5th Circuit Allows San Antonio Park Development To Move Ahead Over Religious Objections of Lipan-Apache

In Perez v. City of San Antonio, (5th Cir., Aug. 13, 2025), the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision affirmed a trial court's refusal to enjoin San Antonio's development plan for a city park.  Plaintiffs are members of the Lipan-Apache Native American Church. Certain of their religious ceremonies can take place only at a particular river bend in the park and require the presence of cormorants in the trees there. The development plans involve removing and relocation of trees and modifying bird habitats to deter birds from nesting in highly urbanized areas of the park. Plaintiffs claim that removal of trees and the bird deterrence program violate their religious freedom protected by the 1st Amendment, the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the Texas Constitution.  In a prior opinion, the 5th Circuit certified to the Texas Supreme Court a question on the meaning of a 2021 amendment to the Texas Constitution that prohibits the government from interfering with religious services. In response, the Texas Supreme Court said that the constitutional provision does not extend to governmental actions for the preservation and management of public lands.

In this week's decision, the majority, refusing to grant an injunction pending further appeal, held that the project did not violate the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act, saying in part:

... [T]he City’s development plan only indirectly impacts Appellants’ religious conduct and expression. Appellants continue to have virtually unlimited access to the Park for religious and cultural purposes. The record shows that, regardless of the rookery management program, no cormorants, due to their migration patterns, inhabit the area for extended periods of time each year....

Appellants did not meet their burden to show that they are likely to succeed on their claim that the plan constitutes a substantial burden of their religious exercise. Even if they did, that would not change the outcome of this appeal because the City’s plan advances a compelling interest through the least restrictive means—and thus survives strict scrutiny.

The majority also held that the city's program did not violate the 1st Amendment, saying in part:

The parties’ dispute under the Free Exercise Clause centers on which standard of constitutional review applies to the instant case, rational basis or strict scrutiny. Appellants argue that the City’s plans for tree removal and rookery management measures are not neutral and generally applicable and, therefore, must be analyzed under the more exacting strict scrutiny standard. The City contends that its planned Park improvements are neutral and generally applicable and that the more deferential rational basis standard of review applies. Assuming strict scrutiny applies, we conclude that the challenged government action in this case withstands Appellants’ Free Exercise challenge, as illustrated infra in the TRFRA claim analysis.

Judge Higginson dissented in part, saying in part:

Despite my respect for the majority’s analysis, I continue to think that Appellants’ religious exercise is substantially burdened and that the City of San Antonio ... failed to accommodate Appellants’ religious beliefs in the least restrictive manner.  I would therefore hold that the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“TRFRA”) requires the City to accommodate Appellants’ religious beliefs across two “items of relief” requested in the complaint: the City’s tree-removal (“Item 2”) and anti-nesting (“Item 3”) measures....

Appellants’ testimony shows that services at the riverbend would be “meaningless” without the trees or the cormorants, and that disruption to either will “unravel” the land’s spiritual ecology—a sine qua non for Church members’ religious exercise.  Just as importantly, Appellants’ testimony confirms that these services cannot “be performed anywhere else.”...

To the extent the majority suggests that Appellants can obtain  spiritual fulfilment by exercising their religious beliefs in a manner contrary to their testimony, such reasoning is forbidden.

UPDATE: On Dec. 12, 2025, the Court filed an amended opinion, again concluding in a 2-1 vote that neither the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act nor the 1st Amendment had been violated.

School Officials Lack Standing To Sue Advocacy Group For Interfering With Their Duties

In Oklahoma State Department of Education v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, (ED OK, Aug. 13, 2025), Oklahoma education officials, in an interesting twist, sued to enjoin the advocacy organization Freedom From Religion Foundation from interfering with Plaintiffs’ statutory authority to govern Oklahoma’s public schools. FFRF had sent letters complaining about Bible reading and prayer in classrooms in one district and appointment of a football team chaplain in another. The court held that Plaintiffs lack standing to bring the suit, saying in part:

... [T]he Complaint does not explain how these letters have interfered with day-to-day operations in any real way.

Plaintiffs’ Complaint also vaguely alludes that Plaintiffs’ injury is the “chilling effect” caused by Defendant’s letters....

... [T]he Complaint does not allege that it has stopped executing its duties or ceased administration of Oklahoma’s public schools because of Defendant’s letters.2  Nor does the Complaint allege that the schools have ceased any policies or practices because of Defendant’s letters. 

For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to show an injury in fact.

[Thanks to Eugene Volokh via Religionlaw for the lead.]

8th Circuit: Jury Should Decide If Anti-Abortion Facebook Posting Impacted Delivery of Public Services

In Melton v. City of Forrest City, Arkansas, (8th Cir., Aug. 13, 2025), the U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals held that a district court should have sent factual questions to a jury instead of granting summary judgment in a retaliation suit by a fireman who was dismissed because of the firestorm caused by a controversial posting on his personal Facebook page. The fire chief had received complaints about the posting from city council members and members of the public. The court said in part:

Steven Melton is a pro-life, evangelical Christian.  In June 2020, he reposted a black-and-white image on Facebook that depicted a silhouette of a baby in the womb with a rope around its neck.  His intent was to convey that he was “anti-abortion.”...

Others did not view the image the same way.  Two weeks after he posted it, a retired fire-department supervisor complained to Melton that he thought it looked like a noose around the neck of a black child.  It upset him because the caption of the image, “I can’t breathe!,” was associated with the protests surrounding George Floyd’s death.  Melton agreed to delete it immediately....

The problem is that there was no showing that Melton’s post had an impact on the fire department itself.  No current firefighter complained or confronted him about it.  Nor did any co-worker or supervisor refuse to work with him.  Granting summary judgment based on such “vague and conclusory” concerns, without more, runs the risk of constitutionalizing a heckler’s veto.

ADF issued a press release announcing the decision.

Contraceptive Mandate Religious and Moral Accommodation Rules Held Invalid

In Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Trump, (ED PA, Aug. 13, 2025), a Pennsylvania federal district court invalidated two rules promulgated in 2018 that allow employers with religious objections and most employers with moral objections to opt out of furnishing contraceptive coverage for their employees in their health insurance plans. Little Sisters of the Poor intervened as a defendant in the case. The court held that promulgation of the rule was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. The court said in part:

In promulgating the Religious Rule, the Agencies’ justified the Rule by invoking potential conflicts between the Contraceptive Mandate and RFRA....

The Religious Rule goes far “beyond what the Departments’ justification” (i.e., resolving potential conflicts between RFRA and the Contraceptive Mandate) “supported—raising doubts about whether the solution lacks a ‘rational connection’ to the problem described.”...

Neither is the Moral Rule sustainable.  The States’ point that, in promulgating the Moral Rule, the Agencies “relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider,”....  Accordingly, the Moral Rule must be set aside as arbitrary and capricious....

Quite apart from the reasons set forth above, both the Religious and the Moral Rules must be vacated because the Agencies did not provide a “satisfactory explanation for [their] action,”... in that they failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for their change in course regarding contraception’s safety and efficacy, and, they failed to adequately address reasonable alternatives to the Rules they crafted....

The APA provides that the “reviewing court shall . . . (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be—(A) arbitrary [and] capricious.”... “Ordinarily, reviewing courts have applied that provision by vacating invalid agency action and remanding the matter to the agency for further review.”...

Becket Fund issued a press release announcing the decision.

DOJ Finds GW University Violated Title VI In Failing To Respond To Antisemitism

In a letter dated Aug. 12 (full text), the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice notified George Washington University that DOJ has found the University in violation of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act because of the University's lack of response to discrimination and antisemitic harassment of Jewish and Israeli students by other students. The letter reads in part:

The Department finds that GWU students and faculty were subjected to a hostile educational environment that was objectively offensive, severe, and pervasive. The antisemitic, hate-based misconduct by GWU students directed at Jewish GWU students, faculty, and employees was, in a word, shocking. The behavior was demonstrably abhorrent, immoral, and, most importantly, illegal....

Jewish students, parents and alumni contacted GWU numerous times to express their alarm and concern about the actions of protesters and to express their legitimate and reasonable fears for their safety. Just between April 25 and May I, 2024, GWU received no less than eight complaints alleging that demonstrators were discriminating against students because they were Jewish or Israeli. The Department has also received other complaints from Jewish GWU students and their parents about antisemitic misconduct and abuse.

Based on its investigation, the Department has concluded that GWU took no meaningful action and instead was deliberately indifferent to the hostile educational environment on its campus in violation of Title VI....

The Department intends to proceed with enforcement of this important federal civil rights law unless resolution of this matter is reached in the near future. The Department therefore offers GWU the opportunity to enter into a voluntary resolution agreement to ensure immediate remediation of these issues and related  reforms to prevent the recurrence of discrimination, harassment, and abuse.... 

The Justice Department issued a press release announcing its findings.

FBI Releases 2024 Hate Crime Data

On August 5, the FBI released 2024 U.S. Hate Crime Statistics (full text of report). The Report discloses the 24.6% of the hate crime incidents last year resulted from religious bias. According to the Report, of the 3,235 victims of anti-religious hate crimes, 69.1% were victims of crimes motivated by offenders’ anti-Jewish bias; 9.3% were victims of anti-Islamic (Muslim) bias; 4.7% were victims of anti-Sikh bias; 2.6% were victims of anti-Other Christian bias; 1.9% were victims of anti-Catholic bias.

Denial of State Reimbursement for Religious Home School Material Does Not Violate 1st Amendment

In Trakel v. Critchfield, (D ID, Aug. 6, 202), an Idaho federal district court rejected parents' claim that they are entitled to reimbursement for religiously influenced supplemental materials that they purchased for their children who are enrolled in the state's home learning program, the Idaho Home Learning Academy. The court said in part:

IHLA is an accredited public charter school that provides Idaho students with a customizable online education. The school offers its own online curriculum options but also reimburses families for the costs of certain self-selected supplemental and enrichment materials. Some of these items are “preapproved,” while others require IHLA to first determine that the items are educationally appropriate, reasonable, and an efficient use of tax dollars....

The school denied the reimbursement request, citing State Department of Education policies and Article IX, Section 5 of the Idaho Constitution, known as the Blaine Amendment,  which prohibits the use of public money for religious purposes....

The Trakels argue this denial violates the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment. Specifically, they view IHLA’s reimbursement policy as a public benefit, which is unconstitutionally limited to secular curriculums....

... [T]he Trakels seek to compel IHLA to provide a religious education. IHLA’s reimbursement policy is not a public benefit that allows parents to make fully independent decisions regarding their children’s education. Although families have an unusual degree of input and flexibility, IHLA is ultimately a public school that sets its own curriculum. To qualify for reimbursement, supplemental materials must receive approval and meet a variety of standards set by the school.... To put it simply, reimbursed materials become part of the IHLA curriculum. The question, then, is whether the Trakels have a free exercise or free speech right for their children to receive a public religious education. The answer is clearly no.

Recent Articles of Interest

From SSRN:

• Bennett Lunn, De-Balkanizing Religious Discrimination: St. Isidore and the Social Cohesion Rationale, (August 01, 2025).
• Richard Kenneth Sherwin, Constitutional Over-Beliefs: Constituent Power, Affective Intensity, and Law's Legitimation, (August 01, 2025).
• Michael Stokes Paulsen, Freedom For Religion, (The Yale Law Journal Forum, Vol.133 (2023).
• Hila Keren, Constitutional Opportunism, (August 04, 2025).
• Isaac Barnes May, Legal Realism and the Separation of Religion and Judicial Reasoning, (Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Volume 36, Issue 2 (2025)).
• Agustin V. Startari, Grammars of Power: How Syntactic Structures Shape Authority, (July 03, 2025).
• Dennis Wieboldt, Ideas With(out) Consequences?: The Natural Law Institute and the Making of Conservative Constitutionalism During the Cold War, 1947-1951, (42 L. & Hist. Rev. __ (2025)).
• Gaurav Mukherjee, Religious Freedom in an Era of Democratic Backsliding, (Oxford Handbook of Comparative Human Rights Law (Mila Versteeg & Neha Jain, eds., 2025).
• Jennifer S. Hendricks, Next Time Around: Abortion and Sex Equality, (June 01, 2024).
• Michael Showalter, Establishment Clause Legislative History Is Not the Law: The Misguided Search for Original Subjective Intent, (Federalist Society Review, forthcoming).

From SSRN (Non-U.S. Law):

• Nicholas Aroney, In Two Natures, without Confusion, without Change, without Division, without Separation Christology and the Constitutional Ordering of Authority, (July 23, 2025).
• Swaraj Pandey, Genocide and International Justice: Legal Accountability in Gaza, Myanmar, and Beyond, (July 20, 2025).
• Jamshed Durrani, QalbCode: A Multidisciplinary Framework for Rewiring the Subconscious Operating System Behind Human Potential, (July 02, 2025).
• Haim V. Levy, Embryo Status, Parenthood, and Child Welfare in Assisted Reproduction: Legal and Ethical Challenges (July 22, 2025).
• Khushi D, When Culture is the Target: Rethinking Genocide in India and Beyond, (May 06, 2025).
• Marie Seong-Hak Kim, Legal Pluralism That Wasn't: State and the Plurality of Law in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe, (February 01, 2025).

From SmartCILP:

• Noah Feldman, The Brainerd Currie Memorial Lecture. History and Tradition? Anatomy of a Constitutional Revolution, 74 Duke Law Journal 1597-1612 (2025).

Court Again Upholds Idaho Law on School Restroom Use by Transgender Students

In Sexuality and Gender Alliance v. Critchfield, (D ID, Aug. 7, 2025), an Idaho federal district court refused to issue a preliminary injunction to bar enforcement of an Idaho statute that requires transgender students in Idaho public schools to use restrooms, changing rooms, and showers that correspond to their biological sex. The 9th Circuit had previously upheld the denial of a broad preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the statute. In this suit, plaintiffs ask for a narrow injunction applicable only to restrooms at Boise High School. Plaintiffs argue that Boise High School has allowed transgender students to use bathrooms consistent with their gender identity for years, and allowing enforcement now would upset the status quo. The court said in part:

Separating restrooms by biological sex has been common for centuries.... And for good reason—there are biological differences between men and women.... Those biological differences are deserving of privacy and S.B. 1100’s segregation of restrooms based on sex is related to that interest. It is not the Court’s role to determine whether S.B. 1100 is a perfect policy; the Court must only address whether it is “substantially related” to the State of Idaho’s interest in protecting student’s privacy. Because S.B. 1100 is substantially related to the State’s legitimate interest in privacy, the Court finds SAGA is unlikely to succeed on its Equal Protection claim....

The Ninth Circuit... concluded: “SAGA failed to meet its burden to show that the State had clear notice at the time it accepted federal funding that Title IX prohibits segregated access to the facilities covered by S.B. 1100 on the basis of transgender status.”... This conclusion applies with equal force to SAGA’s as-applied challenge. Accordingly, the Court finds SAGA is unlikely to succeed on its Title IX claim.

ADF issued a press release announcing the decision.

Executive Order Targets Religious and Political Discrimination by Banks

Yesterday President Trump issued an Executive Order (full text) titled Guaranteeing Fair Banking for All. The Executive Order requires banking agencies to take steps to prevent, and to remedy past, "politicized or unlawful debanking." The Order provides in part:

The term “politicized or unlawful debanking” refers to an act by a bank ... or other financial services provider to ... adversely restrict access to, or adversely modify the conditions of, accounts, loans, or other banking products or financial services ... on the basis of the customer’s or potential customer’s political or religious beliefs, or on the basis of [their] ... lawful business activities that the financial service provider disagrees with or disfavors for political reasons.

10th Circuit Upholds Oklahoma's Ban on Gender-Affirming Care for Minors

In Poe v. Drummond, (10th Cir., Aug. 6, 2025), the U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court's refusal to preliminarily enjoin enforcement of an Oklahoma law that prohibits furnishing of surgical procedures, puberty blocking drugs or cross-sex hormones to treat gender dysphoria in minors.  Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Skrmetti, the court rejected equal protection and parental rights challenges. The court said in part:

We conclude that Oklahoma’s enactment of SB 613 rationally relates to Oklahoma’s interest in safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of minors in light of the debate among medical experts about the risks and benefits associated with treating a minor’s gender dysphoria with gender transitioning procedures.  We thus affirm the district court’s ruling as to Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claim....

In sum, SB 613 does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it discriminates based on age and medical purpose and satisfies rational basis review.  We also need not subject SB 613 to heightened scrutiny based on impermissible legislative purpose because no evidence exists that Oklahoma legislature enacted it as a pretext to invidiously discriminate against transgender minors....

We next determine whether the liberty interest—parents’ right to access gender transition procedures for their children—is so deeply rooted in our Nation’s history to establish a fundamental right.  After conducting “a careful analysis of the history of the right at issue,”... we conclude there is no deeply rooted tradition in parents’ right to access gender transition procedures for their children.

News On 6 reports on the decision.

5th Circuit: Anti-Vax Belief in Bodily Autonomy Can Support Title VII Religious Discrimination Claim

In Wright v. Honeywell International, Inc., (5th Cir., Aug. 5, 2025), the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a trial court's dismissal of a Title VII religious discrimination suit brought by a dock operator who in 2022 refused to comply with Honeywell's Covid vaccine mandate. Honeywell refused to grant plaintiff a religious exemption on the ground that he did not identify a sincerely held religious belief as the basis for his refusal. The court said in part:

Wright sought a religious exemption from the vaccination policy, citing on his exemption request form his belief that “our creator gave us this gift to choose and decide for ourselves,” and also that it is “in our constitution no man should be forced to do something he . . . is not comfortable with.”  Wright is a Baptist Christian.  He explained that his religion does not “prevent[]” him from receiving the vaccine, “but cert[ai]n passages le[ad him] to feel very strongly about” his decision.  Wright also attested on his exemption request form that he “didn[’]t like the respon[s]e [his] body had” to a tetanus vaccine in 2015.  And he stated that this was the first time that he had sought a religious exemption from a mandatory vaccine. 

Wright also submitted Honeywell’s required third-party attestation of his religious beliefs, completed by his daughter.  Citing scripture, his daughter explained, “It is in our belief that humans should only use things that are created of the earth by God.  We believe the vaccine is a claim of the mark of the beast[;] it is man made and goes against our religion.”...

“Bona fide religious beliefs include ‘moral or ethical beliefs as to what is right and wrong which are sincerely held with the strength of traditional religious views.’”...

Wright’s evidence demonstrates a “moral or ethical” belief in bodily autonomy and freedom to choose what to put in his body.... The fact that he gave additional reasons for his vaccine refusal does not show that his belief is “merely a preferred practice.”...  Instead, it simply shows that his vaccine refusal is grounded on both religious and non-religious reasons.  Furthermore, the inquiry on this prong is not “whether [Wright’s specific] belief is a true religious tenet” of the Baptist faith, but rather whether the belief is, “in his own scheme of things, religious.”

7th Circuit: Jury Must Decide Whether Religious Accommodation Would Create Undue Hardship

In a Title VII case that has been in litigation for six years, in Kluge v. Brownsburg Community School Corp., (7th Cir., Aug. 5, 2025), the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision reversed a district court's grant of summary judgment to the Brownsburg school district and sent the case back to the trial court for a jury to determine disputed facts. At issue is a music teacher's religious objections to following school policy that requires him to refer to transgender students by the names and pronouns that the students and their parents have asked that the school use. Initially the school accommodated the teacher by permitting him to address transgender students using only their last names. However, this led to student dissatisfaction and the accommodation was rescinded. The primary disputed facts are whether the accommodation created an "undue hardship" under the standard defined by the Supreme Court in its 2023 decision in Groff v. DeJoy, and whether the teacher's religious objections were sincere.  The majority said in part:

... [T]he record contains material factual disputes about whether the accommodation disrupted Brownsburg’s learning environment, precluding summary judgment to the school....

... [T]he complaints ...  all deal with the effects on the two students from Kluge’s use of the last-name-only practice. Nowhere do these documents support an inference that the students had a problem with Kluge’s religion or “the mere fact [of] an accommodation.”...  Instead, the complaints are leveled against the impacts on students and teachers, regardless of whether the accommodation was for religious or secular reasons. 

... [T]here is still a genuine material factual dispute about whether those complaints rose to an undue hardship on the school’s educational mission....

...  [A] genuine issue of material fact exists regarding Kluge’s sincerity. Even though a claimant’s sincerity does not hinge on whether he is “scrupulous in his [religious] observance,” it would still be premature to take this issue away from the jury on this question. ...

Judge Rovner filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

Until today, when confronted with a Title VII employment discrimination claim, we have deferred to an employer’s good-faith assessment of how an employee performed in the workplace..... Today the court invites a jury to do what we have always said a federal court will not do, which is to sit as a super-personnel department and second-guess the employer’s good-faith reasoning. In making employment decisions, ... employers will now have to consider not only how successfully an employee is performing his job as modified by a religious accommodation, but how a jury might second-guess its assessment in litigation years down the line. This is an untenable restraint on employers’ decision making. 

Today’s decision also burdens employers in a second important respect. Brownsburg successfully argued below that Kluge’s accommodation proved inconsistent with its mission, which is to provide a supportive learning environment for all of its students. Although the majority accepts this mission for present purposes, it also suggests that evidence of an employer’s mission must be limited to policies that are formally documented and adopted prior to any litigation. I think many employers will be surprised to learn that their ability to define their own missions is restricted to formal policies prepared long before an employment dispute arrives in court....

See prior related posting. ADF issued a press release announcing the decision.

9th Circuit: Ministerial Exception Requires Dismissal of Customer Service Representative's Title VII Suit

In McMahon v. World Vision, Inc., (9th Cir., Aug. 5, 2025), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals held that the ministerial exception doctrine requires dismissal of a Title VII employment discrimination suit brought by a World Vision customer service representative ("CSR") whose job offer was revoked when the organization learned that she was in a same-sex marriage. World Vision is a Christian ministry which shares the gospel through outreach to poor and underserved children and families. The court said in part: 

We hold that the ministerial exception applies to a CSR not merely because they interface with the public, pray with their colleagues, or abide by World Vision’s requirements to embody Christian values.  Rather, CSRs qualify for the exception because (1) they are World Vision’s “voice,” responsible for “effectively communicat[ing] World Vision’s involvement in ministries and projects around the world”; (2) their engagement with donors is a form of ministry itself; and (3) they “give people an opportunity to join [World Vision] in the mission of God.”  Each of these religious responsibilities is “vital” to World Vision’s particular religious mission. 

[Corrected] 

Prosecution of Religious Leader for Psilocybin Use Is Enjoined

In Jensen v. Utah County, (D UT, Aug. 4, 2025), a Utah federal district court enjoined Utah County from continuing its prosecution of plaintiff Bridger Lee Jensen for violating the Utah Controlled Substances Act's prohibition on psilocybin. Jensen is the founder of Singularism, an entheogenic religion. The court said in part:

... [A]t this procedural juncture ... it would be wisest to assume—without deciding—that the Utah constitution’s free exercise clause provides protections equal to those of the Federal Constitution’s Free Exercise Clause. Doing so adheres to “the general rule that courts should avoid reaching constitutional issues if the case can be decided on other grounds.”...

... [T]he Utah Controlled Substances Act’s restrictions on psilocybin possession and use, though neutral, are not generally applicable due to the secular exemption for behavioral-health treatment by certain healthcare systems and accordingly trigger strict scrutiny if a plaintiff can show that the restrictions burden its religious exercise. And Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges facts sufficient for the court to conclude that Plaintiffs have alleged a burden on their free exercise....

Only after this court determined that Plaintiffs were likely to prevail on the merits of their state RFRA claim did Defendants institute criminal proceedings against Mr. Jensen and invoke Younger abstention. From this sequence of events, the court finds that Defendants commenced the state criminal action (the basis for their abstention argument now) in order to relitigate the RFRA issue on which they appear to be poised to lose in this court—in other words, to get a second bite at the apple. The court will not allow the shield of the Younger doctrine to be used as a gamesmanship sword.  

Even if Defendants had not waived their Younger abstention defense by voluntarily invoking federal jurisdiction, the court finds that the bad-faith and irreparable-injury exceptions apply....

Based on the record in this case, the court notes once again its finding that the prosecution was brought in bad faith as part of a larger effort to harass Plaintiffs for their entheogenic religious practices and in hopes of giving the government a second opportunity to litigate the free-exercise issues presented squarely in this case. The prosecution has already caused Singularism to lose many of its practitioners and affiliates, and forcing Plaintiffs to wait until the conclusion of the criminal proceedings to secure their free-exercise rights would be the equivalent of issuing a death warrant for their nascent religion....

Court Enjoins Compliance with Arkansas Law Requiring Posting of 10 Commandments in All Classrooms

Earlier this year, Arkansas enacted Act 573 requiring display of the Ten Commandments in public school and college classrooms. In Stinson v. Fayetteville School District No. 1, (WD AR, Aug. 4, 2025), an Arkansas federal district court issued a preliminary injunction barring four school districts that are defendants in the case from complying with the new law.  The court said in part:

Forty-five years ago, the Supreme Court struck down a Ten Commandments law nearly identical to the one the Arkansas General Assembly passed earlier this year. That precedent remains binding on this Court and renders Arkansas Act 573 plainly unconstitutional. Why would Arkansas pass an obviously unconstitutional law? Most likely because the State is part of a coordinated strategy among several states to inject Christian religious doctrine into public-school classrooms. These states view the past decade of rulings by the Supreme Court on religious displays in public spaces as a signal that the Court would be open to revisiting its precedent on religious displays in the public school context. ...

Despite the Kennedy [v. Bremerton School District] Court’s rather sweeping announcement that the Lemon test had been “abandoned,” ..., there is no cause to believe that all Supreme Court precedent that relied on the Lemon test has been—or will be—overruled. The Kennedy opinion itself makes that crystal clear....

...  Act 573’s mandate is incompatible with the Founding Fathers’ conception of religious liberty. The Founders were deeply committed to the principle that government must not compel religious observance or endorse religious doctrine, and that commitment is reflected in multiple foundational texts....

The State has not established that burdening Plaintiffs’ Free Exercise rights “serve[s] a compelling interest and [is] narrowly tailored to that end.”... Even if the State were to meet its burden of showing a compelling interest, it would fail the “narrowly tailored” prong. There are many ways in which students could be taught the relevant history of the Ten Commandments without the State approving an official version of scripture and then displaying it to students in every classroom on a permanent, daily basis....

ACLU issued a press release announcing the decision. [Thanks to Thomas Rutledge for the lead.]

UPDATE: On Aug. 28., a Supplemental Complaint was filed adding an additional school district as a defendant. The court issued a temporary restraining order barring that district from complying with the statute, and giving it an opportunity to submit briefing on why the preliminary injunction should not be expanded to include it.

European Court Says Russia Violated Religious Rights in Its War with Ukraine

In Ukraine and Netherlands v. Russia, (ECHR, July 9, 2025), the European Court of Human Rights in a 1652 paragraph Grand Chamber opinion held Russia has violated a large number of provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights in its conflict with Ukraine. The opinion covers the period from 2014 until 2022 when Russia withdrew as a party to the Convention. Among the violations were intimidation, harassment and persecution of religious groups other than the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP), in violation of Article 9 of the Convention which protects freedom of religion. The Court said in part:

1269.  The evidence shows that since May 2014 freedom of religion has been significantly curtailed in occupied Ukrainian territory. The separatists in the “DPR” [Donetsk] and the “LPR” [Lugansk] quickly declared the UOC-MP to be the main religious group in occupied territory. They harassed and persecuted religious figures of other religions or Christian churches as well as civilians engaging in worship ... in breach of the requirements of international humanitarian law.... There are numerous reports of religious leaders being ill-treated, abducted during religious activities and, in some cases, killed by separatists in eastern Ukraine. It is clear from the context of many of these instances that these individuals had been targeted on account of their positions as leaders of religious communities and in the context of a generalised practice of disrupting and preventing the right of those not adhering to the UOC-MP to practise their religions.... There is also evidence of the banning of religious material, which was deemed to be “extremist” by separatist administrations and institutions.... Members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses appear to have been particularly targeted.

1270.  From 2016 the evidence shows that the “DPR” and the “LPR” began to put in place formal requirements for the registration and operation of religious groups..... Some religious organisations were identified as “extremist” organisations and banned on this ground with their religious material and publications seized, destroyed and banned... Religious leaders and parishioners were pursued on charges of organising or attending illegal gatherings....

1271.  ... In 2022 the Russian occupation administration “nationalised” property from religious communities and repurposed it for their own ends....

The Court also issued a press release summarizing the full decision.

Challenge to Church's Switch in Denominations Fails

In Wimber v. Scott, (CA App., July 30, 2025), a California state appellate court held that plaintiffs who were tithing congregants of a Protestant church formerly known as Vinyard Christian Fellowship and now known as Dwelling Place lack standing to sue the church's pastors and board of directors on behalf of the church for fraud, misrepresentation, breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty. It also held that the First Amendment precludes granting the relief sought. Following the wishes of the church's senior pastor, the pastor and the board of directors disaffiliated the church from the Vinyard Movement and used the church's $62 million in assets to start and fund a new movement. Plaintiffs included the widow of the founder of the Vinyard Movement and a congregant who had contributed over $500,000 to the church. The court said in part:

The NRC [California Nonprofit Religious Corporations Code] limits who may bring a representative lawsuit to, as relevant here, a “member” alleging a director violated their authority (§ 9141, subd. (a)) and a “member” or “former member” alleging breach of a trust. (§ 9142, subd. (a)(1).)  

Because churches are these unique species of corporation, the NRC recognizes the church may refer to persons who are part of its congregation as “‘members.”’ (§ 9332, subd. (a).) But the NRC does not allow these individuals to assert representative lawsuits. Only those persons explicitly authorized to do so by the corporation’s articles or bylaws have the power to bring a representative lawsuit. (Ibid.) Otherwise, any one of a church’s potentially hundreds or thousands of congregants could at any time bring a representative lawsuit....

Appellants’ allegations demonstrate they are members of the congregation, not the corporation....

 Although the statements may constitute misrepresentations, the Scotts made the statements to the “Search Committee and the Board,” of which only Director Appellants were a part. As such, [those plaintiffs who were not directors] ... have not alleged a cause of action for fraud based on misrepresentation....

Even assuming the complaint stated sufficient facts to allege causes of action, the First Amendment would bar this case from going forward....

Appellants ask the court to impose a trust over Dwelling Place’s assets in favor of Vineyard USA and to require the Scotts to keep Dwelling Place a part of the Vineyard Movement and Vineyard USA. Even if the facts alleged in the complaint entitled Appellants to such relief, they are essentially asking the court to manage and run Dwelling Place in a manner consistent with their religious beliefs. We would have to administer Dwelling Place’s assets to further a religious doctrine to which Appellants ascribe. 

Worse, we would then potentially violate the Scotts’ religious beliefs by forcing them to minister Dwelling Place in a mode Appellants see appropriate. We will not do any of this....

We note the ministerial exception also bars Appellants’ claims....  We cannot litigate Appellants’ claims or grant the relief they seek without in some way punishing the church for its hiring of the Scotts, retention of the Scotts, or ratification of the Scotts’ decisions and actions. 

Recent Articles of Interest

From SSRN:

• Paul E. McGreal, Ten Commandments Cases: Learning from Reformation Coercion, (July 27, 2025).
• Christopher C. Lund, A Defense of Offended-Observer Standing Under the Establishment Clause, (Wayne Law Review, Vol. 70, p. 111, 2024 (symposium)).
• Christopher C. Lund, Favoritism, Coercion, and the Establishment Clause, (Michigan Law Review, Vol. 122, p. 1303, 2025 (book review)).
• Francis Joseph Beckwith, Rethinking Intelligent Design: How St. Thomas Aquinas Helped Me Change My Mind about the Relationship Between Science and Faith, (forthcoming in Aquinas and the Crises of Our Age. Eds. M. Dauphinais, R. Nutt, and M. Sherwin, OP.  Ave Maria, FL: Sapientia Press, 2026).
• Russell Bell, Early Christian Authority Conflicts and Textual Preservation: The James-Paul Dispute and Its Impact on Alternative Christian Literature, (July 30, 2025).
• Christian Edmonds, Supplication and Separation: The Establishment Clause After Kennedy, (94 George Washington Law Review Arguendo 21 (2025)).
• Christian Edmonds, Brief Of Amicus Curiae Robertson Center For Constitutional Law In Support Of Petitioner in Cambridge Christian School, Inc., Petitioner v. Florida High School Athletic Association, Inc., (July 08, 2025).
• Ela A. Leshem, Law's Shifting Circles, (Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 114, forthcoming 2026).
• Kyle Velte, Liminality, Political Psychology, and Attacks on Transgender Lives, (The Southwestern Law Review | Vol. 54 | 2025).

From SSRN (Non-U.S. Law):

• Sixbert Sangwa & Placide Mutabazi, Rights-Based Reforms and the Corporate-Cooperative Family Paradox: A Seven-Country Analysis of Marital Dissolution in Africa (1995-2025), (July 27, 2025).
• Manish Kumar Yadav, Judgment Review of Mohd Abdul Samad vs The State of Telangana & Anr Criminal Appeal No. 2842 of 2024 [Arising Out of Special Leave Petition (Crl) No. 1614 of 2024] Supreme Court of India on The Rights of Divorced Muslim Woman, (July 31, 2024).
• Miyoko Pettit-Toledo & Elizabeth Kalei Akau, Healing Intergenerational Wounds in Present-Day Jeju Redress: United States-South Korea-Jeju Support for the Jeju 4.3 Trauma Healing Center, (July 01, 2024).
• Tanvir Ahmed & Md Istiaq Mohhamad Shuvo, Halal Tourism in Bangladesh: An Exploratory Study on its Demand and Opportunities, (August 01, 2024).
• A.B.M. Asrafuzaman, Gender, Law, and Succession: A Comparative Examination of Women's Inheritance Rights in Bangladesh and the United States of America (USA), (July 25, 2025).
• Muhammad Ahsan Ullah Imtiaz, The Right to Marry by Free Consent in Islam and Pakistani Law, (July 28, 2025).
• Murtala Wazeer, The Luminescence of the son of Muhammad: A Short Biography of Sheikh Murtaḍa Abubakar Gatta-Agbọtọmọkekere Oke-Koto, (Muslim News Nigeria, 2025).
• Supipi Fernando, Reforms to Abortion Law in Sri Lanka a Comparative Legal Analysis, (July 06, 2025).

From SmartCILP:

• Shritha Vasudevan, Demonstrating the Independent Normative Pull of International Gender Norms through the Public Interest Litigation Petition in India, 40 Connecticut Journal of International Law 91-116 (2024).
• Symposium, Revisiting Religion in the Struggle for Workplace Justice, St. Louis University Law Journal, (Winter 2025).

Crisis Pregnancy Center Gets Injunction Against Abortion Reversal Ban

In Bella Health and Wellness v. Weiser, (D CO, Aug. 1, 2025), the Colorado federal district court that had previously granted a preliminary injunction in the case now granted a permanent injunction barring enforcement against plaintiffs of Colorado's law that defines providing medication abortion reversal as unprofessional conduct by doctors, nurses and pharmacists. Bella Health operates two faith-based Catholic crisis pregnancy centers. The court said in part:

The parties do not dispute that Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs are sincerely held or that they are substantially burdened by application of Section Three and the Boards’ rules....  And it is not within the province of this Court to second-guess the truth of Bella Health’s religious callings or suggest alternative means of satisfying them.... The only question, therefore, is whether this section’s prohibition against medication abortion reversal is generally applicable to other non-religious uses of progesterone. It is not....

Overall, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that Plaintiffs’ use of progesterone is not being regulated neutrally—it is being singled out....

ADF issued a press release announcing the decision.

Fact Questions Remain as to Whether Sex Abuser's Confession Was Privileged

In Doe v. Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, (AZ App., July 29, 2025), an Arizona state appellate court, reversing a trial court's dismissal of a case, held that issues of fact remain in order to decide whether two bishops in the Church had a duty to report to authorities Paul Adams' confession that he had sexually abused his minor daughter. While clergy are mandatory reporters, Arizona law excludes clergy reporting of a communication or confession if the member of the clergy determines that it is "reasonable and necessary within the concepts of the religion" to do so. The court held that a fact finder could conclude that Paul waived the clergy-penitent privilege when he repeated his confession in the presence of his wife who was invited by the bishop to hear it, or when Paul repeated it at a church council meeting convened to excommunicate him. The court also held that it was unclear whether under church doctrine it was "reasonable and necessary" to withhold the information. The court said in part:

[Paul's wife] Leizza did not meet the bishop with her husband for confession but met with Paul and [Bishop] Herrod after Paul had already confessed to Herrod.  Paul then confessed directly to Leizza in Herrod’s presence.... Herrod had invited Leizza “so [she] would know what Paul had done and so she could protect her children.”  A reasonable fact finder could conclude that in such circumstances, Herrod did not receive Paul’s confession to Leizza; he merely observed it.  As noted, § 13-3620(A)(2) does not exempt a clergy member’s personal observations....

... [T]he Does argued the Church Defendants’ failure to report Paul’s confession was not “reasonable and necessary” according to Church doctrine because the Church’s General Handbook nullifies the confidentiality of confessions in instances where “serious injury,” such as child sex abuse, occurs....

This ... raises the question of whether the Church Defendants violated Church doctrine by not reporting Paul to the authorities.

Axios reports on the decision.

Columbia and UCLA Settle Antisemitism Charges

Last week (July 23), Columbia University announced that it had reached a settlement with the federal government to restore its research funding and federal grants that had been frozen. The University entered a Resolution Agreement (full text) with the Justice Department, Department of Education and HHS. It also entered a separate EEOC Agreement settling Title VII discrimination claims charging antisemitism suffered by Columbia employees.  According to the EEOC's press release:

Columbia University will pay $21 million for a class settlement fund to resolve alleged civil rights violations against Columbia employees occurring on its campus following the Oct. 7 Hamas terror attacks.... This settlement resolves EEOC charges, including a Commissioner’s Charge brought ... on behalf of a class of all Jewish employees, alleging that since at least Oct. 7, 2023, Columbia engaged in a pattern or practice of harassment based on national origin, religion, and/or race, in violation of Title VII....

The full text of the EEOC Agreement does not appear to have been publicly released even though it is incorporated by reference in the Resolution Agreement. 

The broader Resolution Agreement provides in part that Columbia will appoint new faculty members with joint appointments in the Institute for Israel and Jewish Studies and economics, political science or public affairs. It also calls for the appointment of a new administrator who will act as a liaison on antisemitism issues.

A statement by Columbia's president says in part:

The agreement builds on Columbia’s broader commitment to combating antisemitism, reflected most recently in a set of additional institutional actions announced on July 15, 2025, including the incorporation of the IHRA definition of antisemitism into the work of the University’s Office of Institutional Equity (OIE), the appointment of Title VI and Title VII coordinators in OIE, and the expansion of university-wide education and training initiatives.

On July 29, the University of California announced that it had reached a settlement in Frankel v. Regents of the University of California. In the case, a California federal district court previously issued a preliminary injunction sought by Jewish students at UCLA who were blocked from accessing portions of the campus by pro-Palestinian encampments protesting Israel's retaliation in Gaza. (See prior posting.) The Settlement Agreement (full text) (fact sheet) provides for a permanent injunction barring defendants from allowing the exclusion of Jewish students, faculty or staff from programs, activities or campus areas. It also provides for payment of $320,000 to UCLA's Initiative to Combat Antisemitism, $50,000 to each of the four student plaintiffs, $2,300,000 in contributions to eight Jewish non-profit organizations, and $3,600,000 for plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and costs.

Passport Denial Violated RFRA

In Jordan v. Rubio, (D DC, July 29, 2025), a D.C. federal district court held that the State Department violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act by denying a passport to plaintiff because she refused for religious reasons to furnish a birth certificate or a letter confirming that she lacks one. The court said in part:

All her life, Abigail Carmichael Jordan has avoided the perceived stain of a Social Security Number (“SSN”)....  Her devout Christian faith teaches her “that her God-given identity is sacred, and that the allegiance she owes to her government as a citizen of the United States must be subordinate to her allegiance to her Creator.”...  She thus rejects the possibility of being “enumerated” or “marked” by the government, such as by obtaining an SSN, as to do so “would be treating the Government as if it were God.” ... (citing Revelation 13:16–18)....  Indeed, her parents “did everything in their power to ensure that [she] did not receive a birth certificate when she was born ... for fear that applying for a birth certificate would result in the issuance of an SSN....

In short:  The Department withheld a coveted public benefit unless Jordan abandoned the teachings of her faith.  Such carrot-dangling is the classic example of a substantial burden on religious exercise....

It very well may be that Jordan never faced a substantial risk of receiving an unwanted SSN—at birth or during adulthood.  But for Jordan’s RFRA claim, the actual risk is irrelevant.  What matters is whether Jordan sincerely believes that applying for a Letter of No Record conflicted with her faith because it exposed her to the unacceptable possibility that she would be stained with an SSN.  And here, there is no dispute that Jordan honestly believes this.... So the Court must credit her fears—it may not tell Jordan that she is mistaken about the dictates of her own faith.

North Carolina Legislature Overrides Governor's Veto of Bill on Transgender Issues, Pornography and Religious School Opt-Outs

On Tuesday, the North Carolina legislature overrode the governor's veto of House Bill 805 (full text). The new law deals with a lengthy list of issues, including: (1) requiring recognition only of biological sex in state rules and policies; (2) requiring consent and age verification for appearance in, and procedures for removal of, online pornographic images; (3) prohibiting use of state funds for gender transition procedures; (4) extending statute of limitations for malpractice, and removing damage cap, in gender transition procedures on non-minors; (5) allowing parents to bar their children from checking out specific books from school libraries. The new law also provides:

Local boards of education shall adopt policies to allow a student or the student's parent or guardian to request that the student be excused from specific classroom discussions, activities, or assigned readings that the student, parent, or guardian believes would (i) impose a substantial burden on the student's religious beliefs or (ii) invade the student's privacy by calling attention to the student's religion.

Earlier this month, Governor Josh Stein had vetoed the bill based on his opposition to the provisions on transgender issues. His Veto Message (full text) reads in part:

The initial version of House Bill 805 protected people from being exploited on pornographic websites against their will. I strongly support that policy.... Instead of preventing sexual exploitation, the General Assembly chooses to engage in divisive, job-killing culture wars. North Carolina has been down this road before, and it is a dead end. My faith teaches me that we are all children of God no matter our differences and that it is wrong to target vulnerable people, as this legislation does. I stand ready to work with the legislature when it gets serious about protecting people, instead of mean-spirited attempts to further divide us by marginalizing vulnerable North Carolinians.

Catholic Vote reports on these developments.

Missouri Sues Planned Parenthood for False Advertising

Missouri Attorney General Andrew Bailey announced last week that the state of Missouri has filed suit against the national Planned Parenthood Association under the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, the state's consumer protection law.  The complaint (full text) in State of Missouri ex rel Bailey v. Planned Parenthood Federation of America, (MO Cir. Ct., filed 7/23/2025), alleges that representations on Planned Parenthood's website about the safety of mifepristone, the pill used for chemical abortions, is "brazenly false". The complaint says in part:

25. Planned Parenthood’s statements are outright false, and at the very least unlawfully misleading, for a variety of reasons: i. The rate of emergency room visits is much higher for the abortion pill than the drugs Planned Parenthood cites as comparators; ii. Planned Parenthood is comparing a single dose of the abortion pill to overdoses (i.e. misuse) of other drugs, such as Tylenol; and iii. The abortion pill and other drugs have different uses, are administered differently, and are used by individuals who have different underlying comorbidities or risk factors.

The complaint seeks civil penalties of $1.8 million and restitution of $1000 for each woman in the state to whom Planned Parenthood has furnished mifepristone during the past five years. Liberty Counsel issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Muslim Group Sues Over Denial of Zoning Permit for Mosque

Suit was filed last week in a Tennessee federal district court challenging the denial of a special use permit to a Muslim religious organization that wished to build a mosque on land that it owns. The complaint (full text) in Bartlett Muslim Society v. City of Bartlett, Tennessee, (W TN, filed 7/25/2025),

3. After the Plaintiff complied with these extensive, expensive procedural requirements—and despite City staff’s recommendation of approval—the City denied the Plaintiff’s Special Use Permit application based on arbitrary, predetermined reasons and religious animus. 

4. The City has approved similarly situated churches ... for a Special Use Permit under comparable or less favorable circumstances. 

5. In denying the Plaintiff’s Special Use Permit application, the City has imposed a substantial burden on the Plaintiff’s religious exercise, treated it unequally, and discriminated against it based on religion.... 

7. Accordingly, the Plaintiff files this civil-rights action under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq., and Tennessee’s Preservation of Religious Freedom Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-1-407.

Tennessee ACLU issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Cutoff of Funding to All Planned Parenthood Clinics Enjoined

In Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. v. Kennedy, (D MA, July 28, 2025), a Massachusetts federal district court in a 58-page opinion extended a preliminary injunction it had issued a week earlier barring Congress' defunding of Planned Parenthood clinics that do not offer abortions to preliminarily enjoin Congress's cutoff of funds for non-abortion services even to Planned Parenthood clinics that do offer abortions. the court said in part:

To the extent that Section 71113 may be applied to Planned Parenthood Members who do not provide abortion, Plaintiffs are likely to succeed in establishing that the law impermissibly conditions the receipt of Medicaid reimbursements on these Members foregoing their right to associate with Planned Parenthood Federation and other Members...

... Instead of merely prohibiting Planned Parenthood Members that receive Medicaid funds from providing abortions, the statute prohibits them from affiliating with entities that do.... [R]estricting funds based on affiliation with an abortion provider operates only to restrict the associational right of Members that do not provide abortion. ...

... [I]n light of the disconnect between the law and its purported ends on the one hand, and the severe burdens it imposes on Planned Parenthood Federation and its Members on the other, Plaintiffs are likely to establish that Congress singled them out with punitive intent. The legislative context bolsters that conclusion. Plaintiffs have thus demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on their claim that Section 71113 is an unconstitutional bill of attainder. ...

... Where Defendants have not shown the law is precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest, Plaintiffs have demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on their equal protection claim.  

Moreover, Plaintiffs are likely to show that there is no rational relationship between the class burdened by Section 71113—comprised of 47 Planned Parenthood Members and two additional entities—and the goal of reducing abortion. As explained above, Section 71113 affects only a small number of abortion providers and leaves every other conceivable category unaffected.

ABC News reports on the decision.

Office of Personnel Management Says Federal Employee Religious Speech In Workplace Is Protected

Yesterday, the federal Office of Personnel Management issued a Memo (full text) to heads of federal departments and agencies on Protecting Religious Expression in the Federal Workplace. The cover letter transmitting the Memo says in part:

The memo provides clear guidance to ensure federal employees may express their religious beliefs through prayer, personal items, group gatherings, and conversations without fear of discrimination or retaliation....

The memo builds on OPMʼs July 16 guidance on reasonable accommodations for religious purposes....

The Memo itself defines kind of religious speech that should be protected in the federal workplace, saying in part:

... Employees should be permitted to display and use items used for religious purposes or icons of a religiously significant nature ... on their desks, on their person, and in their assigned workspaces. 

... Agencies should allow ... employees to engage in individual or communal religious expressions in both formal and informal settings alone or with fellow employees, so long as such expressions do not occur during on-duty time...

... Employees may engage in conversations regarding religious topics with fellow employees, including attempting to persuade others of the correctness of their own religious views, provided that such efforts are not harassing in nature. Employees may also encourage their coworkers to participate in religious expressions of faith, such as prayer, to the same extent that they would be permitted to encourage coworkers participate in other personal activities. The constitutional rights of supervisors ...should not be distinguished from non-supervisory employees.... However, unwillingness to engage in such conversations may not be the basis of workplace discipline.   

...  [W]hen public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, they are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.....

Among the specific examples of protected employee speech set out in an Appendix to the Memo are:

• An employee may invite another to worship at her church despite being belonging to a different faith. 
• On a bulletin board meant for personal announcements, a supervisor may post a handwritten note inviting each of his employees to attend an Easter service at his church....
• A park ranger leading a tour through a national park may join her tour group in prayer.
• A doctor at a Veterans Affairs (VA) hospital may pray over his patient for her recovery.....

The Hill reports on the Memo. [Thanks to Thomas Rutledge for the lead.]

Recent Articles of Interest

From SSRN:

• Blair Major, The Dignity of Religious Freedom (September 01, 2024).
• Pradeep Kumar Deepak, Slavery in Tripura: A Historical Overview (January 01, 2023).
• Richard W. Garnett & Alicia Cummins, Gerard V. Bradley and the American Law of Church and State, (Yes, ___ American Journal of Jurisprudence ___ (2025)).
• Luciano Meneguetti, The Imago Dei in the Age of Artificial Intelligence: Toward a Theology of Human Dignity in Technological Times, (July 20, 2025).
• Gregor Puppinck, Conscientious Objection and Human Rights, a Systematic Analysis, (June 01, 2025).
• A.B.M. Asrafuzaman, Gender, Law, and Succession: A Comparative Examination of Women's Inheritance Rights in Bangladesh and the United States of America (USA) (July 25, 2025).
• Andrew M. Koppelman & Michael Judah, The New Establishment Clause Hallmarks Test: Sources and Distortions, (Northwestern Public Law Research Paper No. 25-41 (2025)).
• Emmanuel Ladji Inga, Safeguarding Muslim Women’s Religious Rights Through State Liability?, (July 15, 2025).
• Or Bassok, The Gods of the Constitution, From Kant to Kelsen: Democracy, Education, Peace (Francesco Di Donato, Sara Lagi, Flavio Silvestrini eds., Napoli, E.S., forthcoming)).
• Cekli Setya Pratiwi, Structural Violence and Unresolved Conflict: A Transcendence Approach to the Shia-Sunni Divide in Sampang, Indonesia (January 03, 2024).

From SSRN (Islamic law):

• George Henry, Cyber Law and the Insanity Defence: A Comparative Study of Medical and Islamic Legal Responses within the Framework of International Law, (July 14, 2025).
• Ayumiati, Heru Fahlevi, Muhammad Yasir Yusuf, & Syukriy Abdullah, Budget Management of the Aceh Government: An Analysis of the Maqāṣid al-sharī'ah Approach, (Samarah: Jurnal Hukum Keluarga dan Hukum Islam, volume 8, issue 1, 2024).
• Gustiani Herli, Challenges and Opportunities of Sharia Business in the Global Economy, (July 09, 2025).

From SmartCILP:

• Mary Marston, Diversity and Inclusion Trainings as a Public Relations Imperative: Addressing the Faragher–Ellerth Test via Interest-Convergence and Targeted Universalism, 32 American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law 317-348 (2024).
• John G. Culhane, Treacherous Rocks and Safe Harbors: Finding a Workable Compromise Between Constitutional Rights and Anti-Discrimination Laws, 31 Widener Law Review 23-44 (2025).

Cert. Petition Seeks Overturning of Obergefell Decision

A petition for certiorari (full text) was filed with the Supreme Court last week in Davis v. Ermold, (Sup. Ct., cert filed 7/24/2025). In the case, the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a $100,000 damage award to a same-sex couple who were refused a marriage license by Rowan County, Kentucky Clerk Kim Davis who had religious objections to same-sex marriage. (See prior posting.) The petition for review asks the Court to decide whether she, as a public official, has a First Amendment free exercise defense to a claim for damages for emotional distress stemming from her refusal. More broadly, it asks the Court to overrule Obergefell v. Hodges which gave constitutional protection to same-sex marriage. Liberty Counsel issued a press release announcing the filing of the petition.

RFRA and Free Exercise Clause Apply to Corporate Entities Exercising Religion

In United States v. Safehouse, (3d Cir., July 24, 2025), the U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the 1st Amendment's Free Exercise clause apply to corporate entities, and to non-religious entities exercising religion. The United States contended that defendant's offering of supervised illegal drug use violates federal law. Defendant argued that its overdose prevention services reflect its Board members' religious belief in the value of human life. The court said in part:

RFRA’s plain text and Free Exercise doctrine are clear that those statutory and constitutional protections extend to non-natural persons, including so-called non-religious entities. In so holding, we express no view about whether threatened prosecution of Safehouse substantially burdens its exercise of religion. We likewise decline Safehouse’s invitation to determine in the first instance whether it has plausibly stated RFRA and Free Exercise claims. We only address the proper object of RFRA’s and the First Amendment’s protections: that object includes a non-natural entity allegedly exercising religion, even if the entity itself is not religious. 

Adoptive Parent Rule on Transgender Children Violates Plaintiff's Free Speech and Free Exercise Rights

 In Bates v. Pakseresht, (9th Cir., July 24, 2025), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals held unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff Oregon's requirement that to be certified as an adoptive parent, a person must agree to respect and support an adopted child's gender identity and gender expression and use the child's preferred pronouns. Plaintiff contended that it violated her Seventh Day Adventist religious beliefs to use a child's preferred pronouns or take the child for gender transition medical appointments. In a 2-1 decision, the court agreed that the requirement violated plaintiff's free speech and free exercise rights. The majority, in a 50-page opinion, said in part:

We deal here with two vital such rights: the First Amendment’s protections for free speech and the free exercise of religion.  These rights work together, with “the Free Exercise Clause protect[ing] religious exercises, whether communicative or not,” and “the Free Speech Clause provid[ing] overlapping protection for expressive religious activities.”...  Fundamental as basic freedoms, these rights spring from a common constitutional principle: that the government may not insist upon our adherence to state favored orthodoxies, whether of a religious or political variety....

We hold that Oregon’s application of § 413-200-0308(2)(k) to Bates, in denying her certification to be an adoptive parent, triggers strict scrutiny for both her free speech and free exercise claims.  In Part A below, we explain why strict scrutiny applies to Bates’s free speech claim.  In Part B, we do the same for Bates’s Free Exercise Clause claim.  And in Part C, we explain why applying Oregon’s policy to Bates does not survive strict scrutiny.  Bates has therefore shown a likelihood of success on the merits of her claim that denying her certification under § 413-200-0308(2)(k) violates the First Amendment.

Judge Clifton dissented, saying in part in a 40-page opinion:

The only limitation imposed by the state in declining to approve her application to foster a child concerns her treatment of the child, not what she personally believes, how she speaks to the world, or how she practices her faith. Oregon should be permitted to put the best interests of the child for which it is responsible paramount in making the decision to place one of its children in the custody of a foster applicant. Parents would not be expected to entrust their children to caregivers who volunteer that they will not respect the child’s self-determined gender identity, if that is something the parents have decided is important. Oregon should not be powerless to protect children for whom it has parental responsibility and for whom it has decided respect should be given. 

Cutoff of Medicaid Funds to Planned Parenthood Clinics That Do Not Offer Abortions Is Unconstitutional

In Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. v. Kennedy, (D MA, July 21, 2025), a Massachusetts federal district court granted a preliminary injunction barring the federal government from cutting off Medicaid funding to Planned Parenthood members that do not offer abortion services, but whose Medicaid funding was cut off by recent Congressional legislation.  The court concluded that this cutoff likely violated the expressive association and equal protection rights of these Planned Parenthood clinics. The court said in part:

To the extent that Section 71113 may be applied to Planned Parenthood Members who do not provide abortion, Plaintiffs are likely to succeed in establishing that the law impermissibly conditions the receipt of Medicaid funding on these Members foregoing their right to associate with Planned Parenthood Federation and other Members. Members who do not provide abortions cannot escape the law’s burden except by disassociating from Members that do. And because Section 71113 may be applied to Members who are affiliates of each other via the structure, governance, and membership requirements of Planned Parenthood Federation, disassociating with other Members requires disassociating from Planned Parenthood Federation itself.  

While Defendants contend that Section 71113 does not regulate speech, the record demonstrates that Members’ affiliation via their membership in Planned Parenthood Federation is expressive. Planned Parenthood Federation advocates before Congress, provides education and information about sexual and reproductive health, and through Planned Parenthood Action Fund, communicates with the public regarding lawmakers’ voting records, supports campaigns for ballot initiatives, and supports candidates for federal, state, and local officials who will support reproductive freedom in furtherance of its mission....

Congress may set conditions “that define the limits” of a spending program by “specify[ing] the activities Congress wants to subsidize,” but Congress may not set “conditions that seek to leverage funding to regulate speech outside the contours of the program itself.”...

... Instead of merely prohibiting Planned Parenthood Members that receive Medicaid funds from providing abortions, the statute prohibits them from affiliating with entities that do.... Therefore, restricting funds based on affiliation with an abortion provider operates only to restrict the associational right of Members that do not provide abortion....

... Section 71113 ... declines Medicaid funding on the basis of affiliation, and thus draws a classification that burdens a fundamental First Amendment right. Where Defendants have not shown the law is precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest, Plaintiffs have demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on their equal protection claim....

Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts posted an update explaining the court's holding. Fox News reports on the decision.

Russian Supreme Court Bans Satanist Organization

As reported by Mediazona:

Russian Supreme Court Judge Oleg Nefedov has granted a request from the Prosecutor General’s Office and the Ministry of Justice to designate the “international Satanist movement” as “extremist”. In November 2023, the same judge made a similar ruling against the non-existent “international LGBT movement”.

On the morning of July 23, Russia’s Supreme Court designated Satanism as “extremist” and banned its activities with immediate effect. The case was heard behind closed doors, with neither the public nor journalists present....

Patriarch Kirill, the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, first mentioned the “International Satanist movement” in January 2025, when he called for a legislative ban on Satanism in Russia....

In early July, the Prosecutor General’s Office and the Ministry of Justice filed a suit with the Supreme Court to have the “international Satanist movement” declared extremist.

According to Politico:

Despite the official-sounding name, the “International Movement of Satanists” does not appear to exist, at least not under that moniker.

Russia's Prosecutor General's Office said in a statement (full text) yesterday:

Today, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation satisfied the claim of the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation Igor Krasnov to recognize the International Movement of Satanists as extremist and ban its activities in Russia.

As established, the movement is based on extremist ideology, hatred and enmity towards traditional religious confessions.

Its participants publicly call for extremism, as well as for the destruction, damage and desecration of Orthodox churches, chapels, worship crosses, etc.

The followers of the movement adhere to the general principles of Satanism, use the same symbols and attributes, and perform occult rites. The conceptual basis is made up of publications recognized as extremist materials.

The movement is closely associated with manifestations of radical nationalism and neo-Nazism.

Along with ritual murders, participants also commit other crimes, including against minors.

Challenge To California's Investigation of Caste Discrimination Dismissed on Procedural Grounds

In Hindu American Foundation, Inc. v. Kish, (ED CA, July 18, 2025), a California federal district court dismissed on various procedural grounds a suit contending that the California Civil Rights Department is violating the constitutional rights of Hindu Americans by "conflat[ing] a discriminatory caste system with the Hindu religion" in an investigation of Cisco Systems, Inc. Individual plaintiffs in the case include employees of Cisco.

The court first concluded that the Younger abstention doctrine requires it to dismiss the case because it would pose "a serious risk of direct interference with state court proceedings...." The court went on to find a lack of standing to pursue plaintiffs' Establishment Clause claim, saying in part:

In the present case, the Individual Plaintiffs do not allege that they were direct targets of the Department's enforcement action but instead allege that they learned of it through, among other things, conversation or reading about the State Action.... Plaintiffs contend in conclusory fashion that the Department's conduct has chilled their participation in "the political community," but do not identify what political community they refer to in this regard.... Instead, plaintiffs vaguely allege that the Department's conduct has led to conversations at discrete, unidentified social events.... In this way, plaintiffs' allegations merely state an abstract stigmatic injury, rather than an injury caused by direct contact with the Department's actions and are therefore insufficient to establish plaintiffs' standing to assert their claim under the Establishment Clause....

The court also found a lack of standing as to plaintiffs' Free Exercise claims, saying in part: 

Plaintiffs cannot persuasively maintain that there "exists some conflict between one of [their] religious convictions and a challenged governmental action[]" precisely because they contend that caste discrimination is not one of their religious convictions....

Because plaintiffs have not alleged that they plan to engage in religious conduct which could arguably be the target of an enforcement action brought by the Department, the court concludes that they have not shown standing to bring a pre-enforcement action pursuant to the Free Exercise Clause....

The SAC now includes allegations from the Individual Plaintiffs regarding how they feel stigmatized, however, it includes no allegations that the Department has pursued any discriminatory action against the Individual Plaintiffs....

The court similarly found a lack of standing as to plaintiffs' due process and equal protection claims. It also concluded that the Hindu American Foundation lacks organizational or associational standing, saying in part:

Plaintiffs’ theory appears to be that the Foundation was forced to respond to the Department’s actions insofar as it spent any resources responding to those actions rather than on other initiatives.  The Supreme Court has explicitly rejected such a theory of standing.

The Mooknayak reports on the decision.

Cert. Filed In Challenge to Denial of Religious Exemption from Vaccine Mandate

A petition for certiorari (full text) was filed yesterday with the U.S. Supreme Court in Kane v. City of New York. (Sup. Ct., cert. filed 7/21/2025). In the case, the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of petitioners' applications for religious exemptions from the Covid vaccine mandate imposed by the City of New York on public school teachers and staff. (See prior posting.) The certiorari petition seeking Supreme Court review of the decision describes the question presented in part as follows:

After the pandemic, Respondents issued a vaccine mandate for public-education employees. It exempted “Christian Scientists” and others affiliated with “recognized” religions that “publicly” opposed vaccination. But it refused accommodation for anyone with “personal” religious beliefs or anyone whose faith leader—like Pope Francis— had publicly endorsed the vaccine. 

... In sum, the Second Circuit approved a discretionary religious-accommodation scheme that disfavors personal religion.

ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Tennessee Law Barring Recruitment of Minor to Obtain an Abortion Is Unconstitutional

In Welty v. Dunaway, (MD TN, July 18, 2025), a Tennessee federal district court enjoined enforcement of a Tennessee statute that prohibits "recruiting" an unemancipated minor to obtain an out-of-state abortion that is legal where performed. The court said in part:

... [P]laintiffs have established that §39-15-201(a) unconstitutionally regulates speech based on content and is facially overbroad.

Axios reports on the decision. [Thanks to Thomas Rutledge for the lead.]

Supreme Court Review Sought on Parents' Rights to Know of School's Social Transitioning of Their Child

 A petition for certiorari (full text) was filed last week with the U.S. Supreme Court in Foote v. Ludlow School Committee, (Sup.Ct., cert. filed 7/18/2025). In the case, the U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals held (full text of opinion) that petitioners' parental right protected by the 14th Amendment were not infringed by a school Protocol requiring staff to use a student's requested name and gender pronouns in school without notifying parents of the request unless the student consents. The petition for review of the 1st Circuit opinion says in part:

Petitioners do not have a religious objection to their school district’s indoctrination and transition of their children without their knowledge. Theirs is a moral belief, backed by well-supported scientific opinion, that a so-called gender transition harms their children. But their constitutional rights to direct the upbringing of their children remain just as fundamental. The Court should grant the petition and make clear that parents’ fundamental rights do not depend on whether they are religious.

ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the petition for review.

Recent Articles and Books of Interest

From SSRN:

• Lewis S. Davis, Religion, Differential Trust and the Rule of Law: Evidence from Rainfall Data. (2025).
• Libin Zhang, Papal-American Tax Problems and a Solution, (June 16, 2025).
• A.B.M. Asrafuzaman, Shirin Sultana, Rubiaat Hasan Sawon & Sadman Rizwan Apurbo, Muslim and Hindu Women's Inheritance Rights in Bangladesh: An Empirical Study, (July 16, 2024).
• L. Ali Khan, The Prophets of Punjab: Guru Nanak and Ghulam Ahmad. (July 07, 2025).
• A.B.M. Asrafuzaman, Comparing Women's Inheritance Rights in Hindu and Buddhist Communities: Insights from Bangladesh, India, and Nepal, (January 16, 2025).
• Luke W. Goodrich, Religious Hiring Beyond the Ministerial Exception, (101 Notre Dame L. Rev. __ (forthcoming 2026)).
• Sheikh Inam Ul Mansoor, Islamic Law in the Age of Blockchain: Exploring Shari’ah Compliant Cryptocurrencies and Digital Assets, (May 19, 2025).
• Jonathan M. Leganza, The Effects of Tax Incentives to Donate Wealth to Charity: Evidence from Qualified Charitable Distributions, (July 07, 2025).
• David S. Cohen, Greer Donley & Rachel Rebouche, Abortion Shield Laws in Action, (JAMA Internal Medicine, (June 39, 2025)).

Recent Books:

• Peter S. Wenz, Abortion Rights as the Free Exercise of Religion: The Constitutional Case for Choice, (McFarland, 2025).
• John Witte Jr and Andrea Pin, The Legal Foundations of Religious Freedom, (Notre Dame Press, (forthcoming April 2026).
• Matthew Tapie, The Mortara Case and Thomas Aquinas’s Defense of Jewish Parental Authority, (Catholic University of America Press, May 2025).