parties consider that enforcing the Challenged Provisions with respect to talk therapy between a licensed professional and a client that is motivated or informed by religious beliefs and desired by the client would violate Article I, §§ 11 and 16 of the Virginia Constitution, as well as the Virginia Religious Freedom Restoration Act.

Virginia Mercury reports on the consent decree. [Thanks to Scott Mange for the lead.]

Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine Requires Dismissal of Suit Between Unification Church Factions

In Family Federation for World Peace and Unification International v. Hyun Jin Moon, (DC Ct. App., July 3, 2025), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's final dismissal of a lawsuit surrounding a schism and succession dispute in the Unification Church.  The dispute has been in litigation for 14 years and has been before the Court of Appeals three times previously. (See prior posting.) Among the numerous issues dealt with in the Court's 59-page opinion was whether the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine applies to the dispute. The Court said in part:

... [A]ppellants argue that the trial court erred by (1) finding that resolution of the contract claims required determining questions of disputed religious doctrine; and (2) after making that finding, failing to apply the fraud or collusion exception to nonetheless permit review of the contract claims....

At bottom, appellants have yet to provide a clear, spelled-out answer as to how a court or jury might parse their contract and quasi-contract claims through neutral principles of law.  Pointing us to any and all potential contract conditions in the record does not cure the underlying problem we identified in Moon III—which was reiterated by the trial court on remand—that any path of decision-making analysis would require deciding actual, disputed questions of religious doctrine or leadership.  This necessarily results from the combination of (1) the use of extraordinarily broad, religious language in the purported contract terms and (2) an intrachurch dispute about the meaning of that language.  The contract-related claims therefore must fail under the baseline religious abstention doctrine....

Preston has only fraudulently donated UCI’s assets if he is not the true leader of the Unification Church and he knows it.  We cannot say the first thing without running afoul of the abstention doctrine, as we made clear in Moon III, and if bare allegations of fraud or collusion could get us around that, then the courts would be thrust right back into resolving core theological disputes about religious doctrine, hierarchy, and succession.  “No thanks” to that—that runs afoul of the abstention doctrine’s central animating principles.  And it is well established that we cannot apply any fraud or collusion exception in a way that violates the existing Supreme Court precedent on religious abstention....

The trial court acted well within its discretion to put an end to this decade-old case rather than breathing new life into it on its deathbed years after appellants could have gone after the discovery they now belatedly seek.

Monday, July 07, 2025

Section 1981 Suit Can Move Ahead Against Defendants Who Disrupted Jewish Religious Celebration

Congregation Hazon Ovadya, Inc. v. Rabbinical Council of California, (CD CA, July 1, 2025), is a suit by a Sephardic Jewish synagogue against several individuals of Ashkenazi Jewish origin as well as a group of Ashkenazi rabbis. The court describes the dispute:

On or about July 13, 2022, CHO organized a procession and solemn, religious ceremony centered around the dedication of a Torah.... In preparation for the Ceremony, CHO contracted with various rabbis and vendors, including musicians, a disc jockey, and equipment providers....

Plaintiffs allege that the Rabbinical Defendants contacted hundreds of people, including the Individuals Defendants, to organize a riot and frustrate the Ceremony.... Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants were motivated by their bias and animosity towards people of Sephardic origin.... In addition to playing sirens and other noises, some of the Individual Defendants shouted racial slurs at Plaintiff Vanounou, including but not limited to calling him "Arab."....

Due to the riot, the musicians and other vendors were unable to perform their contractual duties during the Ceremony....

Plaintiffs sued under 42 USC §1981 which prohibits discrimination on account of race in the making and enforcement of contracts. The court denied defendants' motion to dismiss the case under California's anti-SLAPP law, saying that the suit does not seek to hold defendants liable for their speech. The court refused to dismiss the suit against three individual defendants, saying in part:

The Court acknowledges that § 1981 is not "meant to provide an omnibus remedy for all racial injustice."... And the facts at issue in this action certainly do not fall within the typical kinds of claims raised under § 1981. However, having been presented with no authority expressly precluding claims of this nature, the Court does not view dismissal on this ground appropriate at this stage. At bottom, Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled that their contractual rights were impaired...

However the court dismissed charges against the Rabbinical organization, saying in part:

Even if the Rabbinical Defendants organized the riot and some of the participants engaged in racial chants, Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts supporting the idea that the Rabbinical Defendants engaged in this conduct themselves or otherwise ordered or condoned it....

Recent Articles of Interest

From SSRN:

From SSRN (Abortion rights):

From SSRN (Non-profit organizations):

From SmartCILP and elsewhere:

Sunday, July 06, 2025

New Federal Law Allows Tax Deduction for Contributions to Tuition Assistance Organizations

H.R. 1, One Big Beautiful Bill Act (full text), signed into law by the President on July 4, provides federal tax credits up to $1700 for contributions to private-school scholarship granting organizations in states that do not provide a state tax credit for such contributions. States must elect in to participate in this program. Sec. 70411 of the new law provides in part::

(a) Allowance of Credit.--In the case of an individual who is a citizen or resident of the United States ... there shall be allowed as a credit against the tax imposed by this chapter for the taxable year an amount equal to the aggregate amount of qualified contributions made by the taxpayer during the taxable year.

 (b) Limitations.--   ``(1) In general.--The credit allowed under subsection (a) to any taxpayer for any taxable year shall not exceed $1,700.  ``(2) ...The amount allowed as a credit ... shall be reduced by the amount allowed as a credit on any State tax return of the taxpayer for qualified contributions made by the taxpayer during the taxable year.

 (c) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--  ``(1) ...The term `covered State' means one of the States ... that ...voluntarily elects to participate under this section and to identify scholarship granting organizations in the State.... `

(2) ... The term `eligible student' means an individual who-- (A) is a member of a household with an income which, for the calendar year ...is not greater than 300 percent of the area median gross income.... and (B) is eligible to enroll in a public elementary or secondary school.

(3) ... The term `qualified contribution' means a charitable contribution of cash to a scholarship granting organization that uses the contribution to fund scholarships for eligible students solely within the State in which the organization is listed pursuant to subsection (g).

News media describe the provision as a national school voucher plan. [Thanks to Scott Mange for the lead.]

Secular Officiants Lack Standing to Bring Pre-Enforcement Challenge to Texas Law Barring Them from Performing Weddings

McCutchan v. Nicholson, (ND TX, July 2, 2025), involves a challenge to the Texas statute that sets out who may conduct marriage ceremonies in the state.  The statute limits officiants to judges, Christian clergy, Jewish rabbis or "a person who is an officer of a religious organization and who is authorized by the organization to conduct a marriage ceremony." The Center for Inquiry that certifies secular marriage celebrants along with one of its certified celebrants brings the challenge, seeking to have secular officiants recognized.  However, the state Attorney General intervened in the case and took the position that the Center for Inquiry qualifies as a "religious" organization as that term is used in the Texas statutes and that its officiants are therefore already permitted to officiate at marriages. The Attorney General argued:

CFI is not secular because it adopts clear, specific, and overt religious beliefs, namely that it “denies that a supernatural source is required for life to have and for people to be guided by values and ethics.” The rejection of God and the supernatural is a religious belief; a truly secular organization would take no stance on the issue....

However, the Court disagreed, concluding that CFI is neither a religious organization nor a religion, saying in part:

At oral argument, the Attorney General discarded the history and tradition of the Texas law, stating that Satanism and Atheism were “religion[s]” and “religious organization[s]” under the Texas Family Code. Interpreting the terms “religion” and “religious organization” to cover Satanism and Atheism not only ignores history and tradition but distorts their plain meaning and risks setting a dangerous precedent.

The court went on, though, to hold that plaintiffs lack standing to bring a pre-enforcement action against the District Attorney (one of the defendants in the case), saying in part:

Individual Plaintiff provides no examples of past enforcement, no public statements regarding enforcement of the statute, and no facts about how the District Attorney could know a secular celebrant violated the law.

This led to the court's final conclusion:

Even if the Court rules on behalf of Individual Plaintiff against Defendant Nicholson, thereby enjoining the County Clerk, his injuries would not be redressed without a favorable judgment against the District Attorney. A ruling in Individual Plaintiff’s favor, thus, would not amount to “relief that directly redresses the injury suffered.”... Accordingly, the Court rules that Individual Plaintiff’s action is DISMISSED without prejudice.

Because individual members of CFI lack standing, so does the organization.

Friday, July 04, 2025

Cert. Granted in Street Preacher's Suit Challenging Protest Zone

Yesterday the U.S. Supreme Court granted review in Olivier v. City of Brandon, Mississippi, (Docket No. 24-993, certiorari granted 7/3/2025). (Order List.) In the case, a Christian street preacher challenges a city ordinance that limits demonstrations to a designated area within three hours of an event at the city's amphitheater. The certiorari petition frames the question in part as follows:

Gabriel Olivier is a Christian who feels called to share the gospel with his fellow citizens.  After being arrested and fined for violating an ordinance targeting “protests” outside a public amphitheater, Olivier brought a § 1983 suit under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to declare the ordinance unconstitutional and enjoin its enforcement against him in the future.   

The Fifth Circuit, applying its precedent construing this Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), held that Olivier’s prior conviction barred his § 1983 suit because even the prospective relief it seeks would necessarily undermine his prior conviction....

Links to briefs and pleadings in the case are available here.

Cert. Granted in Challenge to Ban of Transgender Women on Women's Sports Teams

Yesterday, the U.S. Supreme Court granted review in two cases raising the issue of whether laws that bar transgender women from participating on women's sports teams in public schools and colleges violate Title IX or the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. (Order List). The cases are Little v. Hecox, (Docket No. 24-38, certiorari granted 7/3/2025) involving a challenge to Idaho's Fairness in Women's Sports Act, and West Virginia v. B.P.J., (Docket No. 24-43, certiorari granted 7/3/2025) involving West Virginia's Save Women's Sports Act. Links to all the briefs and pleadings in the Hecox case are available here. Links to all the briefs and pleadings in the West Virginia case are available hereSCOTUSblog reports on the Court's action.

Thursday, July 03, 2025

Another Suit Challenges Texas Law Mandating 10 Commandments in Every Classroom

Suit was filed yesterday in a Texas federal district court challenging the constitutionality of Senate Bill 10 which requires a copy of the Ten Commandments to be posted in every public-school classroom. The complaint (full text) in Nathan v. Alamo Heights Independent School District, (WD TX, filed 7/2/2025), alleges in part:

S.B. 10 is not neutral with respect to religion. By design, it expressly requires the display of religious scripture—the Ten Commandments—in every public-school classroom. It also requires that schools post a specific, state-approved version of that scripture that is associated with certain Protestant faiths, taking sides on theological questions regarding the correct content and meaning of the Ten Commandments and enshrining in state law an official denominational preference....

As a result of the displays mandated by S.B. 10, students who do not subscribe to the state’s official version of the Ten Commandments or whose faith tenets and values are otherwise contradicted by the displays—including the minor-child Plaintiffs—will be pressured into religious observance, veneration, and adoption of this religious scripture....

Houston Public Media reports on the lawsuit. This is the second lawsuit that has been filed challenging the constitutionality of SB 10. (See prior posting.)

11th Circuit: Florida Can Bar Transgender Teacher's Use of Preferred Pronouns to Refer to Herself in Classroom

In Wood v. Florida Department of Education, (11th Cir., July 2, 2025), the U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 decision, held that a transgender woman teacher's right to free speech was not violated by a Florida statute that  prohibits her from using the title “Ms.” and the pronouns “she,” “her,” and “hers” in exchanges with her high school students during class time. The majority concluded that the teacher "cannot show, with respect to the expression at issue here, that she was speaking as a private citizen rather than a government employee." The majority said in part:

... [W]e needn’t—and don’t—consider whether Wood has a First Amendment right to use gendered identifiers or don a “she/her” pin when conversing with colleagues in the faculty lounge, or, for that matter, even whether she has a right to do those things in her classroom after the students have departed for the day....

When a public-school teacher addresses her students within the four walls of a classroom—whether orally or in writing—she is unquestionably acting “pursuant to [her] official duties.”  Interacting with students during class time, quite literally, is a teacher’s “official dut[y].”  We reiterate that our decision is a narrow one.  We hold only that when Wood identified herself to students in the classroom using the honorific “Ms.” and the pronouns “she,” “her,” and “hers,” she did so in her capacity as a government employee, and not as a private citizen....

Judge Jordan dissented, saying in part:

The preferred personal title and pronouns of a teacher are, like her name, significant markers of individual identity.  They exist outside of, and do not depend on, the school or the government for their existence.... 

The majority’s expansive application of the government speech doctrine essentially leaves the First Amendment on the wrong side of the schoolhouse gate.  As this case demonstrates, “the government speech doctrine [is being] used as a subterfuge for favoring certain private speakers over others based on viewpoint.” ...

The statute at issue here, § 1000.071(3), has nothing to do with curriculum and everything to do with Florida attempting to silence those with whom it disagrees on the matter of transgender identity and status.

Wisconsin Supreme Court: Legislature Impliedly Repealed 1849 Abortion Ban

 In Kaul v. Urmanski, (WI Sup. Ct., July 2, 2025), the Wisconsin Supreme Court in a 4-3 decision held that 1849 state law criminalizing abortions has been impliedly repealed by later legislation. The majority said in part:

We conclude that comprehensive legislation enacted over the last 50 years regulating in detail the “who, what, where, when, and how” of abortion so thoroughly covers the entire subject of abortion that it was meant as a substitute for the 19th century near-total ban on abortion. Accordingly, we hold that the legislature impliedly repealed § 940.04(1) as to abortion, and that § 940.04(1) therefore does not ban abortion in the State of Wisconsin....

Chief Justice Karofsky filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:

I agree with the majority’s decision and its analysis. In deciding that the legislature impliedly repealed WIS. STAT. § 940.04(1), the women and children of our state are shielded from the brutal consequences this statute wrought. Yet I write separately because when courts are called upon to arbitrate significant issues in turbulent times such as these, it is incumbent that we pause to reflect on the import of our decisions in the arc of history....

I conclude by elevating the accounts of four women to illustrate the real-world consequences of severe abortion restrictions. I hold these tragedies up to the light in the hope that Wisconsin’s legacy may remain on the side of history that values the health and well-being of all people....

Justice Ziegler filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:
The majority opinion is a jaw-dropping exercise of judicial will, placing personal preference over the constitutional roles of the three branches of our state government and upending a duly enacted law. In this dangerous departure from our constitutional design, four members of the court make up and apply their own version of implied repeal, failing to hew to any semblance of traditional judicial decision-making or jurisprudence....

Justice Bradley filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

Not content with effacing the law, Chief Justice Jill Karofsky rewrites history, erases and insults women by referring to mothers as “pregnant people,” slanders proponents of the pro-life perspective, and broadcasts dangerously false narratives about laws restricting abortion. Laden with emotion, steeped in myth, and light on the law, the concurrence reads as a parody of progressive politics rather than the opinion of a jurist....

With no apparent sense of irony, the concurrence claims abortion restrictions amount to “death warrants” for women, ignoring the people who feel just as passionately that abortion kills innocent human lives—more than 1,000,000 in each of the last two years. The resolution of this divisive question does not belong with the judiciary. The question of abortion belongs with the People....

Justice Hagedorn, joined by Justice Bradley, filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

The Wisconsin Constitution vests the lawmaking power of the people in the state legislature. But today, the Wisconsin Supreme Court effectively deletes a law from the books, taking this power unto itself. Sure, the majority opinion is laden with legal jargon a reader might think reflects a reasoned judicial opinion. Don’t be fooled. This is pure policymaking, driven by antagonism toward a law the majority does not like. The end result is that the policies enacted by the people’s representatives are gone—scratched out with a giant judicial eraser.

Based on its decision in this case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court also dismissed an original action that had asked the Court to interpret the 1849 law as applying only to feticide. Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin v. Urmanski, (WI Sup. Ct., July 2, 2025). See prior posting.

NPR reports on the decisions.

Wednesday, July 02, 2025

Suit Challenges Oklahoma's Social Studies Standards

Suit was filed yesterday in the Oklahoma Supreme Court by public school teachers, parents, children and clergy asking the court to assume original jurisdiction and enjoin implementation of the State Board of Education's 2025 Academic Standards for Social Studies in grades K-8. The complaint (full text) in Randall v. Walters, (OK Sup. Ct., filed 7/1/2025), in addition to challenges to the procedures used to adopt the Standards, alleges that the Standards violate the religious freedom protections of the Oklahoma Constitution and statutes. The complaint alleges in part:

3. The 2025 Standards require stories from the Bible to be taught to first and second graders.  In accordance with a particular Christian view of the Bible, the 2025 Standards present certain biblical passages as historical fact to older children, contrary to a scholarly consensus that those passages do not accurately represent historical events.  As a whole, the 2025 Standards favor Christianity over all other religions, as they contain numerous references to Christianity but few to other faiths....

The complaint cites numerous specific portions of the Standards that require students to identify historical accounts from the Bible and understand the influence of the Bible and Christianity on the founding of the United States.

Americans United issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Tuesday, July 01, 2025

HHS Office of Civil Rights Charges Harvard with Title VI Violations Because of Indifference to Antisemitic Harassment

On June 30, the Department of Health and Human Services Office of Civil Rights issued a Notice of Violation (full text) to Harvard University charging it with antisemitic discrimination in violation of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.  The Notice was transmitted along with a Letter (full text) from the Task Force to Combat Antisemitism. The 57-page Notice of Violation concludes:

5. OCR finds that specific and repeated examples uncovered during our investigation establish a pattern of unlawful and unchecked discrimination at Harvard through: • direct student-on-student harassment; • targeted harassment by student groups; • exclusion from campus spaces; and • institutional-level acceptance of antisemitism....

 As stated above, a school may be held liable under Title VI for its deliberate indifference to student-on-student harassment when it can be shown that: (1) students were “subject to ‘severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive’ … harassment”; (2) the harassment “caused the [students] to be deprived of educational opportunities or benefits”; (3) the school “knew of the harassment”; (4) the harassment occurred “in its programs and activities”; and (5) the school “was deliberately indifferent to the harassment such that its response (or lack thereof) is clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances.” ... Based upon our investigation, OCR finds that Harvard University acted with deliberate indifference towards student-on-student harassment in violation of Title VI.

The Letter from the Task Force on Antisemitism reads in part:

Harvard’s inaction in the face of these civil rights violations is a clear example of the demographic hierarchy that has taken hold of the University. Equal defense of the law demands that all groups, regardless of race or national origin, are protected. Harvard’s commitment to racial hierarchies—where individuals are sorted and judged according to their membership in an oppressed group identity and not individual merit—has enabled anti-Semitism to fester on Harvard’s campus and has led a once great institution to humiliation, offering remedial math and forcing Jewish students to hide their identities and ancestral stories.

Failure to institute adequate changes immediately will result in the loss of all federal financial resources and continue to affect Harvard’s relationship with the federal government. Harvard may of course continue to operate free of federal privileges, and perhaps such an opportunity will spur a commitment to excellence that will help Harvard thrive once again....

JNS reports on these developments.

Recent Articles of Interest

From SSRN:

Suit Challenges Texas Requirement for 10 Commandments in Classrooms

Suit was filed last week in a Texas federal district court challenging the constitutionality of a recently enacted Texas law that requires the display of the Ten Commandments in every public-school classroom. The complaint (full text) in Alexander v. Morath, (ND TX, filed 6/24/2025) alleges in part:

Senate Bill 10 ... is not religiously neutral, as it mandates the display of a specific version of the Ten Commandments in every public-school classroom. This requirement inherently takes a theological stance on the correct content and meaning of the scripture....

The version mandated by S.B. 10 mostly aligns with a Protestant rendition but does not match any version found in the Jewish tradition, notably omitting key language and context from the Torah. Furthermore, it does not match the version followed by most Catholics, as it includes a prohibition against "graven images" which could be offensive given the role of iconography in the Catholic faith....

84. As a result of the Ten Commandments displays mandated by S.B. 10, Texas students—including minor-child Plaintiffs—will be unconstitutionally coerced into religious observance, veneration, and adoption of the state’s favored religious scripture, and they will be pressured to suppress their personal religious beliefs and practices, especially in school, to avoid the potential disfavor, reproach, and/or disapproval of school officials and/or their peers. ...

85. In addition, by mandating that one version of the Ten Commandments be displayed in public educational institutions and prescribing an official religious text for school children to venerate, S.B. 10 adopts an official position on religious matters, violating the Establishment Clause’s prohibition against taking sides in questions over theological doctrine and violating the “clearest command” of the Establishment Clause that “one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.” Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982).

86. There is no longstanding historical practice or tradition of prominently and permanently displaying any version of the Ten Commandments in American public-school classrooms. On the contrary, the Supreme Court unambiguously held in Stone that such a practice is proscribed by the Constitution.

Texas Tribune reports on the lawsuit.

Monday, June 30, 2025

Ohio's School Voucher Program Held to Violate State Constitution

In Columbus City School District v. State of Ohio, (OH Com. Pl., June 224, 2025), an Ohio state trial court held that Ohio's school voucher program, known as EdChoice, is unconstitutional under the Ohio Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 2 which provides:

The General Assembly shall secure a thorough and efficient system of common schools throughout the state; but no religious or other sect, or sects, shall ever have any exclusive right to, or control of, any part of the school funds of this state.

The court said in part:

... EdChoice procedure mandates that payments be made directly from the State to private schools.... Where EdChoice participating private schools are inexplicably receiving double the per pupil state funding than public schools, it is difficult to say that EdChoice is simply a scholarship that follows and/or benefits the student as opposed to a system that benefits private schools. 

Taken together, the evidence presented by the Plaintiffs supports their assertion that, in expanding the EdChoice program to its current form, the General Assembly has created a system of uncommon private schools by directly providing private schools with over $700 million in funding.  This evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that EdChoice violates Article VI Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution....

Despite receiving more funding in each successive year, the Plaintiffs’ public-school districts struggle to educate their students with inadequate funding....  Meanwhile, private religious schools receive EdChoice funding in addition to unknown amounts of non-public revenue.  Such a system is not thorough and efficient.  Thus, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs have proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the EdChoice voucher program violates Article VI Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution....

... [A]n order determining that the EdChoice voucher program is unconstitutional because it bestows the exclusive right to, or control of, any part of the state’s school funds to one or more “religious or other sect, or sects” does not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment because the voucher program does not prohibit any religious organization from participating based on its religious viewpoint....

Viewing the term through Ohioans’ eyes in 1851, “sect” is not limited to religious groups, but refers to any person or collective of persons with like philosophy.  As such, “other sect, or sects,” distinguishes from a “religious sect,” and refers to any non-religious group or groups... 

Though the notes from the debates occurring during the 1850 Constitutional Convention demonstrate that the delegates were primarily concerned with religious sects attempting to control the school funds of the State, the plain language of this clause evidences their intent to prohibit any non-state actor, actors, entity, or entities from controlling school state funds....

Statehouse News Bureau reports on the decision.

Recent Articles and Books on Islamic Law

From SSRN:

Recent Books on Islamic Law:

Sunday, June 29, 2025

Supreme Court Upholds Appointment of Task Force That Recommended Insurance Coverage for Anti-HIV Drugs

In Kennedy v. Braidwood Management, Inc., (Sup. Ct., June 27, 2025), the U.S. Supreme Court in a 6-3 decision held that the method of appointing members of the U. S. Preventive Services Task Force does not violate the Constitution's Appointments Clause. The majority opinion was written by Justice Kavanaugh. Underlying the controversy were the religious objections of plaintiffs to the Task Force's mandate requiring insurance coverage for pre-exposure drugs that prevent the transmission of HIV. Plaintiffs contended that this coverage makes them complicit in facilitating homosexual behavior, drug use and sexual activity outside of marriage. As set out in a footnote by the majority: 

Braidwood also brought a claim under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993.... It prevailed on that claim and secured an injunction against enforcement of the specific requirement that it cover certain HIV-prevention medications without cost sharing. The Government did not appeal that aspect of the District Court’s judgment, and this Court’s decision will not affect the injunction premised on Braidwood’s RFRA claim.

Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Alito and Gorsuch, filed a dissenting opinion. AJMC reports on the decision.

Saturday, June 28, 2025

Supreme Court: Parents Have Free Exercise Right to Opt Children Out of Class Discussions That Undermine Religious Beliefs

 In Mahmoud v. Taylor, (Sup.Ct., June 27, 2025), the U.S. Supreme Court in a 6-3 decision upheld the granting of a preliminary injunction to parents who objected to a Maryland school district's removal of parents' right to opt their children out of class discussions involving "LGBTQ+ inclusive" storybooks. The parents objected to exposing their children to discussions of sexuality and gender that were inconsistent with parents' religious beliefs. The majority, in an opinion authored by Justice Alito, said in part:

The practice of educating one’s children in one’s religious beliefs, like all religious acts and practices, receives a generous measure of protection from our Constitution....

In light of the record before us, we hold that the Board’s introduction of the “LGBTQ+-inclusive” storybooks—combined with its decision to withhold notice to parents and to forbid opt outs—substantially interferes with the religious development of their children and imposes the kind of burden on religious exercise that [Wisconsin v.] Yoder found unacceptable....

To start, we cannot accept the Board’s characterization of the “LGBTQ+-inclusive” instruction as mere “exposure to objectionable ideas” or as lessons in “mutual respect.”...

In any event, the Board and the dissent are mistaken when they rely extensively on the concept of “exposure.” The question in cases of this kind is whether the educational requirement or curriculum at issue would “substantially interfer[e] with the religious development” of the child or pose “a very real threat of undermining” the religious beliefs and practices the parent wishes to instill in the child.... Whether or not a requirement or curriculum could be characterized as “exposure” is not the touchstone for determining whether that line is crossed....

Under our precedents, the government is generally free to place incidental burdens on religious exercise so long as it does so pursuant to a neutral policy that is generally applicable....

 Here, the character of the burden requires us to proceed differently. When the burden imposed is of the same character as that imposed in Yoder, we need not ask whether the law at issue is neutral or generally applicable before proceeding to strict scrutiny.  That much is clear from our decisions in Yoder and Smith....

Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:

... [T]he Board’s response to parents’ unsuccessful attempts to opt their children out of the storybook curriculum conveys that parents’ religious views are not welcome in the “fully inclusive environment” that the Board purports to foster....

The curriculum itself also betrays an attempt to impose ideological conformity with specific views on sexuality and gender....

The Board easily could avoid sowing tension between its curriculum and parents’ First Amendment rights.  Most straightforwardly, rather than attempt to “weave the storybooks seamlessly into ELA lessons,” the Board could cabin its sexual- and gender-identity instruction to specific units.

Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson, filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

 Casting aside longstanding precedent, the Court invents a constitutional right to avoid exposure to “subtle” themes “contrary to the religious principles” that parents wish to instill in their children.... Exposing students to the “message” that LGBTQ people exist, and that their loved ones may celebrate their marriages and life events, the majority says, is enough to trigger the most demanding form of judicial scrutiny..... That novel rule is squarely foreclosed by our precedent and offers no limiting principle.  Given the great diversity of religious beliefs in this country, countless interactions that occur every day in public schools might expose children to messages that conflict with a parent’s religious beliefs. If that is sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny, then little is not. 

The result will be chaos for this Nation’s public schools. Requiring schools to provide advance notice and the chance to opt out of every lesson plan or story time that might implicate a parent’s religious beliefs will impose impossible administrative burdens on schools....

... [N]ever, in the context of public schools or elsewhere, has this Court held that mere exposure to concepts inconsistent with one’s religious beliefs could give rise to a First Amendment claim....

The logic of the Court’s ruling will also apply to countless other topics, interactions, and activities that may conflict with a parent’s religious preferences. What of the parent who wants his child’s curriculum stripped of any mention of women working outside the home, sincerely averring that such activity conflicts with the family’s religious beliefs?  It blinks reality to suggest that the simple solution for schools is to create new discrete units of instruction to cover any set of material to which a parent objects....

SCOTUSblog reports on the decision.

Friday, June 27, 2025

Supreme Court: Medicaid Recipients Cannot Sue Under Sec. 1983 To Challenge State Cutoff of Medicaid Funds to Planned Parenthood

In Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic,(Sup. Ct., June 26, 2025), the U.S. Supreme Court held that Medicaid recipients cannot sue under 42 USC §1983 to challenge South Carolina's cutoff of coverage under Medicaid of Planned Parenthood's non-abortion services.  In a 6-3 decision, the Court held that the remedy for wrongly excluding a provider from state Medicaid was for the Secretary of Health and Human Services to withhold federal Medicaid funding to the state. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion calling for a broader review of the Court's §1983 jurisprudence. Justice Jackson, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

Congress enacted the Medicaid Act’s free-choice-of-provider provision to ensure that Medicaid recipients have the right to choose their own doctors.  The Court’s decision to foreclose Medicaid recipients from using §1983 to enforce that provision thwarts Congress’s will twice over: once, in dulling the tool Congress created for enforcing all federal rights, and again in vitiating one of those rights altogether.

Wednesday, June 25, 2025

DOJ Intervenes In Challenge To Washington Law Removing Clergy Privilege

The Department of Justice on Monday filed a Complaint in Intervention (full text) in Etienne v. Ferguson, (WD WA, filed 6/23/ 2025) to become a party in a suit by Catholic bishops in Washington state challenging a recently adopted amendment to the state's mandatory child abuse reporting law that requires clergy to report child abuse or neglect even if they learn of it in a confessional. The DOJ's petition alleges in part:

7. SB 5375 directly interferes with the fundamental right of Catholic priests to freelyexercise th eir religion by forcing them to  violate the sanctity and confidentiality of confessionalcommunications. No other mandatory reporter is required to forego his or her fundamental rights under the Constitution in this manner. Furthermore, a second provision of this bill expressly strips “clergy,” and no one else, from relying on any legal privileges, including the confessional privilege, as a defense to reporting child abuse and neglect. All non-religious “supervisors” may continue to rely on applicable state law privileges.

8. In addition, at about the same time SB 5375 w as enacted to deprive Catholic priests oftheir privileges under state law, Governor Ferguson signed another bill into law ... which restored legal privileges to attorneys who are mandatory reporters because they happen to work for colleges and universities, including at law school clinics.

The Justice Department issued a press release announcing their motion to intervene in the lawsuit.

Texas Enacts Requirement That Schools Offer Released-Time Programs

On June 20, Texas Governor Gregg Abbott signed SB 1049 (full text) which requires all public and charter schools to permit students to attend released-time religious classes for up to five hours per week. The student must assume responsibility for any school assignments issued during his attendance at religious classes. ADF issued a press release endorsing the new law.

Tuesday, June 24, 2025

Challenge To Narrow Religious Exemption in Maryland Employment Law Is Dismissed In Part

In General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Horton, (D MD, June 18, 2025), a Maryland federal district court denied a preliminary injunction in a suit challenging the Maryland Supreme Court's interpretation of the religious exemption in the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act. The Maryland Supreme Court has held that the exemption is limited to claims brought by employees who perform duties that directly further the core mission of the religious entity. As summarized by the court, plaintiffs allege in part:

(1) the exemption violates Plaintiffs' church autonomy rights under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment; (2) it violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment because it excessively entangles government with religion; (3) it violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment; (4) it violates the Establishment Clause by discriminating against Plaintiffs based on their denomination; (5) it violates Plaintiffs' First Amendment right to expressive association; (6) it violates Plaintiffs' First Amendment right to assembly; and (7) it violates the right to due process of law under the Fifthand Fourteenth Amendments because it is unconstitutionally vague.

In a 43-page opinion, the court found that plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on the merits of any of these claims. However it refused to dismiss outright three of plaintiff's claims, saying in part:

... [T]he Court recognizes that Plaintiffs are in good faith seeking an extension of the law in Count 1 [church autonomy], and that on Count 3 [free exercise], Plaintiffs have a different interpretation of the law on the issue of the applicable level of scrutiny that is not strictly foreclosed by precedent. Ordinarily, a court should refrain from dismissing outright a claim asserting a novel legal theory that can better be assessed after factual development....

... [T]he Court finds that under its view of the legal landscape, Plaintiffs have not stated a viable claim of a violation of the right to expressive association. Nevertheless, as with Counts 1 and 3, where Plaintiffs are seeking an extension of the law to have claims based on expressive association apply to the employment context, and further factual development is arguably warranted before full disposition of this claim, the Motion to Dismiss will be denied as to this claim.

Monday, June 23, 2025

Certiorari Granted in RLUIPA Damages Case

The U.S. Supreme Court today granted review in Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections, (Docket No. 23-1197, certiorari granted 6/23/2025) (Order List). At issue in the case is whether an action for damages lies under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act in a suit against a prison official in his personal capaciy. (Petition for Certiorari). Plaintiff, a Rastafarian, had his dreadlocks forcibly shaved by prison guards.  The Supreme Court has previously held that a damage action under RFRA can be brought against federal prison personnel, but the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals held that it would violate the Spending Clause to recognize a similar remedy under RLUIPA, which is a statute based on Congress' Spending Clause authority. (See prior related posting.) The SCOTUSblog case page has links to all the pleadings and amicus briefs in the case.

Recent Articles of Interest

 From SSRN:

From SmartCILP:

Texas Enacts Law Requiring Ten Commandments In Every Classroom

The Texas legislature has passed, and on June 20 Governor Gregg Abbott signed, SB10 (full text) which requires that:

a public elementary or secondary school shall display in a conspicuous place in each classroom of the school adurable poster or framed copy of the Ten Commandments...

The law requires that a poster or framed copy at least 16x20 in size include only the text of the Ten Commandments set out in the law. It must be posted "in a size and typeface that is legible to a person with average vision from anywhere in the classroom...."

Texas Tribune reports on the new law. A similar Louisiana law was just found to be unconstitutional by the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals which also has jurisdiction over Texas. (See prior posting.)

Sunday, June 22, 2025

5th Circuit Upholds Preliminary Injunction Against Louisiana's 10 Commandments In Classrooms Law

In Roake v. Brumley, (5th Cir., June 20, 2025), the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a district court's grant of a preliminary injunction against enforcement of a Louisiana statute that requires public schools to display the Ten Commandments in every classroom. In a lengty opinion the appellate court found that plaintiffs had standing to challenge the statute and that plaintiffs had shown a substantial likelihood of succcess on the merits of their Establishment Clause claim.  The court said in part:

The precedents of the Supreme Court and this court establish that, in an Establishment Clause case, a plaintiff can generally satisfy the injury-infact element of standing when he experiences—or certainly will experience—unwanted exposure to government-sponsored religious displays or exercises in the course of his regular activities....

Although the Supreme Court set aside the Lemon test in Kennedy [v. Bremerton School District],...  Kennedy did not overrule Stone [v. Graham]. Kennedy does  not mention Stone or purport to overrule the decisions (other than Lemon) on which Stone relies, i.e., Schempp or Engel. Stone remains good law andtherefore controls....

An H.B. 71 display that meets the statute’s minimum requirements is materially identical to the displays challenged in Stone....

It is also unclear how H.B. 71 ensures that students in Louisiana public schools “understand and appreciate the foundational documents of [its] stateand  national government” when it makes displaying those “foundational” documents optional, and does not require that they also be printed in a large, easily readable font.... When the Ten Commandments must be posted prominently and legibly, while the other “contextual” materials need not be visible at all, the disparity lays bare the pretext....

... [T]he question before us is whether the permanent posting of the Ten Commandments in public school classrooms fits within, or is consistent with, a broader tradition of using the Ten Commandments in public education....

Plaintiffs presented the expert testimony of Dr. Steven Green, a religious and constitutional legal historian. Dr. Green testified that the public school system did not exist at the founding; rather, public education originated sometime around the late 1820s. Dr. Green also found no evidence that the Ten Commandments were permanently displayed in early American public schools. He testified that no state enacted a law allowing the display of the Ten Commandments in public schools until North Dakota did so in 1927, and that a court later stuck down the statute....

Judge Dennis filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:

I join the majority opinion in full. I write separately to offer two additional bases for affirming the district court’s judgment. First, the Plaintiffs have standing under settled Supreme Court precedents recognizing “offended observer” standing in Establishment Clause cases.... Second, Louisiana vastly overstates both the holding and reach of Kennedy v. Bremerton School District.... That decision did not undermine—much less overrule—Stone v. Graham.... Nor did it eliminate the component parts of Lemon v. Kurtzman....

Axios reports on the decision.

Friday, June 20, 2025

In Britain, Commons Passes Bill Removing Prosecution of Women for Their Own Abortion; Extending Time Sue for Child Sex Abuse

On June 18, Britain's House of Commons by a vote of 312-95 passed and sent to the House of Lords the Crime and Policing Bill. Among the provisionsin the 444-page bill are Section 82 which removes the limitation period in damage actions claiming child sexual abuse and Section 191 which provides:

For the purposes of the law related to abortion, including sections 58 and 59 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 and the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929, no offence is committed by a woman acting in relation to her own pregnancy.

Discussing Section 191, WGBH reports:

In a landslide vote late Tuesday, lawmakers in the lower house of British parliament, the House of Commons, endorsed new legislation that bars women in England and Wales from ever being investigated, arrested, prosecuted or imprisoned for terminating their own pregnancies — no matter what term or trimester they’re in. The vote was 379 to 137.

Abortion is allowed up to 24 weeks of pregnancy, and beyond that in certain cases, if the woman’s life is in danger. But abortions have to be approved by two doctors, except for those that are terminated at home within 10 weeks....

The bill now goes to the House of Lords for its approval.

Thursday, June 19, 2025

Recent Articles of Interest

From SSRN:

Wednesday, June 18, 2025

Supreme Court Upholds Tennessee's Ban on Gender Affirming Care for Minors

In United States v. Skrmetti,(Sup.Ct., June 18, 2025), the U.S. Supreme Court today by a vote of 6-3 upheld Tennessee's law that bars both hormonal and surgical gender transition procedures for minors. The case generated 5 separate opinions spanning 118 pages. Chief Justice Roberts' majority opinion held that the Tennessee law does not trigger heightened scrutiny. He said in part:

This Court has not previously held that transgender individuals are a suspect or quasi-suspect class. And this case, in any event, does not raise that question because SB1 does not classify on the basis of transgender status. As we have explained, SB1 includes only two classifications: healthcare providers may not administer puberty blockers or hormones to minors (a classification based on age) to treat gender dysphoria, gender identity disorder, or gender incongruence (a classification based on medical use). The plaintiffs do not argue that the first classification turns on transgender status, and our case law forecloses any such argument as to the second....

... [T]here is a rational basis for SB1’s classifications. Tennessee concluded that there is an ongoing debate among medical experts regarding the risks and benefits associated with administering puberty blockers and hormones to treat gender dysphoria, gender identity disorder, and gender incongruence. SB1’s ban on such treatments responds directly to that uncertainty....

Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, saying in part: 

This case carries a simple lesson: In politically contentious debates over matters shrouded in scientific uncertainty, courts should not assume that self-described experts are correct.

Deference to legislatures, not experts, is particularly critical here. Many prominent medical professionals have declared a consensus around the efficacy of treating children’s gender dysphoria with puberty blockers, cross-sex hormones, and surgical interventions, despite mounting evidence to the contrary. They have dismissed grave problems undercutting the assumption that young children can consent to irreversible treatments that may deprive them of their ability to eventually produce children of their own. They have built their medical determinations on concededly weak evidence. And, they have surreptitiously compromised their medical recommendations to achieve political ends.

Justice Barrett, joined by Justice Thomas, filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:

Because the Court concludes that Tennessee’s Senate Bill 1 does not classify on the basis of transgender status, it does not resolve whether transgender status constitutes a suspect class.... I write separately to explain why, in myview, it does not....

Beyond the treatment of gender dysphoria, transgender status implicates several other areas of legitimate regulatory policy—ranging from access to restrooms to eligibility for boys’ and girls’ sports teams. If laws that classify based on transgender status necessarily trigger heightened scrutiny, then the courts will inevitably be in the business of “closely scrutiniz[ing] legislative choices” in all these domains....

Justice Alito filed an opi nion concurring in part, saying in part:

I do notjoin Part II–A–2 of the opinion of the Court, which concludes that SB1 does not classify on the basis of “transgender status.” There is a strong argument that SB1does classify on that ground, but I find it unnecessary to decide that question. I would assume for the sake of argument that the law classifies based on transgender status, but I would nevertheless sustain the law because such a classification does not warrant heightened scrutiny. I also do not join Part II–A–3 of the Court’s opinion because I do not believe that the reasoning employed in Bostock v. Clayton County ... is applicable when determining whether a law classifies based on sex for Equal Protection Clause purposes.

Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Jackson and joined in part by Justice Kagan, saying in part:

Tennessee’s law expressly classifies on the basis of sex and transgender status, so the Constitution and settled precedent require the Court to subject it to intermediate scrutiny. The majority contorts logic and precedent to say otherwise, inexplicably declaring it must uphold Tennessee’s categorical ban on lifesaving medical treatment so long as “‘any reasonably conceivable state of facts’” might justify it... Thus, the majority subjects a law that plainly discriminates on the basis of sex to mere rational-basis review. By retreating from meaningful judicial review exactly where it matters most, the Court abandons transgender children and their families to political whims....

Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

I take no view on how SB1 would fare under heightened scrutiny.... So I would both start and stop at the question of what test SB1 must satisfy. As JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR shows, it is heightened scrutiny...

SCOTUSblog reports on the decision.

Religious Liberty Commission Holds First Hearing

On June 16, the new Justice Department Religious Liberty Commission held it first hearing at the Museum of the Bible in Washington, DC. Video of the full hearing is available in three parts on YouTube: Part 1, Part 2, Part 3OSV News reports on some of the testimony. A critical slant on the hearing was published by Americans United.