In Labrador v. Poe, (Sup. Ct., April 15, 2024), the U.S. Supreme Court, in a case generating three separate opinions, but no opinion for the court, discussed three important issues-- the increasing number of cases on the Court's Emergency Docket (sometimes called its "Shadow Docket"); the increasing number of statewide or nationwide injunctions (sometimes called "Universal Injunctions") issued by federal district courts; and the constitutionality of bans on gender-affirming health care for minors. Last December, an Idaho federal district court issued a preliminary injunction barring the Idaho Attorney General and a county prosecutor from enforcing the state's recently enacted Vulnerable Child Protections Act against anyone. It concluded that the ban likely violated the equal protection clause and plaintiffs' parental rights to make medical decisions for their children. (See prior posting.) One reason given by the district court for issuing a statewide injunction was that plaintiffs, to maintain their privacy, were proceeding using pseudonyms, and it would be difficult to fashion an order applying only to plaintiffs without compromising their anonymity. The 9th Circuit issued a brief order affirming the district court.
In the petition filed with the Supreme Court, the state did not contest the granting of an injunction limited to the plaintiffs' obtaining gender-affirming drug treatments for their children. It only challenged the breadth of the district court's preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court, without issuing an opinion for the majority, stayed the district court's order "except as to the provision to the plaintiffs of the treatments they sought." Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, issued a concurring opinion, saying in part:
The district court issued this sweeping relief even though, by its own admission, the plaintiffs had failed to “engage” with other provisions of Idaho’s law that don’t presently affect them—including the law’s provisions prohibiting the surgical removal of children’s genitals.... In choosing such an extraordinary remedy, the district court clearly strayed from equity’s traditional bounds.
Justice Kavanaugh, joined by Justice Barrett, filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:
Traditionally, one important factor when this Court decides an emergency application involving a new law is likelihood of success on the merits. The likelihood of success on the merits factor can pose difficulty, however, because it can require the Court to assess the merits of important cases earlier and more quickly than is ordinarily preferable, and to do so without the benefit of full merits briefing and oral argument. But when resolving emergency applications involving significant new laws, this Court often cannot avoid that difficulty. It is not ideal, but it is reality. Given that reality, the Court must then determine the best processes for analyzing likelihood of success on the merits in emergency cases.
Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Sotomayor, filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:
This case presents numerous reasons for exercising restraint. As explained in Part I below, the State of Idaho’s emergency application asks us to override the decisions of two lower courts based on an issue not clearly implicated and under circumstances where the State does not contest that its law should remain enjoined as likely unconstitutional, at least as applied to the plaintiffs. As described in Part II, even if today’s application actually involved a “universal injunction,” the emergency docket would not be the place to address the open and challenging questions that that issue raises.
Justice Kagan dissented, without opinion. Chief Justice Roberts did not indicate how he voted.
SCOTUSblog reports at greater length on the opinions.
