Uganda's Constitutional Court Upholds Most of Its Anti-Homosexuality Act

In Odoi v. Attorney General, (Const. Ct. Uganda, April 3, 2023), the Constitutional Court of Uganda in a 203-page opinion upheld most of the Uganda Anti-Homosexuality Act 2023. The Act imposes a life imprisonment sentence for anyone who engages in a homosexual act, and the death penalty for aggravated homosexuality which in general is defined as engaging in a homosexual act with various types of vulnerable persons. However, the court struck down four sections of the Act: §3(2)(c) which defines aggravated homosexuality as including the situation in which the victim contracts a terminal illness as a result of the sexual act; §9 and §11(2)(d) which criminalize knowingly allowing premises to be used or leased out for homosexuality or activities encouraging it, and §14 which imposes a duty to report homosexuality even by individuals who would normally be prevented by privilege from reporting. In a press release, the Court summarized the decision in part as follows:

In coming to its decision, the Constitutional Court considered the following: 

... 2. The absence of consensus at the global level regarding non-discrimination based sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression and sex characteristics (SOGIESC)....

3. The conflict in international human rights law between upholding a universal understanding of human rights and respecting the diversity and freedom of human cultures.... 

4. The conflict between individuals’ right to self-determination, self-perception and bodily autonomy, on the one hand; and the communal or societal right to social, political and cultural self-determination.... 

5. The recent developments in the human rights jurisprudence including the decision of the US Supreme Court in Dobbs v Jackson Women’s Health Organisation, No. 19-1392, 597 U.S. 215 (2022), where the Court considered the nation’s history and traditions, as well as the dictates of democracy and rule of law, to over-rule the broader right to individual autonomy. 

6. The uniqueness of Uganda’s Constitution which obliges the courts of law to take into account the country’s socio-cultural norms, values and aspirations when resolving any disputes before them.  

7. The Anti-Homosexuality Act being, in general, a reflection of the sociocultural realities of the Ugandan society, and was passed by an overwhelming majority of the democratically elected representatives of the Ugandan citizens.

Louis Farrakhan's Suit Against ADL Dismissed

 In Farrakhan v. Anti-Defamation League, (SD NY, April 5, 2024), a New York federal district court dismissed defamation claims asserted by Louis Farrakhan against the Anti-Defamation League. The court describes Farrakhan's allegations:

The [complaint], which details nearly a century's worth of grievances, alleges several instances of defamation and, as against the ADL, various violations of the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. At their core, plaintiffs' claims are that by repeatedly referring to plaintiffs as antisemitic, defendants have defamed them and created a chilling effect on their religious practices. Plaintiffs seek $4.8 billion in damages as well as a declaratory judgment that the term "anti-Semite" is defamatory per se and that the ADL is a quasi-governmental actor that violated plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. Plaintiffs also seek to enjoin defendants from calling them antisemitic or taking any steps to urge third parties to disassociate with them.

A number of claims were dismissed on standing grounds, finding that Farrakhan did not allege concrete injuries traceable to ADL. Farrakhan's defamation claims were dismissed because Farrakhan, a public figure, did not plead actual malice. Others were dismissed because they were merely statements of opinion or Farrakhan had not alleged facts showing falsity.

Alabama Supreme Court Affirms Dismissal of Church Property Dispute

 In Sails v. Weeks, (AL Sup. Ct., April 5, 2024), the Alabama Supreme Court by a vote of 8-1, without an opinion for the majority, affirmed the dismissal of a suit challenging the use and disposal of church property. Defendants contended that plaintiffs are not members of the church and thus could not bring suit on its behalf. Justice Mendheim filed a concurring opinion, saying in part: 

[I]t is inaccurate to attribute the genesis of the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine to the First Amendment. The delicacy with which courts approach church-dispute cases arose more organically from America's history of seeking to disentangle church denominations from state governance...

I believe that our invocation of the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine should come from a desire to protect religious freedom rather than an unfounded fear that religious ideas might taint our civil jurisprudence....

The Sails plaintiffs argued that the heart of this dispute concerns the alleged mismanagement or misuse of church property. However, I believe that the Sails plaintiffs' property allegations are a proxy for asking the courts to decide who controls the church -- an issue our courts lack the means and expertise to decide....

... "[T]he nature of the underlying dispute" is whether the Sails plaintiffs, who stopped attending the church several years ago, are still members of the spiritual church, who are the ones that ultimately control the incorporated church and the property it holds. In short, there is no way around the fact that, in this case, a decision concerning the use of the church property implicates the spiritual church because church membership is a spiritual concern. 

Justice Sellers filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

Defendants ... moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing, in part, that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring an action on behalf of Union Baptist because, they claimed, Union Baptist was no longer a recognized legal entity under Alabama law because of the official name change that occurred in 2017....

... [C]hanging the name of a corporation, amending an organizational document, or reforming a deed involves the use of our civil legal system that by its very nature is not ecclesiastical.  The issue in this case then is who has the authority to act on behalf of the organization?  And, after identifying that issue, the question then becomes whether secular courts can decide that issue or whether that decision should be left to some ecclesiastical authority?  Because we have no ecclesiastical courts with enforcement authority, I am uncertain how the issue can be decided without court intervention. 

Arizona Supreme Court Says 160-Year-Old Abortion Ban Is Enforceable

In Planned Parenthood Arizona, Inc. v. Mayes, (AZ Sup. Ct., April 9, 2024), the Arizona Supreme Court held that A.R.S. §13-3603 that outlaws all abortions except when necessary to save the mother's life-- originally enacted in 1865-- again became operative when Roe v. Wade was overruled. In a 4-2 decision, the majority concluded that A.R.S. §36-2322, Arizona's 15-week abortion law enacted in 2022, did not prevent the effectiveness of the 1864 law. Senate Bill 1164 which enacted the 15-week law contained the following provision on "Construction" of the law:

This act does not: 1. Create or recognize a right to abortion or alter generally accepted medical standards.  The Legislature does not intend this act to make lawful an abortion that is currently unlawful. 2.  Repeal, by implication or otherwise, section 13-3603, Arizona Revised Statutes, or any other applicable state law regulating or restricting abortion.

Today's majority opinion said in part:

We conclude that § 36-2322 does not create a right to, or otherwise provide independent statutory authority for, an abortion that repeals or restricts § 13-3603, but rather is predicated entirely on the existence of a federal constitutional right to an abortion since disclaimed by Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 597 U.S. 215, 292 (2022).  Absent the federal constitutional abortion right, and because § 36-2322 does not independently authorize abortion, there is no provision in federal or state law prohibiting § 13-3603’s operation.  Accordingly, § 13-3603 is now enforceable.

The majority added two caveats:

First, § 13-3603 may be enforced prospectively only.  Second, we stay enforcement of § 13-3603 for fourteen calendar days from the filing date of this Opinion to permit the parties, on remand, to determine whether to pursue remaining issues raised in the trial court and, if so, to request further stay relief at the trial court’s discretion. 

Vice Chief Justice Timmer dissented, joined by Chief Justice Brutinel, saying in part:

  ... [R]elying on a statutory construction note tucked within a session law predating Dobbs, the majority interprets § 36-2322(B) as providing that if Roe was overruled, the state would turn back the clock to 1973 by enforcing the near-total abortion ban against physicians, even if they comply with § 36-2322(B) by performing elective abortions before the fifteen-week gestation point or performing abortions when necessary to prevent serious impairment to the pregnant woman’s health.  I strongly disagree.  As the adage goes, the legislature does not ordinarily “hide elephants in mouseholes.”... And the legislature neither did so nor could do so here with a session law note existing wholly apart from statutory text.  

Sections 13-3603 and 36-2322(B) can and should be interpreted harmoniously to permit their joint enforcement until the legislature or the people, through the initiative process, say otherwise.  This means physicians should be permitted to lawfully perform abortions before the fifteen-week gestation point or when necessary to preserve the pregnant woman’s health.

Arizona Republic reports on the decision.

Cert. Filed In Challenge To Michigan's Blaine Amendment

A petition for certiorari (full text) was filed with the U.S. Supreme Court last week in Hile v. State of Michigan, (Sup. Ct., cert. filed 4/4/2024). In the case, the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals held that an amendment placed in the Michigan Constitution in 1970 that prohibits public funds from being used to aid private or religious schools does not violate the equal protection rights of parents who cannot use Michigan Educational Savings Program to send their children to religious schools. (See prior posting.) The Lion reports on the petition for review.

Class Action By Muslim Women Against NYPD Settled for $17.5M

 AP reports that New York City has agreed to settle the class action damage claim in Clark v. City of New York for $17.5 million. The suit brought in a New York federal district court under RLUIPA challenged the NYPD's former policy of requiring Muslim women to remove their hijabs when sitting for arrest photos. (See prior posting.) Under the settlement, which still must obtain judicial approval, the $17.5 million will be shared equally by all class members who file a claim, with each getting a minimum of $7,824.  Previously, settling the claims for an injunction and declaratory judgment, the police department agreed to change its arrest photo policy. (See prior posting).

Texas' Claim Against HHS Over Pharmacy Guidance Dismissed As Moot

In State of Texas v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, (WD TX, April 5, 2024), a Texas federal district court dismissed as moot a challenge to an HHS Guidance Document for pharmacies. Initially, HHS issued Guidance reminding retail pharmacies of their non-discrimination obligations. The state of Texas and a pharmacy sued contending that the Guidance required Texas pharmacies to dispense abortion-inducing drugs in violation of Texas law and in violation of religious beliefs of plaintiff pharmacy. HHS denied this and moved for dismissal of the complaint. The court disagreed. The court now describes that decision by saying in part:

So based on the suspicion that Defendants were “smurfing” the administration’s policy goal contrary to the Supreme Court’s holding in Dobbs, the Court shot down Defendants’ motion. [See prior posting.]

Three months after the court refused to dismiss the suit, HHS issued a revised Guidance which explicitly provided that the Guidance does not require pharmacies to fill prescriptions for the purpose of abortions. The court went on:

[D]espite the textual changes, which appear crafted specifically to capitulate to Plaintiffs’ claims, Plaintiffs remain unpersuaded....

Plainly put, Plaintiffs’ concern is that anyone—pregnant or not—can walk into a pharmacy with a prescription for methotrexate, which the pharmacy must fill under every circumstance because the prescription was lawfully prescribed for a non-abortion purpose like rheumatoid arthritis. It’s not an unreasonable concern....

From the Court’s perspective, it’s hard to account for the Revised Guidance’s plain text, Defendants’ reasons for issuing the Revised Guidance, and Defendants’ in-person statements, but then still conclude that Plaintiffs will be forced to dispense drugs for abortion purposes. Indeed, it seems the only way the Court could even “reasonably expect” that Plaintiffs’ alleged injury would occur at this point would be for the Court to disregard all of Defendants’ actions as deceptive litigation posturing.  

To be sure, that argument appeals to the Court’s healthy distrust for the fourth branch of government. But there is no evidence that Defendants have tried to enforce these “obligations” against Mayo or any pharmacy in Texas in the almost two years since the  Pharmacy Guidance was issued. ...

Plaintiffs have received everything they asked for; they should take the win. As a result, the issues are now moot and the Court lacks jurisdiction.

ADF issued a press release reacting to the decision.

2nd Circuit: Plaintiffs Lack Standing to Challenge Zoning Law That Accommodates Jewish Worship Sites

In Citizens United to Protect Our Neighborhoods v. Village of Chestnut Ridge, New York, (2d Cir., April 5, 2024), the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals held that neither the organizational nor the individual plaintiffs had standing to bring an Establishment Clause challenge to the Village's 2019 zoning law applicable to places of worship.  According to the court:

... [A]t the urging of the Orthodox Jewish Coalition of Chestnut Ridge ..., the Village began the process of amending its zoning laws so that places of worship could more easily be built in Village neighborhoods, accommodating the need of Orthodox Jewish observers “to pray within walking distance of their homes.”...

In sum, even if it could be argued that the challenged law improperly promotes religion, Plaintiffs point to no cognizable harm that is actual or imminent.  They claim that the Village spent tax money in passing the law yet fail to allege how those funds were anything more than a routine use of the Village’s planning budget....  They claim that they will be directly exposed to newly authorized religious structures without asserting that they have even seen one of those structures or when and where they might ever do so in the future.  And while they contend that the law denies them the same opportunity as religious groups to host large gatherings, they do not assert that they have any particular interest in holding such events....  Ultimately, even if Plaintiffs have a sincere objection to the challenged law, our Article III standing doctrine requires them to first establish a real stake in their challenge before bringing it in federal court.

Recent Articles of Interest

From SSRN:

• Michael P. Foran, Discrimination and Manifestation of Belief: Higgs v Farmor's School [2023] EAT 89, (Industrial Law Journal, Forthcoming).
• Jack M. Balkin, Rabbi Akiva and the Crowns: A Parable of Constitutional Fidelity, (Boston University Law Review, Forthcoming).
• Jaan Islam, Islamic History (tārīkh) and Civilization in the Tas-heel Curriculum, (March 5, 2024).

From SmartCILP:

• Thomas D. Howes, Religion as a Basic Human Good, [Abstract], 66 American Journal of Jurisprudence 239-268 (2021).
• Marc O. DeGirolami, Book Review. The End of the Affair. Post-Liberal Religious Liberty: Forming Communities of Charity, by Joel Harrison, [Abstract], 66 American Journal of Jurisprudence. 409-414 (2021).
• Ryan Houser & Andres Constantin, COVID-19, Religious Freedom and the Law: The United States' Case, 49 American Journal of Law & Medicine 24-40 (2023).

Religiously Motivated Aid for Drug Abusers Not Protected by RFRA or 1st Amendment

In United States v. Safehouse, (ED PA, April 3, 2024), a Pennsylvania federal district court held that neither the Religious Freedom Restoration Act nor the Free Exercise Clause of the 1st Amendment is violated by prosecuting Safehouse for violating 21 USC §856 (Maintaining Drug-Involved Premises). Safehouse is a nonprofit corporation that plans to open a safe injection site for those struggling with opioid abuse. Its founders were religiously motivated, but the corporation's articles do not set out any religious purpose. The court said in part:

Here, the organizers and leaders of Safehouse profess religious motivation, but the work of Safehouse itself is in no respect religious....

As an entity unaffiliated with any specific faith or religious institution, Safehouse claims protection for its non-religious actions, based solely upon the religious motivation of its founders.  Neither RFRA nor the free exercise clause extends that far, as religion cannot provide a “limitless excuse for avoiding all unwanted obligations.” ...  That is necessarily so, because “‘the very concept of ordered liberty precludes allowing’ [a plaintiff], or any other person, a blanket privilege ‘to make his own standards on matters of conduct in which society as a whole has important interests.’”...  The noble intentions of Safehouse and its founders are self-evident, and the public health crisis they seek to address continues unabated, but their religious inspiration does not provide a shield against prosecution for violation of a federal criminal statute barring its operation.

WHYY News reports on the decision.

Indiana Appeals Court: Plaintiffs' Religious Rights Are Violated by State's Abortion Restrictions

In Individual Members of the Medical Licensing Board of Indiana v. Anonymous Plaintiff 1, (IN App., April 4, 2024), an Indiana state appellate court held that plaintiffs are entitled to a preliminary injunction in their suit claiming that the state's Religious Freedom Restoration Act is violated when they are prohibited by Indiana's abortion law from obtaining an abortion that their religious beliefs direct them to obtain. However, the court found that the injunction entered by the trial court was broader than just protecting plaintiffs' religious rights and sent the case back for the trial court to tailor its injunction more narrowly. The court said in part:

The State has provided little authority—and none that we find persuasive—to support the more restrictive view that religious exercise does not encompass the pregnancy terminations at issue here.... If a corporation can engage in a religious exercise by refusing to provide abortifacients—contraceptives that essentially abort a pregnancy after fertilization—it stands to reason that a pregnant person can engage in a religious exercise by pursuing an abortion....

... [W]e need look no further than the language of the Abortion Law to determine that the General Assembly does not view the State’s compelling interest as beginning at fertilization. The Abortion Law exempts in vitro fertilization procedures from its scope, although there is the potential for life that might be destroyed in the process of this procedure.... That broad exemption suggests any compelling interest by the State is absent at fertilization. Beyond that, the Abortion Law expressly permits abortions at all stages of gestation provided certain express requirements are met.... The Abortion Law allows a conditional right to abortions “to prevent any serious health risk to the pregnant woman or to save the pregnant woman’s life.” ... This amounts to an exception to the Abortion Law’s prohibitions based on a prioritization of the pregnant woman’s health over the survival of the zygote, embryo, or fetus. But that is the same sort of prioritization reflected in the Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs, albeit on a different scale....

Thus, the broader religious exemption that Plaintiffs effectively seek has the same foundation as the narrower exceptions already existing in the Abortion Law: all are based on the interests of the mother outweighing the interests of the zygote, embryo, or fetus. The religious exemption that Plaintiffs seek, based on their sincere religious beliefs, merely expands the circumstances in which the pregnant woman’s health dictates an abortion....

The State asserts the injunction is so broad that it enjoins future government action that may not violate RFRA.... Plaintiffs’ response is that the preliminary injunction should be interpreted more narrowly because Plaintiffs never sought such broad relief.

Judge May concurred without a separate opinion and Judge Bailey filed a concurring opinion. Indiana Capital Chronicle reports on the decision. [Thanks to Thomas Rutledge for the lead.]

Australian State Enacts Elaborate Conversion Therapy Baan

In the Australian state of New South Wales, with assent by the Governor on April 3, the Conversion Practices Ban Bill 2024 became law, effective in April 2025. The new law bans treatments or efforts to change or suppress a person's sexual orientation or gender identity where the treatment or efforts cause substantial mental or physical harm or endanger an individual's life. Violations may be punished with up to 5 years in prison. The law however includes a number of specific examples of both gender-affirming treatment and religious expression that are not prohibited. It provides in part:

A conversion practice does not include— (a) a health service or treatment provided by a registered health practitioner that— (i)  the registered health practitioner has assessed as clinically appropriate ... and (ii) complies with all relevant legal, professional and ethical requirements,

Examples ... [are]  • genuinely assisting an individual who is exploring the individual’s sexual orientation or gender identity or considering or undergoing a gender transition • genuinely assisting an individual who is receiving care and treatment related to the individual’s gender identity • genuinely advising an individual about the potential impacts of gender affirming medical treatment.

(b) genuinely facilitating an individual’s coping skills, development or identity exploration to meet the individual’s needs, including by providing acceptance, support or understanding to the individual, or

(c) the following expressions if the expression is not part of a practice, treatment or sustained effort, directed to changing or suppressing an individual’s sexual orientation or gender identity— (i) an expression, including in prayer, of a belief or principle, including a religious belief or principle, (ii) an expression that a belief or principle ought to be followed or applied.

(4) To avoid doubt, the following are examples of what does not constitute a conversion practice under this section— (a) stating what relevant religious teachings are or what a religion says about a specific topic, (b)  general requirements in relation to religious orders or membership or leadership of a religious community, (c) general rules in educational institutions, (d)  parents discussing matters relating to sexual orientation, gender identity, sexual activity or religion with their children.

The law also sets out an elaborate civil complaint structure. Unlike most statutes passed by U.S. jurisdictions, the Australian law appears to apply to adults as well as to minors. Law & Religion Australia reports on the new law.

Texas Man Sentenced To 37 Years in Muslim Hate Crime Murder

A Department of Justice press release reports that yesterday a Texas federal district court sentenced a defendant to 37 years in prison (with credit for time served before sentencing) for a mass shooting at a Dallas car repair business. Thirty-nine year old Anthony Paz Torres had pleaded guilty to five federal hate crime counts. DOJ explains:

 According to court documents, Torres admitted that a few days prior to the shooting, he went to Omar’s Wheels and Tires, made anti-Muslim comments, and pledged that he would come back. When he returned to the business on Dec. 24, 2015, Torres asked customers if they were Muslim. After being escorted back to his vehicle by Omar’s Wheels and Tires employees, Torres discharged his firearm in the direction of multiple employees and customers. Torres admitted that he killed one person and attempted to kill four other people at Omar’s Wheels and Tires because he believed that they were Muslim. 

Uganda Constitutional Court Upholds Most of Anti-Homosexuality Act; Mandatory Reporting of Homosexuality Invalidated

In Odoi-Oywelowo v. Attorney General, (Const. Ct. Uganda, April 3, 2024), Uganda's Constitutional Court in a unanimous 203-page opinion upheld the constitutionality of most of the country's Anti-Homosexuality Act, 2023. The Act bans homosexuality and the promotion of homosexuality and contains various enforcement provisions. Plaintiffs contended that the law violated a number of provisions of the Ugandan Constitution, including protections of human dignity, equality, privacy and expression. While upholding most of the law, the court struck down provisions that punish unintentional transmission of HIV and provisions prohibiting leasing or allowing of premises to be used for homosexuality. It also found that Section 14 of the Act that imposed a duty to report homosexuality and gave immunity to a person who reports it in violation of a privilege violates the constitutional rights to health, privacy and freedom of religion. That provision would have presumably required clergy who learn of homosexuality in privileged conversations to report it. Reuters reports on the decision.

Iowa Enacts Religious Freedom Restoration Act

Yesterday Iowa Governor Kim Reynolds signed SF 2095, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. (Governor's press release.) (Full text of Act.) It provides in part:

State action shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that applying the burden to that person's exercise of religion is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.

The Gazette reports on the bill.

Inmates Sue Claiming Religious Need to Watch Solar Eclipse

Suit was filed last week in a New York federal district court by six inmates at the Woodbourne Correctional Facility in Sullivan County, New York seeking to enjoin a 3-hour statewide prison lock down scheduled for April 8 that will prevent inmates from viewing the solar eclipse.  Plaintiffs are Christian, Muslim, Santerian and Atheist. The complaint (full text) in Zielinski v. New York Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, (ND NY, filed 3/29/2024), alleges that plaintiffs "have each expressed a sincerely held religious belief that April’s solar eclipse is a religious event that they must witness and reflect on to observe their faiths." The complaint sets out the nature of each plaintiff's religious belief. It alleges that the lock down violates plaintiffs' rights under RLUIPA, the Free Exercise and the Equal Protection Clauses. CBS News reports on the lawsuit.

UPDATE: AP, April 5, reports:

Thomas Mailey, a spokesperson for the corrections department, said the department has agreed to permit the six individuals to view the eclipse, while plaintiffs have agreed to drop their suit with prejudice.

Fraud and Negligence Claims Move Ahead Against Church Over Mistreatment of Members

In Ramirez v. World Mission Society, Church of God, (D NJ, April 1, 2024), plaintiff brought suit in a New Jersey federal district court against various defendants, including a church and its Pastor, for fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence. Plaintiff claims that she was pressured into joining defendant Church, in part through concealment of the identity of the Church's leader. She was further coerced into donating 10% of her income to the church based on misrepresentations that the donations would be used for charitable purposes rather than salaries. The Church indoctrinated its members so that they would work long hours at low pay. It alienated plaintiff from her family and friends, and told members they could not have children which led plaintiff to get an abortion and subsequently attempt suicide. The court dismissed many of the claims because elements were not adequately pleaded. Only a claim against the Church and its Pastor for intentional fraud based on false representations and a claim for negligence against the Church survived defendants' motion to dismiss.

Satanic Temple Can Move Ahead with Establishment Clause Challenge to Its Treatment by City Council

In The Satanic Temple v. The City of Chicago, (ND IL, March 31, 2024), an Illinois federal district court held that The Satanic Temple ("TST") had alleged enough to move ahead on its claim that the city had violated the Establishment Clause by constantly delaying for over three years a request by a TST clergyman to deliver an invocation at a Chicago City Council meeting.  The court said in part:

The Establishment Clause requires that the City treat Vavrick the same as it would any other clergy member from any other religion. Assuming, therefore, that the City has not scheduled Vavrick to give an invocation because of his religious beliefs, such practice violates the Establishment Clause.

The court however dismissed plaintiffs' free speech claim finding that plaintiffs had not plausibly alleged that City Council invocations are anything other than government speech. It also refused to grant a preliminary injunction.

Suit For Misappropriating Church Funds Not Precluded by Church Autonomy Doctrine

In Buck v. Peace Apostolic Church, Inc., (CA Super. Ct., March 8, 2024), a California trial court rejected the contention that the church autonomy or ecclesiastical abstention doctrine precludes the court from adjudicating a claim that two church officers and directors improperly spent church funds.  The court said in part:

The First Amendment does not immunize the Church or the individual defendants from illegal acts that apply equally to everyone, religious or not. The Plaintiffs alleged and proved that Defendants committed fraud and engaged in false advertising. Defendants solicited donations from the public promising that “no part of the income or assets of this corporation shall ever inure to the benefit of any director, officer, or member thereof or to the benefit of any private person.”... Prince used her position in the church and the representations made by her and by the church to enrich herself. While Brown did not enrich herself, she facilitated the enrichment of her son, Howard Woods. The defendants cannot take money based on a representation that it would be used for charitable purposes and church mission and use it for personal benefit. That's not internal church governance. That's fraud. The activities that occurred in that case are not protected by the First Amendment.... 

On December 19, 2023, the Court ordered injunctive relief. In part, PAC was ordered to post warnings that read “WARNING: A Jury has found that Tamara Swancy-Prince, Priscilla Woods Brown and Peace Apostolic Church have improperly misappropriated donations.” PAC objects to the injunction arguing that the Court misapplied the law.... The Court is simply not convinced that similar abuses won’t recur.

Florida Supreme Court Clears Abortion Rights Proposal for November Ballot

 In Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General re: Limiting Government Interference with Abortion, (FL Sup. Ct., April 1, 2024), the Florida Supreme Court, in a 4-3 decision, rejected challenges to placing a proposed abortion rights constitutional amendment on the November ballot. The proposed amendment provides:

Limiting government interference with abortion.—Except as provided in Article X, Section 22, no law shall prohibit, penalize, delay, or restrict abortion before viability or when necessary to protect the patient’s health, as determined by the patient’s healthcare provider.

The court said in part:

We decline to adopt a standard that would effectively vest us with the power to bar an amendment from the ballot because of a supposed ambiguity in the text of the amendment.  We decline to encroach on the prerogative to amend their constitution that the people have reserved to themselves.

Chief Justice Muniz filed a concurring opinion, joined by Justices Canaday and Couriel concur, saying in part:

... [Q]uestions of justice are appropriately at the heart of the voters’ assessment of a proposed amendment like the one under review.  With its reference to the existence of “inalienable rights” in all persons, our constitution’s Declaration of Rights assumes a pre-constitutional, objective moral reality that demands our respect—indeed, a moral order that government exists to protect.  The proposed amendment would constitutionalize restrictions on the people’s authority to use law to protect an entire class of human beings from private harm.  It would cast into doubt the people’s authority even to enact protections that are prudent, compassionate, and mindful of the complexities involved.  Under our system of government, it is up to the voters—not this Court—to decide whether such a rule is consistent with the deepest commitments of our political community.

Justice Grosshans filed a dissenting opinion in which Justic Sasso concurs. Justice Francis filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Sasso filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Grosshans and Francis concur, saying in part:

I agree with the majority that, at a very high level, the voters will understand that this amendment creates a broad right to abortion in Florida.  However, our precedent has consistently required that the summary explain more than the amendment’s general aim.  Indeed, we have said that ballot summaries must explain the “material legal effect,” so that the electorate is advised of the “true meaning, and ramifications, of an amendment” and is thereby “adequately informed.” 

The summary here does none of this.

In a separate decision yesterday, the Florida Supreme Court held that the state Constitution's Privacy Clause does not protect abortion rights. (See prior posting.) Orlando Sentinel reports on the two decisions.