Friday, August 30, 2024

5th Circuit Reopens Lipan-Apache's Suit Objecting to Park Modifications

 In 2021, Texas voters approved an amendment to the state constitution that provides:

This state or a political subdivision of this state may not enact, adopt, or issue a statute, order, proclamation, decision, or rule that prohibits or limits religious services, including religious services conducted in churches, congregations, and places of worship, in this state by a religious organization established to support and serve the propagation of a sincerely held religious belief.

The amendment was a response to orders during the Covid pandemic that limited the size of gatherings for religious services. (Background.)

In Perez v. City of San Antonio, (5th Cir., Aug. 28, 2024), the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals certified to the Texas Supreme Court the question of whether this ban is an absolute one, or whether the amendment merely imposes a strict scrutiny requirement on any limitation. The issue arises in a suit by members of the Lipan-Apache Native American Church who claim that improvements to a park that include tree removal and rookery management destroy their ability to use a sacred site in the park for certain religious ceremonies. In a prior decision, the 5th Circuit rejected plaintiffs' claim under the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act. It then held that plaintiffs had not adequately briefed the question of whether the Religious Services Amendment to the constitution covers a compelled preservation of spiritual ecology. (See prior posting.) Plaintiffs filed a motion for a rehearing, and in this week's decision the panel withdrew its original opinion and certified the question of the meaning of the Religious Services Amendment to the Texas Supreme Court, saying in part:

Neither party has cited any cases interpreting this constitutional provision, nor has this court found any. This potentially outcome determinative issue raises novel and sensitive questions....

Thursday, August 29, 2024

11th Circuit Reinstates, Pending Appeal, Florida Ban on Gender-Affirming Care for Minors

In Doe v. Surgeon General, State of Florida, (11th Cir., Aug. 26, 2024), the U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 decision, allowed Florida's ban on prescribing puberty blockers and cross-sex hormones to minors suffering from gender dysphoria to go back into effect, pending appeal of a district court injunction against enforcement of the ban. The district court had concluded that the ban was motivated by anti-transgender animus. (See prior posting.) 

First, the district court likely misapplied the presumption that the legislature acted in good faith when it concluded that the prohibition and regulation provisions, and the implementing rules, were based on invidious discrimination against transgender minors and adults....

... [E]ven if the district court were correct in its animus decision, heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause does not apply to invidious discrimination based on a non-suspect class, and “[n]either the Supreme Court nor this court has recognized transgender status as a quasi-suspect class.”

The majority ordered an expedited calendar for hearing of the appeal. 

Judge Wilson dissented, saying in part:

First, the district court appropriately recognized the presumption of legislative good faith, but identified sufficient record evidence to support concluding that the act’s passage was based on invidious discrimination against transgender adults and minors....

The district court found that the statute is subject to intermediate scrutiny because it is (1) based on sex and (2) based on gender nonconformity.

Tallahassee Democrat reports on the decision.

3rd Circuit: District Court Did Not Show Compelling Interest in Denying Muslim Inmate Religious Accommodations

In Nunez v. Wolf, (3d Cir., Aug. 27, 2024), the U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals, in a suit under RLUIPA, held that the district court had not established that the Department of Corrections had a compelling interest in denying a Muslim inmate religious accommodations so that he could consummate his marriage, have ongoing conjugal visits with his wife, engage in congregate prayer with visitors and be circumcised. The court said in part:

To be clear, we are not holding that the DOC’s denials of Nunez’s requests cannot satisfy strict scrutiny if properly supported on remand.  What we do hold is that this determination cannot be made on the current record and that, as we have now clarified the nature of its burden, the DOC should have the opportunity to supplement the record before renewing its motion for summary judgment.

Wednesday, August 28, 2024

6th Circuit: Off-Duty Police Did Not Violate Dismissed Pastor's Free Exercise Rights

In Couzens v. City of Forest Park, Ohio, (6th Cir., Aug. 27, 2024), the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a church's former pastor against off-duty city police officers who assisted the congregation in physically removing a pastor who had been dismissed from his position by the congregation. The court concluded that the off-duty officers acted reasonably in threatening to arrest the pastor if he did not leave the premises. It also concluded that the pastor's free exercise rights had not been infringed, saying in part:

Couzens contends that the Forest Park Defendants interfered with his free exercise of religion when the officers threatened to arrest him during a church service. He relies primarily on Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94 (1952)....

Kedroff’s church-autonomy doctrine, though, guarantees the independence of ecclesiastical bodies, not individuals.... And, unlike in Kedroff, the officers’ actions here did not reflect the state’s preference for one contender for a church’s control over another. Instead, the officers attempted to enforce what, from their perspective, appeared to be a settled matter: Couzens’s removal as IBC’s pastor....

Arkansas Supreme Court Keeps Abortion Rights Measure Off November Ballot

 In Cowles v. Thurston,(AR Sup. Ct., Aug. 22, 2024), the Arkansas Supreme Court in a 4-3 decision held that the Secretary of State properly refused to count signatures collected by paid canvassers on petitions to have an abortion rights amendment submitted to the voters in November. Proponents failed to submit paid canvasser training certifications along with the petitions, and there were insufficient signatures collected only by volunteer canvassers. Proponents claimed that an employee in the Secretary of State's Office told them that filing the certifications was unnecessary.

Chief Justice Kemp dissented contending that the Secretary of State should complete counting the signatures and grant a provisional cure period.  Justice Baker, Joined by Justice Hudson dissented contending that proponents later filing of certifications adequately complied with the filing requirements, saying that "nothing in the statute requires that the certification and the petition be filed simultaneously." She said in part:

In my view, the majority has reconfigured the relevant statute in order to cater the initiative process to the preference of the respondent while this process is the first power reserved for the people. In fact, despite the majority’s acknowledgment that “[t]his court cannot rewrite the statute[,]” the majority has done just that multiple times to achieve a particular result.

AP reports on the decision. [Thanks to Scott Mange and Thomas Rutledge for the lead.]

Tuesday, August 27, 2024

Australian Court Upholds Gender Identity Discrimination Ban

 In Tickle v Giggle for Girls Pty. Ltd., (Australia Fed. Ct., Aug. 23, 2024), an Australian Federal Court judge upheld the constitutionality of the ban on discrimination on the basis of gender identity in Australia's Sex Discrimination Act. The suit was brought by Roxanne Tickle, a transgender woman, who was denied access to a women's-only online app. The court explained:

The respondents do not accept that a person’s sex can be a matter for self-identification. Correspondingly, they do not accept either the validity or legitimacy of the gender identity discrimination provisions of the SDA....

In about February 2021, Ms Tickle downloaded the Giggle App. The Giggle App had been marketed as being a means for women to communicate with one another in what was described as a digital women-only safe space. Ms Tickle undertook a registration process to gain access to the Giggle App, which including providing information and uploading a self-taken photograph of her face, commonly known as a selfie.

The photograph provided by Ms Tickle to Giggle was assessed by third-party artificial intelligence (AI) software, designed to distinguish between the facial appearance of men and women.... Ms Tickle gained access to the Giggle App.

In the period between February and sometime in September 2021, Ms Tickle had access to the Giggle App’s features and used it to read content posted by other users. In September or early October 2021, Ms Tickle logged on to the Giggle App, but found that she could no longer post content or comment on other users’ posts, or read comments on posts made by other users.... When she attempted to purchase premium features on the Giggle App, she received a “User Blocked” message. Her attempts to contact Giggle via the in-App contact form received no response....

It is most likely that Ms Tickle was denied user access to the Giggle App as a result of a general review process by a natural person of the AI acceptances of registration, rather than by reason of her being singled out....

Law & Religion Australia has an extensive discussion of the decision.

11th Circuit Enjoins New Title IX Rules in 4 States, Pending Appeal

 In State of Alabama v. U.S. Secretary of Education, (11th Cir., Aug. 22, 2024), the U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 decision, issued an injunction pending appeal barring enforcement in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina of the Department of Education's new rules under Title IX.  The new rules define discrimination on the basis of sex as including discrimination on the basis of gender identity. They also reduce the threshold for concluding that conduct amounts to sex discrimination. The majority pointed out:

Before this action, every court to consider the issue across the nation—seven district courts and two courts of appeals— preliminarily enjoined enforcement of the rule.  The district court here, by contrast, refused to enjoin the rule a day before it was supposed to go into effect.

Judge Wilson dissented contending that plaintiffs have not shown the irreparable injury required for obtaining an injunction. ADF issued a press release announcing the decision.

Monday, August 26, 2024

Anti-Injunction Act Precludes RLUIPA Claim, But Church's Constitutional Claims Move Ahead

 In Resurrection House Ministries, Inc. v. City of Brunswick, (SD GA, Aug. 23, 2024), a Georgia federal district court held that the federal Anti-Injunction Act required dismissal of a RLUIPA lawsuit brought by a Ministry against which the city had filed a nuisance action.  The ministry had attempted to open a shelter for the homeless, to which the city objected. However, the court permitted the Ministry to move ahead with its 1st, 4th, 5th and 14th Amendment claims against the city, concluding that the Younger abstention doctrine did not apply. It concluded that plaintiff had adequately alleged that the nuisance action had been brought against it in bad faith, saying in part:

RHM alleges providing a shelter to needy individuals is a tenet of its Christian religion and, therefore, institution of the temporary emergency shelter is a practice of such religion. And practice of RHM’s religion is constitutionally protected by the Free Exercise Clause.... Therefore, RHM has satisfied its burden under the first prong of the Court’s analysis because it has sufficiently alleged that “the conduct allegedly retaliated against or sought to be deterred was constitutionally protected.”...  

The Court also finds that RHM’s allegations are sufficient to set forth that Defendants’ institution of the Nuisance Proceedings “was motivated at least in part by a purpose to retaliate for or to deter that conduct.”

NY AG Enjoined from Enforcing False Advertising Ban Against Clinics Promoting Abortion Pill Reversal

In National Institute for Family & Life Advocates v. James, (WD NY, Aug. 22, 2024), a New York federal district court preliminarily enjoined New York's Attorney General from enforcing New York's false advertising law against two pregnancy centers that promote abortion pill reversal in their promotional material and on their websites. The court said in part:

In short, a "morally and religiously motivated offering of free services cannot be described as a bare 'commercial transaction.'"... As such, the speech at issue here is not commercial.... . Nothing could be fundamentally less commercial than this speech about how a woman might save her pregnancy....

Because Plaintiffs' speech is noncommercial, restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny.... The State's enforcement of the New York Statutes against pro-life pregnancy centers based on their speech about APR is a content-based restriction, as it "target[s] speech based on its communicative content."... It is also viewpoint-based. The Attorney General targets statements supporting the APR protocol....

At the preliminary injunction hearing, the State conceded that it does not attempt to satisfy strict scrutiny. And the record is devoid of anything to suggest that this standard could be met....

Recent Articles of Interest

From SSRN:

From SmartCILP:

Sunday, August 25, 2024

Knights of Columbus May Move Ahead with Suit for Denial of Permit for Christmas Program

 In Knights of Columbus Council 2616 v. Town of Fairfield, (D CT, Aug. 22, 2024), a Connecticut federal district court allowed the Knights of Columbus to move ahead with free speech, free exercise and equal protection claims when the town denied its Special Event Permit Application to host a Christmas Vigil in a prominent public park rather than a less centrally located one. The court said in part:

... [P]laintiffs have shown that the defendants’ stated reason for denying their 2020 application, i.e. COVID-19 concerns, was pretextual....

Therefore, the motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims to the extent they are based on the 2020 application, on the grounds that denial of the 2020 application was a valid discretionary action by the Town to mitigate a public health emergency, is being denied. ...

The Special Events Permitting Scheme does not satisfy the requirement that it contain adequate standards to guide the official’s decision. It contains no criteria, restraints, temporal limits, or guidelines to which the Commission must adhere when ruling on an application. Nor does it contain a method to appeal the Commission’s determination or require that the Commission furnish justifications for its decisions with respect to applications for Special Events Permits. Rather, the Special Events Permitting Scheme vests the Commission with unbridled discretion....

 Viewing the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that the defendants’ actions were content-based. They have alleged facts showing that the Commission permitted other groups to use Sherman Green in a manner that was inconsistent with the reasons the Commission gave for denying the plaintiffs’ applications....

The Hartford Courant reports on the decision.

Friday, August 23, 2024

Supreme Court Refuses to Lift Preliminary Injunction Against DOE's Title IX Changes

 In Department of Education v. Louisiana, (US Sup. Ct., Aug. 16, 2024), the U.S. Supreme Court refused to stay preliminary injunctions that two district courts issued to prevent enforcement of the Department of Education's new rules under Title IX. The new rules, in part, expand the definition of sex discrimination under Title IX to include discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. All the Justices agreed that the injunctions should remain in place as to this portion of the new rules. Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan, Gorsuch and Jackson would have allowed other portions of the new rules to go into effect. Liberty Counsel issued a press release announcing the court's decision.

Court Dismisses Church's Suit Over Disaffiliation Request

In North United Methodist Church v. New York Annual Conference, (CT Super. Ct., Aug 14, 2024), a Connecticut trial court dismissed a local church's petition for a declaratory judgment. The local church sought a finding that it submitted its request to disaffiliate from the parent church in "sufficient time" to complete disaffiliation under the Book of Discipline. The court concluded that it would require the court to resolve a question of church policy and administration to resolve this issue. However, the court retained jurisdiction over the church's request for a declaratory judgment as to property rights, its quiet tile claim and its quantum meruit and unjust enrichment claims.

Arizona Supreme Court Keeps Abortion Initiative on the Ballot

In Arizona Right to Life v. Fontes, (AZ Sup. Ct., Aug. 20, 2024), the Arizona Supreme Court rejected challenges to the ballot description of the Arizona Abortion Access Act that will appear on the November ballot. This keeps the abortion rights initiative on the ballot. Politico reports on the decision.

Thursday, August 22, 2024

Claim That Deprioritizing Religious Vaccine Exemption Requests Violates Title VII Moves Ahead

 In Desmarais v. Granholm, (D DC, Aug. 16, 2024), a D.C. federal district court refused to dismiss a Title VII complaint by a Department of Energy employee that his request for a religious exemption from the Department's Covid vaccine mandate was given lower priority than requests for medical exemptions. The court said in part:

 Of course, there could well be a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for such a policy—but that is an inquiry for summary judgment, not for a motion to dismiss.  The court therefore concludes that Mr. Desmarais has plausibly alleged a causal connection between his protected characteristic and DOE’s decision to put his accommodation request “on hold.” 

9th Circuit: Religious-Based Hiring Does Not Bar Christian Group from Participating in Oregon Grant Program

 In Youth 71Five Ministries v. Williams, (9th Cir., Aug. 8, 2024), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals issued an injunction pending appeal allowing a Christian organization that mentors at-risk youths to participate in Oregon's Youth Community Investment Grant Program. The state had canceled $410,000 in grants to the organization when it discovered that it only hires those that share its faith in violation of the state's "Certification Rule" that bars grantee from discriminating in its employment practices.  The court said in part:

Although Oregon strictly enforced the Certification Rule against 71Five, it has looked the other way with secular groups that also receive state funding.  The record indicates that the state continues to fund many groups that discriminate—by providing services to only subsets of the population—in violation of the Certification Rule.  For example, a group named Ophelia’s Place continues to receive funds even though it provides services only to “girl-identifying youth.”  And another group called the Black Parent Initiative receives funds, despite only serving African and African American families....

The Free Exercise Clause bars the government from treating religious groups worse than secular ones—but Oregon has apparently done just that in selectively enforcing its Certification Rule against 71Five....

Wednesday, August 21, 2024

Court Grants Injunction to Jewish Students at UCLA Impeded by Gaza Protests

In Frankel v. Regents of the University of California(CD CA, Aug. 13, 2024), a California federal district court issued a preliminary injunction in a suit brought by Jewish students at UCLA who were blocked from accessing portions of the campus by pro-Palestinian encampments protesting Israel's retaliation in Gaza. The court said in part:

In the year 2024, in the United States of America, in the State of California, in the City of Los Angeles, Jewish students were excluded from portions of the UCLA campus because they refused to denounce their faith. This fact is so unimaginable and so abhorrent to our constitutional guarantee of religious freedom that it bears repeating, Jewish students were excluded from portions of the UCLA campus because they refused to denounce their faith. UCLA does not dispute this. Instead, UCLA claims that it has no responsibility to protect the religious freedom of its Jewish students because the exclusion was engineered by third-party protesters. But under constitutional principles, UCLA may not allow services to some students when UCLA knows that other students are excluded on religious grounds, regardless of who engineered the exclusion....

Under the Court’s injunction, UCLA retains flexibility to administer the university. Specifically, the injunction does not mandate any specific policies and procedures UCLA must put in place, nor does it dictate any specific acts UCLA must take in response to campus protests. Rather, the injunction requires only that, if any part of UCLA’s ordinarily available programs, activities, and campus areas become unavailable to certain Jewish students, UCLA must stop providing those ordinarily available programs, activities, and campus areas to any students. How best to make any unavailable programs, activities, and campus areas available again is left to UCLA’s discretion.

Becket issued a press release announcing the decision.

Using Students' Preferred Pronouns Is Not Part of Teacher's Ordinary Job Duties

 In Geraghty v. Jackson Local School District Board of Education, (ND OH, Aug. 12, 2024) an Ohio federal district court ruled in part in favor of a middle-school English teacher's compelled speech and free exercise claims.  Plaintiff resigned under pressure when a school board required her against her religious beliefs to use the preferred names and pronouns of students who were socially transitioning genders. However, the court held that certain issues remain to be decided by a jury.

The court said in part:

For the school, using the students’ preferred names and pronouns carried the message that it supported its students....  And, most importantly, for the students, using their preferred names and pronouns carried the message that the speaker respected their gender identity.... 

So, the question is not whether using preferred names and pronouns was part of Geraghty’s ordinary job duties, but whether it was part of her ordinary job duties to convey (or refuse to convey) the message that those names and pronouns carried.  It was not.  Geraghty was a middle school English Language Arts teacher.... Her job was to teach English to the appropriate state standards....  It was not her job “to teach anything with regard to LGBTQ issues.”....

Under the Pickering-Connick framework, the Court asks two questions: First, was the speech at issue “a matter of public concern?”...  And second, was Geraghty’s interest in remaining silent greater than Defendants’ interest in “promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees?”...

... [W]hen Defendants compelled Geraghty to use the students’ preferred names and pronouns, they forced her to “wade[] into a matter of public concern.” ... The final question is whether Geraghty’s “interest in” remaining silent on a “matter[] of public concern” outweighs “the interest of [Defendants], as [Geraghty’s] employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.”...

Defendants assert that they have a compelling interest that “teachers teach and do not use their position of trust and authority to impose their religious beliefs.”...

As the diametrically opposed opinions of the parties’ experts demonstrate, “the use of gender-specific titles and pronouns has produced a passionate political and social debate” in this country....  Whether use of student’s preferred names and pronouns creates a safe and supportive environment for students is a factual question a jury should decide after hearing the parties’ expert testimony. 

Accordingly, while the Court concludes that Geraghty’s compelled speech was not pursuant to her ordinary job duties, it denies the parties’ Motions for Summary Judgment as to the Pickering balancing test....

Focusing on plaintiff's free exercise claim, the court said in part:

[W]hile the District’s practice might look neutral and generally applicable, it was ill defined and provided the District a discretionary “mechanism for individualized exemptions.”... Accordingly, it must survive “the most rigorous of scrutiny.”  

9th Circuit: Ministry Has Standing to Challenge Washington Antidiscrimination Law

In Union Gospel Mission of Yakima, Washington v. Ferguson, (9th Cir., Aug. 12, 2024), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals held that a Christian Ministry has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Washington Law Against Discrimination insofar as it bars plaintiff from requiring all its employees to sign a statement of faith and core values.  The statement requires employees to adhere to Christian lifestyle and behavior, including Christian beliefs on marriage and sexuality. However, the court remanded the case for the trial court to consider the issue of prudential ripeness and to consider plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. [Thanks to Thomas Rutledge for the lead.]

Sunday, August 11, 2024

Illinois Governor Signs 3 Bills Protecting Abortion Rights

On Aug. 7, Illinois Governor J.B. Pritzker signed HB4867 (full text) which amends the Illinois Human Rights Act to make discrimination on the basis of reproductive health decisions, including decisions relating to termination of a pregnancy, unlawful discrimination. He also signed HB 5239 (full text) that prohibits the state from assisting out-of-state officials or individuals who are seeking to impose civil or criminal liability on a person or entity for reproductive health care activity that was lawful in Illinois. And he signed HB 581 (full text) which requires hospital emergency rooms to provide stabilizing treatment including abortion when "abortion is necessary to resolve the patient's injury or acute medical condition that is liable to cause death or severe injury or serious illness." Lawndale News reports on the governor's action.

Friday, August 09, 2024

Organizations Promoting Abortion Pill Reversal Sue New York Attorney General

Three anti-abortion organizations that promote abortion-pill reversal this week filed suit in a New York federal district court against New York Attorney General Letitia James. The complaint (full text) in Summit Life Outreach Center, Inc. v. James, (WD NY, filed 8/7/2024), alleges in part:

In a blitz attack that month, James mailed boilerplate notices-of-intention-to-sue (NOIs) to eleven New York-based pregnancy help organizations (PHOs) and the nonprofit operator of the national Abortion Pill Reversal Network. The NOIs alleged (without evidence) that recipients’ truthful noncommercial statements about APR constituted commercial fraud under two state statutes....

Plaintiffs in this action, pro-life organizations whose mission is informed by their religious conviction that abortion is the killing of an innocent human being, are not parties to that state court suit. But James’ years-long campaign of intimidation against pro-lifers creates considerable “risk of catastrophic harm” that Plaintiffs could soon suffer if (and highly likely when) they are targeted by similar lawfare over their own similar pro-APR communications.... Plaintiffs indeed already are being harmed because the litigative sword of Damocles that hangs above their heads has chilled their speech and forced them to discontinue communicating the science of APR.

Plaintiffs thus are compelled to file this suit to defend their rights to free speech, free exercise of religion, and due process under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. They seek declaratory and injunctive relief, and other such relief as the Court may deem just and equitable, so they can continue speaking about APR and refocus their attention on women in need.

 Thomas More Society issued a press release announcing the lawsuit.

De Facto Exclusion of Catholic Schools From Tuition Grant Program Through Antidiscrimination Law Survives Strict Scrutiny

In St. Dominic Academy v. Makin, (D ME, Aug. 8, 2024), a Maine federal district court, in a 75-page opinion, refused to preliminarily enjoin enforcement of Maine's educational and employment antidiscrimination laws in a suit brought by a Catholic diocese, a Catholic school and a Catholic family. In 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Maine could not exclude parochial schools from participating in its program that pays tuition for certain out-of-district students. While that litigation was pending, the Maine legislature amended state law to provide that schools receiving state funds could not discriminate on the basis of religion, sexual orientation or gender identity. This had the effect of excluding Catholic schools. Plaintiffs contend that this violates their free exercise rights.

The court concluded that the statute must meet strict scrutiny review because it is not a generally applicable law.  However, the court found that the statute survives struct scrutiny, saying in part:

 As a general matter, Maine’s asserted interest in eliminating discrimination within publicly funded institutions is compelling....

Furthermore, all the challenged provisions are written to prohibit only discriminatory conduct.  Under the provisions, “St. Dominic would still be free to conduct morning prayers however it wants, teach from a Catholic perspective, and promote Catholicism to the exclusion of all other religions.”... While the Plaintiffs put forth a number of policies and practices that arguably violate the challenged provisions, at this early stage—no state court has interpreted Chapter 366—it is not sufficiently clear the Act would reach any conduct that the state does not consider discriminatory.... 

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Chapter 366 survives strict scrutiny.  In reaching this result, the Court is mindful of the Supreme Court’s admonition that a “law that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment or advances legitimate governmental interests only against conduct with a religious motivation will survive strict scrutiny only in rare cases.” ...  However, “rare” does not mean “never.”  Based on the record before it at this preliminary stage, the Court determines that the weighty interest advanced by the Defendants and the tailoring of Chapter 366 to fit that interest support a determination that Chapter 366 is likely to survive strict scrutiny....

In reaching its conclusions, the Court has discussed and decided the difficult constitutional questions presented.  At the same time, the Court recognizes that this case poses novel constitutional issues and ... the Court has attempted to frame its opinion as a prelude to a challenge to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit for a more authoritative ruling.

[Post corrected to accurately reflect the scoope and timing of the Maine legislation.]

Thursday, August 08, 2024

Jail Guard's Required Training in Treatment of LGBTQI+ Inmates Did Not Violate His Free Exercise Rights

In Goodknight v. County of Douglas, (D OR, Aug. 6, 2024), an Oregon federal district court rejected religious discrimination claims brought by a county jail guard who objected to required LGBTQI Community Training. The training was impelled by the recently enacted federal Prison Rape Elimination Act.  According to the court:

Plaintiff alleges this Training required employees “to affirm and validate homosexual unions and the self-proclaimed ‘transgender,’ ‘non-binary,’ or ‘genderqueer’ identities of AICs and fellow employees.”...

Plaintiff concluded by confirming his believe that “PREA standards demands [sic] we deny, [sic] God, science, and the common sense verified by our very eyes. This is a Pandora’s box of perversion I refuse to help open. I appeal to you one last time, please repent of this sinful path for the sake of the county, inmates, and my fellow deputies....

Rejecting plaintiff's claims under Title VII and state law, the court said in part:

Despite Plaintiff’s attempt, intentionally or otherwise, to conflate private citizen cases with public employee cases, the fact that the dispute here concerned training regarding how Defendant processed and housed LGBTQI+ individuals—i.e., that the Training concerned how Defendant wanted Plaintiff to perform his basic job duties—demonstrates Plaintiff’s free speech claim necessarily fails. ... 

Plaintiff’s specific factual allegations, along with the Court’s own common sense, confirm that the speech here concerned nothing more than Plaintiff’s dispute with his supervisors over how to perform his job when dealing with certain AICs....

Plaintiff alleges Defendant violated his rights under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise clause when Defendant “lent it’s power to one side in a controversy over religious dogma – specifically, the controversy over whether what [sic] constitutes respectful treatment of persons who self-identify as LGBTQI+.”... This argument is meritless.  ...

Plaintiff’s attempt to conflate ‘government employers forcing their employees’ with “the government forcing its citizens’ ignores longstanding, black‐letter law recognizing that “[a] public employer ‘may impose restraints on the job-related speech of public employees that would be plainly unconstitutional if applied to the public at large.’”

Ohio Court Rejects Challenge to Ban on Treatment of Minors for Gender Dysphoria

In Moe v. Yost(OH Com. Pl., Aug. 6, 2024), an Ohio state trial court held that Ohio's ban on surgical or hormonal treatment of minors for gender dysphoria does not violate the equal protection or due process clause of the 14th Amendment, or the Ohio constitution's single subject rule, due course of law clause or its Health Care Freedom Amendment. The court said in part:

25. The State of Ohio has a legitimate government interest in protecting the health and safety of its citizens.  

26. The Court finds that upon weighing the evidence received at trial, the Health Care Ban is rationally related to this interest. It is limited to minors. Moreover, the medical care banned carries with it undeniable risk and permanent outcomes.  Indeed, countries once confident in the administration of gender affirming care to minors are now reversing their position as a result of the significant inconsistencies in results and potential side effects of the care.  Thus, there can be no doubt that the Health Care Ban is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable.

The court thus vacated the temporary restraining order previously entered in the case. 

The ACLU announced that it would file an immediate appeal of the decision.

Wednesday, August 07, 2024

1st Circuit: Satanic Temple Loses Bid to Deliver City Council Invocation

In The Satanic Temple, Inc. v. City of Boston, (1st Cir., Aug. 6, 2024), the U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals rejected arguments that the failure to invite Satanic Temple to deliver an invocation at a Boston City Council meeting violated the 1st Amendment's Establishment Clause and the free exercise clause of the Massachusetts Constitution. Individual members of Council invite invocation speakers, without any guidelines as to selection. They choose speakers based on personal relations or based on the work the speaker does in the member's district or with the member's constituents. The court said in part:

TST has not shown that any of the Boston City Councilors have chosen invocation speakers based on the Councilors' own religious preferences or biases or barred potential speakers from delivering invocations that oppose the Councilors' religious beliefs.  The record shows rather that speakers were invited based on their contributions to the Councilors' districts and to the Boston community....

The record shows that there are many neutral, non-discriminatory reasons why TST has not been invited to give an invocation, including the following.  TST does not claim to have had a personal or working relationship with any Councilor on the basis of work it has done to benefit Boston communities. ...

Chief Judge Barron filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:

The City starkly sets forth the argument that causes me concern in its brief to us on appeal.  It contends -- seemingly unabashedly -- that the Establishment Clause permits City Councilors to choose invocation speakers based on how likely the selection is to earn them votes at the ballot box from certain religious communities.... 

I suppose the City is right that using invocations to attract political support from certain religious communities does not constitute invidious religious discrimination.  But I am dubious that the Establishment Clause blesses the practice that the City describes....

Court Enjoins Enforcement Against Texas of DOE Guidance Documents on Transgender Students

In State of Texas v. Cardona, (ND TX, Aug. 5, 2024), a Texas federal district court in a 113-page opinion enjoined enforcement against Texas schools of a Notice of Interpretation, a Dear Educator Letter and a Fact Sheet ("Guidance Documents") issued by the U.S. Department of Education that interpreted Title IX's ban on sex discrimination to include discrimination on the basis of gender identity.  The court said in part:

The Guidance Documents' interpretation of "sex" and the accompanying requirement that schools treat "gender identity" the same as biological sex flouts Title IX. The Department lacks the authority to "rewrite clear statutory terms to suit its own sense of how the statute should operate," particularly in a way that undercuts a statute's purpose.... Yet this is exactly what the Guidance Documents do. By interpreting the term "sex" in Title IX to embrace "gender identity" as distinct from biological sex, the Guidance Documents are contrary to law and exceed the Department's statutory authority....

The Guidance Documents' expanded definition of "sex" are contrary to law due to violating another rule of interpretation. That is, Congress must "speak clearly when authorizing an agency to exercise powers of 'vast economic and political significance.'"... Known as the Major Questions Doctrine, it promotes the principle of statutory interpretation that courts should not assume Congress delegated questions of "deep 'economic and political significance'" unless done expressly....

Despite the Department's lack of authority, Defendants nonetheless maintain that Bostock supports the expanded definition of "sex." But this argument falls flat. Bostock stated without equivocation that its holding only applies to Title VII....

The Guidance Documents are substantively and procedurally unlawful in violation of the APA. They are substantively unlawful because the Department's purported interpretations of Title IX squarely conflict with the statute.... Additionally, the Guidance Documents are procedurally unlawful because they impose new substantive obligations on states and other regulated entities without adhering to the APA's notice-and-comment requirements—which were designed to ensure public participation....

Tuesday, August 06, 2024

Connecticut Supreme Court: Constitutional (But Not Statutory) Challenges to Removal of School Vaccination Religious Exemptions Barred by Sovereign Immunity

In Spillane v. Lamont, (CT Sup. Ct., July 30, 2024), the Connecticut Supreme Court in a complicated opinion held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars constitutional claims asserted in a class action suit by school parents against the governor, the commissioners of education and of public health, and two boards of education. Plaintiffs were challenging the legislature's removal of previously available religious exemptions from school vaccination requirements. Under Connecticut law, sovereign immunity for constitutional claims is waived only when actions for declaratory relief or an injunction allege a substantial claim that the state or a state official has violated plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Here plaintiffs did not have a substantial claim that their free exercise or equal protection rights under the federal constitution were violated, nor that their right to education under the Connecticut constitution was violated.

However, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that plaintiffs' statutory claim under the Connecticut Religious Freedom Restoration Act was not barred by sovereign immunity. Connecticut's RFRA waived sovereign immunity for violations and applying the Act here does not violate the principles that one legislature may not bind the authority of a later one or that enactments are presumed to repeal inconsistent portions of prior legislation.

(See prior related posting.) WTNH News reports on the decision.

Monday, August 05, 2024

Recent Articles of Interest

From SSRN:

From SmartCILP:
  • Adnan A. Zulfiqar, Belief as Status: Premodern Islamic Law, Duties, and the Martyr Conundrum, [Abstract], 63 American Journal of Legal History 115-130 (2023).
  • Melissa Vise, The Matter of Personae in Medieval Italy, [Abstract], 63 American Journal of Legal History 131-149 (2023).

Saturday, August 03, 2024

Court Dismisses Title VI Suit Claiming Hostile Environment Affecting Jewish Students At MIT

In StandWithUs Center for Legal Justice v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, (D MA, July 30, 2024), a Massachusetts federal district court dismissed a suit against MIT that alleged deliberate indifference to a hostile educational environment impacting Jewish and Israeli students in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The court said in part:

The [complaint] compellingly depicts a campus embroiled in an internecine conflict that caused Jewish and Israeli students great anguish.  Plaintiffs frame MIT’s response to the conflict largely as one of inaction.  But the facts alleged tell a different story.  Far from sitting on its hands, MIT took steps to contain the escalating on-campus protests that, in some instances, posed a genuine threat to the welfare and safety of Jewish and Israeli students, who were at times personally victimized by the hostile demonstrators.  MIT began by suspending student protestors from non-academic activities....while suspending one of the most undisciplined of the pro-Palestine student groups.  These measures proved ineffective when, in April of 2024, protestors erected the Kresge lawn encampment.  MIT immediately warned students of impending disciplinary action, but its threat went unheeded....  When MIT’s attempt to peacefully clear the encampment proved futile, it suspended and arrested trespassing students. In hindsight, one might envision things MIT could have done differently.  Indeed, some campus administrators elsewhere ... reacted to the protests differently (and with more positive results) than MIT.  But that is not the applicable standard.  That MIT’s evolving and progressively punitive response largely tracked its increasing awareness of the hostility that demonstrators directed at Jewish and Israeli students shows that MIT did not react in a clearly unreasonable manner.

The court also dismissed conspiracy, negligence and breach of contract claims. Bloomberg Law reports on the decision.

Friday, August 02, 2024

Utah Supreme Court Upholds Preliminary Injunction Against Law Banning Most Abortions

 In Planned Parenthood Association of Utah v. State of Utah, (UT Sup. Ct., Aug. 1, 2024), the Utah Supreme Court, in a 4-1 decision, affirmed a trial court's entry of a preliminary injunction against enforcement of SB174, a trigger law that prohibits all abortions except for death or substantial bodily harm of the mother, lethal defect or brain abnormality of the fetus, or the mother was pregnant as a result of rape or incest. The state Supreme Court said in part:

In re J.P. discussed, among other [state constitutional] rights, the right to marry the person of one’s choosing and the right to establish a home.... The commonality these rights share is not a child, but the right to make certain intimate decisions about one’s life free from government intrusion. At this point in the litigation, we cannot say whether a restriction on the ability to choose to have an abortion infringes the rights we recognized in In re J.P., but there are serious questions regarding the scope of those rights that merit further litigation....

PPAU has standing to press its claims and the claims of its patients. 

The district court did not err when it concluded that PPAU had raised serious issues about the constitutionality of SB 174. The court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that PPAU and its patients would be irreparably harmed without the injunction. Likewise, the court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that the balance of harms tipped in favor of enjoining SB 174 while the parties litigate its constitutionality. Nor did the court act outside the bounds of its discretion when it concluded that the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest.

Chief Justice Durrant filed a dissenting opinion, contended that Planned Parenthood lacked standing to bring the lawsuit.

Utah News Dispatch reports on the decision.

Delaware Supreme Court Dismisses Suits Challenging Prior Covid Restrictions on Houses of Worship

 In In re Covid-Related Restrictions on Religious Services, (DE Sup. Ct., Aug. 1, 2024), the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the dismissal by two lower courts of challenges to restrictions on houses of worship imposed by orders of Delaware's governor during the early stages of the Covid pandemic. Plaintiffs filed suit in the Chancery Court over 18 months after the restrictions were lifted seeking an injunction, and when that was rejected, filed suit in Superior Court seeking damages and a declaratory judgment. The Delaware Supreme Court said in part:

Plaintiffs could not demonstrate reasonable apprehension of future conduct.  As the Court of Chancery noted below, “[a]lthough it is true that the virus continues to circulate and mutate, the possibility of a future surge, much less one that will necessitate emergency measures on par with what the world experienced in the first half of 2020, is speculative at best.”  Appellants do not confront the speculative nature of the future threat they allege, and instead invoke a generalized refrain that any restriction on their religious freedom causes irreparable harm.  This argument, such that it is, does not address the Court of Chancery’s analysis or carry Appellants’ burden to establish subject matter jurisdiction.  The importance of Appellants’ constitutional rights is not disputed, but it also is not dispositive.  The fact remains that, by the time Appellants filed suit, the Challenged Restrictions had been lifted, the Governor had entered into a binding agreement not to impose future restrictions targeting Houses of Worship, and the apprehension of a future pandemic and conditions like those of the early days of the emergency was hypothetical and speculative.  This Court “decline[s] to render an advisory opinion on a hypothetical scenario.”...

... [T]he Superior Court correctly held that Appellants’ injury could not be redressed through a prospective declaratory judgment.  In much the same way that Appellants’ irreparable harm argument crumbled because the Challenged Restrictions no longer were in effect and any future action imposing similar restrictions was speculative, the declaratory judgment sought in the Superior Court would not alter the status quo.  Moreover, Appellants’ constitutional rights would not be restored or further protected by declaratory relief because the complained-of harm had long since ceased and the threat of future harm was speculative....

The Delaware Supreme Court also concluded that a damage action against the Governor was barred by the Delaware State Tort Claims Act and qualified immunity.

Jury Must Decide Whether School Board Had Religious Animus

In Pines Church v. Hermon School Department, (D ME, July 31, 2024), a Maine federal district court denied both parties' motions for summary judgment.  Pines Church sought to enter a 12-month lease to use space at Hermon High School for Sunday religious services.  The School Committee offered only a month-to-month lease. Plaintiffs claimed that the denial of a long-term lease was motivated by animus against their orthodox Christian religious beliefs. The court said in part:

Plaintiffs rely on the relatively blatant bias and the inferences that arise from the interrogatories posed by one Committee member who demanded to know from Pastor Gioia the Church’s “position” on a spate of religious, political, and cultural flashpoints before evaluating whether to extend a lease on behalf of a publicly funded school.  Plaintiffs also rely on a somewhat more tepid bias, sanitized through fear-of-association comments by others, along the lines that association with the Church may not fit with the Committee’s “goals” and may therefore create a “negative image” by not comporting with the School Department’s “mission” and evidently its own beliefs.  This evidence certainly is probative of Plaintiffs’ position that the School Committee’s refusal to offer Plaintiffs a lease was motivated by unconstitutional considerations, such as animus toward the Church’s orthodox religious beliefs.  For its part, the School Department counters that the School Committee’s decision, save for the one Committee member’s bill of particulars put to the Pastor, simply resulted from humdrum, benign space and cost concerns, although that narrative is far from conclusive based on the summary judgment record.  These competing characterizations of the Committee’s motivations form the most conspicuous reason I deny summary judgment to the parties in favor of a jury trial.

Thursday, August 01, 2024

Trans Woman Fired by Liberty University Sues

Suit was filed this week in a Virginia federal district court against Liberty University by a transgender woman who was fired from her position as an Apprentice at the IT Help Desk because she was undergoing gender transition treatment. The complaint (full text) in Zinski v. Liberty University, Inc., (WD VA, filed 7/29/2024), alleges that terminating plaintiff's employment violated Title VII's ban on sex discrimination. A press release from ACLU of Virginia elaborates on plaintiff's dismissal, saying in part:

Liberty University officials read a termination notice aloud to Ellenor citing “denying biological and chromosomal sex assigned at birth” as the basis for her termination, stating a conflict with Liberty’s Doctrinal Statement that names “denial of birth sex by self-identification with a different gender” as a “sinful act prohibited by God.” 

6th Circuit: School District's Ban on Students Calling Others by Non-Preferred Pronouns Does Not Violate 1st Amendment

In Parents Defending Education v. Olentangy Local School District, (6th Cir., July 29, 2024), the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision rejected free speech challenges to a school district's anti-bullying and anti-harassment policies that prohibit students from using pronouns that are inconsistent with another student’s gender identity if the use amounts to harassment. The majority said in part:

... Parent A-D’s children intend to communicate a message by using non-preferred pronouns to refer to their classmates.... [T]he single thing on which the parties agree is that pronouns matter.  That is true for transgender students in the District, who experience the use of preferred pronouns as a vital part of affirming their existence and experience the use of non-preferred pronouns as dehumanizing, degrading, and humiliating.  It is also true for Parent A-D’s children, whose parents aver that using pronouns inconsistent with a person’s biological sex at birth contradicts their “deeply held beliefs” about the immutability of sex.  The intentional use of preferred or non-preferred pronouns therefore represents speech protected by the First Amendment....

Students who do not want to use their transgender classmates’ preferred pronouns may permissibly use no pronouns at all, and refer to their classmates using first names.... Parents A-D, to be sure, have made clear that this option is not their preference because their children “don’t want to avoid using pronouns ... they want to use biologically correct pronouns.”... But using first names is remarkably similar to a proposed “compromise” we praised in Meriwether—the plaintiff’s proposal to “call on [the transgender student in his class] using [that student’s] last name alone,” rather than any honorifics....

Outside instructional time, moreover, students may elect to not refer to their transgender classmates at all.  This choice to not speak mirrors the generally accepted accommodation for students morally opposed to reciting the Pledge of Allegiance....

At bottom, PDE has failed to make a clear showing that the District’s prohibition on the intentional use of non-preferred pronouns unconstitutionally compels speech. ...

... [T]he District’s position that students may communicate their belief that sex is immutable through means other than the use of nonpreferred pronouns, indicate that the District is not attempting to prohibit any viewpoints....

Judge Batchelder dissented, saying in part:

As I understand it, the plaintiffs’ position—based on their scientific (biology, physiology, and genetics) and religious beliefs—is that biological gender is immutable, people are either male or female, and there is no such thing as “gender transition”; that is a made-up thing, imaginary or make believe, and a public school cannot force their children to pretend it is a real thing.  Agree or disagree, but that is their position.   

In that light, the speech at issue here concerns the existence of gender transition, not just a debate about gender-identity issues or misgendering.  The Olentangy Local School District’s view—contrary to Parents Defending Education’s—is that there is such a thing as gender transition; it is real, worthy of recognition and, in fact, worthy of protection in the public schools.  Why else would the District require preferred pronouns, prohibit biological pronouns, or press the odd compromise of no pronouns at all?  Therefore, the governmental authority (the District) has taken a clear position (viewpoint) in which all of its captive subjects (students) must affirm the existence of gender transition (either through words or silence), regardless of their own view.  This is a viewpoint-based regulation of speech....

Courthouse News Service reports on the decision.

Requiring Conditional Use Permit Is Not Substantial Burden Under RLUIPA

In Athey Creek Christian Fellowship v. Clackamas County, (D OR, July 30, 2024), an Oregon federal district court dismissed a RLUIPA challenge to the denial of a Conditional Use Permit for construction of the second phase of a church building. The court said in part: 

... [P]laintiff filed this suit in November of 2022, alleging that the zoning ordinance that required churches to apply for a conditional use permit and did not allow churches as a primary use is facially invalid under the RLUIPA, and that the County violated plaintiff’s rights under the RLUIPA, the First Amendment, and the Oregon Constitution by not allowing plaintiff to build phase 2 of the project and forcing plaintiff to re-apply for a new or modified conditional use permit. 

The purported burden here then includes the County’s conclusion that the 2006 CUP has expired, and the County’s resulting insistence that plaintiff must now apply to build phase 2 under the new “primary use” .... Neither one of these carries the traditional hallmarks of a substantial burden under the RLUIPA....

Notably, the record in case is missing a common, even pervasive, attribute in those cases where the plaintiffs succeeded on a substantial burden claim, namely that the relevant zoning authority displayed some outward hostility toward or pretextual decision-making about the plaintiffs’ proposed religious use....

... [P]laintiff has not shown why seeking an extension of the 2006 CUP or timely obtaining the relevant building permits for phase 2 were a substantial burden to its religious exercise....

The same reasoning applies to the alleged burden that resulted from the County’s insistence now that plaintiff must now re-apply as a primary use. It is not a substantial burden to file an application for a proposed land use.

Wednesday, July 31, 2024

Nebraska Law on Abortion and Transgender Care Does Not Violate Single-Subject Rule

In Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc. v. Hilgers, (NE Sup. Ct., July 29, 2024), the Nebraska Supreme Court in a 6-1 decision held that a 2023 Nebraska statute, L.B. 574, which both restricts abortions and restricts gender-altering care for minors does not violate the state Constitution's single subject requirement for legislation.  Chief Justice Heavican's majority opinion said in part:

... [W]e reject Planned Parenthood’s contention that L.B. 574 is unconstitutional because its regulation of abortion does not further its regulation of gender-altering care and vice versa. Here, even though abortion and gender-altering care are distinct types of medical care, and even though L.B. 574 effectuates its purpose or object differently for each type, when broadly construing L.B. 574, all its provisions certainly are encompassed within the regulation of permissible medical care. We emphasize that, in our determination that the provisions of L.B. 574 each seek to regulate medical care, we make no comment on the substance of L.B. 574. Our focus is on whether L.B. 574 complies with article III, § 14.

Justice Papik, joined by Justice Stacy filed a concurring opinion. Justice Miller-Lerman filed a dissenting opinion.

Liberty Counsel issued a press release announcing the decision.

Denial of Foster Care Licensure Subject to Strict Scrutiny

In Burke v. Walsh, (D MA, June 5, 2024), a Massachusetts federal district court refused to dismiss free exercise and free speech claims brought against Massachusetts Department of Children and Families personnel in their official capacities. Plaintiffs, a Catholic couple, were denied licensure for foster care and adoption because they did not demonstrate the ability to support the well-being of an LGBTQIA+ child that might be placed with them. The court said in part:

The court concludes it was clearly established, in 2023, that DCF's individualized and discretionary assessment of Plaintiffs' foster license application was not a "generally applicable" policy and thus was subject to strict scrutiny. Under the governing regulations, DCF considers 17 different subjective criteria, all of which must be demonstrated "to the satisfaction of the Department," when deciding on a foster license application. 110 C.M.R. § 7.104(1). One of these requirements, upon which Defendants relied in denying Plaintiffs' application, is "to promote the physical, mental, and emotional well-being of a child placed in his or her care, including supporting and respecting a child's sexual orientation or gender identity."...

 ... [T]he court need not decide, at this stage, whether it was also clearly established that Defendants' conduct would not withstand strict scrutiny analysis under these circumstances.


Tuesday, July 30, 2024

7th Circuit Gives Broad Interpretation of "Religious" Claims Under Title VII

In Passarella v. Aspirus, Inc., (7th Cir., July 29, 2024), the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals in an opinion by Judge Scudder held that a request for a religious accommodation under Title VII may include secular elements. At issue were employees' requests for an exemption from the employer's Covid vaccine mandate. The court said in part:

At the pleading stage, an employee seeking an accommodation in the form of an exemption from an employer’s vaccine mandate must allege facts plausibly permitting an inference that some “aspect[]” of the request is based on the employee’s “religious observance and practice” or “belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). 

Applying the statutory language necessarily requires an exercise of judgment: the standard is not amenable to formulaic resolution like solving a math equation. To the contrary, its application requires a holistic assessment of the terms of the employee’s exemption request, with the controlling inquiry at the pleading stage being whether the employee plausibly based her vaccination exemption request at least in part on an aspect of her religious belief or practice.  

... An employee may object to an employer’s vaccine mandate on both religious and non-religious grounds—for example, on the view that receiving the vaccine would violate a religious belief and implicate health and safety concerns. Congress permitted this, as we see no other way to give effect to the breadth of its definition of “religion”—as covering “all aspects” of an employee’s religious observance, practice, and belief.... And, for its part, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, in implementing this same definition, has likewise emphasized that a religious objection to a workplace requirement may incorporate both religious and secular reasons.... 

Judge Rovner dissented, saying in part:

I recognize that Dottenwhy, in the statements she submitted to Aspirus, invoked her rights as a Christian, said she had prayed about the matter and sought guidance from G-d, and expressed her conviction that “HE is with me on this decision.” ... Without more, such statements are not enough, in my view, to transform an otherwise secular objection to the vaccine into a religiously-based one.... I am not convinced that Congress meant to compel an employer to grant any requested accommodation that an employee has prayed about and has concluded that his or her G-d supports. If that were so, there would be almost no limit to the accommodations that an employer would have to entertain under Title VII’s ban on religious discrimination....

Passarella’s statement came somewhat closer to describing a religious basis for a vaccine exemption, but in the end, I believe that Aspirus correctly understood her objection to the COVID-19 vaccine to be secular rather than religious....

It cannot be enough to state a claim for a religious accommodation to assert that because one’s conscience is G-d given, any decision one reaches in their good conscience is necessarily inspired and endorsed by G-d, and therefore is religious in nature.

In Bube v. Aspirius Hospital, Inc., (7th Cir., July 29, 2024), a different panel of the 7th Circuit, with only Judge Scudder being on both, reversed the dismissal of claims by two employees for religious exemptions from a hospital's Covid vaccine mandate. The court, in a unanimous opinion written by Judge Scudder, said in part:

We have no trouble concluding that both of these requests are based at least in part on an aspect of the plaintiffs’ religious beliefs. God “gave” Bube a “mind, body and soul” so that she feels obligated to avoid what she considers unsafe substances in order to remain healthy. And Hedrington was “created … perfectly” by God so that accepting a “risk[y]” vaccine would be a “sin.” ...

Scrutinizing the composition of these requests—especially at the pleading stage—runs counter to not only the broad language of Title VII but also the Supreme Court’s repeated warnings that the law requires a hands-off approach when it comes to defining and discerning the core limits of religious exercise.

3rd Circuit: Jury Issues Remain in Suit Over Religious Exemption from Covid Vaccine Mandate

In Spivack v. City of Philadelphia, (3d Cir., July 29, 2024), the U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the dismissal of a suit brought by Rachel Spivack, an Orthodox Jewish employee of the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office, and remanded the case for trial.  Spivack was dismissed from her position for refusing, on religious grounds, to comply with the Office's Covid vaccine mandate. Spivack contended:

 “[a]ll three available brands of COVID-19 vaccines constitute a profound violation of the scriptural prohibitions against forbidden mixtures,” and that “[i]njecting such forbidden substances directly into our bloodstream completely challenges scriptural teaching that regards one’s body as the repository of the soul made in God’s image.” ...

The appeals court said in part:

There is ... a dispute of material fact as to whether anti-religious hostility tainted the DAO’s treatment of religious exemptions.  That is because a reasonable jury could conclude, based on some evidence in the record, that the DAO’s treatment of religious exemptions reflected “intoleran[ce] of religious beliefs.”...

But Krasner claims that Spivack was disciplined under a later policy—the January 2022 policy, which eliminated the religious exemption altogether and kept only the medical exemption.... 

That Krasner continued to evaluate medical exemption requests under the January 2022 policy does not undermine that policy’s general applicability.  Medical exemptions were a separate and objectively defined category of exemption requests....

The critical question is whether the medical exemptions in these policies are comparable to a religious exemption—in other words, whether the “preferential treatment of secular behavior” in the form of a medical exemption “affect[s] the regulation’s purpose in the same way as the prohibited religious behavior.” ...

Unlike a religious exemption, a medical exemption furthers the DAO’s interest in keeping its employees safe and healthy by allowing employees for whom the COVID-19 vaccine would cause death or illness to abstain from vaccination....

[T]he DAO must show that its policy was narrowly tailored, which “requires the government to demonstrate that a policy is the least restrictive means of achieving its objective.”...

Unanswered factual questions pervade this inquiry.  How many similar exemption requests would the DAO need to grant?  Would other, less restrictive mitigation measures for employees with religious exemptions ... have achieved the office’s objectives?  If strict scrutiny applies, a jury must consider these questions....

First Liberty Institute issued a press release announcing the decision.

Monday, July 29, 2024

6 More States Enjoin Enforcement of New Title IX Rules Barring Transgender Discrimination

Yet another court has enjoined the Department of Education from enforcing its new Title IX rules that interpret Title IX's ban on sex discrimination as including a ban on gender identity discrimination. In State of Arkansas v. U.S. Department of Education(ED MO, July 24, 2024), a Missouri federal district court issued a preliminary injunction barring enforcement against Arkansas, Missouri, Iowa, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota and the individual plaintiff, a student in a school in Arkansas who says the rule violates her religious beliefs.  the court said in part:

After preliminary review and without ultimately deciding the issue, the Court is persuaded that plaintiffs have a fair chance of prevailing on their argument that the reasoning of Bostock, a Title VII employment discrimination case, should not apply to Title IX. ...

Given that notice is the touchstone of Title IX, the statute contains no definition of sex or express prohibition of discrimination on the basis of gender identity, and it expressly permits sex-based differential treatment in certain circumstances, plaintiff States have met their preliminary burden of establishing a fair chance of prevailing on their argument that they lacked constitutionally sufficient notice that sex discrimination would be interpreted as including gender identity discrimination when they accepted federal funding under Title IX.

The court also preliminarily enjoined the new rules' expansion of the definition of harassment, concluding that the definition may violate the 1st Amendment by chilling speech. ADF issued a press release announcing the decision.

Recent Articles of Interest

From SSRN:

From SmartCILP:
  • Frank Ravitch, Unprincipled61 Houston Law Review 517 (2024).

Sunday, July 28, 2024

Nebraska Supreme Court Upholds Dismissal of Priest's Suit Against Archdiocese

 In Syring v. Archdiocese of Omaha, (NE Sup. Ct., July 26, 2024), the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of defamation, infliction of mental distress, interference with prospective employment and breach of fiduciary duty claims by a Catholic priest against his Archdiocese.  The priest was listed on an Archdiocese website that named those against whom there had been allegations of misconduct or abuse of a minor. He was forced to resign his ministry position and the Archdiocese refused to approve his serving as a hospital chaplain. The court held that the Archdiocese's action did not meet the standard for outrageous conduct needed to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. It went on the dismiss various of plaintiff's claims on the basis of the ministerial exception doctrine.  The court said in part:

Syring’s claims asserted that the Archdiocese “falsely impute[d] unfitness to preform [sic] duties of employment, and prejudice[d] [Syring] in his profession or trade.” The other claims were premised upon Syring’s assertion that the Archdiocese owed him fiduciary duties. For example, the complaint identified a purported breach of a fiduciary duty in the Archdiocese’s “requiring [Syring’s] resignation, and omitting to advise him of his right to counsel, both civil and canonical.”

We cannot uphold Syring’s claims without interfering with the internal governance of the church, or depriving the church of control, over the selection of its ministers. The claims— based on the conversation between officials of a Catholic archdiocese and a hospital operated by a Catholic religious order regarding permission for Syring to serve as a chaplain, Syring’s fitness to perform the duties of his employment, and the requiring of Syring’s resignation from that employment— lie at the heart of the ministerial exception articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court. The district court did not err in dismissing these claims.

Friday, July 26, 2024

Canadian Court Enjoins Enforcement of Guidelines That Adversely Impact Kosher Slaughtering

 In Jewish Community Council of Montreal v. Canada (Attorney General), (CA Fed. Ct., July 24, 2024), a judge of the Canadian Federal Court issued an interlocutory injunction preventing the Canadian Food Inspection Agency from enforcing Guidelines that require kosher slaughterers that do not stun animals before slaughter to test three indicators of unconsciousness before suspending an animal. Jewish organizations that are plaintiffs in the case say that imposition of the new Guidelines has reduced the volume of kosher beef produced in Canada by 55% and the volume of kosher veal by 90%. The court said in part:

The issue is therefore whether the Guidelines requiring the application of the three indicators of unconsciousness to ensure that an animal is unconscious before suspension, as required under section 143 of the SFCR, are reasonable when applied to shechita, or whether they represent an encroachment on the Applicants’ right to freedom of religion under subsection 2(a) of the Charter, or whether the requirement is discriminatory under section 15 of the Charter....

The Applicants submit that the Guidelines constitute a major departure from prior practice and are unduly protective as they essentially require that the animal be brain-dead before being suspended, when section 143 of the SFCR only requires that the animal be unconscious.... The Guidelines therefore require an unreasonable application of the precautionary principle which does not measurably add to animal welfare (as required under sections 141 to 144 of the SFCR) while slowing down the operation of kosher slaughter to the point where licence holders prefer to cease production. As a result, the Guidelines restrict access to kosher meat and prevent Canadian Jews from exercising the requirements of their faith.

The Guidelines are also discriminatory as they unfairly associate a religious practice of shechita to animal pain, and impose a challenge that does not apply to non-kosher meat production. The Guidelines therefore impose on Jews a burden and deny them benefits in a manner that has the effect of reinforcing, perpetuating, or exacerbating a disadvantage. Their Charter rights to freedom of religion and the right to equality enshrined in the Charter are therefore unjustifiably restricted....

For the perspective of shochetim and bodkim, they are deprived of their ability to practise their faith and profession, as they can no longer exercise their duties as religious leaders in the community. As shochetim and bodkim represent a precious resource for the Canadian Jewish community, the loss of their expertise will encroach on the Canadian Jewish community’s culture and collective aspect of religious beliefs. The interference is therefore substantial, both from an individual and collective point of view....

Hamodia reports on the decision. 

States Lack Standing to Challenge FDA's Rules on Dispensing of Abortion Pill

In State of Washington v. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, (9th Cir., July 24, 2024), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals refused to permit the state of Idaho (and 6 other states) to intervene in a lawsuit brought by a group of states led by the state of Washington challenging the FDA's restrictions on pharmacies' dispensing of the abortion pill mifepristone. FDA regulations adopted in 2021 allow mifepristone to be dispensed by pharmacies in retail locations or by mail, but only if the pharmacy is specially certified to do so. Washington's lawsuit contends that the certification and documentation requirements are unnecessary.  Idaho, on the other hand, wants the court to order the FDA to go back to earlier requirements that only allowed mifepristone to be dispensed in person by a physician and did not allow it to be obtained directly from pharmacies. The court concluded that because Idaho seeks fundamentally different relief that does Washington, it must establish its own standing in order to intervene. The court concluded that Idaho did not have separate standing, saying in part:

Idaho first alleges that elimination of the in-person dispensing requirement will cause the state economic injury in the form of increased costs to the state’s Medicaid system.  At oral argument, Idaho stated that this is its “strongest basis” for standing.  Even taking Idaho’s highly speculative allegations as true, the complaint does not demonstrate an injury-in-fact because it depends on an attenuated chain of healthcare decisions by independent actors that will have only indirect effects on state revenue....

Idaho next alleges that elimination of the in-person dispensing requirement will harm its sovereign interest in law enforcement by making illegal mifepristone use harder to detect.  This allegation is insufficient to convey standing because nothing in the 2023 REMS impairs Idaho’s sovereign authority to enact or enforce its own laws regulating chemical abortion....

Finally, Idaho alleges that elimination of the in-person dispensing requirement will harm its “quasi-sovereign interest” in maternal health and fetal life.  Idaho cannot sue FDA on this basis because the allegations concern the interests of individual citizens—not the separate interests of the state itself....

Courthouse News Service reports on the decision. [Thanks to Thomas Rutledge for the lead.]

Thursday, July 25, 2024

Arkansas Supreme Court Orders Initial Count of Signatures on Abortion Amendment Petitions

 In Cowles v. Thurston, (AR Sup. Ct., July 23, 2024), the Arkansas Supreme Court ordered the state Secretary of State to perform an initial count of signatures submitted by volunteer canvassers for a state constitutional amendment that would give women the right to obtain an abortion during the first 18 weeks after fertilization, and later in cases of rape, incest, fatal fetal anomaly, or to protect the mother's life or physical health. As previously reported, the Secretary of State rejected all the petitions because they were not accompanied by required paperwork regarding those submitted by paid canvassers. 3 Justices would have gone further and given proponents a 30-day cure period. Arkansas Advocate reports on the Court Order. [Thanks to Thomas Rutledge for the lead.]

Equally Divided New Jersey Supreme Court Dismisses Defamation Suit Against Jewish School

 In Hyman v. Rosenbaum Yeshiva of North Jersey, (NJ Sup. Ct., July 24, 2024), an equally divided New Jersey Supreme Court decision resulted in affirmance through a short per curiam opinion of the dismissal of defamation claims brought against an Orthodox Jewish school by a Judaic Studies teacher whose employment by the school was terminated. The Justices were equally divided on whether discovery should be permitted in the case.

The 6 justices participating in the decision unanimously agreed on the standard for applying the ministerial exception, saying that the court must analyze each element of plaintiff's claim and determine whether adjudicating it would require the court to choose between competing religious visions or would interfere with a church's administrative prerogatives including its right to select and control the duties of its ministers, whether or not the alleged misconduct is rooted in religious belief. Here plaintiff's employment was terminated for inappropriate touching of female students. Information about his termination was emailed to the school's Board of Directors, parents of current students and faculty members. The letter was subsequently disseminated on social media.

Justice Patterson's concurring opinion for 3 justices said in part:

Here, the religious employer’s allegedly defamatory statement was not a description of claimed misconduct by Hyman; no such description appears in Price’s letter to the school community.  Instead, Hyman’s defamation claims are premised on Price’s statement that “it was determined that Rabbi Hyman’s conduct had been neither acceptable nor consistent with how a rebbe in our Yeshiva should interact with students.”  In short, the statement at the heart of this case was not an assertion of fact about the former students’ allegations, but an explanation of the Yeshiva’s decision to terminate Hyman -- a determination made in consultation with halachic authorities as well as legal counsel.  With or without discovery regarding the details of the allegations, the court’s inquiry as to the merits would be the same:  the court would be required to assess the reasons for a religious institution’s decision to terminate the employment of a minister, an inquiry that would violate the First Amendment.

Justice Pierre-Louis' dissenting opinion for 3 justices said in part: 

In order for a court to make [a determination that the ministerial exception applies] ... plaintiffs must be allowed discovery.... [U]nder the concurring opinion’s analysis, a religious entity can seemingly fire an employee based solely on a personal vendetta, publish a knowingly false and defamatory statement about the plaintiff, and shield itself from liability -- and even discovery -- by invoking the ministerial exception.  Such a holding slams the courthouse door shut on potentially wronged plaintiffs before they can even obtain discovery that would allow a court to determine whether adjudicating their claims actually interferes with religious autonomy....

Defendants have conflated the issues in this case, making it appear as though this defamation case is the same as an employment discrimination case.  But assessing the legality of what a religious institution says about an adverse employment action is not the same thing as determining the lawfulness of the adverse action itself.  The latter necessarily requires a court to interfere with a religious institution’s internal management, its doctrinal specificities, and its decisions regarding who preaches the faith, but the former does not.

Becket Fund issued a press release announcing the decision.