Religion Clause

Wednesday, July 01, 2026

Michigan Catholic Charities Sues State Officials Over Ouster as Provider of Women's Substance Abuse Services

Last week, Catholic Charities serving the Lansing, Michigan area filed suit against the director of Michigan's Department of Health and Human Services, Michigan's Attorney General and other Michigan officials as well as Mid-State Health Network that administers the Department's Medicaid and federal Substance Use Block Grant funds. Catholic Charities, through Cristo Rey Counseling Center, offers federally funded services for women with substance use disorders. The complaint (full text) in Catholic Charities of Ingham, Eaton & Clinton Counties v. Hertel, (WD MI, filed 6/26/2026), alleges that Mid-State discontinued Cristo Rey as a provider under the program after questioning the Counseling Center's requirement that its staff not discuss or make referrals for abortions, contraception, gender identity, or adoption placements with same-sex couples. It alleges that Michigan state Attorney General Dana Nessel is providing legal guidance to the Department of Health and Human Services, and that "Nessel harbors ... hostility toward Catholic and other religious organizations that hold sincere religious beliefs about abortion and contraception...." The complaint alleges that discontinuing Cristo Rey as a provider violates its 1st and 14th Amendment rights as well as federal statutory provisions. ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

2nd Circuit Reaffirms Permissibility of NY Repeal of Religious Exemptions from School Vaccination Requirements

In Miller v. McDonald, (2d Cir., June 30, 2026), the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals reaffirmed its earlier decision that New York's repeal of its religious belief exemption from required school immunizations, while keeping medical exemptions, does not violate either Amish parents' free exercise rights or their parental rights to control their children's religious upbringing. Last year, the Supreme Court had remanded the case to the Second Circuit for reconsideration in light of Mahmoud v. Taylor. In reaffirming its earlier decision, the Second Circuit said in part:

New York Public Health Law § 2164 is neutral on its face. It does not target or affirmatively prohibit religious practices.... Moreover, the act of repealing the religious exemption did not “in and of itself transmute” this otherwise neutral law into one “that targets religious beliefs.”...

Nor does the legislative history reveal an anti-religious bias....

... [T]he motives of a small number of legislators cannot be attributed to the legislative body as a whole.

Plaintiffs contend that exempting students for medical reasons treats comparable secular conduct more favorably than religious beliefs....

Repealing the religious exemption decreases “to the greatest extent medically possible” the number of unvaccinated students and thus the risk of disease; maintaining the medical exemption allows “the small proportion of students” who medically “cannot be vaccinated” to avoid the health consequences that “taking a particular vaccine would inflict.” ... Exempting religious objectors, however, detracts from that interest. Religious exemptions increase “the risk of transmission of vaccine-preventable diseases among vaccinated and unvaccinated students alike.”...

New York passed § 2164 in response to the 2018 to 2019 measles outbreak. Legislators felt particularly concerned about the concentration of unvaccinated children with religious exemptions in the same schools....

Plaintiffs’ remaining argument is that, even if § 2164 is neutral and generally applicable, it burdens the parental free-exercise right recognized in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), and clarified in Mahmoud v. Taylor. We conclude that it does not....

Section 2164 does not regulate what children are taught, does not require them to affirm any belief, does not expose them to state-selected instruction contrary to their parents’ faith, and does not enlist school officials to displace parental religious formation. It imposes a health-and-safety condition on in-person school attendance to reduce the spread of communicable disease.... The burden may be serious, but it is not the kind of state interference with a child’s religious development that triggered strict scrutiny in Yoder or Mahmoud....

Mahmoud asks whether a burden is “of the same character” as the burden in Yoder, not whether it is more or less serious.... A greater burden in degree is not necessarily the same burden in kind....

Supreme Court Grants Review on Ripeness for RLUIPA Zoning Claims

The Supreme Court yesterday granted review in Grand v. University Heights, (Docket No. 25-965, certiorari granted 6/30/2026) (Order List). In the case, the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals (full text of 6th Circuit opinion) held that plaintiff's claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act as well as the 1st and 14th Amendments are not ripe for review. Plaintiff, an Orthodox Jew, held weekly prayer sessions in his home for himself and his neighbors. After the city raised zoning objections, plaintiff had applied for a special use permit necessary in order to operate a "house of worship" in the area that was zoned U-1. Just before a second hearing on his application, plaintiff withdrew the application. After that hearing, the city took no further action on the application. Some 18 months later, plaintiff filed suit against the city. Affirming the district court's dismissal of the case, the 6th Circuit said in part:

... [N]either the Planning Commission nor the City Council nor the Board of Zoning Appeals has ever determined whether UHCO § 1274.01 applies to the kinds of gatherings he has in mind. And because Grand withdrew his application, the zoning board has never issued a final decision—or for that matter any decision—about his eligibility for a special use permit. The government body “charged with implementing the regulations,” in short, has not “reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue.” ... Grand’s claims thus never ripened into a dispute suitable for federal review.

Plaintiff's Petition for Certiorari lists as the Question Presented to the Supreme Court:

Whether the First Amendment's established chilling-effect doctrine-- under which a credible government threat that deters the exercise of fundamental rights constitutes a complete and independently actionable constitutional injury-- is displaced by Williamson Cnty.'s land-use finality requirement when a plaintiff alleges that government threats both before and after a Planning Commission meeting chilled religious exercise, worship, and assembly.

The Court will hear arguments in the case in the Fall. ADF issued a press release announcing the Court's grant of review. [Thanks to Eugene Volokh via Religionlaw for the lead.]

Tuesday, June 30, 2026

Supreme Court Allows Schools to Exclude Transgender Females from Girls' and Women's Sports Teams

In West Virginia v. B.J.P., (Sup. Ct., June 20, 2026), the U.S. Supreme Court held that states may exclude transgender females from girls' and women's athletic teams without violating either Title IX or the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. The Court's opinion, written by Justice Kavanaugh, and joined by Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch and Barrett said in part:

Notably, B. P. J. does not seriously contest that the term “sex” in Title IX, the Javits Amendment, and the regulations means biological sex. Moreover, B. P. J. agrees ... that Title IX permits schools to maintain separate female and male teams and to prohibit most biological males from playing on women’s and girls’ teams. B. P. J. disagrees with West Virginia and the United States only about whether schools must make an exception to that general rule for biological males who identify as female and have taken puberty blockers or hormones.

But the texts of Title IX, the Javits Amendment, and the Title IX regulations do not say (or even hint) that schools must allow certain biological males to participate in women’s and girls’ sports....

Some percentage of biological males who identify as male possess physical and athletic capabilities that fall within (or below) the range of typical female physical and athletic capabilities. But the plaintiffs acknowledge that States may still exclude those biological males from women’s and girls’ sports, given the general physical differences between males and females.

And the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit the States from applying that same principle to all biological males, including those who identify as female. In the distinctive sports context, in other words, the States may treat all biological males the same and treat all biological females the same, given the inherent physical differences between biological males and biological females.....

In so ruling, we emphasize one last point. Most of the biological female and transgender student-athletes who are involved in transgender sports disputes around the country are teenagers or in their early twenties. Those student athletes want to play sports. Their desire to compete warrants respect. No student-athlete on either side of the issue, whether a biological female or transgender, deserves to be ostracized or vilified.

Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:

Men and boys with gender dysphoria are not women or girls, even if they believe that they are. Sex is an immutable “biological” characteristic ...; it is binary; and “man” and “woman,” “boy” and “girl,” are the terms that correspond to adults and children of each sex.... To use language to obscure reality—to show “indifference regarding the truth”— is to lie to the public and cease to treat our fellow citizens “as equal[s].”...

Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:

... Nothing in Title IX clearly and unambiguously alerts funding recipients that they are prohibited from restricting a school-sponsored sports team to biological women or girls....

Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson filed an opinion concurring only in the judgment, saying in part:

... West Virginia might be right that transgender girls retain some inherent athletic advantage over cisgender girls due to their sex identified at birth even after receiving the hormonal therapy B. P. J. identifies. All agree, moreover, that States do have some room to legislate around issues when there exists significant, and genuine, scientific debate. At this point, however, neither the District Court nor the Fourth Circuit has passed upon any of the available evidence or made the necessary factual findings about the state of the scientific debate....

Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, saying in part:

... [T]he majority is wrong to suggest that the term “sex” in Title IX “cannot plausibly be interpreted to refer to anything other than biological sex.”... Title IX makes room for individuals to live in the gender they choose; it cares not just about sex assigned at birth but also about individuals’ ability to match (or not) their gender presentation to their gender identity. Because West Virginia’s law forces B. P. J. to live—in this case, to play—as a boy though she is a girl, it might well run afoul of Title IX properly construed.

Reuters reports on the decision.

Cert. Denied Over Dissent of 3 Justices in Covid Vaccine Mandate Controversy

The U.S. Supreme Court yesterday denied review in Doe v. Hochul , (Docket No. 24-1015, certiorari denied 6/29/2026) over a dissenting opinion by Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito. At issue in the case was New York's refusal to grant state healthcare workers a religious exemption from the state's Covid vaccine mandate. Justice Gorsuch dissenting said in part:

... [T]he Court of Appeals did not assess the reasonableness of the plaintiffs’ requested accommodations. In fact, the court took as given that the plaintiffs had “plausibly alleged a prima facie case of Title VII religious discrimination.” ... Still, the court held, the defendants had presented a successful “undue hardship” defense as a matter of law.... More specifically, the court reasoned that granting the plaintiffs’ requested religious accommodations would have imposed an “undue hardship” on their employers because it “would have required the [employers] to violate the state [vaccine] regulation” and “subjected the [employers] to financial penalties or a suspension or revocation of their operating licenses.”...

Soon after it decided this case, the Second Circuit reiterated its understanding of Title VII’s undue hardship defense, holding that “an accommodation that would require an employer to violate” a state law necessarily “imposes an undue hardship”—and does so even when the state law is “unconstitutional as applied” to the plaintiff....

... [I]t seems to me that state law cannot control whether an employer faces an “undue hardship” for purposes of federal antidiscrimination laws, just like it cannot conclusively resolve what constitutes a “reasonable accommodation”.... To hold otherwise would appear to leave States free to strip individuals of the protections guaranteed by so many federal civil rights statutes....

Supreme Court Grants Review on Standing of Parents to Challenge Notification About Children Receiving Gender-Affirming Care

The U.S. Supreme Court yesterday granted review in International Partners for Ethical Care, Inc. v. Ferguson, (Docket No. 25-840, certiorari granted 6/29/2026). (Order List.). At issue in the case is whether parents whose children have gender dysphoria and might run away from home in the future have standing to challenge a group of Washington laws that exempt youth shelters from notifying parents that their children are in the shelter when the child is seeking gender-affirming care. Instead, the shelter is to notify the Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF). DCYF must then contact the parents and offer to make referrals for behavioral health services and family reconciliation services.

In a July 2025 decision (full text), the 9th Circuit held that parents had not alleged sufficient current or future injury to grant standing. The 9th Circuit subsequently denied en banc review over the dissents of three judges. The petition for certiorari frames the Question Presented as:

Whether parents have standing to challenge a law or policy that deliberately displaces their decision making role as to “gender transitions” of their children, and in so doing creates present and likely future impediments to their ability to parent their children as they deem best for them.

Cert. Petition Filed in Lipan Apache Efforts To Prevent Impairment of Religious Ceremonial Site

A petition for certiorari (full text) was filed with the U.S. Supreme Court last week in Perez v. City of San Antonio, (Sup. Ct., cert. filed 6/26/2026). In the case, the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision affirmed a trial court's refusal to enjoin San Antonio's development plan for a city park. Plaintiffs are members of the Lipan-Apache Native American Church. Certain of their religious ceremonies can take place only at a particular river bend in the park and require the presence of cormorants in the trees there. The development plan will remove trees and modify bird habitats. (See prior posting. and 5th Circuit's amended opinion.) The petition for review sets out the Questions Presented as:

1. Whether the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment permit courts, when deciding whether government action burdens religious exercise, to override a claimant’s sincere theological judgment of what the religious exercise requires.

2. Whether the government can satisfy its burden to prove that its action is the least religiously restrictive means available when, after notice that its action would burden religious exercise, the government admits that it failed to consider any workable alternatives prior to litigation.

First Liberty Institute issued a press release announcing the filing of the petition.

Monday, June 29, 2026

Michigan AG Releases Report on Sexual Abuse in Saginaw Catholic Diocese

On June 25, Michigan Attorney General Dana Nessel released a 258-page report titled Diocese of Saginaw: A Complete Accounting (full text). It is the sixth of what will be seven reports on allegations of sexual abuse or assault and other sexual misconduct by priests or deacons in each of Michigan's seven dioceses. Last week's report contains information on complaints against 37 Catholic priests and one deacon in the Saginaw diocese. The Attorney General says:

To date, eleven cases have been brought by the Department of Attorney General for all seven dioceses. Nine have resolved with convictions. Of these eleven cases, none of them related to priests ministering in the Diocese of Saginaw.

Bishop Robert Guss responded to the Report through a posting on the Diocese's website that says in part:

For the 37 priests and one deacon, 30 are known or presumed to be dead. For the 8 who are living or presumed to be living, none are in active ministry.
For the 37 priests and one deacon, other than a few entries, the conduct as alleged that may have violated Michigan criminal law all occurred before 2002, the year of the U.S. Bishops’ Charter.
The vast majority of reported abuse cases in our diocese are very old, with most occurring in the 1970s and 1980s.

He also held a news conference and issued a letter responding to the Report and saying in part:

I want to express my deepest sorrows to those who have been victims of abuse by members of the clergy. Please accept my sincere apology for the pain and suffering you have experienced by those who were entrusted with your care. I'm deep]y saddened by it all. And, again, I apologize to you on behalf of the Church and our Diocese.

The Abuse Survivors Coalition issued a statement saying in part:

The Bishop’s words ignored the systemic problem and minimized what occurred during the time period covered in the report. For example, Bishop Gruss apologized for the trust that has been broken by the “misconduct of a few.” But childhood sexual abuse by clergy is not “misconduct.” It is serious criminal behavior resulting in life-long damage to the victims. Moreover, the Bishop completely ignored the issue of highly placed Catholic officials who allowed identified abusers to remain in ministry and harm additional young lives.

Supreme Court Review Sought by Teacher Who Objects to School's Gender identity Policy

A petition for certiorari (full text) was filed with the U.S. Supreme Court last week in Polk v. Montgomery County Public Schools, (Sup. Ct., cert. filed 6/26/2026). In the case, the U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the denial of a preliminary injunction sought by a substitute teacher who objected on free speech and free exercise grounds to a Maryland school district's Guidelines for Student Gender Identity. (See prior posting.) The petition for review poses the Questions Presented as:

1. When public schools try to force teachers, over their religious objections, to use pronouns inconsistent with a student’s biological sex and to hide from parents information about their child’s gender expression at school, does Smith apply and foreclose heightened scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause?

2. Do public schools violate the Free Speech Clause when they compel objecting teachers to adhere to such a school policy?

ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the petition.

Sunday, June 28, 2026

President's Religious Liberty Commission Delivers Draft Report

On June 26, the President's Religious Liberty Commission delivered its draft report to the President. (Press Release). The 224-page Report (full text) sets out numerous recommendations for various segments of society and government. The Report's Executive Summary concludes in part:

... People often use the metaphor “wall of separation of church and state” to justify excluding religious Americans from equal participation in the public square. But the “wall of separation” phrase does not appear in the First Amendment or anywhere else in the Constitution. What the First Amendment does say about the relationship between religion and the government is that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” In practical terms, that means that the government may not officially prefer one religion over another, take over the functions of a church, or coerce religious observance.

Nothing in the First Amendment allows the government to create a “wall” between an individual’s personal faith and our nation’s public life. The idea that it does allow—or even require—a “wall of separation” only took off in the mid-twentieth century, when the Supreme Court began citing Thomas Jefferson’s 1802 letter to the Danbury Baptist Association, written 10 years after the First Amendment was ratified.

One belabored metaphor—often used out of context—cannot support the view that the aim of the First Amendment was to exile the practice of religion from public life. And no Founding document supports that conclusion either....

The concept of a “wall of separation between church and state” can wrongly imply that church and state are opposed to one another and must remain completely separate. In reality, however, church and state strengthen and support one another. Perhaps a better analogy is that religious liberty acts as a bridge between church and state. In other words, when people of faith exercise their religious liberty by living that faith—from praying to serving the poor to treating people with charity to upholding moral standards—they live more fulfilling lives, build vibrant families, bolster our communities, and ultimately, strengthen our nation. In this way, religious liberty isn’t simply an appendage of our society. It is the beating heart of our republic and the lifeblood of America’s success....

The Report is open for public comment for 15 days.

Saturday, June 27, 2026

Texas Adopts Required Reading List for Schools, Including Biblical Stories and Verses for Gades 1-12

Yesterday, the Texas State Board of Education approved a required reading list for each grade from kindergarten through high school. The list includes Bible verses or stories for every grade except kindergarten. Zeale reports:

The Republican-controlled board voted 9-5 with one member absent to adopt the reading lists, which were required under a 2023 state law directing the board to specify required vocabulary and at least one literary work for each grade level. The adopted lists contain nearly 200 literary works spanning kindergarten through high school, including selections from the Bible alongside classic works by authors such as William Shakespeare, Jane Austen, Charles Dickens, and E.B. White.

The requirements will take effect beginning with the 2030-2031 school year....

The reading lists assign different Bible passages from specific translations, including the New International Reader’s Version, King James Version, and English Standard Version.

According to the Houston Chronicle:

The book list makes Texas the only state in the country to issue its own literature requirements, rather than leaving the choices up to teachers or districts....

Though teachers may still select other books to supplement the list, many testified prior to the vote that the required list was already too long to be taught within a single school year.

Here are the Biblical verses and stories required (as amended): 1st Grade- Jonah and the Whale by Jonah 1:1-5, 10-17, 2:10; 2nd Grade- David and Goliath (excerpt from The Children's Book of Heroes) by William J. Bennett (editor); 3rd Grade- ROAR! – Daniel and the Lion's Den – Children's Adapted Version by CBN;

4th Grade: The Necessity of Humility (Book of Luke, Chapter 14, Verses 7-11) by New International Reader's Version: New Testament; 5th Grade- Moses (Book of Exodus, Chapter 3: The Burning Bush and Book of Exodus, Chapter 14: The Parting of the Red Sea) by New International Reader's Version: Hebrew Bible/Old Testament; 6th Grade- Do Not Be Anxious (Book of Matthew, Chapter 6, Verses 25-34) by English Standard Version: New Testament;

7th Grade- The Shepherd's Psalm (Book of Psalms, Chapter 23) by King James Version: Hebrew Bible/Old Testament; The Eight Beatitudes (Book of Matthew, Chapter 5, Verses 1-12) by King James Version: New Testament; 8th Grade- To Everything There is a Season (Book of Ecclesiastes, Chapter 3) by King James Version: Hebrew Bible/Old Testament; Book of Lamentations, Chapter 3 by Tanakh: Jewish Publication Society 1917.

English 1 (9th grade)-Parable of the Prodigal Son (Book of Luke, Chapter 15, Verses 11-32) by English Standard Translation: New Testament; English II (10th Grade)- The Book of Job (Book of Job, Chapters 1-7,11,14,19,28,38-42) by New International Reader's Version: Hebrew Bible/Old Testament; English III (11th Grade)- Adam and Eve (Book of Genesis, Chapters 2 and 3) by New International Reader's Version: Hebrew Bible/Old Testament; English IV (12th Grade): The Definition of Love (Book of 1 Corinthians, Chapter 13) by English Standard Version: New Testament.

A video of the full board meeting that adopted the reading requirements is available online. (Discussion of the proposal begins at 54:21). AP also reports on the Board's action.

Friday, June 26, 2026

Suit Charging Misrepresentation of Use of Tithed Funds Dismissed on Ecclesiastical Abstention Grounds

In Leach v. Gateway Church, (ED TX, June 23, 2026), a Texas federal district court dismissed on ecclesiastical abstention grounds a class action suit brought by donors to the church who claim that the church misrepresented the charities to which tithed funds would be distributed. The court said in part:

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants represented or promised that “15% of all tithe dollars would be distributed to global missions and Jewish ministry partners,” inducing Plaintiffs to give generously toward these ends.... Plaintiffs contend that Defendants made these representations through various mediums, including during sermons, in the “Members’ Handbook,” at conferences, and on Gateway’s website..... Plaintiffs assert that Defendants did not allocate these funds as they represented that they would.... Plaintiffs argue that Defendants’ reallocation of their tithe dollars from “global missions” and “Jewish ministries” to “secret organizations” or to other “charitable purposes,” ... was an improper transfer....

The claims at issue will implicitly require the Court to determine the meaning of Plaintiff’s references to “global missions,” “Jewish ministry partners,” “local, national, and international outreach efforts,” and other terms that implicate religious beliefs....

... [W]hile both parties acknowledge Plaintiffs’ claims are grounded in traditional civil law, resolving the claims would require the court to examine the management of Gateway’s donated funds, which will “necessarily implicate[] questions of faith, scripture, and religious doctrine.”...

Further, resolving Plaintiffs’ claims would require the Court to “evaluat[e] the truth of [a] sermon.”... Plaintiffs specifically alleged that two senior pastors promised to give the congregation their money back if they were dissatisfied with how the church used it.... These promises were purportedly made during sermons....

... [T]his analysis may have been different if Plaintiffs had alleged that Morris, Dulin, or any other Gateway leader reallocated their tithe dollars for personal gain....

Fort Worth Report reports on the decision.

Thursday, June 25, 2026

9th Circuit: Question of Fact Remains on Whether Airline Flight Attendants Were Fired Because of Their Religious Beliefs

In Brown v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., (9th Cir., June 24, 2026), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals held that there is a genuine dispute of material fact that precludes dismissing before trial a suit by two Alaska Airlines flight attendants (Brown and Smith) who were fired after they posted comments on an internal intranet communications network opposing the Airline's support for the proposed federal Equality Act. That proposed Act protected LGBTQ+ rights. At issue is whether the firings were because of the flight attendants' religious beliefs or instead because their comments violated the company’s anti-discrimination and anti-harassment policies. The court said in part:

... [T]he issue is not whether Alaska can punish employees who engage in discrimination and harassment (it can). The issue here is instead a factual one of whether Brown was in fact fired for engaging in discrimination or harassment, or whether Alaska instead used the cover of its employee policies to fire Brown because of her religious beliefs. Construing the facts in the light most favorable to Brown, there is a genuine dispute of material fact on this point, and so summary judgment for Alaska was improper....

Under our cases, a union under Title VII “has an affirmative obligation to oppose employment discrimination against its members,” and if the union instead “acquiesce[s] or join[s] in the Company’s discrimination practices, it too is liable to the injured employees.”

The record raises factual questions about whether AFA’s representation of Brown was colored by potential disagreement with her religious views....

Judge Christen dissented in part, saying in part:

I dissent from my colleagues’ decision to reverse the district court’s entry of summary judgment on Lacey Smith’s claims against Alaska because I do not agree that Smith demonstrated a genuine dispute of material fact about whether Alaska terminated her because of her religion...

During Alaska’s investigation, Smith insisted that she was merely posing a philosophical question rather than asserting to the investigators that her Christian beliefs caused her to conclude that the Equality Act was immoral. The majority posits that “‘morality’ is often associated with religious beliefs,” but references to morality are not inherently religious....

First Liberty Institute issued a press release announcing the decision.

Parents Sue California School District Over Opt-Out Rights

Suit was filed this week in a California federal district court challenging a California school district's refusal to allow parents to opt their children out of LGBTQ+ instruction that conflicts with the family's religious beliefs. Plaintiff parents contend that the Supreme Court's 2025 decision in Mahmoud v. Taylor gives them the right to opt their children out of this instruction. The complaint (full text) in Taylor v. Sunnyvale School District, (ND CA, filed 6/22/2026), alleges in part:

12.... As devout members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, they, like “[m]any Americans,” including the parents in Mahmoud, “believe that biological sex reflects divine creation, that sex and gender are inseparable, and that children should be encouraged to accept their sex and to live accordingly.”...

13. The Taylors also believe that Sunnyvale’s curriculum is age-inappropriate and inconsistent with their religious beliefs, practices, and child-raising philosophies, and that forcing their children to participate in Sunnyvale’s LGBTQ+ instruction will undermine their efforts to raise their children in accordance with their religious beliefs....

18. ... [A]fter months of cordial conversation, Sunnyvale abruptly reversed course and denied the Taylors’ request for notice and opt-outs, stating in a letter that LGBTQ+ instruction “is not optional and is not subject to parent opt-out provisions.” ... According to Sunnyvale, “the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Mahmoud v. Taylor … addressed a specific set of facts in another state,” did not create a “general or automatic right for parents to opt their children out of required curriculum,” and “does not override California’s statutory requirements governing instructional content.”... With that, the denial letter concluded that Sunnyvale is “not granting opt-outs from LGBTQ+-inclusive curriculum or storybooks that are part of our adopted educational program.”...

Plaintiffs contend that the school's refusal violates their parental right to control the education of their children as well as their free exercise and free speech rights. Becket Fund issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Wednesday, June 24, 2026

Supreme Court Rejects Suit Against Cisco for Aiding Persecution of Falun Gong

Yesterday, in Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe, (Sup. Ct., June 23, 2026), the U.S. Supreme Court rejected claims by practitioners of Falun Gong, that Cisco Systems violated the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act by aiding and abetting actions against Falun Gong carried out by the government of China. Cisco created a surveillance technology used by the Chinese Communist Party to identify, track, arrest, subject to forced labor and torture Falun Gong practitioners. At issue is whether the two U.S. statutes permit suits in U.S. courts against Cisco for its role.

The majority opinion written by Justice Barrett and joined by Chief Justice Roberets and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch and Kavanaugh Held that "Courts cannot create new rights of action to remedy violations of international law, so there is necessarily no liability for aiding and abetting such violations." They also held that there is no liability under the Torture Victim Protection Act for aiding and abetting.

Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion. Justices Kagan and Jackson joined the dissenting opinion insofar as it disagreed with the majority's interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute. They contended that there is an implied right of action under the Alien Tort Statute for violations of international law. Justice Sotomayor alone went on to argue that the Torture Victim Protection Act allows victims to sue for aiding and abetting torture.

Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Kagen, filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. They agreed with the dissent's views on the Alien Tort Statute. However, they agreed with the majority, though with somewhat different reasoning, that the Torture Victim Protection Act does not create an aiding-and-abetting cause of action.

Reuters reports on the decision. [Thanks to Dusty Hoesly for the lead.]

Massachusetts Supreme Court Invalidates Initiative Petition That Excludes Religious Housing from Rent Controls

The Massachusetts Constitution Art. 48 which sets out the procedures for initiative petitions provides in part that no measure relating to religion, religious practices or religious institutions may be proposed by an initiative petition. In Cella v. Attorney General, (MA Sup. Judicial Ct., June 23, 2026), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that this provision is violated by a petition proposing an end to the statewide ban on rent control and instituting a limit on rent increases. The new rent control limits, however, would not apply to several categories of dwellings, including dwelling units in facilities operated solely for religious purposes. The court said in part:

The Attorney General argues that the petition does not discriminate in favor of religious institutions because it also provides exemptions for secular dwelling units, including facilities operated for educational and nonprofit purposes. The presence of secular exemptions does not negate that the petition, on its face, uses religion as "a factor in its application" .... Nor do these secular exemptions change the fact that the petition, by including a carveout for religious facilities, brings "religious questions into the politics of this State"...

The court rejected the Attorney General's argument that the petition should be allowed because its "main purpose" is unrelated to religion. The Court said in part:

Applying a less exacting standard -- permitting at least some measures that by their own terms govern religion, religious practices, or religious institutions -- would contravene not only the plain language of art. 48, but also the intent of its framers. The convention delegates intended to strictly maintain "the entire separation of church and State" by "mak[ing] it as difficult as possible to bring religious questions into the politics of this State."

The Court however pointed out:

... [A]lthough religious beliefs may encompass a wide array of human conduct, an initiative petition does not "relate[]" to religion within the meaning of art. 48 just because a person's personal religious beliefs might inform his or her views on an otherwise secular subject matter; rather, the measure itself must relate to religion....

Some Claims for Football Injuries at Catholic School Are Barred by Ecclesiastical Abstenition Doctrine

In In re Fort Bend Christian Academy, (TX App., June 23, 2026), a Texas state appellate court held that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine bars some of the claims brought by parents of a high school student who suffered traumatic brain injury during football practice at the Christian college preparatory high school. The court said in part:

... [T]he Hagans alleged that the Academy breached its obligation to make academic accommodations for B.H. after he suffered the brain injury. The Academy, however, is a college preparatory school committed to offering “a superior academic experience integrated with a consistent, Christian worldview and biblical perspective.” Accordingly, the Hagans’s claims alleging the Academy failed to accommodate B.H. do not turn on neutral principles of law but on the Academy’s application of its policy governing when — and to what extent — it modifies its biblically-based curriculum for students....

Additionally, the Hagans alleged that, before B.H.’s enrollment, Academy officials made specific promises that he would not be subjected to bullying and harassment....

We conclude these claims too concern ecclesiastical matters over which the trial court lacks jurisdiction because they arise from the Academy’s application of internal policies grounded in religious doctrine. These claims are premised on the Academy’s alleged failure to enforce its anti-bullying policy and prevent students from bullying B.H. But the policy states the Academy will provide “discipline that [is] Bibliocentric,” and that its approach to discipline is for students “to grow in self-discipline according to God’s Word so that external discipline measures become less needed.”... Consequently, the trial court cannot adjudicate these claims without deciding questions of religious doctrine and interfering with the Academy’s internal governance....

[The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine] does not bar the Hagans’s negligence claim, brought on B.H.’s behalf for personal-injury damages, because that claim arises from duties imposed by law — independent of any agreement between the Academy and the Hagans — and may be adjudicated under neutral tort principles without imposing liability on the Academy for complying with its religious-based policies....

Finally, we consider the doctrine’s application to the Hagans’s breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and DTPA claims to the extent those claims allege that the Academy breached concussion-management obligations arising from its TAPPS [Texas Association of Private and Parochial Schools] membership....

We conclude that the claims seeking to hold the Academy liable for breaching alleged concussion-management obligations arising from its TAPPS membership present secular, non-ecclesiastical issues over which the trial court may exercise jurisdiction....

Tuesday, June 23, 2026

Supreme Court: Damages Under RLUIPA Not Available Against Prison Guards

In Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections and Public Safety, (Sup. Ct., June 23, 2026), the U.S. Supreme Court in a 6-3 decision held that a Rastafarian inmate whose knee-length hair was forcibly shaved by prison guards does not have a claim for damages under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act against the guards in their private capacities. The majority's holding turns on the fact that RLUIPA was enacted under Congress' taxing and spending power. The majority said in part:

As a condition of funding, Congress called on state prison systems to agree to answer suits by private plaintiffs alleging substantial burdens on their religious exercises. Specifically, the law asked those systems to consent to suit by any injured party “assert[ing] a violation of” RLUIPA and seeking “appropriate relief.” §2000cc–2(a)....

Under the Spending Clause, Congress lacks regulatory authority to impose liability on [the officers] directly and must depend instead on consent. And because they never agreed to answer suits like this one, Mr. Landor’s case cannot proceed against them any more than a breach of contract action might proceed against a defendant who never formed a contract....

Under the Spending Clause, Congress’s power to spend money does not include the power to regulate. Spending Clause statutes can bind only those who voluntarily and knowingly undertake obligations by agreement with the federal government. Because that essential element is missing here, we affirm the judgment of the Fifth Circuit.

Justice Jackson, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

Neither respondents nor the Court contests Congress’s power to impose RLUIPA’s substantive directive accommodating religious freedom. The majority nevertheless adopts the peculiar position that Congress is powerless to create, and a State is powerless to accept, the natural next step: a damages remedy against officials who violate that directive.

This severance of rights and remedies is a sleight of hand; it comes by way of the majority’s full-throated endorsement of a contract analogy even though what secures the rights at issue is not a contract but a law. Today’s decision magically transforms a federal statute into an invitation to be accepted or declined, deemed binding only if each particular defendant has explicitly agreed to be penalized. No matter that laws, as opposed to contracts, don’t ordinarily work

AP reports on the decision.

7th Circuit Upholds Alcohol Ban as Condition of Supervised Release for Messianic Jew

In United States v. Broadfield, (7th Cir., June 22, 2026), Brian Broadfield, who had served a prison term on drug charges, sought to have the conditions of his supervised release modified. A condition of his supervised release was that he refrain from all alcohol use. He argued that the condition should be modified so that he can consume a glass of wine each Friday during a Messianic Jewish religious ceremony. Broadfield had previously violated the terms of a supervised release through conduct caused in part by alcohol consumption. The court said in part:

[Broadfield] contends, as a practicing Messianic Jew, the district court’s supervised release condition prohibiting him from the use of alcohol violates his free exercise of religion, in violation of RFRA. ...

Here, Broadfield concedes that the government has a compelling interest in preventing him from using alcohol outside his religious services. But the government goes further, contending that it has a compelling interest in prohibiting Broadfield from consuming alcohol entirely. We agree....

The evidence here shows that completely prohibiting Broadfield from consuming alcohol is the least restrictive means to further the government’s compelling interest in protecting the community from him, preventing his recidivism, promoting his rehabilitation and successful completion of supervised release, and treating his alcoholism. For that reason, we need not opine on whether monitoring Broadfield’s alcohol use with a breathalyzer would be a “viable alternative.”...