Religion Clause

Tuesday, August 06, 2024

Connecticut Supreme Court: Constitutional (But Not Statutory) Challenges to Removal of School Vaccination Religious Exemptions Barred by Sovereign Immunity

In Spillane v. Lamont, (CT Sup. Ct., July 30, 2024), the Connecticut Supreme Court in a complicated opinion held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars constitutional claims asserted in a class action suit by school parents against the governor, the commissioners of education and of public health, and two boards of education. Plaintiffs were challenging the legislature's removal of previously available religious exemptions from school vaccination requirements. Under Connecticut law, sovereign immunity for constitutional claims is waived only when actions for declaratory relief or an injunction allege a substantial claim that the state or a state official has violated plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Here plaintiffs did not have a substantial claim that their free exercise or equal protection rights under the federal constitution were violated, nor that their right to education under the Connecticut constitution was violated.

However, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that plaintiffs' statutory claim under the Connecticut Religious Freedom Restoration Act was not barred by sovereign immunity. Connecticut's RFRA waived sovereign immunity for violations and applying the Act here does not violate the principles that one legislature may not bind the authority of a later one or that enactments are presumed to repeal inconsistent portions of prior legislation.

(See prior related posting.) WTNH News reports on the decision.

Monday, August 05, 2024

Saturday, August 03, 2024

Court Dismisses Title VI Suit Claiming Hostile Environment Affecting Jewish Students At MIT

In StandWithUs Center for Legal Justice v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, (D MA, July 30, 2024), a Massachusetts federal district court dismissed a suit against MIT that alleged deliberate indifference to a hostile educational environment impacting Jewish and Israeli students in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The court said in part:

The [complaint] compellingly depicts a campus embroiled in an internecine conflict that caused Jewish and Israeli students great anguish. Plaintiffs frame MIT’s response to the conflict largely as one of inaction. But the facts alleged tell a different story. Far from sitting on its hands, MIT took steps to contain the escalating on-campus protests that, in some instances, posed a genuine threat to the welfare and safety of Jewish and Israeli students, who were at times personally victimized by the hostile demonstrators. MIT began by suspending student protestors from non-academic activities....while suspending one of the most undisciplined of the pro-Palestine student groups. These measures proved ineffective when, in April of 2024, protestors erected the Kresge lawn encampment. MIT immediately warned students of impending disciplinary action, but its threat went unheeded.... When MIT’s attempt to peacefully clear the encampment proved futile, it suspended and arrested trespassing students. In hindsight, one might envision things MIT could have done differently. Indeed, some campus administrators elsewhere ... reacted to the protests differently (and with more positive results) than MIT. But that is not the applicable standard. That MIT’s evolving and progressively punitive response largely tracked its increasing awareness of the hostility that demonstrators directed at Jewish and Israeli students shows that MIT did not react in a clearly unreasonable manner.

The court also dismissed conspiracy, negligence and breach of contract claims. Bloomberg Law reports on the decision.

Friday, August 02, 2024

Utah Supreme Court Upholds Preliminary Injunction Against Law Banning Most Abortions

In Planned Parenthood Association of Utah v. State of Utah, (UT Sup. Ct., Aug. 1, 2024), the Utah Supreme Court, in a 4-1 decision, affirmed a trial court's entry of a preliminary injunction against enforcement of SB174, a trigger law that prohibits all abortions except for death or substantial bodily harm of the mother, lethal defect or brain abnormality of the fetus, or the mother was pregnant as a result of rape or incest. The state Supreme Court said in part:

In re J.P. discussed, among other [state constitutional] rights, the right to marry the person of one’s choosing and the right to establish a home.... The commonality these rights share is not a child, but the right to make certain intimate decisions about one’s life free from government intrusion. At this point in the litigation, we cannot say whether a restriction on the ability to choose to have an abortion infringes the rights we recognized in In re J.P., but there are serious questions regarding the scope of those rights that merit further litigation....

PPAU has standing to press its claims and the claims of its patients.

The district court did not err when it concluded that PPAU had raised serious issues about the constitutionality of SB 174. The court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that PPAU and its patients would be irreparably harmed without the injunction. Likewise, the court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that the balance of harms tipped in favor of enjoining SB 174 while the parties litigate its constitutionality. Nor did the court act outside the bounds of its discretion when it concluded that the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest.

Chief Justice Durrant filed a dissenting opinion, contended that Planned Parenthood lacked standing to bring the lawsuit.

Utah News Dispatch reports on the decision.

Delaware Supreme Court Dismisses Suits Challenging Prior Covid Restrictions on Houses of Worship

In In re Covid-Related Restrictions on Religious Services, (DE Sup. Ct., Aug. 1, 2024), the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the dismissal by two lower courts of challenges to restrictions on houses of worship imposed by orders of Delaware's governor during the early stages of the Covid pandemic. Plaintiffs filed suit in the Chancery Court over 18 months after the restrictions were lifted seeking an injunction, and when that was rejected, filed suit in Superior Court seeking damages and a declaratory judgment. The Delaware Supreme Court said in part:

Plaintiffs could not demonstrate reasonable apprehension of future conduct. As the Court of Chancery noted below, “[a]lthough it is true that the virus continues to circulate and mutate, the possibility of a future surge, much less one that will necessitate emergency measures on par with what the world experienced in the first half of 2020, is speculative at best.” Appellants do not confront the speculative nature of the future threat they allege, and instead invoke a generalized refrain that any restriction on their religious freedom causes irreparable harm. This argument, such that it is, does not address the Court of Chancery’s analysis or carry Appellants’ burden to establish subject matter jurisdiction. The importance of Appellants’ constitutional rights is not disputed, but it also is not dispositive. The fact remains that, by the time Appellants filed suit, the Challenged Restrictions had been lifted, the Governor had entered into a binding agreement not to impose future restrictions targeting Houses of Worship, and the apprehension of a future pandemic and conditions like those of the early days of the emergency was hypothetical and speculative. This Court “decline[s] to render an advisory opinion on a hypothetical scenario.”...

... [T]he Superior Court correctly held that Appellants’ injury could not be redressed through a prospective declaratory judgment. In much the same way that Appellants’ irreparable harm argument crumbled because the Challenged Restrictions no longer were in effect and any future action imposing similar restrictions was speculative, the declaratory judgment sought in the Superior Court would not alter the status quo. Moreover, Appellants’ constitutional rights would not be restored or further protected by declaratory relief because the complained-of harm had long since ceased and the threat of future harm was speculative....

The Delaware Supreme Court also concluded that a damage action against the Governor was barred by the Delaware State Tort Claims Act and qualified immunity.

Jury Must Decide Whether School Board Had Religious Animus

In Pines Church v. Hermon School Department, (D ME, July 31, 2024), a Maine federal district court denied both parties' motions for summary judgment. Pines Church sought to enter a 12-month lease to use space at Hermon High School for Sunday religious services. The School Committee offered only a month-to-month lease. Plaintiffs claimed that the denial of a long-term lease was motivated by animus against their orthodox Christian religious beliefs. The court said in part:

Plaintiffs rely on the relatively blatant bias and the inferences that arise from the interrogatories posed by one Committee member who demanded to know from Pastor Gioia the Church’s “position” on a spate of religious, political, and cultural flashpoints before evaluating whether to extend a lease on behalf of a publicly funded school. Plaintiffs also rely on a somewhat more tepid bias, sanitized through fear-of-association comments by others, along the lines that association with the Church may not fit with the Committee’s “goals” and may therefore create a “negative image” by not comporting with the School Department’s “mission” and evidently its own beliefs. This evidence certainly is probative of Plaintiffs’ position that the School Committee’s refusal to offer Plaintiffs a lease was motivated by unconstitutional considerations, such as animus toward the Church’s orthodox religious beliefs. For its part, the School Department counters that the School Committee’s decision, save for the one Committee member’s bill of particulars put to the Pastor, simply resulted from humdrum, benign space and cost concerns, although that narrative is far from conclusive based on the summary judgment record. These competing characterizations of the Committee’s motivations form the most conspicuous reason I deny summary judgment to the parties in favor of a jury trial.

Thursday, August 01, 2024

Trans Woman Fired by Liberty University Sues

Suit was filed this week in a Virginia federal district court against Liberty University by a transgender woman who was fired from her position as an Apprentice at the IT Help Desk because she was undergoing gender transition treatment. The complaint (full text) in Zinski v. Liberty University, Inc., (WD VA, filed 7/29/2024), alleges that terminating plaintiff's employment violated Title VII's ban on sex discrimination. A press release from ACLU of Virginia elaborates on plaintiff's dismissal, saying in part:

Liberty University officials read a termination notice aloud to Ellenor citing “denying biological and chromosomal sex assigned at birth” as the basis for her termination, stating a conflict with Liberty’s Doctrinal Statement that names “denial of birth sex by self-identification with a different gender” as a “sinful act prohibited by God.”

6th Circuit: School District's Ban on Students Calling Others by Non-Preferred Pronouns Does Not Violate 1st Amendment

In Parents Defending Education v. Olentangy Local School District, (6th Cir., July 29, 2024), the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision rejected free speech challenges to a school district's anti-bullying and anti-harassment policies that prohibit students from using pronouns that are inconsistent with another student’s gender identity if the use amounts to harassment. The majority said in part:

... Parent A-D’s children intend to communicate a message by using non-preferred pronouns to refer to their classmates.... [T]he single thing on which the parties agree is that pronouns matter. That is true for transgender students in the District, who experience the use of preferred pronouns as a vital part of affirming their existence and experience the use of non-preferred pronouns as dehumanizing, degrading, and humiliating. It is also true for Parent A-D’s children, whose parents aver that using pronouns inconsistent with a person’s biological sex at birth contradicts their “deeply held beliefs” about the immutability of sex. The intentional use of preferred or non-preferred pronouns therefore represents speech protected by the First Amendment....

Students who do not want to use their transgender classmates’ preferred pronouns may permissibly use no pronouns at all, and refer to their classmates using first names.... Parents A-D, to be sure, have made clear that this option is not their preference because their children “don’t want to avoid using pronouns ... they want to use biologically correct pronouns.”... But using first names is remarkably similar to a proposed “compromise” we praised in Meriwether—the plaintiff’s proposal to “call on [the transgender student in his class] using [that student’s] last name alone,” rather than any honorifics....

Outside instructional time, moreover, students may elect to not refer to their transgender classmates at all. This choice to not speak mirrors the generally accepted accommodation for students morally opposed to reciting the Pledge of Allegiance....

At bottom, PDE has failed to make a clear showing that the District’s prohibition on the intentional use of non-preferred pronouns unconstitutionally compels speech. ...

... [T]he District’s position that students may communicate their belief that sex is immutable through means other than the use of nonpreferred pronouns, indicate that the District is not attempting to prohibit any viewpoints....

Judge Batchelder dissented, saying in part:

As I understand it, the plaintiffs’ position—based on their scientific (biology, physiology, and genetics) and religious beliefs—is that biological gender is immutable, people are either male or female, and there is no such thing as “gender transition”; that is a made-up thing, imaginary or make believe, and a public school cannot force their children to pretend it is a real thing. Agree or disagree, but that is their position.

In that light, the speech at issue here concerns the existence of gender transition, not just a debate about gender-identity issues or misgendering. The Olentangy Local School District’s view—contrary to Parents Defending Education’s—is that there is such a thing as gender transition; it is real, worthy of recognition and, in fact, worthy of protection in the public schools. Why else would the District require preferred pronouns, prohibit biological pronouns, or press the odd compromise of no pronouns at all? Therefore, the governmental authority (the District) has taken a clear position (viewpoint) in which all of its captive subjects (students) must affirm the existence of gender transition (either through words or silence), regardless of their own view. This is a viewpoint-based regulation of speech....

Courthouse News Service reports on the decision.

Requiring Conditional Use Permit Is Not Substantial Burden Under RLUIPA

In Athey Creek Christian Fellowship v. Clackamas County, (D OR, July 30, 2024), an Oregon federal district court dismissed a RLUIPA challenge to the denial of a Conditional Use Permit for construction of the second phase of a church building. The court said in part:

... [P]laintiff filed this suit in November of 2022, alleging that the zoning ordinance that required churches to apply for a conditional use permit and did not allow churches as a primary use is facially invalid under the RLUIPA, and that the County violated plaintiff’s rights under the RLUIPA, the First Amendment, and the Oregon Constitution by not allowing plaintiff to build phase 2 of the project and forcing plaintiff to re-apply for a new or modified conditional use permit.

The purported burden here then includes the County’s conclusion that the 2006 CUP has expired, and the County’s resulting insistence that plaintiff must now apply to build phase 2 under the new “primary use” .... Neither one of these carries the traditional hallmarks of a substantial burden under the RLUIPA....

Notably, the record in case is missing a common, even pervasive, attribute in those cases where the plaintiffs succeeded on a substantial burden claim, namely that the relevant zoning authority displayed some outward hostility toward or pretextual decision-making about the plaintiffs’ proposed religious use....

... [P]laintiff has not shown why seeking an extension of the 2006 CUP or timely obtaining the relevant building permits for phase 2 were a substantial burden to its religious exercise....

The same reasoning applies to the alleged burden that resulted from the County’s insistence now that plaintiff must now re-apply as a primary use. It is not a substantial burden to file an application for a proposed land use.

Wednesday, July 31, 2024

Nebraska Law on Abortion and Transgender Care Does Not Violate Single-Subject Rule

In Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc. v. Hilgers, (NE Sup. Ct., July 29, 2024), the Nebraska Supreme Court in a 6-1 decision held that a 2023 Nebraska statute, L.B. 574, which both restricts abortions and restricts gender-altering care for minors does not violate the state Constitution's single subject requirement for legislation. Chief Justice Heavican's majority opinion said in part:

... [W]e reject Planned Parenthood’s contention that L.B. 574 is unconstitutional because its regulation of abortion does not further its regulation of gender-altering care and vice versa. Here, even though abortion and gender-altering care are distinct types of medical care, and even though L.B. 574 effectuates its purpose or object differently for each type, when broadly construing L.B. 574, all its provisions certainly are encompassed within the regulation of permissible medical care. We emphasize that, in our determination that the provisions of L.B. 574 each seek to regulate medical care, we make no comment on the substance of L.B. 574. Our focus is on whether L.B. 574 complies with article III, § 14.

Justice Papik, joined by Justice Stacy filed a concurring opinion. Justice Miller-Lerman filed a dissenting opinion.

Liberty Counsel issued a press release announcing the decision.

Denial of Foster Care Licensure Subject to Strict Scrutiny

In Burke v. Walsh, (D MA, June 5, 2024), a Massachusetts federal district court refused to dismiss free exercise and free speech claims brought against Massachusetts Department of Children and Families personnel in their official capacities. Plaintiffs, a Catholic couple, were denied licensure for foster care and adoption because they did not demonstrate the ability to support the well-being of an LGBTQIA+ child that might be placed with them. The court said in part:

The court concludes it was clearly established, in 2023, that DCF's individualized and discretionary assessment of Plaintiffs' foster license application was not a "generally applicable" policy and thus was subject to strict scrutiny. Under the governing regulations, DCF considers 17 different subjective criteria, all of which must be demonstrated "to the satisfaction of the Department," when deciding on a foster license application. 110 C.M.R. § 7.104(1). One of these requirements, upon which Defendants relied in denying Plaintiffs' application, is "to promote the physical, mental, and emotional well-being of a child placed in his or her care, including supporting and respecting a child's sexual orientation or gender identity."...

... [T]he court need not decide, at this stage, whether it was also clearly established that Defendants' conduct would not withstand strict scrutiny analysis under these circumstances.

Tuesday, July 30, 2024

7th Circuit Gives Broad Interpretation of "Religious" Claims Under Title VII

In Passarella v. Aspirus, Inc., (7th Cir., July 29, 2024), the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals in an opinion by Judge Scudder held that a request for a religious accommodation under Title VII may include secular elements. At issue were employees' requests for an exemption from the employer's Covid vaccine mandate. The court said in part:

At the pleading stage, an employee seeking an accommodation in the form of an exemption from an employer’s vaccine mandate must allege facts plausibly permitting an inference that some “aspect[]” of the request is based on the employee’s “religious observance and practice” or “belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).

Applying the statutory language necessarily requires an exercise of judgment: the standard is not amenable to formulaic resolution like solving a math equation. To the contrary, its application requires a holistic assessment of the terms of the employee’s exemption request, with the controlling inquiry at the pleading stage being whether the employee plausibly based her vaccination exemption request at least in part on an aspect of her religious belief or practice.

... An employee may object to an employer’s vaccine mandate on both religious and non-religious grounds—for example, on the view that receiving the vaccine would violate a religious belief and implicate health and safety concerns. Congress permitted this, as we see no other way to give effect to the breadth of its definition of “religion”—as covering “all aspects” of an employee’s religious observance, practice, and belief.... And, for its part, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, in implementing this same definition, has likewise emphasized that a religious objection to a workplace requirement may incorporate both religious and secular reasons....

Judge Rovner dissented, saying in part:

I recognize that Dottenwhy, in the statements she submitted to Aspirus, invoked her rights as a Christian, said she had prayed about the matter and sought guidance from G-d, and expressed her conviction that “HE is with me on this decision.” ... Without more, such statements are not enough, in my view, to transform an otherwise secular objection to the vaccine into a religiously-based one.... I am not convinced that Congress meant to compel an employer to grant any requested accommodation that an employee has prayed about and has concluded that his or her G-d supports. If that were so, there would be almost no limit to the accommodations that an employer would have to entertain under Title VII’s ban on religious discrimination....

Passarella’s statement came somewhat closer to describing a religious basis for a vaccine exemption, but in the end, I believe that Aspirus correctly understood her objection to the COVID-19 vaccine to be secular rather than religious....

It cannot be enough to state a claim for a religious accommodation to assert that because one’s conscience is G-d given, any decision one reaches in their good conscience is necessarily inspired and endorsed by G-d, and therefore is religious in nature.

In Bube v. Aspirius Hospital, Inc., (7th Cir., July 29, 2024), a different panel of the 7th Circuit, with only Judge Scudder being on both, reversed the dismissal of claims by two employees for religious exemptions from a hospital's Covid vaccine mandate. The court, in a unanimous opinion written by Judge Scudder, said in part:

We have no trouble concluding that both of these requests are based at least in part on an aspect of the plaintiffs’ religious beliefs. God “gave” Bube a “mind, body and soul” so that she feels obligated to avoid what she considers unsafe substances in order to remain healthy. And Hedrington was “created … perfectly” by God so that accepting a “risk[y]” vaccine would be a “sin.” ...

Scrutinizing the composition of these requests—especially at the pleading stage—runs counter to not only the broad language of Title VII but also the Supreme Court’s repeated warnings that the law requires a hands-off approach when it comes to defining and discerning the core limits of religious exercise.

3rd Circuit: Jury Issues Remain in Suit Over Religious Exemption from Covid Vaccine Mandate

In Spivack v. City of Philadelphia, (3d Cir., July 29, 2024), the U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the dismissal of a suit brought by Rachel Spivack, an Orthodox Jewish employee of the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office, and remanded the case for trial. Spivack was dismissed from her position for refusing, on religious grounds, to comply with the Office's Covid vaccine mandate. Spivack contended:

“[a]ll three available brands of COVID-19 vaccines constitute a profound violation of the scriptural prohibitions against forbidden mixtures,” and that “[i]njecting such forbidden substances directly into our bloodstream completely challenges scriptural teaching that regards one’s body as the repository of the soul made in God’s image.” ...

The appeals court said in part:

There is ... a dispute of material fact as to whether anti-religious hostility tainted the DAO’s treatment of religious exemptions. That is because a reasonable jury could conclude, based on some evidence in the record, that the DAO’s treatment of religious exemptions reflected “intoleran[ce] of religious beliefs.”...

But Krasner claims that Spivack was disciplined under a later policy—the January 2022 policy, which eliminated the religious exemption altogether and kept only the medical exemption....

That Krasner continued to evaluate medical exemption requests under the January 2022 policy does not undermine that policy’s general applicability. Medical exemptions were a separate and objectively defined category of exemption requests....

The critical question is whether the medical exemptions in these policies are comparable to a religious exemption—in other words, whether the “preferential treatment of secular behavior” in the form of a medical exemption “affect[s] the regulation’s purpose in the same way as the prohibited religious behavior.” ...

Unlike a religious exemption, a medical exemption furthers the DAO’s interest in keeping its employees safe and healthy by allowing employees for whom the COVID-19 vaccine would cause death or illness to abstain from vaccination....

[T]he DAO must show that its policy was narrowly tailored, which “requires the government to demonstrate that a policy is the least restrictive means of achieving its objective.”...

Unanswered factual questions pervade this inquiry. How many similar exemption requests would the DAO need to grant? Would other, less restrictive mitigation measures for employees with religious exemptions ... have achieved the office’s objectives? If strict scrutiny applies, a jury must consider these questions....

First Liberty Institute issued a press release announcing the decision.

Monday, July 29, 2024

6 More States Enjoin Enforcement of New Title IX Rules Barring Transgender Discrimination

Yet another court has enjoined the Department of Education from enforcing its new Title IX rules that interpret Title IX's ban on sex discrimination as including a ban on gender identity discrimination. In State of Arkansas v. U.S. Department of Education, (ED MO, July 24, 2024), a Missouri federal district court issued a preliminary injunction barring enforcement against Arkansas, Missouri, Iowa, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota and the individual plaintiff, a student in a school in Arkansas who says the rule violates her religious beliefs. the court said in part:

After preliminary review and without ultimately deciding the issue, the Court is persuaded that plaintiffs have a fair chance of prevailing on their argument that the reasoning of Bostock, a Title VII employment discrimination case, should not apply to Title IX. ...

Given that notice is the touchstone of Title IX, the statute contains no definition of sex or express prohibition of discrimination on the basis of gender identity, and it expressly permits sex-based differential treatment in certain circumstances, plaintiff States have met their preliminary burden of establishing a fair chance of prevailing on their argument that they lacked constitutionally sufficient notice that sex discrimination would be interpreted as including gender identity discrimination when they accepted federal funding under Title IX.

The court also preliminarily enjoined the new rules' expansion of the definition of harassment, concluding that the definition may violate the 1st Amendment by chilling speech. ADF issued a press release announcing the decision.

Sunday, July 28, 2024

Nebraska Supreme Court Upholds Dismissal of Priest's Suit Against Archdiocese

In Syring v. Archdiocese of Omaha, (NE Sup. Ct., July 26, 2024), the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of defamation, infliction of mental distress, interference with prospective employment and breach of fiduciary duty claims by a Catholic priest against his Archdiocese. The priest was listed on an Archdiocese website that named those against whom there had been allegations of misconduct or abuse of a minor. He was forced to resign his ministry position and the Archdiocese refused to approve his serving as a hospital chaplain. The court held that the Archdiocese's action did not meet the standard for outrageous conduct needed to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. It went on the dismiss various of plaintiff's claims on the basis of the ministerial exception doctrine. The court said in part:

Syring’s claims asserted that the Archdiocese “falsely impute[d] unfitness to preform [sic] duties of employment, and prejudice[d] [Syring] in his profession or trade.” The other claims were premised upon Syring’s assertion that the Archdiocese owed him fiduciary duties. For example, the complaint identified a purported breach of a fiduciary duty in the Archdiocese’s “requiring [Syring’s] resignation, and omitting to advise him of his right to counsel, both civil and canonical.”

We cannot uphold Syring’s claims without interfering with the internal governance of the church, or depriving the church of control, over the selection of its ministers. The claims— based on the conversation between officials of a Catholic archdiocese and a hospital operated by a Catholic religious order regarding permission for Syring to serve as a chaplain, Syring’s fitness to perform the duties of his employment, and the requiring of Syring’s resignation from that employment— lie at the heart of the ministerial exception articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court. The district court did not err in dismissing these claims.

Friday, July 26, 2024

Canadian Court Enjoins Enforcement of Guidelines That Adversely Impact Kosher Slaughtering

In Jewish Community Council of Montreal v. Canada (Attorney General), (CA Fed. Ct., July 24, 2024), a judge of the Canadian Federal Court issued an interlocutory injunction preventing the Canadian Food Inspection Agency from enforcing Guidelines that require kosher slaughterers that do not stun animals before slaughter to test three indicators of unconsciousness before suspending an animal. Jewish organizations that are plaintiffs in the case say that imposition of the new Guidelines has reduced the volume of kosher beef produced in Canada by 55% and the volume of kosher veal by 90%. The court said in part:

The issue is therefore whether the Guidelines requiring the application of the three indicators of unconsciousness to ensure that an animal is unconscious before suspension, as required under section 143 of the SFCR, are reasonable when applied to shechita, or whether they represent an encroachment on the Applicants’ right to freedom of religion under subsection 2(a) of the Charter, or whether the requirement is discriminatory under section 15 of the Charter....

The Applicants submit that the Guidelines constitute a major departure from prior practice and are unduly protective as they essentially require that the animal be brain-dead before being suspended, when section 143 of the SFCR only requires that the animal be unconscious.... The Guidelines therefore require an unreasonable application of the precautionary principle which does not measurably add to animal welfare (as required under sections 141 to 144 of the SFCR) while slowing down the operation of kosher slaughter to the point where licence holders prefer to cease production. As a result, the Guidelines restrict access to kosher meat and prevent Canadian Jews from exercising the requirements of their faith.

The Guidelines are also discriminatory as they unfairly associate a religious practice of shechita to animal pain, and impose a challenge that does not apply to non-kosher meat production. The Guidelines therefore impose on Jews a burden and deny them benefits in a manner that has the effect of reinforcing, perpetuating, or exacerbating a disadvantage. Their Charter rights to freedom of religion and the right to equality enshrined in the Charter are therefore unjustifiably restricted....

For the perspective of shochetim and bodkim, they are deprived of their ability to practise their faith and profession, as they can no longer exercise their duties as religious leaders in the community. As shochetim and bodkim represent a precious resource for the Canadian Jewish community, the loss of their expertise will encroach on the Canadian Jewish community’s culture and collective aspect of religious beliefs. The interference is therefore substantial, both from an individual and collective point of view....

Hamodia reports on the decision.

States Lack Standing to Challenge FDA's Rules on Dispensing of Abortion Pill

In State of Washington v. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, (9th Cir., July 24, 2024), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals refused to permit the state of Idaho (and 6 other states) to intervene in a lawsuit brought by a group of states led by the state of Washington challenging the FDA's restrictions on pharmacies' dispensing of the abortion pill mifepristone. FDA regulations adopted in 2021 allow mifepristone to be dispensed by pharmacies in retail locations or by mail, but only if the pharmacy is specially certified to do so. Washington's lawsuit contends that the certification and documentation requirements are unnecessary. Idaho, on the other hand, wants the court to order the FDA to go back to earlier requirements that only allowed mifepristone to be dispensed in person by a physician and did not allow it to be obtained directly from pharmacies. The court concluded that because Idaho seeks fundamentally different relief that does Washington, it must establish its own standing in order to intervene. The court concluded that Idaho did not have separate standing, saying in part:

Idaho first alleges that elimination of the in-person dispensing requirement will cause the state economic injury in the form of increased costs to the state’s Medicaid system. At oral argument, Idaho stated that this is its “strongest basis” for standing. Even taking Idaho’s highly speculative allegations as true, the complaint does not demonstrate an injury-in-fact because it depends on an attenuated chain of healthcare decisions by independent actors that will have only indirect effects on state revenue....

Idaho next alleges that elimination of the in-person dispensing requirement will harm its sovereign interest in law enforcement by making illegal mifepristone use harder to detect. This allegation is insufficient to convey standing because nothing in the 2023 REMS impairs Idaho’s sovereign authority to enact or enforce its own laws regulating chemical abortion....

Finally, Idaho alleges that elimination of the in-person dispensing requirement will harm its “quasi-sovereign interest” in maternal health and fetal life. Idaho cannot sue FDA on this basis because the allegations concern the interests of individual citizens—not the separate interests of the state itself....

Courthouse News Service reports on the decision. [Thanks to Thomas Rutledge for the lead.]

Thursday, July 25, 2024

Arkansas Supreme Court Orders Initial Count of Signatures on Abortion Amendment Petitions

In Cowles v. Thurston, (AR Sup. Ct., July 23, 2024), the Arkansas Supreme Court ordered the state Secretary of State to perform an initial count of signatures submitted by volunteer canvassers for a state constitutional amendment that would give women the right to obtain an abortion during the first 18 weeks after fertilization, and later in cases of rape, incest, fatal fetal anomaly, or to protect the mother's life or physical health. As previously reported, the Secretary of State rejected all the petitions because they were not accompanied by required paperwork regarding those submitted by paid canvassers. 3 Justices would have gone further and given proponents a 30-day cure period. Arkansas Advocate reports on the Court Order. [Thanks to Thomas Rutledge for the lead.]

Equally Divided New Jersey Supreme Court Dismisses Defamation Suit Against Jewish School

In Hyman v. Rosenbaum Yeshiva of North Jersey, (NJ Sup. Ct., July 24, 2024), an equally divided New Jersey Supreme Court decision resulted in affirmance through a short per curiam opinion of the dismissal of defamation claims brought against an Orthodox Jewish school by a Judaic Studies teacher whose employment by the school was terminated. The Justices were equally divided on whether discovery should be permitted in the case.

The 6 justices participating in the decision unanimously agreed on the standard for applying the ministerial exception, saying that the court must analyze each element of plaintiff's claim and determine whether adjudicating it would require the court to choose between competing religious visions or would interfere with a church's administrative prerogatives including its right to select and control the duties of its ministers, whether or not the alleged misconduct is rooted in religious belief. Here plaintiff's employment was terminated for inappropriate touching of female students. Information about his termination was emailed to the school's Board of Directors, parents of current students and faculty members. The letter was subsequently disseminated on social media.

Justice Patterson's concurring opinion for 3 justices said in part:

Here, the religious employer’s allegedly defamatory statement was not a description of claimed misconduct by Hyman; no such description appears in Price’s letter to the school community. Instead, Hyman’s defamation claims are premised on Price’s statement that “it was determined that Rabbi Hyman’s conduct had been neither acceptable nor consistent with how a rebbe in our Yeshiva should interact with students.” In short, the statement at the heart of this case was not an assertion of fact about the former students’ allegations, but an explanation of the Yeshiva’s decision to terminate Hyman -- a determination made in consultation with halachic authorities as well as legal counsel. With or without discovery regarding the details of the allegations, the court’s inquiry as to the merits would be the same: the court would be required to assess the reasons for a religious institution’s decision to terminate the employment of a minister, an inquiry that would violate the First Amendment.

Justice Pierre-Louis' dissenting opinion for 3 justices said in part:

In order for a court to make [a determination that the ministerial exception applies] ... plaintiffs must be allowed discovery.... [U]nder the concurring opinion’s analysis, a religious entity can seemingly fire an employee based solely on a personal vendetta, publish a knowingly false and defamatory statement about the plaintiff, and shield itself from liability -- and even discovery -- by invoking the ministerial exception. Such a holding slams the courthouse door shut on potentially wronged plaintiffs before they can even obtain discovery that would allow a court to determine whether adjudicating their claims actually interferes with religious autonomy....

Defendants have conflated the issues in this case, making it appear as though this defamation case is the same as an employment discrimination case. But assessing the legality of what a religious institution says about an adverse employment action is not the same thing as determining the lawfulness of the adverse action itself. The latter necessarily requires a court to interfere with a religious institution’s internal management, its doctrinal specificities, and its decisions regarding who preaches the faith, but the former does not.

Becket Fund issued a press release announcing the decision.

Wednesday, July 24, 2024

Leader in International Neo-Nazi Group Indicted for Soliciting Hate Crimes and Mass Violence

The U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of New York announced last week the federal indictment of the leader of an international neo-Nazi group. The press release said in part:

A federal grand jury in Brooklyn yesterday returned a four-count indictment charging Georgian national Michail Chkhikvishvili, also known as ... “Commander Butcher” ... with soliciting hate crimes and acts of mass violence in New York City. Chkhikvishvili was arrested in Chișinău, Moldova on July 6, 2024 pursuant to an Interpol Wanted Person Diffusion.... Chkhikvishvili is alleged to be a leader of the Maniac Murder Cult,... an international racially or ethnically motivated violent extremist group. Chkhikvishvili allegedly recruited others to commit violent acts in furtherance of MKY’s ideologies, including planning and soliciting a mass casualty attack in New York City....

Beginning in approximately November 2023, Chkhikvishvili solicited [an FBI undercover agent ("UC")] ... to commit violent crimes.... Chkhikvishvili provided detailed plans and materials such as bomb-making instructions and guidance on making Molotov cocktails.... In November 2023, Chkhikvishvili began planning a mass casualty attack in New York City to take place on New Year’s Eve. The scheme involved an individual dressing up as Santa Claus and handing out candy laced with poison to racial minorities. The scheme also involved providing candy laced with poison to children at Jewish schools in Brooklyn. Chkhikvishvili drafted step-by-step instructions to carry out the scheme and shared with the UC detailed manuals on creating and mixing lethal poisons and gases. He also instructed the UC on methods of making ricin-based poisons in powder and liquid form....

Prison Sentences Imposed in Two Separate Antisemitism Cases

Yesterday, an Indiana federal district court sentenced 67-year-old Andrezj Boryga to 24 months in prison followed by two years of supervised release after Boryga pleaded guilty to transmitting antisemitic threats in interstate commerce. According to a Justice Department press release:

... [B]etween July 9 and Dec. 14, 2022, Boryga left voicemails at Anti-Defamation League offices located in New York, Texas, Colorado, and Nevada. Boryga used antisemitic slurs on eight voicemails as he threatened to assault or kill Jewish people.

Yesterday a New Jersey federal district court sentenced 29-year-old Dion Marsh to 40 years in prison followed by 5 years of supervised release after Marsh pleaded guilty to committing a series of violent assaults on visibly identifiable members of the Lakewood, New Jersey, Orthodox Jewish community. According to a Justice Department press release:

[Marsh] pleaded guilty... to ... five counts of violating the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act and one count of carjacking. With respect to the Shepard Byrd Act violations, Marsh admitted to willfully causing bodily injury to five victims and attempting to kill and cause injuries with dangerous weapons to four of the victims because they are Jewish.

Tuesday, July 23, 2024

Report Ranking States on Legal Protections for Religious Liberty Released

Last Friday, the Center for Religion, Culture and Democracy announced release of its 2024 report (full text) on Religious Liberty in the States. According to the Report:

Now in its third annual edition, RLS 2024 considers thirty-nine distinct kinds of legal provisions that states may adopt to protect religious liberty. These legal provisions, which we refer to as “items,” are aggregated into sixteen “safeguards” that we then average to produce one index score per state. The index allows us to rank states and to track changes in religious liberty protections over time....

States are far more likely to pass some protections than others. States either do not have mandates that require health-insurance plans to cover contraception, abortion, and/or sterilization or, if they do, most include a religious accommodation so that organizations that have religious objections to covering such procedures are not compelled to do so. Every state in the union requires children to be vaccinated before attending public (and sometimes private) schools, but the vast majority provide exemptions for families that have religious objections to vaccinations. And most states either provide absentee ballots for any reason or permit individuals who have religious commitments that prevent them from voting in person to receive them.

The least widely adopted protections include guaranteeing that medical professionals and organizations with religious objections to providing contraception will not be compelled to do so. Very few states permit public officials who may be asked to participate in a wedding ceremony to decline to do so for religious reasons. Finally, only one state permits for-profit businesses to decline to participate in wedding ceremonies to which their owners/employees have sincere religious objections.

This year's report ranks Illinois first and West Virginia 50th in protections for religious liberty.

Monday, July 22, 2024

Church Obtains Preliminary Injunction Under RLUIPA Allowing Its On-Site Shelter Program to Continue

In Church of the Rock, Inc. v. Town of Castle Rock, Colorado, (D CO, July 19, 2024), a Colorado federal district court granted a church a preliminary injunction preventing the Town of Castle Rock from interfering with the church's use of an RV and a trailer on church property in its On-Site Temporary Shelter Ministry. The court said in part:

The Town argues that the Church’s RLUIPA claim is not likely to succeed because the applicable zoning regulations do not substantially burden the Church’s exercise of its religious beliefs.... The Town instead characterizes the nature of the burden as a “mere inconvenience” and suggests that the Church could find other ways to satisfy its religious compulsion to provide for the needy, such as by providing hotel rooms or housing in other areas that are zoned for residential use.... It also suggests that finding a substantial burden in this case “effectively would be granting an automatic exemption to religious organizations from generally applicable land use regulations.”

The Church responds that its religious beliefs don’t just obligate it to provide for the needy in some general way; they obligate it to provide for the needy on Church property....

The Church has carried its burden on this question.... Although the Town alludes to a bit of a disconnect between the Church’s assertion that it is compelled to allow the poor to “live among you” and its desire to have people live in RVs on Church grounds rather than in homes and residential areas where Church members live, it does not ultimately dispute the sincerity of the Church’s assertions on this point, which are supported by sworn affidavits....

(See prior related posting.) CBS News reports on the decision.

Sunday, July 21, 2024

Religious College Loses RFRA Challenge to SBA's Loan Forgiveness Rules

In Gordon College v. U.S. Small Business Administration, (D DC, July 18, 2024), the D.C. federal district court dismissed claims by a religious nonprofit college that its rights under RFRA as well as the 1st and 14th Amendments were infringed when it was denied forgiveness of a $7 million loan that it received under the Covid era Paycheck Protection Program. Loan forgiveness was available to qualifying small businesses. Gordon College's loan forgiveness application was denied because it had over 500 employees and thus did not meet the SBA's small-business size standard. Rejecting plaintiff's RFRA claim, the court said in part:

... [P]laintiff fails to identify a “sincere religious belief” that has been infringed by application of the PPP’s 500-employee cap to plaintiff.... Absent here ... is any articulated connection between plaintiff’s asserted need to have more than 500 employees and its exercise of religion. Plaintiff, for example, does not allege that “any religious group” has “as one of its tenets” the requirement that an associated religious institution have more than 500 employees ... or that it has treated having more than 500 employees to “ris[e] to [any] level of significance in [its] religion.”...

As to plaintiff's Constitutional challenges, the court said in part:

... [T]he application of the PPP’s 500-employee cap to plaintiff is neutral and generally applicable, thereby triggering rational basis review, rather than strict scrutiny. Plaintiff has failed to bring a rational-basis challenge by not plausibly alleging that no reasonable set of facts could provide a rational basis for the PPP’s 500-employee cap. Accordingly, plaintiff’s Free Exercise and Equal Protection claims are dismissed....

Here, plaintiff alleges that “[d]efendants have interfered with the autonomy of [plaintiff] to define its own doctrine, membership, employment, staffing, affiliation, and other internal requirements” by “insisting on certain requirements [sic] for determining staffing and employment.... [P]laintiff has failed ... to explain why the PPP’s 500-employee cap... interfered with any “matters of faith and doctrine.” Plaintiff’s religious autonomy claim is thus dismissed.

Friday, July 19, 2024

International Representatives Release Guidelines for Countering Antisemitism

On Wednesday in Buenos Aires, Argentina, representatives of 36 nations and international organizations, including U.S. Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Antisemitism Ambassador Deborah Lipstadt, released a set of legally nonbinding Global Guidelines for Countering Antisemitism (full text). Thursday was the 30th anniversary of the 1994 Hizballah bombing of the Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA) in Buenos Aires in which 85 people were killed. On Thursday, Secretary of State Blinken issued a statement (full text) announcing the Guidelines, saying in part:

The United States is pleased to play a leadership role, together with the European Union, the Organization of American States, the Government of Argentina, and other governments and international bodies, in advancing these guidelines and we invite others across the international community to endorse and implement them. The Guidelines identify practical actions that governments, international bodies, civil society organizations, and people of conscience everywhere can take against antisemitism wherever and whenever it occurs.

Suit Challenges California's Ban on School Parental Notification Requirements as to Gender Transitioning

A school district and parents of school-age children filed suit this week in a California federal district court challenging California's recently-enacted AB 1955. The statute prohibits school districts from requiring notification of parents when their children are socially transitioning their gender in school, unless the student consents to the disclosure. The complaint (full text) in Chino Valley Unified School District v. Newsom alleges that the statute violates parental rights to control the upbringing of their children and parents' free exercise rights as well as being preempted by the federal Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act. The complaint alleges in part:

The Parent Plaintiffs have each alleged that they are devout Christians who believe God created man and woman as distinct, immutable genders; their religious beliefs require that they be notified if their child requests to socially transition at school so that they may be involved with their child's treatment at school.

ABC News 10 reports on the lawsuit.

Russian Court Bans Online Sale of Souvenir Toilet Paper: Depiction Offends Feelings of Religious Believers

Moscow Times and Vyorstka reported yesterday that a Russian District Court in Moscow has banned the offering on four websites in Russia of souvenir toilet paper imprinted with images of the 1997 version of Russia's 1000-ruble bills. The court found that the toilet paper "offends the feelings of religious believers" in violation of Article 148 of the Russian Penal Code. The 1000-ruble bill carries a picture of a statue of Yaroslav the Wise who was Grand Prince of Kiev from 1019 to 1054. Yaroslav the Wise was canonized in 2016 by the Bishops Council of the Russian Orthodox Church. Prior to that, in 2005 he was named a local saint by the Patriarch of Moscow and in 2004 he was included in the calendar of saints of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate). The court said in part:

In a free democratic society, the dissemination of illegal information capable of offending the religious feelings of believers cannot be protected by freedom of thought, speech, opinion and information

Company Settles EEOC Suit for $110,000, Compensating Employee Whose Religious Objections to Vaccine Were Ignored

A national furniture retailer, Hank's Furniture, has settled a Title VII religious discrimination lawsuit brought against it by the EEOC. Under a consent decree, Hank's will pay $110,000 in damages and will implement a written policy assuring broad accommodation of religious beliefs that do not impose an undue burden. According to the EEOC's press release:

... [A] former assistant manager at HFI’s Pensacola, Florida, location notified the company that her religious beliefs prevented her from receiving a COVID-19 vaccine. Rather than discuss the employee’s religious beliefs to determine the feasibility of an accommodation, management ignored accommodation requests then summarily denied the employee’s requests and attempted to dispute the validity of her sincerely-held religious beliefs.

Thursday, July 18, 2024

9th Circuit: Zen Apprentice's Suit Dismissed Under Ministerial Exception Doctrine

In Behrend v. San Francisco Zen Center, Inc., (9th Cir., July 17, 2024), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal under the ministerial exception doctrine of a disability discrimination suit brought by plaintiff who worked at the Zen Center as a Work Practice Apprentice. The court said in part:

Behrend ... appeals, arguing that he was not a minister because he performed mostly menial work and did not have a “key role in making internal church decisions and transmitting the faith to others.”...

Behrend was tasked with performing maintenance, kitchen, and guest services. But he was also responsible for assisting with rituals, participating in meditations and services, cleaning the temple, attending talks and classes, and performing doan ryo ceremonial tasks like ringing bells and cleaning altars. He lived and worked full time at the temple as a monk. While Behrend may not have taught and was not a part of the hierarchical leadership structure, he “performed vital religious duties” as part of the Center’s WPA program.... In short, were the court to adopt a rule like the one Behrend suggests, we would be “interfering with the freedom of religious groups to select” who may or may not serve as a live-in monk.

Wednesday, July 17, 2024

Cert. Petitions Filed in Challenges to Bans on Transgender Women on Women's Sports Teams

Last week, a petition for certiorari (full text) was filed in the U.S. Supreme Court seeking review in Little v. Hecox, (Docket No. 24-38, cert. filed 7/11/2024). At issue in the case is whether Idaho's Fairness in Women's Sports Act violates the Equal Protection Clause. The Act prohibits transgender women and girls from participating on women's sports teams in public elementary schools, high schools and public colleges. Here are the 9th Circuit opinions issued in the case and text of the relevant statutes.

In a related case, State of West Virginia v. B.P.J., (Docket No. 24-23, cert. filed July 16, 2024), a petition for certiorari (full text) was filed in a case challenging West Virginia's Save Women's Sports Act as violative of Title IX and of the Equal Protection Clause. At issue is the ban on transgender girls participating on girls' sports teams in public high schools or state colleges where team members are chosen on the basis of competitive skills or in contact sports. Here is the 4th Circuit's opinion in the case and the text of the relevant statute.

ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the petitions.

Diocese Not Liable in Bankruptcy for Sex Abuse Without Agency Relationship with Abuser or Abuser's Institution

In In re Roman Catholic Diocese of Rockville Centre, New York, (SD NY, July 15, 2024), a New York federal district court affirmed a bankruptcy court's dismissal of appellants' claims that they were sexually abused as children by clergy and staff at religious institutions in the diocese's territory. The court said in part:

... [T]o adequately assert state law tort claims, Claimants must plead that the Debtor had some control over the abusers or the religious institutions where the abuse occurred.... In other words, Claimants were required to plead the existence of an employment or agency relationship between the Diocese and the alleged abusers, or an agency relationship between the Diocese and the religious institutions.

The bankruptcy court properly determined that Claimants offered no non-conclusory allegations to support either theory of liability....

The bankruptcy court correctly observed that “the Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution bar courts from interpreting issues of religious Canon Law to resolve disputes.”... Instead, “the claimants must show that an employment or agency relationship existed between the Debtor and abuser or Religious Institutions/Orders, based on facts relevant to those theories as they are normally established in the secular context.”... [T]he resolution of the issue presented in this case ... does not, however, depend upon any interpretation of Canon Law that would violate the First Amendment. Here, Claimants fail to state a claim because the allegation that the Diocese revoked the faculties of one abuser accused in connection with a claim that is not at issue in this appeal is insufficient to plausibly allege that the specific abusers at issue here were employees or agents of the Diocese, or that their institutions were agencies of the Diocese.... [A]n allegation that the Diocese hired, fired, supervised, or disciplined an individual not at issue in this appeal does not support an inference that the Diocese has the power to control all clergy or staff at Catholic institutions within its geographic territory or exercised that power over any specific abuser in this appeal....

Former Priest's Defamation Claim Dismissed Under Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine

In Episcopal Diocese of Southern Virginia v. Marshall, (VA App., July 16, 2024), a Virginia state appellate court held that a defamation per se claim by a former Episcopalian priest against a bishop who removed him from the ministry should be dismissed under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. The former priest, Robert Marshall, allegedly made improper comments to a female employee. The court said in part:

We find that the defamation claim is inextricably intertwined with the disciplinary proceedings that led to the priest’s ouster. In addition, the trier of fact would have to decide if the priest committed “sexual misconduct” within the meaning of canon law, which proscribes a broader swath of conduct than secular law....

Marshall claims that the bishop falsely stated that the investigator had “determined that the allegations had merit.” ... He says that the bishop falsely stated that Marshall had admitted to the improper conduct.... He pleads that Bishop Haynes also lied when she claimed that the church had followed the process required under ecclesiastical law....

[A]lthough Marshall denies that he wants a secular court to undo his defrocking, his defamation claim is so intertwined with the bishop’s deposing him as a priest that the defamation claim cannot be litigated without entangling the court in a religious dispute. When a priest who has been fired sues the church and its leadership raising tort claims that cannot be unscrambled from the church’s decision to fire him, “the First Amendment has struck the balance for us.” ... Churches have an overarching interest “in choosing who will preach their beliefs, teach their faith, and carry out their mission.” ... In order for a church to remain “free to choose those who will guide it on its way,” ... such tort claims must sometimes give way.

... The trial court erred in concluding that Marshall’s claim for defamation per se against Bishop Haynes could be resolved on secular principles...

Monday, July 15, 2024

2nd Circuit: Trial Court Must Make Further Findings in Wedding Photographer's Challenge to NY Public Accommodation Law

In Emilee Carpenter, LLC, dba Emilee Carpenter Photography v. James, (2d Cir., July 12, 2024), the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded a New York federal district court's dismissal of a free speech challenge by a wedding photographer to New York's public accommodation law that bars discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The photographer refuses because of her religious and personal beliefs to photograph same-sex weddings. The court held that the case must be remanded for further fact finding in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's intervening decision in 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis. The court said in part:

... [W]hether Carpenter’s actual wedding photography services constitute expressive conduct is an open threshold question for the district court to consider on remand...

To state a compelled speech claim, it is not enough for a plaintiff to show that the service at issue involves a medium of expression. The plaintiff must also demonstrate that the expressive activity is her own – that is, she created the expressive content herself or, by compiling or curating third-party content in some forum, she is also engaged in her own expressive activity....

Here, to the extent Carpenter is using her photographs or website to host the expressive content of third parties (such as the wedding couple who hired her), rather than her own, the district court must determine ... whether the law compels Carpenter’s own speech....

Specifically, the court should assess whether Carpenter’s blogging is more akin to, for instance, advertisement than to a service Carpenter offers to the general public, which her customers purchase from her—in other words, whether Carpenter’s blogging is a good or service regulated by New York’s public accommodations laws....

The court rejected the photographer's expressive association, free exercise, Establishment Clause and vagueness claims, saying in part:

Nowhere in her complaint does Carpenter allege that she offers as a service to the public her active religious participation in the weddings that she photographs. New York’s laws therefore do not require Carpenter to sing, pray, follow an officiant’s instructions, act as a “witness” of the union “before God,” or otherwise participate in any same-sex wedding....

Courthouse News Service and ADF report on the decision.

Sunday, July 14, 2024

Church Ceremony Without Marriage License Was Enough to Create a Civil Marriage In New York

In L.F. v. M.A., (NY Cnty. Sup. Ct., July 9, 2024), a New York state trial court, in a divorce action, held that a ceremony at a Coptic Orthodox Church in New York was sufficient to consider the parties civilly married even though they did not obtain a civil marriage license. Defendant had contended that the ceremony was merely a family blessing, and that the parties were never married. According to the court:

At stake is not just the status of the parties' young child in common or spousal maintenance, but potentially millions of dollars in what would be marital assets versus separate property.

In a prior decision, the court ordered the Bishop who performed the ceremony to testify about it. In the current decision, the court said in part:

... [T]he parties participated in a religious solemnized ceremony, one that so looked like a wedding that the church's Father H.H. prepared the marriage certificate, and until one day before his testimony here, never thought anything other than that the parties were married that day in that ceremony. Plaintiff believed she was married — that is undisputed. Defendant now states that he did not think he was married, but his actions during the years immediately after the ceremony paint a clear and undisputed picture that he could have only thought that he was married and not otherwise.... In reaching its determination, the Court must, and does, apply neutral principles of law, and does not reach into religious details of a ceremony within the Coptic Orthodox Church. The court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Plaintiff has more than carried her burden that there was indeed a religious marriage ceremony that day, and further, that both parties so understood, as well, as did Father H.H. (and at least some of their wedding's witnesses).

Catholic Counselors Challenge Michigan's Transgender Conversion Therapy Ban

Suit was filed last week in a Michigan federal district court challenging the constitutionality of Michigan statutes that ban counselors from engaging in conversion therapy with minors, particularly as applied to counseling minors regarding their gender identity. The complaint (full text) in Catholic Charities of Jackson, Lenawee and Hillsdale Counties v. Whitmer, (WD MI, filed 7/12/2024), alleges that the ban violates counselors' and patients' free speech rights, parents' right to control the upbringing of their children, free exercise rights of plaintiffs and parents, as well as alleging that the statute is void for vagueness. The complaint reads in part:

115. Plaintiffs intend to continue helping young people live consistently with their own religious beliefs on matters of gender identity and sexuality—including young people who desire to align their gender identity with their biological sex, or who desire to refrain from acting on sexual attractions outside the context of male–female marriage.

116. HB 4616 prohibits Plaintiffs from using their professional training to help young people who have these goals....

125. Because Plaintiffs are chilled or prohibited from discussing issues of human sexuality and gender identity, their clients are denied access to ideas they wish to hear and to counseling that would help them live consistently with their own personal, religious, and life goals.

126. Parents of these children are likewise deprived of their right to direct the religious upbringing of their children by obtaining counseling that respects their religious identity.

127. This acutely impacts religious minorities. Such religious minorities are underrepresented among counselors generally, and it is especially difficult to find counselors willing to counsel minors who are struggling to reconcile their faith with their gender identity and sexuality....

Becket Fund issued a press release announcing the lawsuit.

Friday, July 12, 2024

School's Exclusion of Fellowship of Christian Athletes Violates RFRA and 1st Amendment

In Fellowship of Christian Athletes v. District of Columbia, (D DC, July 11, 2024), a D.C. federal district court issued a preliminary injunction requiring D.C.'s Jackson Reed High School to reinstate Fellowship of Christian Athletes as a recognized student organization for the school year 2024-2025. FCA's recognition had been suspended because it required its student leaders to affirm its Statement of Faith which bars sexual relations outside of heterosexual marriage and bars any sexually immoral act including homosexuality. This was seen as a violation of the school's anti-discrimination policy. The court concluded that applying the anti-discrimination policy in this manner violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act because it substantially burdens FCA's exercise of religion. The court said in part:

[T]he District’s interest is unjustifiably speculative. It seeks to “protect[] the safety and well-being of its students by promoting an equitable environment free of discrimination.”... [T]he District readily admits that a student in noncompliance with FCA’s Statement of Faith—whether an atheist, Jewish, gay, or lesbian student—is unlikely to seek a leadership position.... The District can thus offer “only speculation” that FCA’s reinstatement would pose an actual threat of discrimination against any Jackson-Reed student based on a protected characteristic.... Such a speculative goal does not pass muster under strict scrutiny.

Moreover, the District’s exclusion of FCA as a means of eliminating discrimination is “fatally underinclusive.”... [T]he District permits student groups besides FCA to continue operating at Jackson-Reed even though they restrict membership on the basis of protected characteristics and/or ideological alignment.... The District’s “interest” in nondiscrimination “cannot justify” a nondiscrimination policy “that requires only religious” groups to “bear [its] weight.” ...

The court also concluded that the school had violated the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause, concluding that the school's policy was not generally applicable and thus was subject to strict scrutiny. It said in part:

[T]he District permits secular groups to limit their membership to ideologically aligned students while denying the same right to FCA with respect to its leadership. The Court can find “no meaningful constitutionally acceptable distinction between the types of exclusions at play here.”

India's Supreme Court Says Muslim Women Can Invoke Secular Law for Maintenance Award After a Religious Divorce

In Mohd v. State of Telangana, (India Sup. Ct., July 10, 2024), a 2-judge panel of India's Supreme Court held that a Muslim woman who has been divorced under Muslim law, has a choice of seeking maintenance under the secular provisions of Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in addition to remedies available under the 1986 Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act. Each of the two justices wrote an opinion. Justices Nagarathna in his opinion said in part:

... [A] technical or pedantic interpretation of the 1986 Act would stultify not merely gender justice but also the constitutional right of access to justice for the aggrieved Muslim divorced women who are in dire need of maintenance. This Court would not countenance unjust or Faustian bargains being imposed on women. The emphasis is on sufficient maintenance, not minimal amount. After all, maintenance is a facet of gender parity and enabler of equality, not charity. It follows that a destitute Muslim woman has the right to seek maintenance under Section 125 of the CrPC despite the enactment of the 1986 Act. Thus, an application for maintenance under Section 125 of the CrPC would not prejudice another application under Section 3 of the 1986 Act insofar as the latter is additional in nature and does not pertain to the same requirements sought to be provided for by Section 125 of the CrPC. One cannot be a substitute for or supplant another; rather it is in addition to and not in derogation of the other.

The Independent reports on the decision.

United Methodist Church Is Not a Jural Entity That Can Be Sued Under NY Child Victims Act

In Chestnut v. United Methodist Church, (NY App. Div., July 10, 2024), a New York state appellate court held that the "United Methodist Church" is not a jural entity that can be sued under New York's Child Victims Act. Plaintiff, who alleged that she was sexually abused as a young child over a 4-year period by a youth group leader who was also the son of a clergyman, named 6 defendants. She alleged that United Methodist Church was in a principal-agent relationship with the Woodbury, New York church that employed the abuser. The court said in part:

Here, the issue of whether United Methodist Church is a jural entity capable of being sued does not concern a religious controversy, and, therefore, does not require the interpretation or application of ecclesiastical doctrine. Instead, the issue of whether United Methodist Church may be considered an unincorporated association rests entirely on neutral principles of law....

... [W]e conclude that the defendants established that United Methodist Church ... is a religious denomination ... and not a jural entity amenable to suit as an unincorporated association. It is undisputed that United Methodist Church does not have a principal place of business, does not have its own offices or employees, and does not and cannot hold title to property, and there is no proof in the record that United Methodist Church has incorporated or held itself out as a jural entity in any other jurisdiction....

... United Methodist Church governs itself through the efforts of United Methodists from all over the world who, at various levels, propose and adopt policies and procedures in the Discipline to be followed by, among others, local churches, annual conferences, and the various corporate entities at the general church level, such as GCFA. Given this unique structure, the hierarchical nature of United Methodist Church's "connectional" structure does not, in and of itself, suggest that United Methodist Church is an unincorporated association or anything other than a religious denomination.

Thursday, July 11, 2024

Arkansas Secretary of State Rejects Abortion Rights Initiative Petitions as Inadequate

Yesterday, Arkansas Secretary of State John Thurston rejected petitions to place a proposed state constitutional amendment on the November ballot that would have given women the right to obtain an abortion during the first 18 weeks after fertilization, and later in cases of rape, incest, fatal fetal anomaly, or to protect the mother's life or physical health. (Full text of Amendment via Arkansas Advocate reporting.) In his letter (full text via Arkansas Advocate reporting) rejecting the petitions, the Secretary of State said that proponents had failed to comply with statutory requirements to file a statement listing paid canvassers by name and stating that they had been supplied with specified information about collecting signatures. Proponents needed 90,704 signatures. Only 87,382 of the 101,525 submitted were from unpaid canvassers.

Suit Challenges HHS Rules Barring Gender Identity Discrimination in Federally Funded Health Care Programs

Suit was filed yesterday in a Missouri federal district court by six states and a national organization of pediatricians challenging new rules adopted in May by the Department of Health and Human Services barring discrimination on the basis of gender identity in federally funded health care programs. The complaint (full text) in State of Missouri v. Becerra, (ED MO, filed 7/10/2024), alleges in part:

1. ... [The] new final rule ... forces doctors to perform, refer for, or affirm harmful gender-transition procedures and forces States to pay for these dangerous procedures in state health plans....

2. HHS threatens to punish doctors and States who do not comply with the mandate by imposing huge financial penalties and excluding them from federally funded healthcare programs like Medicare, Medicaid, and the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP). This punishment would effectively preclude doctors and States from providing healthcare for the most vulnerable children in low-income communities.

3. This harmful rule violates the Affordable Care Act (ACA), the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the structural principles of federalism, and the freedom of speech.

4. Congress did not authorize any of this. The rule purports to implement the sex-discrimination prohibition in Section 1557 of the ACA, but there is no gender-transition mandate in that statute, nor in Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 from which it is derived. Nor did the rule (or the ACA) satisfy the constitutional requirements of clear notice for such a mandate: the States and healthcare providers did not agree to provide, pay for, or affirm gender-transition procedures when they began Medicaid, Medicare, and CHIP.

States bringing the lawsuit are Missouri, Utah, Arkansas, Iowa, North Dakota, South Dakota and Idaho. ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Wednesday, July 10, 2024

9th Circuit Hears Oral Arguments on Requiring Adoptive Parents to Support Gender Identity of Adoptees

The U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals yesterday heard oral arguments (video of full oral arguments) in Bates v. Pakseresht. In the case, an Oregon federal district court rejected plaintiff's free exercise and free speech challenges to the state's denial of her application to be certified to adopt children through the Oregon Department of Human Services. Plaintiff was denied certification because, consistent with her Christian religious beliefs, she would not agree in advance to support an adoptive child's sexual orientation, gender identity, and gender expression. (See prior posting.) Oregon Capital Chronicle reports on the oral arguments.