Nebraska Law on Abortion and Transgender Care Does Not Violate Single-Subject Rule

In Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc. v. Hilgers, (NE Sup. Ct., July 29, 2024), the Nebraska Supreme Court in a 6-1 decision held that a 2023 Nebraska statute, L.B. 574, which both restricts abortions and restricts gender-altering care for minors does not violate the state Constitution's single subject requirement for legislation.  Chief Justice Heavican's majority opinion said in part:

... [W]e reject Planned Parenthood’s contention that L.B. 574 is unconstitutional because its regulation of abortion does not further its regulation of gender-altering care and vice versa. Here, even though abortion and gender-altering care are distinct types of medical care, and even though L.B. 574 effectuates its purpose or object differently for each type, when broadly construing L.B. 574, all its provisions certainly are encompassed within the regulation of permissible medical care. We emphasize that, in our determination that the provisions of L.B. 574 each seek to regulate medical care, we make no comment on the substance of L.B. 574. Our focus is on whether L.B. 574 complies with article III, § 14.

Justice Papik, joined by Justice Stacy filed a concurring opinion. Justice Miller-Lerman filed a dissenting opinion.

Liberty Counsel issued a press release announcing the decision.

Denial of Foster Care Licensure Subject to Strict Scrutiny

In Burke v. Walsh, (D MA, June 5, 2024), a Massachusetts federal district court refused to dismiss free exercise and free speech claims brought against Massachusetts Department of Children and Families personnel in their official capacities. Plaintiffs, a Catholic couple, were denied licensure for foster care and adoption because they did not demonstrate the ability to support the well-being of an LGBTQIA+ child that might be placed with them. The court said in part:

The court concludes it was clearly established, in 2023, that DCF's individualized and discretionary assessment of Plaintiffs' foster license application was not a "generally applicable" policy and thus was subject to strict scrutiny. Under the governing regulations, DCF considers 17 different subjective criteria, all of which must be demonstrated "to the satisfaction of the Department," when deciding on a foster license application. 110 C.M.R. § 7.104(1). One of these requirements, upon which Defendants relied in denying Plaintiffs' application, is "to promote the physical, mental, and emotional well-being of a child placed in his or her care, including supporting and respecting a child's sexual orientation or gender identity."...

 ... [T]he court need not decide, at this stage, whether it was also clearly established that Defendants' conduct would not withstand strict scrutiny analysis under these circumstances.

7th Circuit Gives Broad Interpretation of "Religious" Claims Under Title VII

In Passarella v. Aspirus, Inc., (7th Cir., July 29, 2024), the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals in an opinion by Judge Scudder held that a request for a religious accommodation under Title VII may include secular elements. At issue were employees' requests for an exemption from the employer's Covid vaccine mandate. The court said in part:

At the pleading stage, an employee seeking an accommodation in the form of an exemption from an employer’s vaccine mandate must allege facts plausibly permitting an inference that some “aspect[]” of the request is based on the employee’s “religious observance and practice” or “belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). 

Applying the statutory language necessarily requires an exercise of judgment: the standard is not amenable to formulaic resolution like solving a math equation. To the contrary, its application requires a holistic assessment of the terms of the employee’s exemption request, with the controlling inquiry at the pleading stage being whether the employee plausibly based her vaccination exemption request at least in part on an aspect of her religious belief or practice.  

... An employee may object to an employer’s vaccine mandate on both religious and non-religious grounds—for example, on the view that receiving the vaccine would violate a religious belief and implicate health and safety concerns. Congress permitted this, as we see no other way to give effect to the breadth of its definition of “religion”—as covering “all aspects” of an employee’s religious observance, practice, and belief.... And, for its part, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, in implementing this same definition, has likewise emphasized that a religious objection to a workplace requirement may incorporate both religious and secular reasons.... 

Judge Rovner dissented, saying in part:

I recognize that Dottenwhy, in the statements she submitted to Aspirus, invoked her rights as a Christian, said she had prayed about the matter and sought guidance from G-d, and expressed her conviction that “HE is with me on this decision.” ... Without more, such statements are not enough, in my view, to transform an otherwise secular objection to the vaccine into a religiously-based one.... I am not convinced that Congress meant to compel an employer to grant any requested accommodation that an employee has prayed about and has concluded that his or her G-d supports. If that were so, there would be almost no limit to the accommodations that an employer would have to entertain under Title VII’s ban on religious discrimination....

Passarella’s statement came somewhat closer to describing a religious basis for a vaccine exemption, but in the end, I believe that Aspirus correctly understood her objection to the COVID-19 vaccine to be secular rather than religious....

It cannot be enough to state a claim for a religious accommodation to assert that because one’s conscience is G-d given, any decision one reaches in their good conscience is necessarily inspired and endorsed by G-d, and therefore is religious in nature.

In Bube v. Aspirius Hospital, Inc., (7th Cir., July 29, 2024), a different panel of the 7th Circuit, with only Judge Scudder being on both, reversed the dismissal of claims by two employees for religious exemptions from a hospital's Covid vaccine mandate. The court, in a unanimous opinion written by Judge Scudder, said in part:

We have no trouble concluding that both of these requests are based at least in part on an aspect of the plaintiffs’ religious beliefs. God “gave” Bube a “mind, body and soul” so that she feels obligated to avoid what she considers unsafe substances in order to remain healthy. And Hedrington was “created … perfectly” by God so that accepting a “risk[y]” vaccine would be a “sin.” ...

Scrutinizing the composition of these requests—especially at the pleading stage—runs counter to not only the broad language of Title VII but also the Supreme Court’s repeated warnings that the law requires a hands-off approach when it comes to defining and discerning the core limits of religious exercise.

3rd Circuit: Jury Issues Remain in Suit Over Religious Exemption from Covid Vaccine Mandate

In Spivack v. City of Philadelphia, (3d Cir., July 29, 2024), the U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the dismissal of a suit brought by Rachel Spivack, an Orthodox Jewish employee of the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office, and remanded the case for trial.  Spivack was dismissed from her position for refusing, on religious grounds, to comply with the Office's Covid vaccine mandate. Spivack contended:

 “[a]ll three available brands of COVID-19 vaccines constitute a profound violation of the scriptural prohibitions against forbidden mixtures,” and that “[i]njecting such forbidden substances directly into our bloodstream completely challenges scriptural teaching that regards one’s body as the repository of the soul made in God’s image.” ...

The appeals court said in part:

There is ... a dispute of material fact as to whether anti-religious hostility tainted the DAO’s treatment of religious exemptions.  That is because a reasonable jury could conclude, based on some evidence in the record, that the DAO’s treatment of religious exemptions reflected “intoleran[ce] of religious beliefs.”...

But Krasner claims that Spivack was disciplined under a later policy—the January 2022 policy, which eliminated the religious exemption altogether and kept only the medical exemption.... 

That Krasner continued to evaluate medical exemption requests under the January 2022 policy does not undermine that policy’s general applicability.  Medical exemptions were a separate and objectively defined category of exemption requests....

The critical question is whether the medical exemptions in these policies are comparable to a religious exemption—in other words, whether the “preferential treatment of secular behavior” in the form of a medical exemption “affect[s] the regulation’s purpose in the same way as the prohibited religious behavior.” ...

Unlike a religious exemption, a medical exemption furthers the DAO’s interest in keeping its employees safe and healthy by allowing employees for whom the COVID-19 vaccine would cause death or illness to abstain from vaccination....

[T]he DAO must show that its policy was narrowly tailored, which “requires the government to demonstrate that a policy is the least restrictive means of achieving its objective.”...

Unanswered factual questions pervade this inquiry.  How many similar exemption requests would the DAO need to grant?  Would other, less restrictive mitigation measures for employees with religious exemptions ... have achieved the office’s objectives?  If strict scrutiny applies, a jury must consider these questions....

First Liberty Institute issued a press release announcing the decision.

6 More States Enjoin Enforcement of New Title IX Rules Barring Transgender Discrimination

Yet another court has enjoined the Department of Education from enforcing its new Title IX rules that interpret Title IX's ban on sex discrimination as including a ban on gender identity discrimination. In State of Arkansas v. U.S. Department of Education, (ED MO, July 24, 2024), a Missouri federal district court issued a preliminary injunction barring enforcement against Arkansas, Missouri, Iowa, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota and the individual plaintiff, a student in a school in Arkansas who says the rule violates her religious beliefs.  the court said in part:

After preliminary review and without ultimately deciding the issue, the Court is persuaded that plaintiffs have a fair chance of prevailing on their argument that the reasoning of Bostock, a Title VII employment discrimination case, should not apply to Title IX. ...

Given that notice is the touchstone of Title IX, the statute contains no definition of sex or express prohibition of discrimination on the basis of gender identity, and it expressly permits sex-based differential treatment in certain circumstances, plaintiff States have met their preliminary burden of establishing a fair chance of prevailing on their argument that they lacked constitutionally sufficient notice that sex discrimination would be interpreted as including gender identity discrimination when they accepted federal funding under Title IX.

The court also preliminarily enjoined the new rules' expansion of the definition of harassment, concluding that the definition may violate the 1st Amendment by chilling speech. ADF issued a press release announcing the decision.

Recent Articles of Interest

From SSRN:

• Dov Fischer, Development of Accounting and the Jewish Calendar, a Comparative Study (Presentation Slides), (June 20, 2024).
• Justin Askins, Peace Lily (February 26, 2024).
• Bryan Dennis Tiojanco, Gender, Sexuality and Democratic Constitutionalism in the Philippines, (Chapter 8 of Wen-Chen Chang, Kelley Loper, Mara Malagodi, & Ruth Rubio-Marín (eds.), Gender, Sexuality and Constitutionalism in Asia, Bloomsbury Publishing, Jan 25. 2024).
• Muhammad Sarim Tahir, Concept of Usurpation(Ghasab) and its Remedies in Islamic Law of Torts and its Remedies  (February 05, 2024).
• Preston Green, Suzanne Eckes & Julie Mead, Chartering Religion: Educators' Civil Rights in Religious Charter Schools, (West's Education Law Reporter (forthcoming)).
• Muhammad Sarim Tahir, Khul'a Without Husband's Consent in the Eyes of Shariah vs Superior Courts of Pakistan: A Critical Analysis, (June 30, 2024).
• Bryan Dennis Tiojanco, Gender, Sexuality and Democratic Constitutionalism in the Philippines, (Chapter 8 of Wen-Chen Chang, Kelley Loper, Mara Malagodi, & Ruth Rubio-Marín (eds.), Gender, Sexuality and Constitutionalism in Asia, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2024).
• Benjamin Field, Jeff Rowes & Christian Lansinger, Brief of Appellees in Richwine v. Matuszak (7th Cir.) on the First Amendment Rights of End-of-Life Doulas, (June 28, 2024).

From SmartCILP:

• Frank Ravitch, Unprincipled, 61 Houston Law Review 517 (2024).

Nebraska Supreme Court Upholds Dismissal of Priest's Suit Against Archdiocese

 In Syring v. Archdiocese of Omaha, (NE Sup. Ct., July 26, 2024), the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of defamation, infliction of mental distress, interference with prospective employment and breach of fiduciary duty claims by a Catholic priest against his Archdiocese.  The priest was listed on an Archdiocese website that named those against whom there had been allegations of misconduct or abuse of a minor. He was forced to resign his ministry position and the Archdiocese refused to approve his serving as a hospital chaplain. The court held that the Archdiocese's action did not meet the standard for outrageous conduct needed to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. It went on the dismiss various of plaintiff's claims on the basis of the ministerial exception doctrine.  The court said in part:

Syring’s claims asserted that the Archdiocese “falsely impute[d] unfitness to preform [sic] duties of employment, and prejudice[d] [Syring] in his profession or trade.” The other claims were premised upon Syring’s assertion that the Archdiocese owed him fiduciary duties. For example, the complaint identified a purported breach of a fiduciary duty in the Archdiocese’s “requiring [Syring’s] resignation, and omitting to advise him of his right to counsel, both civil and canonical.”

We cannot uphold Syring’s claims without interfering with the internal governance of the church, or depriving the church of control, over the selection of its ministers. The claims— based on the conversation between officials of a Catholic archdiocese and a hospital operated by a Catholic religious order regarding permission for Syring to serve as a chaplain, Syring’s fitness to perform the duties of his employment, and the requiring of Syring’s resignation from that employment— lie at the heart of the ministerial exception articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court. The district court did not err in dismissing these claims.

Canadian Court Enjoins Enforcement of Guidelines That Adversely Impact Kosher Slaughtering

 In Jewish Community Council of Montreal v. Canada (Attorney General), (CA Fed. Ct., July 24, 2024), a judge of the Canadian Federal Court issued an interlocutory injunction preventing the Canadian Food Inspection Agency from enforcing Guidelines that require kosher slaughterers that do not stun animals before slaughter to test three indicators of unconsciousness before suspending an animal. Jewish organizations that are plaintiffs in the case say that imposition of the new Guidelines has reduced the volume of kosher beef produced in Canada by 55% and the volume of kosher veal by 90%. The court said in part:

The issue is therefore whether the Guidelines requiring the application of the three indicators of unconsciousness to ensure that an animal is unconscious before suspension, as required under section 143 of the SFCR, are reasonable when applied to shechita, or whether they represent an encroachment on the Applicants’ right to freedom of religion under subsection 2(a) of the Charter, or whether the requirement is discriminatory under section 15 of the Charter....

The Applicants submit that the Guidelines constitute a major departure from prior practice and are unduly protective as they essentially require that the animal be brain-dead before being suspended, when section 143 of the SFCR only requires that the animal be unconscious.... The Guidelines therefore require an unreasonable application of the precautionary principle which does not measurably add to animal welfare (as required under sections 141 to 144 of the SFCR) while slowing down the operation of kosher slaughter to the point where licence holders prefer to cease production. As a result, the Guidelines restrict access to kosher meat and prevent Canadian Jews from exercising the requirements of their faith.

The Guidelines are also discriminatory as they unfairly associate a religious practice of shechita to animal pain, and impose a challenge that does not apply to non-kosher meat production. The Guidelines therefore impose on Jews a burden and deny them benefits in a manner that has the effect of reinforcing, perpetuating, or exacerbating a disadvantage. Their Charter rights to freedom of religion and the right to equality enshrined in the Charter are therefore unjustifiably restricted....

For the perspective of shochetim and bodkim, they are deprived of their ability to practise their faith and profession, as they can no longer exercise their duties as religious leaders in the community. As shochetim and bodkim represent a precious resource for the Canadian Jewish community, the loss of their expertise will encroach on the Canadian Jewish community’s culture and collective aspect of religious beliefs. The interference is therefore substantial, both from an individual and collective point of view....

Hamodia reports on the decision. 

States Lack Standing to Challenge FDA's Rules on Dispensing of Abortion Pill

In State of Washington v. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, (9th Cir., July 24, 2024), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals refused to permit the state of Idaho (and 6 other states) to intervene in a lawsuit brought by a group of states led by the state of Washington challenging the FDA's restrictions on pharmacies' dispensing of the abortion pill mifepristone. FDA regulations adopted in 2021 allow mifepristone to be dispensed by pharmacies in retail locations or by mail, but only if the pharmacy is specially certified to do so. Washington's lawsuit contends that the certification and documentation requirements are unnecessary.  Idaho, on the other hand, wants the court to order the FDA to go back to earlier requirements that only allowed mifepristone to be dispensed in person by a physician and did not allow it to be obtained directly from pharmacies. The court concluded that because Idaho seeks fundamentally different relief that does Washington, it must establish its own standing in order to intervene. The court concluded that Idaho did not have separate standing, saying in part:

Idaho first alleges that elimination of the in-person dispensing requirement will cause the state economic injury in the form of increased costs to the state’s Medicaid system.  At oral argument, Idaho stated that this is its “strongest basis” for standing.  Even taking Idaho’s highly speculative allegations as true, the complaint does not demonstrate an injury-in-fact because it depends on an attenuated chain of healthcare decisions by independent actors that will have only indirect effects on state revenue....

Idaho next alleges that elimination of the in-person dispensing requirement will harm its sovereign interest in law enforcement by making illegal mifepristone use harder to detect.  This allegation is insufficient to convey standing because nothing in the 2023 REMS impairs Idaho’s sovereign authority to enact or enforce its own laws regulating chemical abortion....

Finally, Idaho alleges that elimination of the in-person dispensing requirement will harm its “quasi-sovereign interest” in maternal health and fetal life.  Idaho cannot sue FDA on this basis because the allegations concern the interests of individual citizens—not the separate interests of the state itself....

Courthouse News Service reports on the decision. [Thanks to Thomas Rutledge for the lead.]

Arkansas Supreme Court Orders Initial Count of Signatures on Abortion Amendment Petitions

 In Cowles v. Thurston, (AR Sup. Ct., July 23, 2024), the Arkansas Supreme Court ordered the state Secretary of State to perform an initial count of signatures submitted by volunteer canvassers for a state constitutional amendment that would give women the right to obtain an abortion during the first 18 weeks after fertilization, and later in cases of rape, incest, fatal fetal anomaly, or to protect the mother's life or physical health. As previously reported, the Secretary of State rejected all the petitions because they were not accompanied by required paperwork regarding those submitted by paid canvassers. 3 Justices would have gone further and given proponents a 30-day cure period. Arkansas Advocate reports on the Court Order. [Thanks to Thomas Rutledge for the lead.]

Equally Divided New Jersey Supreme Court Dismisses Defamation Suit Against Jewish School

 In Hyman v. Rosenbaum Yeshiva of North Jersey, (NJ Sup. Ct., July 24, 2024), an equally divided New Jersey Supreme Court decision resulted in affirmance through a short per curiam opinion of the dismissal of defamation claims brought against an Orthodox Jewish school by a Judaic Studies teacher whose employment by the school was terminated. The Justices were equally divided on whether discovery should be permitted in the case.

The 6 justices participating in the decision unanimously agreed on the standard for applying the ministerial exception, saying that the court must analyze each element of plaintiff's claim and determine whether adjudicating it would require the court to choose between competing religious visions or would interfere with a church's administrative prerogatives including its right to select and control the duties of its ministers, whether or not the alleged misconduct is rooted in religious belief. Here plaintiff's employment was terminated for inappropriate touching of female students. Information about his termination was emailed to the school's Board of Directors, parents of current students and faculty members. The letter was subsequently disseminated on social media.

Justice Patterson's concurring opinion for 3 justices said in part:

Here, the religious employer’s allegedly defamatory statement was not a description of claimed misconduct by Hyman; no such description appears in Price’s letter to the school community.  Instead, Hyman’s defamation claims are premised on Price’s statement that “it was determined that Rabbi Hyman’s conduct had been neither acceptable nor consistent with how a rebbe in our Yeshiva should interact with students.”  In short, the statement at the heart of this case was not an assertion of fact about the former students’ allegations, but an explanation of the Yeshiva’s decision to terminate Hyman -- a determination made in consultation with halachic authorities as well as legal counsel.  With or without discovery regarding the details of the allegations, the court’s inquiry as to the merits would be the same:  the court would be required to assess the reasons for a religious institution’s decision to terminate the employment of a minister, an inquiry that would violate the First Amendment.

Justice Pierre-Louis' dissenting opinion for 3 justices said in part: 

In order for a court to make [a determination that the ministerial exception applies] ... plaintiffs must be allowed discovery.... [U]nder the concurring opinion’s analysis, a religious entity can seemingly fire an employee based solely on a personal vendetta, publish a knowingly false and defamatory statement about the plaintiff, and shield itself from liability -- and even discovery -- by invoking the ministerial exception.  Such a holding slams the courthouse door shut on potentially wronged plaintiffs before they can even obtain discovery that would allow a court to determine whether adjudicating their claims actually interferes with religious autonomy....

Defendants have conflated the issues in this case, making it appear as though this defamation case is the same as an employment discrimination case.  But assessing the legality of what a religious institution says about an adverse employment action is not the same thing as determining the lawfulness of the adverse action itself.  The latter necessarily requires a court to interfere with a religious institution’s internal management, its doctrinal specificities, and its decisions regarding who preaches the faith, but the former does not.

Becket Fund issued a press release announcing the decision.

Leader in International Neo-Nazi Group Indicted for Soliciting Hate Crimes and Mass Violence

The U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of New York announced last week the federal indictment of the leader of an international neo-Nazi group. The press release said in part:

A federal grand jury in Brooklyn yesterday returned a four-count indictment charging Georgian national Michail Chkhikvishvili, also known as ... “Commander Butcher” ... with soliciting hate crimes and acts of mass violence in New York City.  Chkhikvishvili was arrested in Chișinău, Moldova on July 6, 2024 pursuant to an Interpol Wanted Person Diffusion.... Chkhikvishvili is alleged to be a leader of the Maniac Murder Cult,... an international racially or ethnically motivated violent extremist group.  Chkhikvishvili allegedly recruited others to commit violent acts in furtherance of MKY’s ideologies, including planning and soliciting a mass casualty attack in New York City....

Beginning in approximately November 2023, Chkhikvishvili solicited [an FBI undercover agent ("UC")] ... to commit violent crimes....  Chkhikvishvili provided detailed plans and materials such as bomb-making instructions and guidance on making Molotov cocktails.... In November 2023, Chkhikvishvili began planning a mass casualty attack in New York City to take place on New Year’s Eve.  The scheme involved an individual dressing up as Santa Claus and handing out candy laced with poison to racial minorities.  The scheme also involved providing candy laced with poison to children at Jewish schools in Brooklyn.  Chkhikvishvili drafted step-by-step instructions to carry out the scheme and shared with the UC detailed manuals on creating and mixing lethal poisons and gases.  He also instructed the UC on methods of making ricin-based poisons in powder and liquid form....

Prison Sentences Imposed in Two Separate Antisemitism Cases

Yesterday, an Indiana federal district court sentenced 67-year-old Andrezj Boryga to 24 months in prison followed by two years of supervised release after Boryga pleaded guilty to transmitting antisemitic threats in interstate commerce.  According to a Justice Department press release:

... [B]etween July 9 and Dec. 14, 2022, Boryga left voicemails at Anti-Defamation League offices located in New York, Texas, Colorado, and Nevada. Boryga used antisemitic slurs on eight voicemails as he threatened to assault or kill Jewish people.

Yesterday a New Jersey federal district court sentenced 29-year-old Dion Marsh to 40 years in prison followed by 5 years of supervised release after Marsh pleaded guilty to committing a series of violent assaults on visibly identifiable members of the Lakewood, New Jersey, Orthodox Jewish community.  According to a Justice Department press release:

[Marsh] pleaded guilty... to ... five counts of violating the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act and one count of carjacking. With respect to the Shepard Byrd Act violations, Marsh admitted to willfully causing bodily injury to five victims and attempting to kill and cause injuries with dangerous weapons to four of the victims because they are Jewish.

Report Ranking States on Legal Protections for Religious Liberty Released

 Last Friday, the Center for Religion, Culture and Democracy announced release of its 2024 report (full text) on Religious Liberty in the States. According to the Report:

Now in its third annual edition, RLS 2024 considers thirty-nine distinct kinds of legal provisions that states may adopt to protect religious liberty. These legal provisions, which we refer to as “items,” are aggregated into sixteen “safeguards” that we then average to produce one index score per state. The index allows us to rank states and to track changes in religious liberty protections over time....

States are far more likely to pass some protections than others. States either do not have mandates that require health-insurance plans to cover contraception, abortion, and/or sterilization or, if they do, most include a religious accommodation so that organizations that have religious objections to covering such procedures are not compelled to do so. Every state in the union requires children to be vaccinated before attending public (and sometimes private) schools, but the vast majority provide exemptions for families that have religious objections to vaccinations. And most states either provide absentee ballots for any reason or permit individuals who have religious commitments that prevent them from voting in person to receive them. 

The least widely adopted protections include guaranteeing that medical professionals and organizations with religious objections to providing contraception will not be compelled to do so. Very few states permit public officials who may be asked to participate in a wedding ceremony to decline to do so for religious reasons. Finally, only one state permits for-profit businesses to decline to participate in wedding ceremonies to which their owners/employees have sincere religious objections.

 This year's report ranks Illinois first and West Virginia 50th in protections for religious liberty.

Church Obtains Preliminary Injunction Under RLUIPA Allowing Its On-Site Shelter Program to Continue

In Church of the Rock, Inc. v. Town of Castle Rock, Colorado, (D CO, July 19, 2024), a Colorado federal district court granted a church a preliminary injunction preventing the Town of Castle Rock from interfering with the church's use of an RV and a trailer on church property in its On-Site Temporary Shelter Ministry. The court said in part:

The Town argues that the Church’s RLUIPA claim is not likely to succeed because the applicable zoning regulations do not substantially burden the Church’s exercise of its religious beliefs.... The Town instead characterizes the nature of the burden as a “mere inconvenience” and suggests that the Church could find other ways to satisfy its religious compulsion to provide for the needy, such as by providing hotel rooms or housing in other areas that are zoned for residential use.... It also suggests that finding a substantial burden in this case “effectively would be granting an automatic exemption to religious organizations from generally applicable land use regulations.”

The Church responds that its religious beliefs don’t just obligate it to provide for the needy in some general way; they obligate it to provide for the needy on Church property....

The Church has carried its burden on this question.... Although the Town alludes to a bit of a disconnect between the Church’s assertion that it is compelled to allow the poor to “live among you” and its desire to have people live in RVs on Church grounds rather than in homes and residential areas where Church members live, it does not ultimately dispute the sincerity of the Church’s assertions on this point, which are supported by sworn affidavits....

(See prior related posting.)  CBS News reports on the decision.

Recent Articles of Interest

From SSRN:

• Perry Dane, Some Thoughts on the Architecture of Freedom of Religion and Freedom of Speech, (Notre Dame Law Review Reflection (2024)).
• Nitsan Plitman, Harnessing Religious Arguments for The Benefit of Trans Advocacy: A New Approach, (Harvard Civil Rights - Civil Liberties Law Review, Vol. 58, pp. 395 (2023)).
• Matthew Cavedon, Fraternal Pluralism: How Catholics Approach Others, (July 15, 2024).
• Michel Rosenfeld, The Place of 'Hate' in Hate Speech: A Jurisprudential and Comparative Constitutional Inquiry, (Oxford Handbook of Hate Speech, Cardozo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2024-28).
• Jeffrey A. Redding, Queer in a Time of Kashmir, (October 06, 2023).
• Areeba Butt, Minority Rights Under International Law, (July 03, 2024).
• Tyler B. Lindley, Anachronistic Readings of Section 1983, (June 14, 2024).
• Jordan Carr Peterson, Implementing Equality: State (Non)Compliance with Judicial Revisions to Public Policy on Gay Rights, (Law & Policy, Forthcoming).

From SmartCILP:

• Saumya Saxena, Policing Sati: Law, Order, and Spectacle in Postcolonial India, 41 Law & History Review 341-363 (2023).
• Leilah Vevaina, Mergers and Legal Fictions: Coverture and Intermarried Women in India, 41 Law & History Review 387-404 (2023).

Religious College Loses RFRA Challenge to SBA's Loan Forgiveness Rules

 In Gordon College v. U.S. Small Business Administration, (D DC, July 18, 2024), the D.C. federal district court dismissed claims by a religious nonprofit college that its rights under RFRA as well as the 1st and 14th Amendments were infringed when it was denied forgiveness of a $7 million loan that it received under the Covid era Paycheck Protection Program. Loan forgiveness was available to qualifying small businesses. Gordon College's loan forgiveness application was denied because it had over 500 employees and thus did not meet the SBA's small-business size standard. Rejecting plaintiff's RFRA claim, the court said in part:

... [P]laintiff fails to identify a “sincere religious belief” that has been infringed by application of the PPP’s 500-employee cap to plaintiff.... Absent here ... is any articulated connection between plaintiff’s asserted need to have more than 500 employees and its exercise of religion.  Plaintiff, for example, does not allege that “any religious group” has “as one of its tenets” the requirement that an associated religious institution have more than 500 employees ... or that it has treated having more than 500 employees to “ris[e] to [any] level of significance in [its] religion.”...

As to plaintiff's Constitutional challenges, the court said in part: 

... [T]he application of the PPP’s 500-employee cap to plaintiff is neutral and generally applicable, thereby triggering rational basis review, rather than strict scrutiny.  Plaintiff has failed to bring a rational-basis challenge by not plausibly alleging that no reasonable set of facts could provide a rational basis for the PPP’s 500-employee cap.  Accordingly, plaintiff’s Free Exercise and Equal Protection claims are dismissed....

Here, plaintiff alleges that “[d]efendants have interfered with the autonomy of [plaintiff] to define its own doctrine, membership, employment, staffing, affiliation, and other internal requirements” by “insisting on certain requirements [sic] for determining staffing and employment.... [P]laintiff has failed ... to explain why the PPP’s 500-employee cap... interfered with any “matters of faith and doctrine.”  Plaintiff’s religious autonomy claim is thus dismissed.

International Representatives Release Guidelines for Countering Antisemitism

On Wednesday in Buenos Aires, Argentina, representatives of 36 nations and international organizations, including U.S. Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Antisemitism Ambassador Deborah Lipstadt, released a set of legally nonbinding Global Guidelines for Countering Antisemitism (full text). Thursday was the 30th anniversary of the 1994 Hizballah bombing of the Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA) in Buenos Aires in which 85 people were killed. On Thursday, Secretary of State Blinken issued a statement (full text) announcing the Guidelines, saying in part:

The United States is pleased to play a leadership role, together with the European Union, the Organization of American States, the Government of Argentina, and other governments and international bodies, in advancing these guidelines and we invite others across the international community to endorse and implement them.  The Guidelines identify practical actions that governments, international bodies, civil society organizations, and people of conscience everywhere can take against antisemitism wherever and whenever it occurs.

Suit Challenges California's Ban on School Parental Notification Requirements as to Gender Transitioning

A school district and parents of school-age children filed suit this week in a California federal district court challenging California's recently-enacted AB 1955.  The statute prohibits school districts from requiring notification of parents when their children are socially transitioning their gender in school, unless the student consents to the disclosure. The complaint (full text) in Chino Valley Unified School District v. Newsom alleges that the statute violates parental rights to control the upbringing of their children and parents' free exercise rights as well as being preempted by the federal Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act. The complaint alleges in part:

The Parent Plaintiffs have each alleged that they are devout Christians who believe God created man and woman as distinct, immutable genders; their religious beliefs require that they be notified if their child requests to socially transition at school so that they may be involved with their child's treatment at school.

ABC News 10 reports on the lawsuit.

Russian Court Bans Online Sale of Souvenir Toilet Paper: Depiction Offends Feelings of Religious Believers

Moscow Times and Vyorstka reported yesterday that a Russian District Court in Moscow has banned the offering on four websites in Russia of souvenir toilet paper imprinted with images of the 1997 version of Russia's 1000-ruble bills. The court found that the toilet paper "offends the feelings of religious believers" in violation of Article 148 of the Russian Penal Code. The 1000-ruble bill carries a picture of a statue of Yaroslav the Wise who was Grand Prince of Kiev from 1019 to 1054. Yaroslav the Wise was canonized in 2016 by the Bishops Council of the Russian Orthodox Church. Prior to that, in 2005 he was named a local saint by the Patriarch of Moscow and in 2004 he was included in the calendar of saints of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate). The court said in part:

In a free democratic society, the dissemination of illegal information capable of offending the religious feelings of believers cannot be protected by freedom of thought, speech, opinion and information

Company Settles EEOC Suit for $110,000, Compensating Employee Whose Religious Objections to Vaccine Were Ignored

 A national furniture retailer, Hank's Furniture, has settled a Title VII religious discrimination lawsuit brought against it by the EEOC. Under a consent decree, Hank's will pay $110,000 in damages and will implement a written policy assuring broad accommodation of religious beliefs that do not impose an undue burden. According to the EEOC's press release:

... [A] former assistant manager at HFI’s Pensacola, Florida, location notified the company that her religious beliefs prevented her from receiving a COVID-19 vaccine. Rather than discuss the employee’s religious beliefs to determine the feasibility of an accommodation, management ignored accommodation requests then summarily denied the employee’s requests and attempted to dispute the validity of her sincerely-held religious beliefs.

9th Circuit: Zen Apprentice's Suit Dismissed Under Ministerial Exception Doctrine

In Behrend v. San Francisco Zen Center, Inc., (9th Cir., July 17, 2024), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal under the ministerial exception doctrine of a disability discrimination suit brought by plaintiff who worked at the Zen Center as a Work Practice Apprentice.  The court said in part:

Behrend ... appeals, arguing that he was not a minister because he performed mostly menial work and did not have a “key role in making internal church decisions and transmitting the faith to others.”...

Behrend was tasked with performing maintenance, kitchen, and guest services. But he was also responsible for assisting with rituals, participating in meditations and services, cleaning the temple, attending talks and classes, and performing doan ryo ceremonial tasks like ringing bells and cleaning altars. He lived and worked full time at the temple as a monk. While Behrend may not have taught and was not a part of the hierarchical leadership structure, he “performed vital religious duties” as part of the Center’s WPA program.... In short, were the court to adopt a rule like the one Behrend suggests, we would be “interfering with the freedom of religious groups to select” who may or may not serve as a live-in monk.

Cert. Petitions Filed in Challenges to Bans on Transgender Women on Women's Sports Teams

Last week, a petition for certiorari (full text) was filed in the U.S. Supreme Court seeking review in Little v. Hecox, (Docket No. 24-38, cert. filed 7/11/2024). At issue in the case is whether Idaho's Fairness in Women's Sports Act violates the Equal Protection Clause.  The Act prohibits transgender women and girls from participating on women's sports teams in public elementary schools, high schools and public colleges. Here are the 9th Circuit opinions issued in the case and text of the relevant statutes.

In a related case, State of West Virginia v. B.P.J., (Docket No. 24-23, cert. filed July 16, 2024), a petition for certiorari (full text) was filed in a case challenging West Virginia's Save Women's Sports Act as violative of Title IX and of the Equal Protection Clause.  At issue is the ban on transgender girls participating on girls' sports teams in public high schools or state colleges where team members are chosen on the basis of competitive skills or in contact sports. Here is the 4th Circuit's opinion in the case and the text of the relevant statute.

ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the petitions.

Diocese Not Liable in Bankruptcy for Sex Abuse Without Agency Relationship with Abuser or Abuser's Institution

In In re Roman Catholic Diocese of Rockville Centre, New York, (SD NY, July 15, 2024), a New York federal district court affirmed a bankruptcy court's dismissal of appellants' claims that they were sexually abused as children by clergy and staff at religious institutions in the diocese's territory. The court said in part:

... [T]o adequately assert state law tort claims, Claimants must plead that the Debtor had some control over the abusers or the religious institutions where the abuse occurred....  In other words, Claimants were required to plead the existence of an employment or agency relationship between the Diocese and the alleged abusers, or an agency relationship between the Diocese and the religious institutions.   

The bankruptcy court properly determined that Claimants offered no non-conclusory allegations to support either theory of liability....

The bankruptcy court correctly observed that “the Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution bar courts from interpreting issues of religious Canon Law to resolve disputes.”...  Instead, “the claimants must show that an employment or agency relationship existed between the Debtor and abuser or Religious Institutions/Orders, based on facts relevant to those theories as they are normally established in the secular context.”... [T]he resolution of the issue presented in this case ... does not, however, depend upon any interpretation of Canon Law that would violate the First Amendment.  Here, Claimants fail to state a claim because the allegation that the Diocese revoked the faculties of one abuser accused in connection with a claim that is not at issue in this appeal is insufficient to plausibly allege that the specific abusers at issue here were employees or agents of the Diocese, or that their institutions were agencies of the Diocese.... [A]n allegation that the Diocese hired, fired, supervised, or disciplined an individual not at issue in this appeal does not support an inference that the Diocese has the power to control all clergy or staff at Catholic institutions within its geographic territory or exercised that power over any specific abuser in this appeal....

Former Priest's Defamation Claim Dismissed Under Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine

In Episcopal Diocese of Southern Virginia v. Marshall, (VA App., July 16, 2024), a Virginia state appellate court held that a defamation per se claim by a former Episcopalian priest against a bishop who removed him from the ministry should be dismissed under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. The former priest, Robert Marshall, allegedly made improper comments to a female employee. The court said in part:

We find that the defamation claim is inextricably intertwined with the disciplinary proceedings that led to the priest’s ouster.  In addition, the trier of fact would have to decide if the priest committed “sexual misconduct” within the meaning of canon law, which proscribes a broader swath of conduct than secular law....

Marshall claims that the bishop falsely stated that the investigator had “determined that the allegations had merit.” ... He says that the bishop falsely stated that Marshall had admitted to the improper conduct....  He pleads that Bishop Haynes also lied when she claimed that the church had followed the process required under ecclesiastical law....

[A]lthough Marshall denies that he wants a secular court to undo his defrocking, his defamation claim is so intertwined with the bishop’s deposing him as a priest that the defamation claim cannot be litigated without entangling the court in a religious dispute.  When a priest who has been fired sues the church and its leadership raising tort claims that cannot be unscrambled from the church’s decision to fire him, “the First Amendment has struck the balance for us.” ...  Churches have an overarching interest “in choosing who will preach their beliefs, teach their faith, and carry out their mission.” ... In order for a church to remain “free to choose those who will guide it on its way,” ... such tort claims must sometimes give way. 

... The trial court erred in concluding that Marshall’s claim for defamation per se against Bishop Haynes could be resolved on secular principles...

2nd Circuit: Trial Court Must Make Further Findings in Wedding Photographer's Challenge to NY Public Accommodation Law

In Emilee Carpenter, LLC, dba Emilee Carpenter Photography v. James, (2d Cir., July 12, 2024), the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded a New York federal district court's dismissal of a free speech challenge by a wedding photographer to New York's public accommodation law that bars discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.  The photographer refuses because of her religious and personal beliefs to photograph same-sex weddings.  The court held that the case must be remanded for further fact finding in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's intervening decision in 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis. The court said in part:

... [W]hether Carpenter’s actual wedding photography services constitute expressive conduct is an open threshold question for the district court to consider on remand...

To state a compelled speech claim, it is not enough for a plaintiff to show that the service at issue involves a medium of expression.  The plaintiff must also demonstrate that the expressive activity is her own – that is, she created the expressive content herself or, by compiling or curating third-party content in some forum, she is also engaged in her own expressive activity....

Here, to the extent Carpenter is using her photographs or website to host the expressive content of third parties (such as the wedding couple who hired her), rather than her own, the district court must determine ... whether the law compels Carpenter’s own speech....

Specifically, the court should assess whether Carpenter’s blogging is more akin to, for instance, advertisement than to a service Carpenter offers to the general public, which her customers purchase from her—in other words, whether Carpenter’s blogging is a good or service regulated by New York’s public accommodations laws....

The court rejected the photographer's expressive association, free exercise, Establishment Clause and vagueness claims, saying in part:

Nowhere in her complaint does Carpenter allege that she offers as a service to the public her active religious participation in the weddings that she photographs.  New York’s laws therefore do not require Carpenter to sing, pray, follow an officiant’s instructions, act as a “witness” of the union “before God,” or otherwise participate in any same-sex wedding....

Courthouse News Service and ADF report on the decision. 

Recent Articles of Interest

From SSRN:

• Dennis J. Wieboldt III, Christian History Meets Constitutional History: John Courtney Murray's Augustinian Political Theology of the American Founding, (Horizons 51 (2024).
• Dennis J. Wieboldt III, Natural Law Appeals as Method of American-Catholic Reconciliation: Catholic Legal Thought and the Red Mass in Boston, 1941-1944, (U.S. Catholic Historian 41 (2023)).
• Dennis J. Wieboldt III, Natural Law for the Laity: A Case Study in Catholic Education on the Airwaves, (Theology and Media(tion): Rendering the Absent Present (Orbis Books, 2024)).
• Dennis J. Wieboldt III, The 'Crusading Fanatics' of American Law: American Jesuits and the Origins of the Neo-Scholastic Legal Revival, 1870-1960, (Journal of Law and Religion (forthcoming)).
• Caleb Ridings, The Illinois Antinomy: The Story Behind America's Unexpected Free Exercise Vanguard, (Journal of Global Justice and Public Policy, Volume 11 (forthcoming)).

From SSRN (Non-U.S. Law):

• Zainab Zaya Khan, Freedom of Religion in India-Current Scenario & Supreme Court, (June 05, 2024).
• Anxhela Sulaj, Law And Religion in Albania Religious Diversity and Coexistence Albania as A Model of Tolerance and Coexistence, (April 29, 2024).
• Maryam Bibi & Muhammad Abdullah Fazi, Ascendance of Populist Radical Right Politics in India and Islamophobia: A Politico-Legal Analysis of the Bharatiya Janata Party, (July 01, 2024).
• Nzube Udechukwu, The Custom of Refund of Bride Price as a Condition for Divorce: Critical Analysis of Reuben v. Reuben, (July 06, 2024).
• Disha Wadekar & Sukanya Shantha, A Note on Caste-Based Division of Labour and Discriminatory Classification Against Denotified Tribes Inside Indian Prisons, (April 01, 2024).
• Mahabub Ul Alam Khan, The Islamic Origins of Human Rights: Alignments with Bangladesh's Legal Framework and Policy Suggestions for Legislators, (June 16, 2024).
• Jack Tsen-Ta Lee, Speaking of the Dead: Human Remains as Heritage in the Singapore Context, (Gdańskie Studia Azji Wschodniej, issue 25, 2024).

From SmartCILP:

• Clay W. Crozier, "Purposefulness" throughout the Doctrines: The Importance of Masterpiece Cakeshop and Its Contribution to Constitutional Analysis, 36 Regent University Law Review 59-85 (2023).

Church Ceremony Without Marriage License Was Enough to Create a Civil Marriage In New York

In L.F. v. M.A., (NY Cnty. Sup. Ct., July 9, 2024), a New York state trial court, in a divorce action, held that a ceremony at a Coptic Orthodox Church in New York was sufficient to consider the parties civilly married even though they did not obtain a civil marriage license. Defendant had contended that the ceremony was merely a family blessing, and that the parties were never married.  According to the court:

At stake is not just the status of the parties' young child in common or spousal maintenance, but potentially millions of dollars in what would be marital assets versus separate property.

In a prior decision, the court ordered the Bishop who performed the ceremony to testify about it. In the current decision, the court said in part:

... [T]he parties participated in a religious solemnized ceremony, one that so looked like a wedding that the church's Father H.H. prepared the marriage certificate, and until one day before his testimony here, never thought anything other than that the parties were married that day in that ceremony. Plaintiff believed she was married — that is undisputed. Defendant now states that he did not think he was married, but his actions during the years immediately after the ceremony paint a clear and undisputed picture that he could have only thought that he was married and not otherwise.... In reaching its determination, the Court must, and does, apply neutral principles of law, and does not reach into religious details of a ceremony within the Coptic Orthodox Church. The court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Plaintiff has more than carried her burden that there was indeed a religious marriage ceremony that day, and further, that both parties so understood, as well, as did Father H.H. (and at least some of their wedding's witnesses).

Catholic Counselors Challenge Michigan's Transgender Conversion Therapy Ban

Suit was filed last week in a Michigan federal district court challenging the constitutionality of Michigan statutes that ban counselors from engaging in conversion therapy with minors, particularly as applied to counseling minors regarding their gender identity. The complaint (full text) in Catholic Charities of Jackson, Lenawee and Hillsdale Counties v. Whitmer, (WD MI, filed 7/12/2024), alleges that the ban violates counselors' and patients' free speech rights, parents' right to control the upbringing of their children, free exercise rights of plaintiffs and parents, as well as alleging that the statute is void for vagueness.  The complaint reads in part:

115. Plaintiffs intend to continue helping young people live consistently with their own religious beliefs on matters of gender identity and sexuality—including young people who desire to align their gender identity with their biological sex, or who desire to refrain from acting on sexual attractions outside the context of male–female marriage.  

116. HB 4616 prohibits Plaintiffs from using their professional training to help young people who have these goals....

125. Because Plaintiffs are chilled or prohibited from discussing issues of human sexuality and gender identity, their clients are denied access to ideas they wish to hear and to counseling that would help them live consistently with their own personal, religious, and life goals. 

126. Parents of these children are likewise deprived of their right to direct the religious upbringing of their children by obtaining counseling that respects their religious identity. 

127. This acutely impacts religious minorities. Such religious minorities are underrepresented among counselors generally, and it is especially difficult to find counselors willing to counsel minors who are struggling to reconcile their faith with their gender identity and sexuality....

Becket Fund issued a press release announcing the lawsuit. 

School's Exclusion of Fellowship of Christian Athletes Violates RFRA and 1st Amendment

 In Fellowship of Christian Athletes v. District of Columbia, (D DC, July 11, 2024), a D.C. federal district court issued a preliminary injunction requiring D.C.'s Jackson Reed High School to reinstate Fellowship of Christian Athletes as a recognized student organization for the school year 2024-2025. FCA's recognition had been suspended because it required its student leaders to affirm its Statement of Faith which bars sexual relations outside of heterosexual marriage and bars any sexually immoral act including homosexuality. This was seen as a violation of the school's anti-discrimination policy. The court concluded that applying the anti-discrimination policy in this manner violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act because it substantially burdens FCA's exercise of religion. The court said in part:

[T]he District’s interest is unjustifiably speculative.  It seeks to “protect[] the safety and well-being of its students by promoting an equitable environment free of discrimination.”... [T]he District readily admits that a student in noncompliance with FCA’s Statement of Faith—whether an atheist, Jewish, gay, or lesbian student—is unlikely to seek a leadership position....  The District can thus offer “only speculation” that FCA’s reinstatement would pose an actual threat of discrimination against any Jackson-Reed student based on a protected characteristic.... Such a speculative goal does not pass muster under strict scrutiny.  

Moreover, the District’s exclusion of FCA as a means of eliminating discrimination is “fatally underinclusive.”... [T]he District permits student groups besides FCA to continue operating at Jackson-Reed even though they restrict membership on the basis of protected characteristics and/or ideological alignment....  The District’s “interest” in nondiscrimination “cannot justify” a nondiscrimination policy “that requires only religious” groups to “bear [its] weight.” ...

The court also concluded that the school had violated the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause, concluding that the school's policy was not generally applicable and thus was subject to strict scrutiny. It said in part:

[T]he District permits secular groups to limit their membership to ideologically aligned students while denying the same right to FCA with respect to its leadership. The Court can find “no meaningful constitutionally acceptable distinction between the types of exclusions at play here.”

India's Supreme Court Says Muslim Women Can Invoke Secular Law for Maintenance Award After a Religious Divorce

In Mohd v. State of Telangana, (India Sup. Ct., July 10, 2024), a 2-judge panel of India's Supreme Court held that a Muslim woman who has been divorced under Muslim law, has a choice of seeking maintenance under the secular provisions of Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in addition to remedies available under the 1986 Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act. Each of the two justices wrote an opinion. Justices Nagarathna in his opinion said in part:

... [A] technical or pedantic interpretation of the 1986 Act would stultify not merely gender justice but also the constitutional right of access to justice for the aggrieved Muslim divorced women who are in dire need of maintenance. This Court would not countenance unjust or Faustian bargains being imposed on women. The emphasis is on sufficient maintenance, not minimal amount. After all, maintenance is a facet of gender parity and enabler of equality, not charity. It follows that a destitute Muslim woman has the right to seek maintenance under Section 125 of the CrPC despite the enactment of the 1986 Act. Thus, an application for maintenance under Section 125 of the CrPC would not prejudice another application under Section 3 of the 1986 Act insofar as the latter is additional in nature and does not pertain to the same requirements sought to be provided for by Section 125 of the CrPC. One cannot be a substitute for or supplant another; rather it is in addition to and not in derogation of the other.

The Independent reports on the decision.

United Methodist Church Is Not a Jural Entity That Can Be Sued Under NY Child Victims Act

In Chestnut v. United Methodist Church, (NY App. Div., July 10, 2024), a New York state appellate court held that the "United Methodist Church" is not a jural entity that can be sued under New York's Child Victims Act. Plaintiff, who alleged that she was sexually abused as a young child over a 4-year period by a youth group leader who was also the son of a clergyman, named 6 defendants. She alleged that United Methodist Church was in a principal-agent relationship with the Woodbury, New York church that employed the abuser. The court said in part:

Here, the issue of whether United Methodist Church is a jural entity capable of being sued does not concern a religious controversy, and, therefore, does not require the interpretation or application of ecclesiastical doctrine. Instead, the issue of whether United Methodist Church may be considered an unincorporated association rests entirely on neutral principles of law....

... [W]e conclude that the defendants established that United Methodist Church ... is a religious denomination ... and not a jural entity amenable to suit as an unincorporated association. It is undisputed that United Methodist Church does not have a principal place of business, does not have its own offices or employees, and does not and cannot hold title to property, and there is no proof in the record that United Methodist Church has incorporated or held itself out as a jural entity in any other jurisdiction....

... United Methodist Church governs itself through the efforts of United Methodists from all over the world who, at various levels, propose and adopt policies and procedures in the Discipline to be followed by, among others, local churches, annual conferences, and the various corporate entities at the general church level, such as GCFA. Given this unique structure, the hierarchical nature of United Methodist Church's "connectional" structure does not, in and of itself, suggest that United Methodist Church is an unincorporated association or anything other than a religious denomination.

Arkansas Secretary of State Rejects Abortion Rights Initiative Petitions as Inadequate

Yesterday, Arkansas Secretary of State John Thurston rejected petitions to place a proposed state constitutional amendment on the November ballot that would have given women the right to obtain an abortion during the first 18 weeks after fertilization, and later in cases of rape, incest, fatal fetal anomaly, or to protect the mother's life or physical health. (Full text of Amendment via Arkansas Advocate reporting.) In his letter (full text via Arkansas Advocate reporting) rejecting the petitions, the Secretary of State said that proponents had failed to comply with statutory requirements to file a statement listing paid canvassers by name and stating that they had been supplied with specified information about collecting signatures. Proponents needed 90,704 signatures. Only 87,382 of the 101,525 submitted were from unpaid canvassers.

Suit Challenges HHS Rules Barring Gender Identity Discrimination in Federally Funded Health Care Programs

Suit was filed yesterday in a Missouri federal district court by six states and a national organization of pediatricians challenging new rules adopted in May by the Department of Health and Human Services barring discrimination on the basis of gender identity in federally funded health care programs. The complaint (full text) in State of Missouri v. Becerra, (ED MO, filed 7/10/2024), alleges in part:

1. ... [The] new final rule ... forces doctors to perform, refer for, or affirm harmful gender-transition procedures and forces States to pay for these dangerous procedures in state health plans....

2. HHS threatens to punish doctors and States who do not comply with the mandate by imposing huge financial penalties and excluding them from federally funded healthcare programs like Medicare, Medicaid, and the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP). This punishment would effectively preclude doctors and States from providing healthcare for the most vulnerable children in low-income communities. 

3. This harmful rule violates the Affordable Care Act (ACA), the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the structural principles of federalism, and the freedom of speech. 

4. Congress did not authorize any of this. The rule purports to implement the sex-discrimination prohibition in Section 1557 of the ACA, but there is no gender-transition mandate in that statute, nor in Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 from which it is derived. Nor did the rule (or the ACA) satisfy the constitutional requirements of clear notice for such a mandate: the States and healthcare providers did not agree to provide, pay for, or affirm gender-transition procedures when they began Medicaid, Medicare, and CHIP. 

States bringing the lawsuit are Missouri, Utah, Arkansas, Iowa, North Dakota, South Dakota and Idaho. ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

9th Circuit Hears Oral Arguments on Requiring Adoptive Parents to Support Gender Identity of Adoptees

The U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals yesterday heard oral arguments (video of full oral arguments) in Bates v. Pakseresht. In the case, an Oregon federal district court rejected plaintiff's free exercise and free speech challenges to the state's denial of her application to be certified to adopt children through the Oregon Department of Human Services.  Plaintiff was denied certification because, consistent with her Christian religious beliefs, she would not agree in advance to support an adoptive child's sexual orientation, gender identity, and gender expression. (See prior posting.) Oregon Capital Chronicle reports on the oral arguments.

Kansas Supreme Court Invalidates Ban on D&E Abortions, Abortion Clinic Regulations

In Hodes & Nauser MDs, P.A. v. Kobach, (KS Sup. Ct., July 5, 2024), the Kansas Supreme Court, in a 5-1 decision, held that a 2015 statute that bans (except in limited circumstances) so-called "dismemberment abortions" violates the Kansas state constitution. The court said in part:

S.B. 95 effectively bans a common method of second-trimester abortion called Dilation and Evacuation except when a D & E is "necessary to preserve the life of the pregnant women" or to prevent a "substantial and irreversible physical impairment of a major bodily function of the pregnant woman."...

The State devoted much of its brief to inviting us to reverse our earlier ruling in this case that the Kansas Constitution protects a right to abortion. We decline the invitation....

The State has not carried its burden to establish S.B. 95 is narrowly tailored to furthering any compelling interest.

Justice Wilson filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:

I write separately because I believe S.B. 95 is unconstitutional, though for a different reason than the majority. In my view, this purported law is unconstitutionally vague, leaving a doctor vulnerable to criminal culpability, while providing dubious notice and insufficient explanation to the doctor of what conduct is criminalized. Thus, prosecutors and juries determine retroactively when and how S.B. 95's rules are violated.

Justice Stegall dissented, saying in part:

First, it is noteworthy that the majority cannot bring itself to acknowledge the government's compelling interest in unborn human life. Yes, the majority maneuvers around this problem by skipping it in favor of its narrow tailoring analysis. But the truth is, the majority doesn't answer this question because it is so decidedly troublesome to the majority's new section 1 regime. For the majority, an interest in protecting unborn life— including the dignity of that life—is only "aspirational" with "many nuances and facets" that have "potentially far-reaching precedential effect."...  For those unfamiliar with legalese, this translates to, "We don't want to tie our hands with such inconveniences."

In a second 5-1 decision in Hodes & Nauser, MDs. P.A. v. Stanek, (KS Sup. Ct., July 5, 2024), the Kansas Supreme Court, in majority and dissenting opinions covering 114 pages, struck down "a series of statutes and implementing regulations ... relating to licensure of abortion provider facilities." The court said in part:

... [T]he State failed to meet its evidentiary burden to show the Challenged Laws further its identified compelling interest in protecting maternal health and regulating the medical profession as it relates to maternal health. Without this showing, the Challenged Laws do not survive strict scrutiny and are constitutionally infirm. We decline the State's request to sever the unconstitutional licensure requirements because the State failed to meet its burden to show severability is proper under applicable Kansas law. Finally, we deem it unnecessary to address the district court's finding of an equal protection violation because we are affirming the district court's decision on grounds that the State failed to satisfy its burden to show the Challenged Laws further a compelling state interest....

Justice Rosen and Justice Biles each filed a concurring opinion.

Justice Wilson filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:

... I am duty bound to follow the clear and essential path illuminated by our precedent. This is necessary to protect the stability, predictability, and trust in our legal system. My decision to do so is further buttressed by the people's vote on this very matter, which can be interpreted as a repudiation of legislative attempts to eliminate the core holdings of Hodes I—holdings which survive today's confusing and troubling revisions.

Justice Stegall filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

The saga of this court's section 1 jurisprudence has now taken its bizarre—but predicted—turn. Recall I wrote at the conclusion of my lengthy dissent in Hodes I that a legal regime of unrestricted access to abortion is now "the judicially preferred policy tail wagging the structure of government dog" and, as such, every rule and even judicial coherence and consistency will "give way, at every turn, to the favored policy." ... Should proof of this claim be required, one need look no further than the pudding of today's decision.... The betrayal of this court's promise of neutral, uniform, and rational constitutional adjudication is as far-reaching as it is audacious—and its damaging impact on this institution's legitimacy will be felt for years to come.

UPI reports on the decision.

 

Christian Released-Time Education Provider Sues Foe for Copyright Infringement

LifeWise, Inc. is a Christian nonprofit organization that provides released-time religious education to public school students where state law permits. It uses a copyrighted curriculum which it has developed.  Last week it filed a copyright infringement suit in an Indiana federal district court against Fort Wayne parent Zachary Parrish who was a creator of a Facebook group and a website opposing use of the LifeWise curriculum.  Parrish's website contends that "Lifewise Academy is spreading Evangelical Christianity, Purity Culture, Christian Nationalism, homophobic beliefs, transphobia, and hateful rhetoric to the youngest of our children."  The complaint (full text) in LifeWise, Inc. v. Parish, (ND IN, filed 7/2/2024), alleges in part:

30. ... Mr. Parrish signed up online to volunteer for LifeWise. 

31. ... Mr. Parrish does not support LifeWise’s mission. Instead, his goal was to gather information and internal documents with the hope of publishing information online which might harm LifeWise’s reputation and galvanize parents to oppose local LifeWise Academy chapters in their communities. 

32. ... [A]fter submitting his fraudulent volunteer application, Mr. Parrish improperly gained access to LifeWise’s information storage systems, downloaded internal LifeWise documents, and posted them to his Website. He also improperly obtained and posted a digital copy of the entire LifeWise Curriculum.

33. On April 9, 2024, LifeWise’s attorney sent Mr. Parrish a cease and desist letter informing him of his infringement and requesting he remove LifeWise’s internal documents, which are currently unregistered works, from the Website. 

34. Mr. Parrish responded by emailing a meme stating: “it’s called fair use bitch.”

WOSU Public Media and Cleveland.com report on the lawsuit.

Claims That College Encouraged Jewish Plaintiffs to File Antisemitism Claims Are Dismissed

As previously reported, five Orthodox Jewish faculty members at New York's Kingsborough Community College are suing the school, the faculty union and various faculty members asserting religious hostile work environment and retaliation claims. Two of the faculty member defendants in turn filed cross claims against the school (which is part of City University of New York) alleging breach of contract and First Amendment violations. They alleged that the school was complicit with plaintiffs in attempting to retaliate against them for their expression of anti-Israel views. In Lax v. City University of New York, (Kings Cty. NY Sup. Ct., July 5, 2024), a New York state trial court dismissed the cross claims. The court said that cross claimants had not alleged any retaliatory animus or adverse action taken by the school. The court said in part:

CUNY, as a governmental entity, cannot be held liable for failing to prevent plaintiffs from allegedly violating Wetzel and Perea's right to free speech since CUNY was not charged with any affirmative duty to silence plaintiffs regarding their complaints of discrimination and anti-Semitism....

Having an anti-Israel political agenda is not a protected group under the NYSHRL or the NYCHRL....

... Wetzel and Perea have not alleged that CUNY instigated or encouraged plaintiffs to file their EEOC complaints or to otherwise accuse them of anti-Semitism. 

--[CORRECTED] 

[Thanks to Volokh Conspiracy for the lead.] 

Mohamed Elsanousi Appointed to USCIRF

On June 26, President Biden announced his appointment of Dr. Mohamed Elsanousi as a member of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom. Dr. Elsanousi is Executive Director of the Network for Religious and Traditional Peacemakers. He was a founder of Faiths4Vaccines which promoted equitable distribution of the Covid vaccine and combatted vaccine hesitancy. According to the organization's website, he holds a bachelor’s degree in Shariah and Law from Islamabad, Pakistan's International Islamic University, an LL.M. and a Ph.D from Indiana University School of Law, as well as a graduate diploma in philanthropic studies from the Indiana University Center on Philanthropy. USCIRF's announcement of his appointment says in part:

Elsanousi was the Principal Coordinator for developing the standards and protocols for safeguarding the rights of Christian, Jewish, and other religious minorities in Muslim-majority communities. His efforts in this role led to the adoption of the Marrakech Declaration, the most recognized Islamic theological document advocating for improved religious freedom.

Recent Articles of Interest

 From SSRN:

• Kyle Velte, The Supreme Court's Gaslight Docket, (June 28, 2024).
• Stephanie H. Barclay, The Religion Clauses After Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, 108 Iowa L. Rev. 2097 (2023).
• Kathleen Brady, Catholic Liberalism and the Liberal Tradition, (June 11, 2023).
• Sophia Palumbo, Preserving the Sacred Medicine: Why Peyote Should Be Excluded from Entheogenic Plant Decriminalization Efforts, (Ohio State Legal Studies Research Paper No. 862 (2024)).
• Felice Batlan, The Displaced Persons Act of 1948 and Home-Grown Antisemitism, (April 01, 2024).
• Reva B. Siegel & Mary Ziegler, Abortion's New Criminalization—A History-And-Tradition Right to Healthcare Access After Dobbs and the 2023 Term, (Yale Law School, Public Law Research Paper (July 1, 2024).
• Peter J. Mazzacano, From Covenant to Compact to Contract: The Legal Transplantation of Puritan Jurisprudence to America, (A Civil Society with no Hierarchy, Bădescu & Livni (eds.) (2023)).

From SSRN (Non-U.S. Law):

• Mohammad Sarim, Re-Smothering of India's Independence: A study about Discriminated Indian Muslims, (May 27, 2024).
• Kaushal Singh, Rethinking Secularism: An Inquiry into its Viability and Adaptation in the Indian Context, (April 23, 2024).
• Yohannes Eneyew Ayalew & Karin Frodé, Regulating Online Hate Speech in Ethiopia Through International Human Rights Standards: (Infra)structural Challenges, (December 15, 2023).

From SmartCILP:

• Tracy Hester, Ecoworship and Federal Environmental Law, 48 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 311-365 (2023).
• Mara Poulsen, Comment. I Will Multiply Thy Sorrow and Thy Conception: Abortion as a Crime of Moral Turpitude, 96 Temple Law Review 95-134 (2023).

Two Additional Courts Enjoin Enforcement of New Title IX Rules

In addition to the nationwide preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Department of Education's new Title IX rules on transgender discrimination (see prior posting), two other federal district court last week issued more geographically limited preliminary injunctions against enforcement of the same rules. In State of Florida v. Department of Health and Human Services, (MD FL, July 3, 2024),  a Florida federal district court enjoined enforcement within Florida, saying in part:

HHS and the Final Rule interpret Title IX, and hence section 1557, to prohibit discrimination based on “gender identity.” 89 Fed. Reg. at 37,699 (45 C.F.R. § 92.101(a)(2)). The Final Rule is stillborn and a nullity if Title IX does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of “gender identity.” The Eleventh Circuit has spoken on this point, clearly: Title IX does not address discrimination on the basis of gender identity. Adams v. Sch. Bd. of St. John’s Cnty., 57 F. 4th 791, 812–15 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc). Frankly, this ends the issue—the new Rule appears to be a dead letter in the Eleventh Circuit.

In State of Kansas v. U.S. Department of Education, (D KS, July 2, 2024), a Kansas federal district court issued a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the new rules in Kansas, Alaska, Utah and Wyoming, saying in part:

... [T]he purpose of Title IX was to protect “biological women from discrimination in education[;] [s]uch purpose makes it difficult to sincerely argue that, at the time of enactment, ‘discrimination on the basis of sex’ included gender identity, sex stereotypes, sexual orientation, or sex characteristics.”... The DoE’s reinterpretation of Title IX to place gender identity on equal footing with (or in some instances arguably stronger footing than) biological sex would subvert Congress’ goals of protecting biological women in education....

... [T]he court finds that the Final Rule involves issues of both vast economic and political significance and therefore involves a major question.... As such, Congress must have given the agency “clear statutory authorization” to promulgate such a Final Rule.....The court finds that Congress did not give such clear statutory authorization to the DoE....

... [T]he Final Rule violates the Spending Clause because it introduces conditions for spending that were not unambiguously clear in Title IX....

The court finds that Plaintiffs have shown that the Final Rule violates he First Amendment by chilling speech through vague and overbroad language.....

 [T]he court finds that the Final Rule is arbitrary and capricious because it offers an implausible explanation for agency action, is a sharp departure from prior action without a reasonable explanation, and failed to consider important interests as discussed herein.

Arizona Governor Vetoes Bill That Would Have Required Equal Insurance Coverage and Access for Gender Detransitioning

On June 18, Arizona Governor Katie Hobbs vetoed (full text of veto letter) vetoed Senate Bill 1151 (full text) that would have required health insurers that cover gender transition procedures to also provide coverage for gender detransition procedures. It would also have required physicians and hospitals that provide gender transition procedures to provide or pay for gender detransition procedures. It also would have required insurance companies to report data to the state (without identifying information on patients) on detransition claims. Governor Hobbs in her veto letter said that the bill is unnecessary and would create privacy risks for patients. Catholic News Agency reported on the Governor's veto, quoting many who disapproved of her action.

Court Grants Nationwide Injunction Barring Extensiion of Title IX To Gender Identity Discrimination

In State of Tennessee v. Becerra, (SD MS, July 3, 2024), in a suit brought by 15 states a Mississippi federal district court issued a nationwide preliminary injunction barring the Department of Education from enforcing its new rules under Title IX insofar as they define sex discrimination as including discrimination on the basis of gender identity. The court said in part:

The Supreme Court recently held that agencies are no longer entitled to deference pursuant to Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.... because Chevron “allow[ed] agencies to change course even when Congress [had] given them no authority to do so.” Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo,....

The Supreme Court further held that “statutes, no matter how impenetrable, do — in fact, must — have a single, best meaning....

In summary, the Court has found no basis for applying Bostock’s Title VII analysis to Section 1557’s incorporation of Title IX. HHS acted unreasonably when it relied on Bostock’s analysis in order to conflate the phrase “on the basis of sex” with the phrase “on the basis of gender identity.”...

... [T]his Court cannot accept the suggestion that Congress, with a “clear voice,” adopted an ambiguous or evolving definition of “sex” when it acted to promote educational opportunities for women in 1972.

Mississippi Today reports on the decision.

NY Sanitation Worker Can Move Ahead on Failure To Accommodate Anti-Vax Beliefs

Decisions on suits by individuals who were denied religious exemptions from now-rescinded Covid vaccine mandates are still being issued by the courts.  In Rizzo v. New York City Department of Sanitation, (SD NY, July 2, 2024), a New York federal district court refused to dismiss a Title VII failure to accommodate claim (as well as similar state-law and local-law claims) brought by a New York City sanitation worker. The court rejected the city's arguments that the worker's objections were based on conscience, not religion. It also rejected, at least at this stage of the litigation, the city's argument that accommodation would impose an undue burden on the city.  The court also allowed plaintiff to move forward on his claim that the city failed to engage in cooperative dialogue as required by the New York City Human Rights Law.  However, the court dismissed plaintiff's Title VII disparate impact claim and his 1st Amendment Free Exercise claim.

Court Rejects Texas AG's Challenge To Catholic Agency Assisting Migrants

 As previously reported, a legal battle has been underway between Annunciation House, a Catholic agency serving migrants and refugees in El Paso, and Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton who accuses the agency of sheltering migrants who have entered the country illegally. This week the Attorney General failed in his efforts to close down Annunciation House.  In Annunciation House, Inc. v. Paxton (I), (TX Dist. Ct., July 1, 2024), a Texas state trial court held that Texas statutes which bar harboring migrants to induce them to stay illegally in the U.S. are pre-empted by federal law and cannot be used as the basis for a quo warranto action to revoke the agency's registration to operate in Texas. The court said in part:

The State’s proposed counterclaim in the nature of quo warranto violates the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act by substantially burdening Annunciation House’s free exercise of religion and failing to use the “least restrictive means” of securing compliance with the law.

In Annunciation House, Inc. v. Paxton (II), (TX Dist. Ct., July 1, 2024), the court dismissed the Attorney General's suit against Annunciation House, saying in part:

The record before this Court makes clear that the Texas Attorney General’s use of the request to examine documents from Annunciation House was a pretext to justify its harassment of Annunciation House employees and the persons seeking refuge.

El Paso Times reports on the case.