In a Title VII case that has been in litigation for six years, in Kluge v. Brownsburg Community School Corp., (7th Cir., Aug. 5, 2025), the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision reversed a district court's grant of summary judgment to the Brownsburg school district and sent the case back to the trial court for a jury to determine disputed facts. At issue is a music teacher's religious objections to following school policy that requires him to refer to transgender students by the names and pronouns that the students and their parents have asked that the school use. Initially the school accommodated the teacher by permitting him to address transgender students using only their last names. However, this led to student dissatisfaction and the accommodation was rescinded. The primary disputed facts are whether the accommodation created an "undue hardship" under the standard defined by the Supreme Court in its 2023 decision in Groff v. DeJoy, and whether the teacher's religious objections were sincere. The majority said in part:
... [T]he record contains material factual disputes about whether the accommodation disrupted Brownsburg’s learning environment, precluding summary judgment to the school....
... [T]he complaints ... all deal with the effects on the two students from Kluge’s use of the last-name-only practice. Nowhere do these documents support an inference that the students had a problem with Kluge’s religion or “the mere fact [of] an accommodation.”... Instead, the complaints are leveled against the impacts on students and teachers, regardless of whether the accommodation was for religious or secular reasons.
... [T]here is still a genuine material factual dispute about whether those complaints rose to an undue hardship on the school’s educational mission....
... [A] genuine issue of material fact exists regarding Kluge’s sincerity. Even though a claimant’s sincerity does not hinge on whether he is “scrupulous in his [religious] observance,” it would still be premature to take this issue away from the jury on this question. ...
Judge Rovner filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:
Until today, when confronted with a Title VII employment discrimination claim, we have deferred to an employer’s good-faith assessment of how an employee performed in the workplace..... Today the court invites a jury to do what we have always said a federal court will not do, which is to sit as a super-personnel department and second-guess the employer’s good-faith reasoning. In making employment decisions, ... employers will now have to consider not only how successfully an employee is performing his job as modified by a religious accommodation, but how a jury might second-guess its assessment in litigation years down the line. This is an untenable restraint on employers’ decision making.
Today’s decision also burdens employers in a second important respect. Brownsburg successfully argued below that Kluge’s accommodation proved inconsistent with its mission, which is to provide a supportive learning environment for all of its students. Although the majority accepts this mission for present purposes, it also suggests that evidence of an employer’s mission must be limited to policies that are formally documented and adopted prior to any litigation. I think many employers will be surprised to learn that their ability to define their own missions is restricted to formal policies prepared long before an employment dispute arrives in court....
See prior related posting. ADF issued a press release announcing the decision.
